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This book is the first about private wildlife conservation and 
community involvement in Zimbabwe. It is a case study based 
on ethnographic fieldwork done in 1998. It focuses on the joint 
venture between a private wildlife conservation initiative, the 
Save Valley Conservancy, and its surrounding communities in 
terms of reciprocal exchange and the land question. 
It makes clear, amongst other things, that the current political 
tragedy in Zimbabwe about land did not start when Mugabe 
lost the referendum in February 2000. The book tries to offer 
an explanation for the unforgiving route that Mugabe has  
obviously taken in the land question, despite his words of 
reconciliation when he came to power in 1980. This book is of 
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in the fields of (private) wildlife conservation, community 
participation and organisational co-operation.
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
‘11.15 a.m. and the white landowner, the district administrator, the ward 
councillor and three representatives of Chief Gudo gather under a tree on the 
extensive property of the landowner for a discussion about mutual concerns. 
Although the landowner has invited them to come to his newly developed safari 
camp bordering a beautiful natural pan and discuss matters over a drink, they 
insist on discussing the issue under a tree with a view of the new clearing on the 
property, intended for future irrigation to grow paprika for the export market. 
After a few introductory remarks, the Gudo people tell the landowner that the 
traditional burial sites of their chiefs, vaguely indicated to be some of the 
nearby kopjes, and their ceremonial natural pools are located on his property, 
more specifically beside his new safari camp, and they claim the land to be 
theirs. The landowner explains that he can show his title deeds to anybody 
interested to prove legally which land is his and that he knows nothing of burial 
sites on his property. However, he insists that access to the burial sites and the 
ritual pools can always be negotiated and arranged. But the ward councillor 
refuses and says in an aggressive tone that he cannot present his people with a 
compromise. He says he cannot go back to them with a message that he has 
negotiated a deal whereby so many people are allowed access to their burial and 
ritual sites for so many minutes. The two parties part without having reached a 
solution or a mutual understanding.’1 
 The land issue and control over natural resources have always divided black 
and white in Zimbabwe in general and around wildlife areas in particular.2 The 
result has often been a process of outright negative reciprocity. Even after 
Southern Rhodesia became independent Zimbabwe in 1980 this process did not 
stop despite words of reconciliation from Robert Mugabe.3 Unequal land 
                                                           
1  Fieldnotes, 27 May 1998. 
2  Duffy, R. (2000), Killing for Conservation. Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe, The 
International African Institute in association with Oxford: James Currey; Blooming-
ton, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press; Duffy, R. (September 1997), The 
Environmental Challenge to the Nation State: Superparks and National Parks Policy 
in Zimbabwe, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23 (3). 
3  De Waal, V. (1990), The Politics of Reconciliation. Zimbabwe’s First Decade, 
London: Hurst & Company; Cape Town: David Philip. 
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distribution and a process of negative reciprocity persisted and matters escalated 
after February 2000 when Mugabe lost a crucial constitutional referendum.4  
 Group-based competition over natural resources and community conserva-
tion in Africa has attracted a great deal of solid scholarly attention in general5 
and by Zimbabwean scholars in Zimbabwe in particular.6 This book stands in 
and builds on this tradition and contributes to it an ethnographic case study on a 
joint venture in the specific field of private wildlife conservation, since this has 
been a major gap in the literature on community conservation in (southern) 
                                                           
4  Blair, D. (2002), Degress in Violence. Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in 
Zimbabwe. London, New York: Continuum. 
5  See for instance: Marks, S.A. (1984), The Imperial lion. Human Dimensions of 
Wildlife Management in Central Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press; 
McNeely, J. & Pitt, D. (eds) (1985), Culture and Conservation: the Human 
Dimension in Wildlife Planning. London: Croon Helm; Bell, R.H.V. (1987), 
Conservation with a human face, in: Anderson D. & Grove R. (eds), Conservation in 
Africa. People, Policies and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 79-
101; Adams, Th. & McShane, J. (1996)[1992], The Myth of Wild Africa. 
Conservation Without Illusion. Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press; Bonner, R. (1993), At the Hand of Man. Peril and Hope for Africa’s Wildlife. 
New York: Vintage Books; Western, D. & Wright, R.M. (eds) (1994), Natural 
Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation. New York: Island 
Press; Gibson, C.C. & Marks, S.A. (1995), Transforming Rural Hunters into 
Conservationists: an Assessment of Community-Based Wildlife Management 
Programs in Africa. World Development, vol. 23, no. 6, 941-957; Gibson, C.C. 
(1999), Politicians and Poachers. The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in 
Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hulme, D. & Murphree, M. 
(eds)(2001), African Wildlife & Livelihoods. The Promise and Performance of 
Community Conservation. Oxford: James Currey. 
6  See for instance: Murombedzi, J. (1992), Decentralisation or Recentralisation? 
Implementing CAMPFIRE in Omay Communal Lands of the Nyaminyani District. 
Harare: CASS, University of Zimbabwe, Working Paper no. 2; Madzudzo, E. & 
Dzingirai, V. (1995), A Comparative Study of the Implications of Ethnicity on 
CAMPFIRE in Bulilimamangwe and Binga Districts in Zimbabwe, Zambezia, vol. 
22, no. 1, 25-41; Child, G. (1995), Wildlife and People: the Zimbabwean Success. 
Harare: Wisdom Institute; Madzudzo, E. (1998), Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management in Zimbabwe: Opportunities and Constraints. Harare: CASS, 
University of Zimbabwe, NRM Series, CASS Working Paper; Dzingirai, V. & 
Madzudzo, E. (1999), Big Men and CAMPFIRE: a Comparative Study of the Role 
of External Actors in Conflicts over Local Resources, in: Zambezia, vol. 26, no. 1, 
77-92; Hughes, D. (2001), Cadastral Politics: the Making of Community-Based 
Resource Management in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Development and Change 
32 (4), 741-768. 
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Africa.7 The case study is conceptually framed along the lines of identifying 
processes of reciprocal exchange between the joint venture partners, in this case 
a private wildlife conservancy and its neighbouring communities. In the specific 
literature on joint ventures, this conceptual field, which in a sense seems so 
obvious because the explicit choice of organisational co-operation is always 
based on a trade-off between what you have to put into it and what you expect 
to get out of it, has seldom been explicitly explored.8 
 In this book I focus on an initiative in the southeast Lowveld of Zimbabwe 
(see Map 1), where 24 local cattle farmers pooled their land and sold their cattle 
to create a private wildlife conservancy, the Savé Valley Conservancy (SVC). 
All, save one parastatal, were white landowners. The SVC is part of and sur-
rounded by five heavily populated districts desperately in need of land. From 
the many environmentally degraded and overpopulated communal lands in the 
districts, the lush Lowveld flora and fauna of the SVC were seen as a land of 
milk and honey. But a double and electrified buffalo fence separated the com-
munal farmers from this land of abundance. A structural process of negative 
reciprocity, expressed mainly through poaching and fence cutting by the (black) 
communal farmers and communities and through an ever-tightening ‘fines and 
fences’ approach by the (white) commercial farmers of the SVC, seemed to be 
cast in iron. The SVC devised a mechanism to move towards a more positive 
type of reciprocity, which could also serve as a political answer in the context of 
a deteriorating political climate concerning land issues in relation to private 
wildlife conservancies in the second half of the 1990s. A gift to the communi-
ties was considered a good starting point, a gift of reconciliation to mark and 
signify the start of a process of mutual beneficial give and take between the 
SVC and its neighbouring communities, a gift that would trigger the transition 
from a negative to a more positive form of reciprocity and a gift that was 
expected to stimulate a fitting return gift, of approximate equivalence, from the 
communities. 
 The SVC gift consisted of the creation of a community trust, the Savé Valley 
Conservancy Trust (SVCT). The communities would be represented through 
this trust and the SVCT would function as the legal entity through which the 
SVC could relate to the communities in a structure of organisational co-opera-
                                                           
7  Pp. 294-295, Hulme, D. & Murphree, M. (2001), Community Conservation as 
Policy. Promise and Performance, in: Hulme, D. & Murphree, M. (eds), African 
Wildlife & Livelihoods. The Promise and Performance of Community Conservation. 
Oxford: James Currey. 
8  One of the few exceptions is: Kogut, B. (December 1989), The Stability of Joint 
Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive Rivalry. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, XXXVIII, 182-198. 
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tion. In other words, through the SVCT, the SVC was able to create a joint 
venture with the communities and through this joint venture the SVC would be 
able to redistribute some of the economic benefits from its wildlife utilisation 
programme according to the distribution of shares in the joint venture. It was 
considered the ideal gift to the communities: the surrounding communities 
would be given an opportunity to participate in the (white-dominated) wildlife 
tourism industry and in return the communities would repay the gift by 
respecting the boundaries of the SVC through less poaching and less fence 
cutting. In terms of reciprocity, the gift would turn a relation based on negative 
reciprocity into one of more balanced reciprocity and would turn a relationship 
based on mistrust into one of guarded trust.9  
 Private wildlife conservancies have no statutory definition in Zimbabwe but 
at the same time there are several of them in the country and in the 1990s they 
became an ever more popular land-use option. This led to questions being asked 
in parliament in 1996 by Mr. Mudariki who requested clarification from the 
Minister of Environment and Tourism on the government’s general policy and 
regulations towards conservancies: how many communal farmers were bene-
fiting from conservancies and how were the conservancies acquiring their 
wildlife. These questions came after an exposé in which Mr. Mudariki empha-
sised a context in which the ‘mushrooming’ conservancies in the country were 
said to be disadvantaging Zimbabwe’s farming industry by using prime farm-
land for wildlife. They were also inconveniencing the Department of National 
Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) by stealing wildlife from national 
parks. The Minister answered that, although rules and regulations were not yet 
in place, proposals were being considered through which conservancies would 
be restricted to some of the drier parts of the country to avoid disrupting 
conventional agriculture. With regard to the second question, he answered that 
conservancies would only be given government approval and a licence if there 
were ‘a formal and meaningful relationship between the particular conservancy 
and the surrounding communities’. The answer to the last question about the 
acquisition of wildlife by conservancies stated, and this is especially interesting 
because of the choice of words and the image it evokes, that there had been 
‘several cases of illegal dealings and thefts, especially from National Parks 
estate’ and that the government was doing its utmost to curb ‘these sinister 
activities’.10 These answers led the SVC to understand that its particular land-
use in the Lowveld would not create any immediate problems because the 
                                                           
9  Pp. 16-17, Misztal, B.A. (1996), Trust in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
10  Hansard 14th February 1996, Written answer to questions, pp. 3967-3971. 
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Lowveld is one of the driest regions in Zimbabwe.11 But apart from ecological 
concerns its governmental approval and licence would also depend on its rela-
tionship with neighbouring communities. In November 1998, the SVC and the 
SVCT did join hands in a joint venture at a formal and ceremonial meeting, and 
starting capital was promised. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was to 
be signed in a later and separate ceremony. Despite enormous (historical) 
differences in almost all fields, be they socio-economic, socio-political or socio-
cultural and related to land, a form of organisational co-operation had been 
established between (white) commercial farmers and (black) communal 
farmers. 
 It should be explicitly noted that the land issue in Zimbabwe is not simply a 
matter of antagonistic relations between black and white over land, nor that 
black and white are mutually exclusive and independent entities in Zimbabwe. 
There is much more interdependence between the two than perhaps either of 
them would sometimes like to acknowledge. It is also not true that struggles 
related to land only started with the advance of the whites in Zimbabwe and that 
the black Zimbabweans had lived in a kind of natural harmony with each other 
regarding control over land until that time. Spierenburg and others, for instance, 
have made it abundantly clear that communities also fought and still fight 
among themselves for control over natural resources, including land.12 It has 
also become clear that black Zimbabweans used many of the same strategies the 
whites (would) use (later on), like the manipulation of history and relational 
power play, to try and reach this goal of control over land. But at the same time, 
it cannot be denied that land is, and always has been, an important issue 
between black and white in Zimbabwe, especially when considering initiatives 
concerning the preservation and conservation of nature and natural resources 
                                                           
11  Pp. 14 & 25, Moyo, S., Robinson, P., Katerere, Y., Stevenson, S. & Davison, G. 
(1991), Zimbabwe’s Environmental Dilemma. Balancing Resource Inequities, 
Harare: Natprint. 
12  Spierenburg, M. (2003) Strangers, Spirits and Land. The Struggle for Control over 
Land in Dande, Northern Zimbabwe. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Amsterdam. See 
also Spierenburg, M. (2001) Moving into Another Spirit Province, Immigrants and 
the Mhondoro Cult in Northern Zimbabwe, in: Bruijn, M. de, H. van Dijk, D. 
Foeken (eds) Mobile Africa, Changing Patterns of Movement in Africa and Beyond. 
Leiden, Brill; Dzingirai, V. (1995), Take Back your CAMPFIRE, unpublished paper, 
Harare: CASS, University of Zimbabwe; Nabane, N. (1994), A Gender Sensitive 
Analysis of a Community Based Wildlife Utilization Initiative in Zimbabwe’s 
Zambezi Valley, Harare: CASS, University of Zimbabwe, NRM Occasional Papers 
Series; Naban, N., Dzingirai, V. & Madzudzo, E. (1994), Membership in Common 
Property Regimes. A Case Study of Guruve, Binga, Tsholotsho and Balilimamangwe 
CAMPFIRE Programmes, Harare: CASS, University of Zimbabwe, NRM Occa-
sional Papers Series 
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through the installation of exclusive wildlife areas. Especially in the context of 
creating wildlife areas in southern Africa, black and white were, and often still 
are, diametrically opposed. In this specific case in the Lowveld of Zimbabwe, it 
has turned out that the two parties contesting and co-operating in a private 
wildlife conservancy are organisationally divided along the lines of a white-
dominated SVC and a black-dominated SVCT. It therefore fits very well into 
southern Africa’s long history of interaction between wildlife areas managed by 
whites but surrounded by black communities.  
 This might give the impression that the labels ‘good’ and ‘bad’ have already 
been assigned from the outset of this book, as quite a few interpretations of 
Zimbabwean history regarding land and nature conservation almost automati-
cally appear to see the whites as relentless imperialist brutes only (see for 
bibliographical details Chapter 1). Whites are, in this line of interpretation, the 
‘bad guys’ and the black Zimbabweans who have had to experience all this 
white imperialism and Romantic ideology on nature conservation, but have also 
vehemently protested against it, are naturally the ‘good guys’. 
 Neumann also makes use of the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to 
describe the relationship between nature and community conservation.13 Accord-
ing to him, local African communities tend, in the perception of interventionist 
nature conservation organisations dominated by Western capital, to be divided 
into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ natives depending on how close they are to nature. The 
closer they are, the ‘better’ they are and the more right they have to stay in the 
area and enjoy the financial privileges of Western donor attention. The more 
‘modern’ they are or have become, the more they should be restricted, that is, 
they should be removed from these conservation areas. It is often assumed that 
it is up to the nature conservation agencies to ‘teach’ the communities how to 
behave as ‘good natives’. Analysis of the empirical data on the joint venture 
between the SVC and SVCT shows that neither of the partners in the joint 
venture deserves only one of the labels. The situation is far more complicated 
and interwoven. The same holds for more general levels of interaction between 
black and white in Zimbabwe over the issue of land. A strict division between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ does not even apply after the political and related economic 
disasters following the lost referendum in February 2000. It would be far too 
easy to blame only one party and applaud the other.  
 
 
                                                           
13  Neumann, R.P. (2000), Primitive Ideas: Protected Area Buffer Zones and the 
Politics of Land in Africa, in: Broch-Due, V. & Schroeder, A. Producing Nature and 
Poverty in Africa, Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 220-242. 
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Theoretical framework 
 
Reciprocity (and related to that trust and imagery) is the central concept in this 
book. Van Baal defines reciprocity as ‘doing or rendering something in return 
for a good received, an act committed, or an evil inflicted. Involved is an 
exchange in which the term has connotations of approximate equivalence and 
equality.’14 Reciprocal relations should be seen as a ‘system of social exchange 
rather than a series of unilateral and discontinuous acts’. Subjects ‘are caught in 
a crossfire of rights and obligations, debts and claims, that punctuate their 
existence’.15 Writers usually introduce the theme of reciprocity by providing 
examples of various material gifts that are exchanged in particular situations. It 
should be realised though, especially within the context of (co-operating) 
organisations, that ‘it is words [and text!] first and foremost, sentences and 
arguments, that humans produce and exchange with others’.16 This makes it 
clear right from the start that the reciprocal process between organisations is 
about material but also, and in the first stages of reaching a form of co-operation 
probably even more about immaterial exchange17 and furthermore that the 
‘rules’18 are largely implicit.19 
 Reciprocity is an inherently ambivalent concept in which affective and effec-
tive aspects are intertwined. The ratio has to be judged by the actors involved in 
every transaction but even a final judgement can never be based on complete 
knowledge and will therefore always contain a certain amount of uncertainty. 
Trust is needed to handle this uncertainty, although it can never eliminate the 
uncertainty because the concept suffers from the same ambivalence as reciproc-
ity. Trust can be given or might be withheld for reasons of perceived images of 
the Other. It is given easily and almost unhesitatingly to people with a trust-
worthy reputation. But if their identity is not perceived as trustworthy, trust will 
be withheld and justify ‘indifference’.20 Without trust, a reciprocal relationship 
                                                           
14  Pp. 11, Van Baal, J. (1975), Reciprocity and the Position of Women, Assen: Van 
Gorcum. 
15  Pp. 16, 137-138, Godbout, J.T., in collaboration with Caillé, A. (1998), The World 
of the Gift, London, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
16  Ibid: 12. 
17  Haas, D.H. & Deseran, F.A. (1981), Trust and Symbolic Exchange, Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 44 (1): 3-13. 
18  The word rules is consciously put between inverted commas because I definitely do 
not want to suggest that reciprocal processes are governed by rigid, mechanical and 
law-like rules, like a predictable mechanism (although I also use the word mecha-
nism sometimes to refer to reciprocal processes) or machinery. 
19  Godbout 1998: 186-190. 
20  Misztal 1996: 137 
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is difficult, if not impossible, to start. But a situation may change over time. 
Images can alter, trust can be built up and a reciprocal relationship can be 
started21 but the timing is crucial. When does one give and when does one with-
hold? When does one repay a reciprocal obligation and when not? To whom 
should one give and who should be excluded? All these are questions related to 
time and context. 
 The theoretical foundations of the gift in anthropological discourse were 
established by Marcel Mauss in his Essay sur le Don in 1925 but only published 
in 1950, the year of his death. It marked a major theoretical breakthrough in the 
concept. Mauss asks himself a central question: ‘(i)n primitive or archaic types 
of society what is the principle whereby the gift has to be repaid? What force is 
there in the thing given which compels the recipient to make a return?’22 He 
makes a distinction between three obligations: giving, receiving and repaying,23 
and answers his central question by referring to the vague and mystic power of 
the hau, a Maori concept of a power which ‘travels with’ the gift and always 
wants to return to its initial giver in the form of and mediated by a return gift. 
This hau motivates and forces the recipient to feel a moral obligation towards 
the giver and to make a return gesture. The hau, then, can be interpreted as the 
‘spirit of the gift’24 and would essentially function as ‘an instrument used to 
cement inter-community relationships’.25 
 But if a spirit is an explanation for the moral obligation to repay, it does not 
answer the question as to why anything is given in the first place. What is it that 
obliges people to give? In relation to the potlatch,26 Mauss explains that a chief 
has an obligation to give in an excessive way, to keep his subjects ‘in the 
shadow of his name’.27 Otherwise he will lose his rank. In essence, the obliga-
tion to give stems from the obligations it creates in others, that is, a matter of 
                                                           
21  Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Co-operation. London: Penguin Books. 
22  Pp. 1, Mauss, M. (1966)[1950], The Gift, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
23  Ibid: 37. 
24  Ibid: 8-9. 
25  Pp. 36, Kayango, K. (1987), Reciprocity and Interdependence: the Rise and Fall of 
the Kololo Empire in Southern Africa in the 19th Century, Lund: Almquist & Wiksell 
International. 
26  The potlatch of the Kwakiutl of the Northwest coast of America (that is, northern 
Vancouver Island and the adjacent British Columbia coast) is described in an 
introductory book to anthropology as ‘(…) ceremonial feasts featuring displays of 
wealth, ostentatious destruction of personal property, and lavish gift giving – all of 
these designed to enhance the host’s fame and social standing and to challenge the 
invited guests to reciprocity that might bring them to economic ruin and social 
disgrace’ (pp. 118, Pi-Sunyer, O. & Salzmann, Z. (1978), Humanity and Culture. An 
Introduction to Anthropology, London, Dallas: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
27  Mauss 1966: 38. 
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creating, sustaining or challenging power relations. This seems a rather unvar-
nished strategic consideration for giving and one far removed from the mythical 
hau. The fact that the giving should be excessive suggests strategic, and thus 
power-related, considerations. Giving seems to serve two goals at once. It is a 
way of decreasing social distance, in the sense of sharing and on the other hand 
it creates, or even invests in, power distance because the recipient is now 
indebted to the giver. If, on top of this, the giving is excessive, the ambivalence 
of gifts and giving becomes crystal clear: gifts might be interpreted as generos-
ity but can at the same time be viewed as an act of violence and humiliation by 
the recipient who might not be able to repay his debt.28 In the same vein, the 
obligation to receive is saturated with strategic power considerations. To accept 
a gift in a potlatch is to accept a challenge, the challenge of repayment. Not 
taking up that challenge marks an early defeat. But refusing from a politically 
powerful position is perceived as a political act of strength and counter-chal-
lenge.29 In the context of the American potlatch, the obligation to return a gift is 
mandatory. If not, one has forever lost face and the subsequent disgrace is 
immense. The same loss of face also exists in Maori culture if they are not able 
to repay a gift, where gift giving, according to Mauss, also has overtones of 
competitiveness.30 But, in the Maori context, the strict political interpretation of 
reciprocal exchange in the potlatch is abandoned by introducing the hau as the 
apparently ultimate explanation of the obligation to repay.  
 This mystification and semi-religious interpretation of reciprocal processes 
by Mauss has been criticised from many sides. Firth, for instance, claimed that 
Mauss had reified the concept of the hau as having active potential.31 Lévi 
Strauss went further and accused Mauss of ‘going native’ without recognising 
that such a culturally specific explanation could not be generalised as such. He 
expressed his disapproval in strong terms: ‘Are we not dealing with a mystifi-
cation, an effect quite often produced in the minds of ethnographers by indige-
nous people? (...) In the case in point, instead of applying his principles consis-
tently from start to finish, Mauss discards them in favour of a New Zealand 
theory – one that is immensely valuable as an ethnographical document yet is 
nothing more than a theory. The fact that Maori sages were the first people to 
pose certain questions and to resolve them in an interesting but strikingly 
unsatisfactory manner does not oblige us to bow to their interpretation. Hau is 
                                                           
28  Pp. 12, Godelier, M. (1999), The Enigma of the Gift, Cambridge: Polity Press 
(Translation from French, L’Énigme du don, 1996). 
29  Mauss 1966: 39-40. 
30  Ibid: 6, especially notes 8 and 9. 
31  Pp. 419-420, Firth, R. (1959), Economics of the Zealand Maori, Wellington: 
Government Printer. 
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not the ultimate explanation for exchange; it is the conscious form whereby 
men of a given society, in which the problem had particular importance, 
apprehended an unconscious necessity whose explanation lies elsewhere.’32 Lévi 
Strauss’s solution was to look for the fundamental structure underlying all three 
aspects of the exchange relation – giving-receiving-returning – instead of 
focusing on the separate parts as Mauss had done. ‘(...) Mauss seems – rightly – 
to have been controlled by a logical certainty, namely, that exchange is the 
common denominator of a large number of apparently heterogeneous social 
activities. But exchange is not something he can perceive at the level of facts. 
Empirical observation finds not exchange but only, as Mauss himself says, 
‘three obligations: giving, receiving, returning. The whole theory calls for the 
existence of a structure, only fragments of which are delivered by experience 
(...). But instead (...) Mauss strives to reconstruct a whole out of parts.’33 
 The demystification and secularisation of the concept of reciprocity was 
complete when Sahlins criticised Mauss for not mentioning the relevance of the 
principle of reciprocity in economic life and confining it to kinship relations and 
related societies (that is, non-Western lineage economies) alone.34 Sahlins intro-
duced an almost bookkeeping-like approach to reciprocity, conceptualised in his 
typology of three types of reciprocal relations:35 generalised reciprocity that 
refers to transactions that are altruistic in nature, in which ‘the counter is not 
stipulated by time, quantity, or quality: the expectation of reciprocity is indefi-
nite’. Examples of this type of reciprocity are found in tightly knit social groups 
like families and kinsmen. It refers to a solidary community. Balanced recip-
rocity, as the term indicates, has to do with the direct exchange of things 
material or immaterial of approximately the same value, in which reciprocation 
is direct and without delay. This type of reciprocity is less personal and tends to 
be more economic in nature, although the social aspect of the mechanism 
remains important. The main examples of this type are trade and buying-selling 
relations. Finally negative reciprocity is characterised by ‘an attempt to get 
something for nothing’ by whatever means possible: the pursuit of self-interest 
in its purest anti-social form. Examples are theft, chicanery and haggling. The 
distinction between the three types runs parallel to the increase in social 
distance and changing patterns of power relations between actors involved in 
                                                           
32  Pp. 47-48, Lévi Strauss, C. (1987), Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Italics added. 
33  Ibid: 45-47. 
34  Pp. 186, Sahlins, M.D. (1972), Stone Age Economics, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
35  Pp. 31-33, Sahlins, M.D., (1996), On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in: 
Komter, A.E. (ed.), The Gift. An Interdisciplinary Approach, Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press. 
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the reciprocal mechanism. Together with this increasing social distance between 
actors and changing power relations comes the decreasing level of trust. In 
generalised reciprocity there is a situation of almost blind trust. In balanced 
reciprocity it is about guarded trust to ensure that neither party in the transaction 
cheats the other. In negative reciprocity mistrust is central and neither party 
dares nor is able to trust the other.  
 A similar typological approach is taken by Van Baal36 who discerns four 
types of reciprocal relations in which he indicates the increasing strategic and 
power play aspects of a reciprocal relationship in relation to increasing social 
distance more explicitly than Sahlins. The first two types, gift exchange and the 
give-and-take that typifies interaction between the members of small groups, are 
the most personal of the four. Exchange takes place between people who are 
socially close and know each other informally and who show a willingness to 
co-operate as partners. In the third type, trade, and the fourth that is negative 
reciprocity, people see each other not as partners as such but increasingly as 
parties in exchange who have to challenge each other in the arena of power 
play. According to Van Baal, the reciprocal relation is constantly tending 
towards balance as the parties perceive each other as equals and negotiate, 
implicitly as in negative reciprocity or explicitly as in trade, for a balanced 
account for both ‘without any soft-heartedness’37 on either side. The word 
‘balance’, however, has a particular meaning in the case of negative reciprocity. 
If, for instance, someone is murdered, the injured party will never get that 
person back no matter what punishment is meted out to the murderer or how-
ever much compensation is demanded. Nevertheless, a sense of balance is 
reached through the atonement of the wrongdoer(s).38 So from the perspective of 
(re)payment, the relationship is not at all balanced. However it is in the percep-
tion of the parties through atonement on one side but also through the ‘feeling’ 
of the injured party that the other ‘has paid’ for its crime and that a balance has 
been reached: they feel compensated. This typology in effect implies, as Sahlins 
says, that the reciprocal process is increasingly seen and used instrumentally 
and strategically in power relations as we follow the types from gift-exchange 
to negative reciprocity. Strategy and instrumentality are implemented, often 
implicitly and indirectly, through bargaining and negotiations. The stranger the 
exchange partner becomes, as in negative reciprocity, the more calculation and 
                                                           
36  Pp. 94-107, Van Baal, J. (1981), Man’s Quest for Partnership: the Anthropological 
Foundations of Ethics and Religion, Assen: Van Gorcum. 
37  Ibid: 95. 
38  Ibid: 105. Compare also Caplan, P. (ed.), (1995), Understanding Disputes. The 
Politics of Argument, Oxford Providence: Berg. 
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less trust are allowed and even openly revealed (that is, the greater the social 
distance).39  
 One can easily imagine that in processes of organisational co-operation 
Sahlins’s ‘generalised reciprocity’ or Van Baal’s ‘gift exchange’ and ‘give-and-
take’ are not usually at stake because these types of reciprocity are at the 
solidary extreme, found in close-knit families and the like. Organisational 
structures of co-operation are usually not to be found on the solidary extreme.40 
This means that for analysing processes of organisational co-operation we 
should primarily focus on Sahlins’s types of ‘balanced and negative reciprocity’ 
or on Van Baal’s typology, ‘trade’ and ‘negative reciprocity’, in relation to trust 
and imagery and its implications for power play. Balanced reciprocity is the 
more ideal type in which both partners win – the so-called win-win scenario. 
Negative reciprocity occurs when partners in a joint venture only treat, trust and 
see each other as parties, that is, getting as much out of the deal as possible and 
not trusting the intentions of the other. Both types can be considered as the 
extreme ends of a continuum. In the case of the joint venture of the SVC and the 
SVCT, it is obvious that the initial relations between the SVC and its neigh-
bouring communities, predating the joint venture, could be characterised in 
terms of full-fledged negative reciprocity based on an unequal power balance 
between black and white. The gift of the joint venture was meant to create a 
more balanced and positive reciprocity; to move towards a win-win situation. 
 This book describes the tribulations and (temporary) triumphs of the process 
up to 1999, with the SVC trying to win over the hearts of its neighbouring 
communities by offering them the SVCT as a gift. It is a case study on recipro-
cal processes and not a study of blacks and whites in Zimbabwe, although they 
constitute the two partners in the joint venture. Of course the interaction 
between black and white in relation to land is of prime importance in this book 
but only in so far as it influences their reciprocal relationship as partners and 
parties in the joint venture. It is a case study, based on anthropological field-
work done in 1998, with extensive and detailed empirical description focusing 
on the SVC. This case study in its (historical) context shows that the so-called 
‘escalation of political violence’ after February 2000 certainly did not come out 
                                                           
39  Pp. 207, Bourdieu, P. (1997), Selections from The logic of Practice, in: Schrift, A.D. 
(ed.), The logic of the Gift. Towards an Ethic of Generosity, London, New York, 
Routledge; see also Cronk, L. (1994), Reciprocity and the Power of Giving, in: 
Spradley, J.P. & McCurdy, D.W. (eds), Conformity and Conflict. Readings in Cul-
tural Anthropology, Harper Collins, (8th Edition), pp. 161-167. 
40  Actually the majority of the (international) joint ventures are established between 
straightforward competitors. Morris, D. & Hergert, M. (1987), Trends in 
collaborative agreements, Columbia Journal of World Business, Summer. 
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of the blue. It had been anticipated for a long time, going back in fact to the 
arrival of the first white people in southern Africa after Van Riebeeck who later 
went on to arrive in what is now known as Zimbabwe with the Pioneer Column 
in 1890. The book also demonstrates that it is too simplistic only to blame 
Mugabe and his political rhetoric for the revival of sentiments of the struggle 
for independence about land and the resulting increase in violence by so-called 
War Veterans after February 2000. In the strict terms of negative reciprocity 
alone it could even be argued that Mugabe is settling the score in much the 
same way as the whites treated blacks after arriving in the region.  
 But there is equally another side to the coin as my case study indicates some-
thing about later developments in Zimbabwe. Having done my fieldwork in 
1998, just prior to when issues about land redistribution really started to hit the 
headlines in the Western media, it would be rather pompous to present the case 
in a somewhat prophetic light. I remember that when in April-May 2000 I sent 
my Ph.D. thesis to several people professionally involved in wildlife conserva-
tion and utilisation programmes in southern Africa, one of them wrote back 
asking me if the developments in Zimbabwe after 1998 filled me with a sense of 
‘gloomy satisfaction’. Although many things in my thesis already hinted at the 
danger of an unresolved Land Question for a joint venture between commercial 
and communal farmers, and although I suggested in my appendix on recom-
mendations that the SVC would have done better if it had given the neighbour-
ing communities, that is the SVCT, a stake in the land instead of of the land, 41 it 
would be rather cheap to indicate, with the advantage of hindsight, the issues 
encountered in 1998 as inevitably leading to the events that occurred later on. 
That matters having turned out this way is to a large extent coincidence, in the 
sense of a possibility – a possible but not necessary or inevitable outcome. 
Coincidence in the sense that for the same reasons (that is, the situation in 
1998), things could have turned out differently.42 What can be seen from the 
empirical material presented here though is that many elements which escalated 
later were already ‘in the air’ in 1998; that later developments were not sudden 
nor did they come as a complete surprise; that there is a historical context to the 
process which could not have predicted later developments but which never-
theless provides a more informed perspective on these developments. For the 
same reasons, I have not tried to ‘complement’ or ‘complete’ my material from 
                                                           
41  Pp. 393-395, Wels, H. (2000), Fighting over Fences. Organisational Co-operation 
and Reciprocal Exchange between the Savé Valley Conservancy and its 
Neighbouring Communities in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam.  
42  Pp. 18-13, De Mul,  J. (1994), Toeval (translation: Coincidence), Rotterdam: Eras-
mus Universiteit. 
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1998 with material from 1999 onwards so as to bridge the gap to later develop-
ments. Therefore this book is first and foremost an extensive case study on the 
developments of the joint venture between the SVC and SVCT up until 1999. 
Firstly and mainly this is because I was not in a position to do such extensive 
fieldwork in 1999-2000 as I had done in 1998. Therefore the material after 1998 
would have been far less in-depth in comparison to the 1998 empirical data, 
which would have given a certain imbalance to the case presented. As a result, 
the case study is predominantly presented on the basis of empirical material 
from my 1998 fieldwork.  
 Secondly, there is the assumption about ‘complementarity’ and ‘complete-
ness’ that a social reality can be finished or ‘done with’ in its description and 
analysis; as if it can be captured as a whole. This does not fit into my interpre-
tation of an ethnographic orientation to processes of organisational co-operation 
as I use it in this case study. Like Richards, by ethnographic orientation I mean 
that ‘it is mainly an attempt to contextualize some of the data (…) via descrip-
tion and analysis of concrete situations, events and discourses. But no ethno-
graphic account is ever “pure fact”. It may help readers to point out some of the 
main theoretical assumptions and influences that have shaped my own under-
standing of the materials at my disposal.’43 The emphasis on the word ‘some’ 
indicates that any claim to completeness is not deemed possible and would only 
imply misguided intellectual arrogance. Related to my first point, it means that I 
have primarily stuck to my 1998 material, which is as comprehensive as I could 
accomplish in one year. 
 Following this ethnographic approach, a fair amount of attention has been 
paid to an extensive description and analysis of the specific (historical) contexts 
of this initiative in organisational co-operation by the SVC. The ethnographic 
orientation is focused on the SVC case study and the route and process of their 
gift giving in setting up the SVCT and the joint venture. Although I pay 
extensive attention to the neighbouring communities, this is mainly directed 
through the formal organisational setting of the SVC. Finally my explicit choice 
for an ethnographic orientation, that is (historical) contextualisation of data 
through description and analysis, also means that I have used a predominantly 
qualitative approach in research methodology.  
 
                                                           
43  Pp. xx-xxi, Richards, P. (1996), Fighting for the Rainforest. War, Youth and Resour-
ces in Sierre Leone, The International African Institute, in association with Oxford: 
James Currey; Portsmouth (N.H.): Heinemann. Italics and emphasis added. 
INTRODUCTION                                                       15 
On methodology 
 
To understand my methodological point of view it is necessary to point out my 
perspective on social reality in general and the specific role of a social scientist 
doing research in this field. I consider social reality to be highly complex and 
without boundaries, a rhizome and universe of complexities.44 As a scientist you 
scrape a slice of social reality out of that universe and combine it with your 
theoretical composition; you glue social reality to a conceptual framework 
through the process of operationalisation of theoretical concepts; that is, you 
actively construct social reality. This particular composition forms one’s line of 
consistency ‘not in a sense of homogeneity, but as a holding together of dispa-
rate elements’.45 A mode of composition forms ‘(…) a fuzzy aggregate, a 
synthesis of disparate elements (…) defined only by a degree of consistency 
that makes it possible to distinguish the diparate elements constituting the 
aggregate’.46 In other words, concepts highlight certain aspects of social reality 
and leave other aspects of it in the dark. ‘Constructionists are deeply committed 
to the contrary view that what we take to be objective knowledge and truth are 
created, not discovered by mind’.47 The niche is presented within a relevant 
context. But even within contexts social complexity remains immense as a 
result of the inherent dynamism and fluidity of the perpetual social construc-
tionist process. Every perspective on or description or representation of this 
social reality, in whatever theoretical conceptualisation or combination, is there-
fore necessarily a highly reductionist selection. This selection can only be made 
consistent through a thorough theoretical conceptualisation by the author. 
 Two important methodological consequences can be drawn from this social 
constructivist stance. In the first place, although I want to convince the reader 
that the outcome of my research is plausible, at the same time it is one outcome 
amongst (literally) countless other possible outcomes, that is, other possible 
conceptual constructions and interpretations on the basis of the (constructed) 
data from the field. Secondly and following on from the first, a researcher 
should always be extremely modest about considering him or herself ‘an 
authority’ on the case. Every claim in that direction can be interpreted with 
                                                           
44  Pp. 3, Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1987), A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. The Athlone Press. 
45  Ibid: xiv. 
46  Ibid: 344. 
47  Gergen in Schwandt, T.A. (1994), Constructivists, Interpretivist Approaches to 
Human Inquiry, in: Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S. (eds), Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 118-137. 
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Clough as ‘symptomatic of its will to scientificity’.48 For ethnographic research 
and science the will to strive towards scientificity implies that the final ethno-
graphic text ‘correlates to the subject’s own desired wholeness’ and at the same 
time establishes the ethnographer’s authority as ‘the authorized subject of a 
complete or empirically adequate knowledge’.49 From a constructivist perspec-
tive every claim to this type of empirical completeness is looked upon with 
suspicion and even with disdain.  
 Before reading the rest of this book it is therefore important to know about 
the ‘incompleteness’ of the empirical data on which this book is based. The 
research was done on the SVC and its joint venture with the neighbouring 
communities through the SVCT. As a researcher I did not live among the 
communities but among the SVC community. I went to the communities often 
and spoke to them and interviewed them extensively on several issues related to 
the joint venture and the SVC, frequently through an interpreter from the SVC. 
Conceptually my aim in this book is primarily to try and understand the motives 
and context of the gift of the SVC to the communities in terms of reciprocity.  
 All this should not prevent me, however, from trying to come to firmly 
formulated conclusions within my own conceptual and empirical framework in 
order to attempt to challenge the reader to disagree and bring forward other 
stimulating conceptual and empirical interpretations. 
 
 
Structure of the book 
 
The book has a straightforward structure. In Chapter 1 I start by describing the 
emergence of private wildlife conservancies in South Africa in the 1970s. Their 
later spread and development in Zimbabwe against the historical background of 
the issue of land in what would become Southern Rhodesia, is the subject of 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I introduce the origin and main themes in the creation 
of the SVC. This chapter is basically intended as a historical context of organ-
isational and management development and its consequences and explanatory 
value for the later development of the joint venture with the SVCT. As a 
chronological follow up, Chapter 4 is devoted to exploring and analysing the 
reciprocal relations between the constituents of the SVC, the white commercial 
farmers, and the SVCT, the black communal farmers and communities. It is a 
chapter about cases in reciprocal interaction between white landowners and 
                                                           
48  Pp. xxv, Clough, P.T. (1998), The End(s) of Ethnography. From Realism to Social 
Criticism, New York, Berlin: Peter Lang (second edition). 
49  Ibid: 3. 
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black landless peasants. It describes the actual balance sheet in terms of 
reciprocity between black and white in and around the joint venture. Finally, in 
Chapter 5, I summarise the main conclusions about the ethnographic description 
of the joint venture in terms of my conceptual framework.      
 
 1 
 
Private wildlife conservancies:  
Early days in South Africa  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conservancy concept on private land was initiated in the province of Natal 
(now KwaZulu Natal) in South Africa in the 1970s. The basic idea was to curb 
and prevent poaching on co-operating commercial farms, called a conservancy, 
through the installation of game guards. By employing game guards commercial 
farmers, predominantly white, took a further step towards securing the border 
between the combined private properties and the neighbouring communities. In 
the 1980s the conservancy concept evolved under the influence of the advisory 
status of the Natal Parks Board (NPB), towards more wildlife utilisation, in 
particular commercial hunting, in an attempt to let the conservancy pay for 
itself. That it was hunting particularly which was deemed most suitable to 
utilise the wildlife has to do with the imperial tradition and social identity of 
whites in southern Africa in which hunting always played an important and 
dominant role.1 But most hunting areas require fencing for safety reasons and 
for keeping the valuable trophies on the property. Added to the already existing 
system of game guards, the border between conservancies and neighbouring 
                                                           
1  MacKenzie, J.M. (1987), Chivalry, Social Darwinism and Ritualised Killing: the 
Hunting Ethos in Central Africa up to 1914, in: Anderson, D. & Grove, R. (eds), 
Conservation in Africa. People, Policies and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press; MacKenzie, J.M. (1988), The empire of nature: hunting, 
Conservation and British Imperialism, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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communities was becoming even more rigid and sealed. This ongoing process 
created, on top of a national history in which segregation between black and 
white was already a prominent feature, more mutual distrust, stereotyped ideas 
about each other’s identities and ‘normal’ behaviour, which in conjunction with 
each other prevented the two groups from initiating or even considering any 
form of positive reciprocal exchange.  
 In the 1990s, in spite of the gap between conservancies and communities, the 
call for community relations and the exchange of benefits between formally 
protected wildlife areas and surrounding communities was heard loud and clear 
all over the world. In the report on the IVth World Congress on National Parks 
and Protected Areas it is stated that ‘(t) relationship between people and land 
have too often been ignored and even destroyed well-intentioned but insensitive 
resource conservation and management initiatives. The congress called for 
community participation and equality in decision-making processes, together 
with mutual respect among cultures to be achieved urgently.2 This message, 
originating from government-related conservation efforts in national parks and 
other protected areas, also had its effects on the informal conservation efforts on 
private land, that is, private wildlife conservancies, although to date it has never 
been as institutionalised or outspoken as in the formal conservation sector. Up 
till 1994, the year of the first general democratic elections, in South Africa the 
government has always been dominated by white people and was based on the 
ideology of apartheid. And also after 1994 ‘all the bureaucrats in central 
government responsible for bio-diversity protection [remained at first] members 
of the old guard, with transformation occurring only from 1998 onwards.  
 Within the SANP [South African National Parks], key officials, whether in 
the parks or in head office, were from the former white-ruled establishment, and 
continued to reflect similar values after democratisation’.3 For this reason nature 
conservation policies in South Africa cannot be seen in isolation from the 
broader political context of (post-)apartheid with a corresponding negative 
attitude of the majority of the black people towards them. When (white) private 
wildlife conservancies emerged on the conservation scene in the second half of 
the 1970s, it was only to be expected that in first instance they would choose for 
a ‘splendid isolation’ from the neighbouring (black) communities in line with 
the apartheid thinking at the time. Inevitably the attitudes of communities 
                                                           
2  Pp. 7, McNeely, J.A. (ed.)(1992), Parks for Life. Report of the IVth World Congress 
on National Parks and Protected Areas. Gland: IUCN. 
3  Pp. 3, Cock, J. & Fig, D. (1999), From Colonial to Community-Based Conservation: 
Environmental Justice and the National Parks of South Africa, paper presented at the 
conference African Environments: Past and Present, 5-8 July, St. Anthony’s 
College, Oxford. 
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towards conservancies has to a large extent been shaped by this political 
context. In the 1990s conservancies had to begin to fight the shadows of a 
history of increasing segregation and related perceptions of communities 
towards it. In this Chapter I shall describe the development of private wildlife 
conservancies in South Africa and the national context in Zimbabwe in which 
the SVC tried to realise its plans with the neighbouring communities. This 
contextualisation is necessary to understand the fundamental and even diametri-
cal differences between white and black relations and attitudes towards land in 
Zimbabwe and its consequences for the processes between the SVC and it 
neighbouring communities in the joint venture. 
 
 
Private wildlife conservancies in South Africa 
 
In South Africa as a whole around 80%4 of the land is privately owned by 
(mainly white) farmers and in the province of Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal) that 
figure is 60%, whereas the whites only constitute 12.8% of the population.5 
These figures indicate a huge imbalance in land distribution between black and 
white in South Africa. This goes back to the very beginning of white occupancy 
and colonisation in southern Africa, but the present Government recognises the 
Natives Land Act of 1913 in which rights to own or to rent land were made 
dependent on a person’s racial classification as a formal starting point for their 
current restructuring and reform of the land policy.6 Be that as it may, ‘past 
legislation indicates that the South African government had a marked disregard 
                                                           
4  Pp. 1, Markham, R.W. (1988), Nature Conservation on Private Land: the Conser-
vancy Concept, unpublished paper, Natal Parks Board. Minnaar indicates that ‘(i)n 
1990 about 77.000 white farmers (inclusive of absentee landlords) owned 
approximately 77 million hectares or 63 per cent of a total of 122 million hectares. 
(...) In contrast the total area of the ten homelands is 17 million hectares or just 
under 14 per cent of the total’ pp. 28-29, Minnaar, A. (1994), The Dynamics of Land 
in Rural Areas: 1990 and onwards, in: Minnaar, A. (ed.)(1994), Access to and 
Affordability of Land in South Africa: the Challenge of Land Reform in the 1990s, 
Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. 
5  Pp. 1, Bourquin, O., Markham, R.W., Mathias, I., Steele, N.A. and Wright, C.W. 
(1985), A New Approach to Conservation – Wildlife Conservancies in Natal, 
unpublished paper, Natal Parks Board. Population figure (1994) taken from 
Britannica Book of the Year 1996. 
6  Pp. 9 and 54, Department of Land Affairs (1997), White Paper on South African 
Land Policy. See also pp. 79-90, Nauta, W. (2001), The Implications of Freedom. 
The Changing Role of Land Sector NGOs in a transforming South Africa. 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.  
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for the land rights of indigenous people dating back to the first settlements’.7 
Between 1960 and 1980 some 3.5 million people were removed from rural and 
urban areas. ‘It was only in 1978, with the introduction of the 99-year leasehold 
system and in the mid-1980s with the abolition of influx control, that the state 
acknowledged that black people should have permanent land rights in urban 
areas. Yet land rights in rural areas have remained tenuous’.8 From 1994 onward 
land in South Africa is considered the cornerstone of its reconstruction and 
development and recognised as the basis of their social identity.9 This implies 
amongst other matters that the Government is willing to recognise long-term 
historical ownership to land, even if it is not formally recognised by law.10 There 
is also recognition that especially in the predominantly white commercial 
farming areas a crisis is severe in that ‘(e)victions have reached endemic 
proportions’ which are still mainly based on a bias in the law system towards 
right of owners.11 Some of the evictions can be specifically attributed to ‘white 
farmers switching from crop and cattle farming to game farming or forestry’.12 
The laws governing land-use planning also tend to favour commercial farmers 
to the detriment of blacks.13 After the 1994 elections especially, everybody 
began to claim to own the land. ‘One group may claim ownership because they 
have traditionally owned the land for generations, another because Pretoria 
awarded the land to them and gave them documents to this effect. In other 
situations, there are people who were accepted within tenure systems as 
‘refugees’ 60 years ago who now claim independent rights to stay there, while 
the ‘host’ owners want to use the land for agricultural purposes to which they 
have always aspired’.14 Also before the 1994 elections there were struggles over 
land in South Africa, but these have mostly been ignored by the mainstream 
historians. The active role of blacks in the struggle over land was put ‘away in 
the locations’, escaping official notice by government and scholarship. A study 
in the Transkeian Territories from around the turn of the century shows that 
‘(p)eople clung tenaciously to their rural identities and productive resources, 
and questions of land and livestock continued to dominate their political 
                                                           
7  Pp. 21, Torres, S. (1994), Land, a Question of Historical Inheritance or Legal Right, 
in: Minnaar 1994. 
8  Department of Land Affairs 1997: 11. 
9  Ibid: 7 ‘Land does not only form the basis of our wealth, but also our security, pride 
and history’. 
10  Ibid: 61. 
11  Ibid: 31 and 64. 
12  Minnaar 1994: 49. 
13  Department of Land Affairs 1997: 77. 
14  Ibid: 31.266 
 
22 CHAPTER 1 
responses’.15 This should not come as a surprise because ‘African people claim 
land as their birthright which extends to ancestral rights’.16 If an individual was 
an accepted member of the community, he or she could always claim and was 
entitled to share in the land of the community and its natural resources, but strict 
individual tenure was not an option. This is where African and European 
perspectives on land are diametrically opposed. In European capitalist develop-
ment land had increasingly been designated absolute property, a form of capital, 
and with that transition had become part of a market and thus exchangeable. 
‘Purchase of a commodity on the market confers absolute right of property over 
that commodity to the individual. The right of property is enshrined in law and 
the value of property determined in the process of exchange without reference 
to its actual or potential use’.17 Originating from the Romantic ideas of land-
scape as being in control of the land, it now became just another dimension of 
control over capital and with it came a sense of being in control of the ‘very 
processes of nature’18 and of taming the wilderness.19 
 Amidst the abundance of private land ownership in South Africa, the NPB 
(now KZN Wildlife), part of South African Government, falling under the 
Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, has carried out its conservation 
work since its official inception in 1947, in the formally protected areas which 
comprised only some 6% of the land surface of Natal.20 The only times it ever 
ventured beyond these confines was when it had to deal with ‘problem animals’, 
wildlife which had strayed from the protected area and was causing problems in 
areas with human habitation, and for fisheries. The division between NPB and 
private landowners was substantial. The two parties were virtually at war with 
each other because to most farmers wildlife represented more of a threat to their 
operations than that it was something to conserve. The NPB was the controlling 
                                                           
15  Pp. 1 and 3, Beinart, W. & Bundy, C. (eds) (1987), Hidden Struggles in Rural South 
Africa. Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei & Eastern Cape 1890-1930, 
London: James Currey; Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press; 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
16  Torres 1994: 23. Or in the words of Toren about the similar Fijian notion of land, 
‘people are the land’s very substance (which) does not allow one to alienate it’. 
Land contains their personal identity, pp. 164 & 171-173, Toren, T (1995), Seeing 
the ancestral sites: transformations in Fijian notions of the land, in: Hirsch, E. & 
O’Hanlon, M. (eds), The Anthropology of Landscape. Perspectives on Place and 
Space, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
17  Pp. 63, 199 & quotation 43-44, Cosgrove, D.E. (1984), Social Formation and 
Symbolic Landscape, London, Sydney: Croom Helm. 
18  Ibid: 236. 
19  Ibid: 170. 
20  Bourquin a.o. 1985: 1. 
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body which came with the law in its hand to tell them what to do or not to do 
with wildlife on their own property. The nickname in Afrikaans of the 
Nationale Parkeraad (National Parks Board) was the Nasionale Varkeraad 
(National Pigs Board).21 A game ranger in Natal was seen as a ‘social pariah’.22 
Farmers were not the only ones who did not like the game rangers. The latter 
were in equal odium with the black communities. ‘The apartheid system in 
many cases fostered animosity and bitterness between conservation organisa-
tions and the black community’.23 With respect to private land the NPB sus-
pected that there was still a wealth of wildlife and flora outside their protected 
areas, but they could not even make a soundly based estimate.24 There were 
some changes at the beginning of the 1960s, more requests were made to the 
NPB to assist private landowners in matters related to wildlife on their proper-
ties, ranging from problem animals to advice about game-birds and in 1965 the 
NPB started an advisory section involving a farm game biologist and a techni-
cian.25 Over the years requests for advice mounted and in 1971 the NPB decided 
to ‘zone’ the province in to nine zones of an average of 5,220 km², each zone 
having its own two conservation officers.26 In their zones the conservation 
officers were still confronted with many individual private landowners, whom 
they had to try to reach with their campaigns for environmental awareness and 
the like. However, these two officers did not have the time, the resources or the 
physical possibilities to visit, control or patrol all these farmers separately on a 
regular basis. If they could persuade farmers to work together or pool their 
resources, it was possible for them to visit combined farmers which would make 
life more easy for the NPB.27 Many of the problems of individual farmers were 
the same everywhere. Control of poaching on their property was perceived as 
the number one problem. For that reason, to stimulate co-operation between 
farmers the first activity of the NPB, in the person of Nick Steele, was to draw 
up a Farm Patrol Plan in 1975, in which landowners were advised ‘of ways of 
                                                           
21  Interview with Conservancy Officer of the NPB, 23 March 1998. 
22  Pp. 4, Player in Draper, M. (December 1998), Zen and the Art of Garden Province 
Maintenance – the Soft Intimacy of Hard Men in the Wilderness of KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa (1952-1997), Journal of Southern African Studies, 24 (4). 
23  Pp. 68, Pretorius, S. (1994), Conservation and Resource Allocation: Parks and 
People. In: Minnaar 1994. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Bourquin i.a. 1985: 2. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Interview with Conservancy Officer of the NPB, 23 March 1998. 
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combating poaching and conserving wildlife in a co-operative manner with their 
neighbours’.28  
 The plan did not meet with the unanimous enthusiasm of the private land-
owners straightaway. The turning point only came in 1978 when farmers in the 
Balgowan area in Natal did join hands to curb poaching as ‘snaring had become 
common and local labourers often hunted with packs of dogs’29 and formed the 
first conservancy, the Balgowan Conservancy on the 14 August 1978, by jointly 
applying the recommendations formulated in the Farm Patrol Plan. Since then 
the conservancy idea has caught on like a house on fire all over Natal, and has 
also spread to other provinces in South Africa and other countries in southern 
Africa. In 1994 there were a recorded 168 conservancies in Natal, comprising 
1.4 million hectares of land.30 In an interview with the Conservancy Officer of 
the Natal Parks Board in 1998, he mentioned that there were approximately 380 
conservancies around the country, most of them, 220, still in KwaZulu-Natal.31 
The concept is also applied in Namibia and Zimbabwe, but not to the extent it 
has caught on in South Africa. 
 A private wildlife conservancy (from now on called ‘conservancy’) may be 
defined as ‘a voluntary, co-operative environmental management of an area by 
that community and its users group’.32 This rather abstract and academic defini-
tion is brought down to earth for farmers in a brochure issued by the NPB in 
which it gives recommendations on wildlife management to farmers and in 
which the conservancy concept is described as ‘a group of farms on which 
neighbouring landowners have pooled some of their resources for the purpose 
of conserving wildlife on their combined property’.33 After this definition 
                                                           
28  Pp. 1, Markham, R.W. (November 1986), Establishing a Wildlife Conservancy. In: 
Wildlife Management. Technical Guides for Farmers, no. 18. Pietermaritzburg, 
Natal Parks Board. ‘Neighbours’ in this quotation, to make it perfectly plain, are 
neighbouring commercial farmers and it does certainly not refer to neighbouring 
communities of communal farmers. 
29  Pp. 22, Kotzé, S. (1993), Conservancies in Natal. The Origins and Application of a 
Component in Informal Wildlife Conservation. Unpublished BA Thesis, University 
of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.  
30  Davies, G. (1994), Editorial, The Guinea-fowl: Natal Conservancies Association, no. 
2. 
31  Interview with Conservancy Officer of the NPB, 4 March 1998. 
32  Pp. 1, Natal Parks Board (1993), Guidelines for the Formation of a Conservancy, 
Pietermaritzburg: Natal Parks Board. This definition does not confine conservancies 
to rural areas alone. Nowadays there are also urban and even industrial conservan-
cies based on the concept of co-operative environmental management by a commu-
nity. When I speak of conservancies in this book though, I confine myself to the 
rural ones. 
33  Markham. November 1986: 1. 
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launched in the brochure, it is unequivocal that employing game guards by the 
co-operating farmers to try and stop poaching activities is very central to the 
conservancy concept. Landowners actually link up in a conservancy only to be 
able to hire and pay for the services of game guards together. This was the 
reason for the founding of the first conservancy, the Balgowan Conservancy in 
1978, based on the recommendations of the Farm Patrol Plan by the NPB. The 
agricultural activities on the different properties, and not wildlife utilisation as 
such, had in first instance to pay for the conservation effort. 
 The Balgowan Conservancy owes its existence mainly to one particular 
landowner, Tony Kerr,34 who tried to motivate and convince his neighbour land-
owners to join him in his effort to curb poaching on their land.35 This took him 
quite some time, from 1975 to the official inauguration of the Balgowan 
Conservancy on 14 August 1978. It was when one of his neighbours, a profes-
sional lawyer, Colonel Francis, took a keen interest in Kerr’s proposal and 
contacted the NPB, in December 1977, to see if it would support the idea, that it 
started to gain momentum. The NPB reacted favourably and suggested they 
have a look at the Farm Patrol Plan, which was in fact the first document to 
suggest conservation on private land in South Africa. The attractiveness of the 
plan to farmers was that it did not interrupt their normal farming activities or 
take up much of their time, while it could bring them the advantage of ‘reduced 
poaching, stock theft, arson, trespassing, vandalism, and theft of crops, timber 
and fencing (...)’. At the same time flora and fauna would be protected, ‘and 
that’s what ‘in it’ for the conservation authorities’.36 By introducing his Farm 
Patrol Plan to Kerr and Francis, Steele is rightly seen as one of the main 
architects of the conservancy concept.37 At the inauguration of the Balgowan 
                                                           
 
34  Tony Kerr received the Conservationist of the Year award from the Natal Branch of 
the Wildlife Society of South Africa in 1986, ‘because of his insight and hard work in 
assisting to get conservancies off the ground in Natal’, The Natal Wildlife Conser-
vancies Association Newsletter, 1986, no. 4. It was named The Guinea-fowl in 1994. 
35  This section is based on Kotzé 1993: 18-28. 
36  Pp. 23, Gosling, M. (1984), Self-help conservation, Farmer’s Weekly, 28 September 
1984. 
37  Pp. 3, Astrup, M. (1997), A tribute to Malamba, News from the Natal Parks Board, 
no. 42. Nick Steele died, age 63, on 3 June 1997. In the obituary he is mentioned not 
only for his role in the development of conservancies but also for his strong belief in 
the role of field rangers ‘who worked at the coal face of conservation (...)’. In the 
obituary in the Guinea-fowl (pp. 12-13), the newsletter of the Natal Conservancy 
Association, he is also remembered for his ‘policy of sharing’ which he wrote when 
he was director of the Bureau of Natural Resources (now Department of Nature 
Conservation) ‘which allows local communities access to proclaimed conservation 
areas to harvest natural resources’ (The Guinea-fowl, Newsletter of the Natal 
Conservancies Association, no. 3 of 1997). This was obviously at a later stage in his 
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Conservancy Steele represented the NPB and was asked to give a presentation 
about how the Conservancy would proceed from there on. He basically put 
forward his ideas, formulated in his Farm Patrol Plan with which the Balgowan 
Conservancy carried on, and this marked the beginning of the rapid spread of 
conservancies first in Natal and later in other provinces in South Africa, and 
then in other countries in southern Africa. 
 In 1978 conservancies began to flourish in Natal and in 1982 the NPB 
initiated and launched a representative and facilitating body: the Natal Wildlife 
Conservancy Association, which right from the outset produced a Newsletter. 
The Newsletter began with some eight to ten A4 pages held together by one 
staple in the top left corner. It has grown more luxurious over time. A bit later, a 
second staple was added and now the Newsletter was held together by two 
staples in the left side of the pages. In the first issue of 1985 a gracious duiker 
featured on the front page. Since 1988 every newsletter has been decorated with 
the special South African conservancy logo, the guinea-fowl. In 1986 the NCA 
started a logo competition. The Roads Department in Natal was approached and 
they were willing to place standard conservancy road signs at the entrances of 
all conservancies in Natal. The word ‘conservancy’ would not appear on the 
signboard, but only the logo with perhaps the name of the conservancy (this 
latter did not come to pass). The winning logo design would earn R200,-. One 
of the requirements was that the design should be ‘simple and clear’ and the use 
of colour was not necessary. They gave a few examples on the page, all of them 
silhouettes of animals, like a rhino head, a kudu head (looks too much like the 
kudu logo of Kruger National Park) and a guinea-fowl which later on wins the 
competition (see Figure 1). 
 Obviously there have been no better entries than the ones they showed as an 
example.38 In 1988 road signs with the logo are put in place at the various loca-
tion around Natal and one conservancy member relates in a newsletter how it 
went with their conservancy. ‘I want to share a small discussion I had with the 
local (...) Roads Department foreman. This department is, at the moment, 
straightening and widening our district road. The discussion went something 
like this. Foreman to me, while waiting for a roadside meeting with engineers, 
surveyors etc. right down to the roads superintendent. ‘You know Mr. Green, 
these guinea-fowl warning signs have arrived at the depot and my boss says he 
can’t remember where the complaints came from to put them up. He suggests 
we drive around the district and where we see a lot of guinea-fowl near the 
                                                           
career, because when he advocated the establishment of conservancies, he argued 
that farmers should primarily start working together to keep local communities at 
bay. 
38  Information in this section based on NCA Newsletter, no. 5, 1986. 
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Figure 1: Conservancy road sign in South Africa 
 
 
road, we erect the signboards. If they are not in the correct position the public 
will soon complain again’. (...) I replied ‘Aren’t they conservancy signs’? ‘What 
is a conservancy’?39  
 In April 1989 the NCA registered the 100th conservancy, after which the 
editorial at the beginning of the newsletter noted that, ‘My gut feeling is that 
conservancies have started of in a rather humble way – but will become a real 
force in nature conservation’.40 In 1993 the newsletter became a more profes-
sional looking A5 size. From the third issue in 1997 the newsletter was spon-
sored by a commercial forestry firm, Sappi, which made it possible to improve 
on the quality of the paper drastically and to work with a colour. The profes-
sionalisation of the newsletter can be used as a metaphor of the professionalisa-
tion of conservancies itself. It started as an initiative to curb poaching and 
protect wildlife by joining hands to hire game guards. The operation was paid 
for by the core agricultural activities of the landowner. Gradually the idea 
shifted towards letting the wildlife pay for itself, mainly through hunting. Texts 
about promoting hunting activities in conservancies began to appear in the 
newsletter from 1985 onwards. In the first issue of the newsletter in 1985 the 
editorial on the first page starts with stating that ‘(t)he hunting season is with us 
once again. Many hunters will be out shooting the various species of game 
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animals available to them. Now is the time for conservancies to utilise their 
resource in a wise manner, for instance, by putting some monetary value to 
game. The money so earned can help pay for an individual’s conservancy fees 
or it can be pooled in the conservancy central fund. By doing the latter the 
conservancy will start paying for itself rather than having agriculture pay for 
conservation. Hunting should be viewed as a management tool aiding the aims 
of conservation’.41 
 To become a sustainable force in nature conservation in the socio-political 
context of South Africa it is important that the conservancy idea, which is 
almost exclusively a white men’s affair,42 should also become politically accept-
able to and appreciated by the black majority living around these conservancies. 
But the two core elements and developments in conservancies in South Africa 
in the 1970s and the 1980s are actually not conducive at all to realising this 
potential. The first core issue in the development of conservancies in South 
Africa is their emphasis on the role of game guards as suggested in the Farm 
Patrol Plan, which obviously matched with a need felt among private land-
owners at the time that they had to do something about poaching on their land. 
The second is the later development of hunting as a form to make conservancies 
economically feasible and sustainable. Both developments in the first instance 
only detached conservancies further from the surrounding communities. They 
exacerbated to a general and persistent image of conservancies as bastions of 
white power, based on segregation and splendid isolation. Game guards play an 
important role in this. 
 
 
Game guards and poaching:  
Relations between conservancies and neighbouring communities 
 
Journalist Clarke Gittens wrote an article in the Farmers Weekly in 1987, 
extolling the benefits to farmers of starting conservancies which opens by 
reiterating what is considered the raison d’être of conservancies: ‘Do you fancy 
a marked drop in your crop and/or stock theft? Continuous control over fencing 
and water troughs? A way of discouraging vagrants on seldom-used sections of 
the farm?’43 The answer seems to be to set up a conservancy which makes game 
guards the ‘framework or skeleton for conservancy life’ as the NCA Newsletter 
                                                           
41  NCA Newsletter, no.1, 1985. 
42  It was only in the last issue of The Guinea-fowl in 1998 that the ‘establishment of 
the first all black managed’ conservancy could be announced. 
43  Pp. 22, Gittens, C. (1987), The Benefits of Conservancies, Farmer’s Weekly, 23 
January 1987. 
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puts it.44 The early years of conservancies are marked by an almost obsessive 
attention for game guards, their numbers, their training, their activities and their 
effectiveness in curbing poaching on the properties. The first NCA Newsletter 
is almost completely devoted to game guards.45 When the number of conservan-
cies began to be mentioned on page 3 in 1978, the following details are given: 
number of conservancies, number of landowners involved and, even before the 
size in hectares is given, the number of guards. In 1978 the Balgowan Conser-
vancy started with one game guard. In 1981, there were already sixty-three 
conservancies in Natal, which employed some 172 game guards. The rest of the 
newsletter is devoted to subjects related to game guards like their work 
contracts, training by the NPB on page 4, progress report on their training on 
page 6, and an article by Nick Steele about game guard administration on pages 
7 and 8. The remainder of the Newsletter is occupied by reports from different 
conservancies which all talk about game guard activities. Mr. Barry Raw, for 
instance, reports on the Kamberg Conservancy in which he writes about their 
satisfaction with the game guards who are doing such an excellent job. The 
conservancy has been in operation for eighteen months and he summarises what 
the guards have already achieved during that period. They have arrested several 
people in relation to thefts of maize, potato, cabbage, and fertilizer. In addition 
they have reported on broken fences on thirty occasions and removed 242 
snares, some of them with decomposing animals still in them. Now that they 
have proved themselves worthy of such a step, the conservancy has decided to 
arm the two game guards. One with a single barrel shotgun and the other with 
an assegai (traditional short Zulu spear). These weapons are more than simply a 
reward for their achievement as guards, they are also ‘to prove their status and 
hopefully stop the threats against them when patrolling near the black farms at 
Tendele and also to control the number of predators (...)’. This quotation 
pinpoints two things. In the first place, the surrounding communities are not 
happy with the game guards and that the relation between the landowner and the 
surrounding communities is tense, certainly not one dominated by mutual trust 
or positive reciprocal give-and-take. Secondly that the game guards seem to be 
first of all ‘people guards’ and only after that do they also have something to do 
with wildlife. The argument about the predators seems almost only a kind of 
afterthought by way of legitimising that the gun is not only meant as a deterrent 
towards the communities.  
 The communities do not seem to be hostile towards the game guards only in 
this particular conservancy, but in general. In Steele’s article about game guard 
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administration he warns the Conservancy Warden in charge of the game guards 
not to take corrective measures against game guards too easily after complaints 
made by the communities. ‘There are always people who are prepared to 
fabricate stories to cause trouble. Their aim being to get rid of an irritating 
source of trouble to their own illegal acts like snaring and shebeens’. This 
makes crystal clear why his Farm Patrol Plan hit the nail on the head in relation 
to experiences and perceptions of the landowners. It also betrays at least as 
clearly that the relations between landowners gathered in a conservancy and 
surrounding communities is (already) seriously distorted and that game guards 
may be a solution in one respect but there was a strong possibility they would 
aggravate the grievances and put the relation under extra strain, while no 
structural improvements are made in actually reducing poaching figures as often 
is the case (see also the case of the SVC later). Parallels can be seen in this 
respect with Gibson’s observations, who, after studying ADMADE and LIRDP-
programmes in Zambia, which also made extensive use of game guards to 
contain poaching, concludes that ‘(…) ADMADE and LIRDP have not stopped 
illegal hunting’.46 But this interpretation is never mentioned or even considered 
in any conservancy Newsletter. The opposite is true. In the fourth newsletter, 
one and a half page is devoted to the ‘Conservancy record relating to anti-
poaching work for 1982’. In general four categories are used to present the 
records: arrests made, convictions, hunting dogs shot, and snares removed. 
Dewdrop Conservancy, for instance, is recorded to have arrested four people, 
shot eleven dogs and removed 200 snares. Similar figures can be found for 
other conservancies.47 All these figures and records seem to indicate that the 
game guards were being put under severe pressure by the communities through 
their normal activities and search for natural resources on private farmland. Not 
only the outside communities but also the farm labourers on the properties 
themselves were ‘suspicious of the guards’. The latter maybe for the same 
reasons as the communities. As a solution some conservancies launched an 
educational programme for their farm labourers to inform them about and make 
them aware of nature conservation. On days specifically organised for the 
‘labour-gang supervisors’ or indunas, farm labourers were especially invited to 
attend, first and foremost to receive The Message, but also because after the 
meeting they were offered a well-prepared bushbuck. They were admonished by 
the speaker who told them that ‘the bushbuck would not have been there for 
                                                           
46  Gibson 1999: 140 
47  Pp. 4-5, NCA Newsletter, no. 2, 1983. See also records of the Mooi River Valley 
Conservancy which indicates arrests being made between April and August 1983, 
mainly for hunting with dogs on the private property, pp. 5-6, NCA Newsletter, no. 
3, 1983. 
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them to eat, had it not been for their co-operation in the conservancy system’.48 
Concealed behind this last formulation seems to be the vested threat that the 
farmworkers themselves are also suspected of and known for their taking part in 
the illegal activities which the game guards are hired to stop them from 
pursuing such an ill-advised course. In the Warden’s Annual Report of 1983-
1984 of the Seaview Conservancy.49 it is said without any hesitation that ‘(t)he 
guards proved most unpopular amongst the farm labourers, who had had the run 
of the area for years’. It is mentioned that the guards caught 170 labourers for 
trespass on the farms, that they ‘confiscated seventeen dangerous weapons’ 
from them and that they ‘minimised labour fighting over weekends and at 
nights’. Although the report says that things have changed for the better through 
a public relations offensive of ‘talking and explaining’, the relations between 
game guards and farm labourers remained sensitive. In a nutshell, game guards 
were and are put under pressure from the inside by farm labourers and from the 
outside by neighbouring communities. It can be concluded with Gibson that 
‘(…) the law enforcement responsibilities of a wildlife scout often over-shadow 
the positive features of scout-villager interactions, producing a frequently tense 
– and sometimes overtly hostile relationship’.50 Basically, ‘(…) locals fear and 
distrust scouts (…)’.51  
 Seen from this perspective, it is no wonder that many conservancies reported 
that a high proportion of their newly posted game guards, after having being 
trained at NPB, were absconding. This amounted to 17% and the main reasons 
were said to be a ‘lack of job satisfaction and working conditions’. In the next 
newsletter it was mentioned that the ‘wastage of trained game guards’ was even 
as high as 25%.52 Instead of putting the problem in a broader context and 
relating this percentage to the social pressures and the bad relationship with the 
surrounding communities, or even suggesting that there might be a correlation, 
they state with conviction that they ‘feel that with a standardised wage, 
improved uniform and better accommodation conditions (...) this figure will 
drop’.53 If not, then conservancies will ‘run the risk of acquiring a reputation as 
bad employers and the Natal Parks Board cannot incur the cost of training for a 
25% wastage’.54 As a solution to the problem they offer all tangible incentives, 
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50  Gibson 1999: 125 
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perhaps because of lack of insight, without placing the problem in a broader 
context of relations between communal and commercial farmers. And at a later 
stage, in the 1990s, several conservancies exchanged game guards for security 
firms, a move which further hardened the positions and relations between 
conservancies and neighbouring communities. This wider context of the 
development of conservancies in relation to their neighbours is never made 
explicit. In the second newsletter the then director of the NPB, Geddes Page, 
also writes nothing about the broader context in which conservancies seem to 
operate in South Africa but only mentions that the growth in the number of 
conservancies indicates that ‘the need for better wildlife management on private 
land was overdue’. Furthermore, he notes that the understanding between the 
private sector and the NPB has improved which has not always been the case, as 
I already mentioned in the introduction of this section, and which he thinks is 
worthwhile. A complete inner-circle perspective only; a policy in the ‘best’ 
tradition of the fines and fences approach in nature conservation. 
 
 
Towards wildlife utilisation in conservancies 
 
The trend towards devoting large sections of the NCA Newsletter to issues 
related to game guards gradually declines after 1983 and attention begins to turn 
towards other subjects related to running a successful conservancy. Two main 
subjects that make their debut in the Newsletter are the series of the NPB of 
Wildlife Management Technical Guides for farmers and the attention paid to 
possibilities of commercial hunting in conservancies.55 In the Technical Guides 
we can see the gradual shift from strictly agricultural land use with game guards 
who are employed as a sideline to curb illegal activities on the property, 
towards a more wildlife-oriented land use. In the years between 1982 and 1985 
sixteen of these approximately sixty-two pages documents were prepared, 
fourteen of them between July 1984 and November 1985. The first was written 
for the Balgowan Conservancy in 1982 and the second for the Mooi River West 
Conservancy in July 1983, both by Price and Collinson.56 The fourteen Guides 
produced between July 1984 and November 1985 were all the work of Rob 
                                                           
55  Ibid: 2. 
56  Written by Price, M.A. and published Pietermaritzburg: NPB, Game and Fish 
Preservation Board, The Eston-Beaumont Conservancy Management Guidelines 
(October 1982); written by Price, M.A. & Collinson, R.H.F. and published Pieter-
maritzburg: NPB, Game and Fish Preservation Board, The Balgowan Conservancy 
Management Guidelines (October 1982); Mooi River West Conservancy Manage-
ment Guidelines (July 1983). 
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Markham who was Conservancy Officer of the NPB at the time.57 This rapid 
production was made possible because the Guides were all written in the same 
format with minor variations depending on the particular conservancy. All of 
them contain chapters on the management of wildlife categories, like game 
mammals, game birds, problem animals and carnivores. Attention is also paid to 
categories of flora and how to manage, for instance, grasslands, forests and in 
some instances how to cope with alien species of vegetation as in the Guidelines 
of the Bester Conservancy. 
 In eight of the Guidelines, a separate leaflet about the possibility of commer-
cial hunting in the conservancy is included.58 This is not surprising considering 
the history of white men hunting in South Africa. Farmers live in that tradition 
and ‘(f)or thousands of farmers, hunting is a favourite pastime, even a part of 
their traditional and cultural way of life’.59 As early as the third newsletter in 
1983 there is cautious mention of the possibilities of commercial hunting in 
conservancies. In the minutes of a Conservancy Liaison Committee Meeting of 
5 October 1984, held at NPB Headquarters at Queen Elizabeth Park in Pieter-
maritzburg, Markham writes cautiously: ‘What are your views on hunting by 
recreational hunters on private land in Natal, especially within conservancies? 
Do you agree with having paying hunters being given the chance of taking off 
surplus game?’60 Hunting at that time was mostly taking place on commercial 
game ranches and attracted mainly overseas clients. It was recognised that some 
trophies clients want to shoot either not occur on game ranches (grey rhebuck 
and oribi) or were not abundant enough to be harvested by hunting (common 
reedbuck and mountain reedbuck). These particular animals do occur in some 
                                                           
57  Written by Markham, R.W. and published Pietermaritzburg: NPB, Game and Fish 
Preservation Board Lowland East Conservancy Management Guidelines (October 
1983); Upper Umvoti Conservancy Management Guidelines (May 1984); Cavers-
ham Conservancy Management Guidelines (July 1984); Mid Illova Conservancy 
Management Guidelines (August 1984); Mooi River Valley Conservancy Game 
Mammal Management Guidelines (January 1985); Seaview Conservancy Manage-
ment Guidelines (February 1985); Dargle Conservancy Management Guidelines 
(May 1985); Baynesfield Wildlife Conservancy Management Guidelines (vol. 1) 
(October 1985); Besters Conservancy Management Guidelines (vol. 1) (October 
1985); Ripplemead Conservancy Management Guidelines (vol. 1) (October 1985); 
Paddock Plains Conservancy Management Guidelines (vol. 1) (November 1985); 
Umgenyane Conservancy Management Guidelines (vol. 1) (November 1985); 
Boston Conservancy Management Guidelines (Not Dated). 
58  Besters Conservancy, Baynesfield Wildlife Conservancy, Boston Conservancy, Mid 
Illova Conservancy, Umgenyane Conservancy, Ripplemead Conservancy, Paddock 
Plains Conservancy, Dargle Conservancy and Mooi River Valley Conservancy. 
59  Pp. 10, NCA Newsletter, no. 5, 1987. 
60  Included in NCA Newsletter, no. 5, 1984, pp. 2-3. 
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conservancies in sufficiently large numbers to be harvested, and because they 
were highly sought-after, overseas clients were prepared to pay high prices to be 
able to hunt them. This could lead to significant financial gains for the conser-
vancy. The less well-heeled local hunter could also be seen as a potential client 
whose wishes could be accommodated in conservancies. Therefore it is advised 
that conservancies who want to harvest their wildlife in this way register their 
game with the co-ordinating body for these activities, which is the NPB again.61 
 The leaflet in the Guidelines also gives an indication of prices for trophies 
and accommodation. It is interesting to note the differences in prices paid for 
trophies by local hunters and overseas clients. For the same blesbok, a local 
hunter pays R150,- while an overseas client pays R600,- for a male. For a grey 
duiker a local hunter pays R45,- while an overseas client is expected to pay 
R200,-. On average an overseas client is expected to pay three to four times as 
much for the same trophy. This indicated that developing commercial hunting 
in conservancies for overseas clients could be a lucrative activity. In the News-
letters of the NCA after 1984, hunting is increasingly advocated. In the second 
Newsletter of the NCA in 1984 Ian Goss, of the Goss Estates in the Magudu 
area suggests conservancies seriously consider hunting on their property, based 
on his own seven years’ experiences with commercially hunting bushbuck, grey 
duiker and impala. Although these are nothing more than simply plains game, 
there is already indication in the text of suggesting more specialised packages of 
animals with real trophy value. At first he had just offered the wildlife which 
happened to roam his property, but now he seemed as if he was considering 
managing a more specific wildlife population with a nicely balanced mixture 
that people come and hunt for specific trophies and not just for the sport of 
hunting down any kind of animal. ‘Bushbuck are of course the most sought-
after game in the area, as the hunter’s patience and skill are really put to the test. 
The bushbuck in the hunting area are very acceptable as trophy animals, having 
on average 355 mm (...) horns’. He suggests that ‘some conservancies could 
follow the example’.62 It might be interpreted symbolically in this respect that 
the first Newsletter in 1985 is decorated with a grey duiker. Not surprisingly the 
logical consequence is that it is precisely in this Newsletter as well that the 
Editorial on the first page is completely devoted to advocating commercial 
hunting in conservancies. Hunting is legitimised in the last sentence which says 
that ‘(h)unting should be viewed as a management tool aiding the aims of 
conservation’.63 What they mean is that commercial hunting earns money hand 
over first which could be devoted to conservation. Since then hunting has 
                                                           
61  Pp. 3, NCA Newsletter, no. 1, 1983. 
62  Pp. 10, NCA Newsletter, no. 2, 1984. 
63  Pp. 1, NCA Newsletter, no. 1, 1985. 
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become a regular and obviously accepted topic in the Newsletter. In a Newslet-
ter in 1986, again symbolically, on the same page that Tony Kerr, who was 
behind the inception of the Balgowan Conservancy, is honoured for having 
received the Conservationist of the Year Award from the Wildlife Society of 
South Africa, there is an advertisement for ‘A hunter’s handbook’ which is said 
to be ‘a must for conservancies that need information on hunting’.64 The hunting 
business is becoming ever more serious and not something which is done at 
random, but which is well-managed and demands large investments of money 
and time in terms of (re)stocking the conservancy with huntable wildlife. The 
focal point of further conservancy development seems to have become to 
integrate commercial hunting into the operation. In 1989 it is said in the News-
letter that ‘(g)ame auctions have recently become a part of farmers life (judging 
by the increased frequency of these events), just as supermarkets are part of 
modern shoppers’ life. Both game auctions and supermarkets make it easier for 
buyers and sellers in that the wares are viewed choices are made (...). Farmers 
have counted their domestic stock, but not their game for over a century in 
South Africa. Domestic stock has always had an economic value attached to it 
whereas game has not! For instance, if a farmer knew that he could get R50,- 
for every daisy shot on his farm – the farmer would sooner, rather than later, 
want to know how many R50,-s were running on his property and whether or 
not the population was viable (...) remember it [game HW] now has an aesthetic 
as well as an economic value attached to it’.65 The hunting frenzy continues in a 
Newsletter in 1994, which is now called the Guinea-fowl, where the Editorial 
tells that the Conservancy Officer has been to two international hunting 
conventions, Safari Club International and Dallas Safari Club, which are 
portrayed as probably the biggest in the United States of America.66 
 The Professional Hunters Association of South Africa (PHASA) has been 
keeping records of average trophy fees since 1995. This is quite a difficult task 
to accomplish because not all of the hunting businesses are willing to say what 
prices they ask for trophies. Some will only give them for some common 
species, but not for the more rare species because those prices are more subject 
to negotiation between hunting operator and client than are the general trophies. 
For that reason, prices can vary and since 1996 they simply indicate the range in 
between which the prices fall. Some animals are included in one list and not in 
the other. For instance lion trophy prices are included in the figures for 1995 but  
                                                           
64  Pp. 5, NCA Newsletter, no. 4, 1986. 
65  Pp. 1, NCA Newsletter, no. 3, 1989. 
66  Pp. 2, The Guinea-fowl, no. 1, 1994. 
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Table 1 
Average trophy fees 1995-1997 in South Africa (PHASA), in US$ 
 Avg.  Avg. Avg. Range Avg. Avg. Range  
 trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy 
  fee fee fee fee fee fee fee  
  1995 1996 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 
Species  (low) (high)  (low) (high) 
Baboon 80 55 105 50-125 65 100 50-115 
Blesbok 285 230 330 150-400 25 420 200-450 
Blesbok, White 550 565 750 400-950 595 670 580-700 
Bontebok 1250 1185 1575 1000-1700 870 1400 750-1600 
Buffalo 4500 3250 5400 3000-6000 3000 6450 2500-6995 
Bushbuck 485 480 600 380-750 505 665 450-750 
Bushpig 290 220 320 110-400 250 395 180-500 
Caracal 225 150 240 150-280 
Cheetah 2750  
Civet 210 145 375 140-400 
Deer, Fallow 385 365 600 250-795 345 500 300-500 
Duiker, Blue 550 625 730 475-800 575 800 480-850 
Duiker, Grey 165 120 220 100-275 150 220 100-275 
Duiker, Red 660 600 775 400-800 515 785 450-800 
Eland 1465 1260 1650 1150-2000 1400 1750 1200-1995 
Gemsbok 840 780 1025 600-1300 785 950 700-1300 
Genet  75 175 50-200 
Giraffe 2500 2425 3115  2500-3400 1595 3150 1200-4000 
Grysbok, Cape 610 545 935  400-1000 565 740 470-850 
Grysbok, Sharp’s 565 350 500 350-500 485 700 470-700 
Hartebeest, Red 740 695 1075 550-1250 725 880 645-1100 
Hyena 430 
Impala 210 210 310 135-350 215 315 135-350 
Jackal 60 50 105 50-150 50 105 50-150 
Klipspringer 500 515 650 350-700 490 650 400-700 
Kudu, Eastern Cape 815 715 950 695-1100 825 980 800-1200 
Kudu, Greater 880 875 985  600-1250 905 1150 875-1250 
Lechwe, Red 1380 1210 1565 1000-1600 1215 1450 1200-1600 
Leopard 2880 1450 3075 2000-3500 2250 3300 2000-3800 
Lion  3750 6000 3000-6000 
Nyala (male) 1270 1265 1585 1050-1700 1265 1585 1100-1700 
Oribi 725 825 1000  750-1000 645 1285 570-1500 
Ostrich  700 600 1375 350-1700 485 1050 300-1250 
Reedbuck, Common 480 490 645 400-745 450 625 350-700 
Reedbuck, Mountain 360 375 515 300-570 340 485 250-600 
Rhebok, Vaal 645 590 790 500-850 635 800 570-850 
Roan 6825  
Sable 5385 3500 5165 3500-5500 3250 4500 3000-5500 
       cont.>> 
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Table 1, cont. 
Average trophy fees 1995-1997 in South Africa (PHASA), in US$ 
 Avg.  Avg. Avg. Range Avg. Avg. Range  
 trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy trophy 
  fee fee fee fee fee fee fee  
  1995 1996 1996 1996 1997 1997 1997 
Species  (low) (high)  (low) (high) 
Springbok 225 230 325 200-375 210 325 150-375 
Springbok, Black 435 340 580 250-700 420 535 350-600 
Springbok, White 475 355 585 350-650 450 600 400-650 
Steinbok 175 200 285 125-375 185 250 100-275 
Suni, Livingstones 790 725 1050 675-1200 730 950 600-1000 
Tsessebe 1720  
Warthog 200 150 225 110-275 200 260 150-350 
Waterbuck, Common 1235 1210 1450 1000-1650 1250 1545 1000-1800 
Wildebeest, Black 695 635 865 500-1050 710 845 600-950 
Wildebeest, Blue 725 675 875 550-1050 700 875 570-1100 
Zebra, Burchell’s 820 775 1100 600-1250 795 940 700-1000 
Zebra, Hartmann’s 1050 
 
 
not for 1996 or 1997. The caracal is included in 1995 and 1996, but not in 1997. 
See Table 1 for comparative details. 
 Brenda Crook, an American biologist from Colorado State University, in a 
paper in 1995, comes to the conclusion that ‘recreational hunting and culling’ 
are the ‘most obvious’ ways of earning revenues in conservancies and which is 
encouraged and facilitated by the NPB.67 In 1997 the Deputy Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, also explicitly supported the role of 
hunting in South Africa by saying that ‘hunting in SA was making a real 
contribution to the protection of ecosystems and wildlife’ and that the draft 
policy on conservation contained a sentence which read ‘(g)overnment ... will 
continue to support programmes that utilise indigenous wildlife sustainably for 
subsistence purposes and commercial gain’.68 One of the ways the NPB stimu-
lates conservancies to develop hunting activities, apart from advice and the like, 
is giving discounts, of about 15-20% at wildlife auctions.69 Table 2 shows what
                                                           
67  Pp. 5, Crook, B. (May 1995), The Conservancy Concept, with Special Emphasis on 
Natal, South Africa. Unpublished paper, Department of Wildlife Biology, Colorado 
State University. 
68  Bushcraft Mag-e-Zine Archive News Article, courtesy of the Business Day, 
Government support for role of hunting in SA, 16 April 1997, taken from Internet: 
http://www.wildnetafrica.co.za/bushcraft. 
69  Interview with Conservancy Officer of the NPB, 4 March 1998. 
 
 Through this
close co-operation between the NPB and conservancies, the latter have been able
to develop at a much higher pace than would otherwise have been possible. 
The first has been able to extend its influence on wildlife management in the  
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the prices were for the several species in South Africa in 1997.
 
Table 2 
Average prices for wildlife at wildlife auctions in South Africa, 1997 
Species Average price Highest price Lowest price 
  in Rand* in Rand* in Rand* 
Blesbok 613 1.020 380 
Blesbok (yellow) 1,556 1,600 1,520 
Blesbok (white) 793 1,250 550 
Bontebok 2,450 2,450 2,450 
Buffalo (FMD free) 73,854 150,000 26,000 
Bushpig 1,250 1,250 1,250 
Duiker (grey) 724 1,100 400 
Eland 4,025 7,800 2,400 
Gemsbok 2,635 4,600 1,800 
Giraffe 9,323 13,000 6,000 
Impala 627 1,850 425 
Klipspringer 4,363 6,000 3,200 
Kudu 1,889 4,400 1,400 
Lechwe 3,500 3,600 3,450 
Nyala 3,129 6,300 3,100 
Ostrich 913 3,000 180 
Red Hartebeest 2,485 3,750 1,500 
Reedbuck 2,315 3,100 2,000 
Reedbuck 1,301 3,000 375 
Rhinoceros (white) 74,309 160,000 41,000 
Roan 26,400 38,000 15,000 
Sable 24,892 36,000 13,000 
Springbok 403 700 220 
Springbok (black) 629 1,500 500 
Springbok (white) 1,371 1,875 770 
Steinbok 1,107 1,700 657 
Warthog 500 500 500 
Waterbuck 3,358 5,700 2,000 
Wildebeest (black) 2,219 3,200 2,000 
Wildebeest (blue) 2,226 5,800 1,800 
Zebra (hartman) 2,388 3,500 2,000 
* 1 Rand average 1997= 0,217 US$  
                                                           
70  Based on Game & Hunt, January - February 1997, vol. 4/1, pp. 11. 
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province outside the sphere of formally protected areas considerably. Both 
could be happy with this outcome.  
 One message that came across loud and clear was that local communities 
surrounding these conservancies were not ‘part of the deal’. In fact, the 
widening of the gap between conservancy and neighbouring communities seems 
to form the baseline of conservancy development. In the first place by the 
employment of game guards who tried to prevent the communities from 
poaching and in the process, tried to seal the borders between the two. Later, in 
the 1980s, when hunting was being increasingly promoted and considered a 
lucrative economic activity for conservancies to pay their way, the separation 
became even more visible and rigorous through the erection of fences around 
hunting areas to prevent wildlife causing trouble in neighbouring communities, 
to keep the ‘walking monetary value’ on your property, but also to prevent 
people from coming in. Commercial hunting and the involvement of communi-
ties seemed fairly antithetical developments. According to a NPB officer 
working on the programme of Community Conservation ‘a fence is thebottom 
line for conservationists and for the communities’. In the particular context of 
KwaZulu-Natal there is an interesting connotation to fences in relation to the 
Zulu language. In Zulu the word for fence is icingu, which means the material 
the fence is made of. Shaya icingu means ‘hit the wire’ and figuratively means 
making a phone call. A conservancy fence is in this context thus a very potent 
way for the communities to communicate their message to the other side of the 
fence; communities talk back through fences. This officer told the story of how 
the NPB had created Forums to be used as a platform to talk about problems 
and other issues of communities. In the Forums NPB Officers as well as 
community representatives participate. The NPB thought that the community 
was setting the agenda for a particular meeting. So the NPB was satisfied about 
the progress these Forums made and also thought that the communities ‘were 
happy’. All the while these communities were damaging fences and fence 
material was stolen. In the end it came out that this was their way of indicating 
that they wanted a more senior NPB representative to attend the Forum to speak 
with.71 In the domain of formal conservation there was an increasingly louder, 
international call during the second half of the 1980s urging local communities 
in wildlife management directly, or at least grant them some of the economic 
benefits from the activities of wildlife utilisation by way of indirect involve-
ment.72 The underlying assumption was that if they were involved in this way 
                                                           
 
71  Interview with NPB Officer, 18 March 1998. 
72  See for instance IIED (July 1994), Whose Eden? An Overview of Community 
Approaches to Wildlife Management, London: IIED; Wells, M. & Brandon, K. (with 
Hannah, L.) (1992), People and Parks. Linking Protected Area Management with 
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they would sense the monetary value of wildlife and as a result feel the 
necessity to protect this valuable asset. In the process they would develop a 
more positive conservation ethos. In the formally protected areas this know-
ledge has resulted in all kinds of formal and structural programmes to involve 
neighbouring communities, one way or the other, in the process of wildlife 
management. In August 1994 the National Parks Board of South Africa inaugu-
rated a Social Ecology Section.73 The Board said it recognise(s) that poverty is 
the greatest threat to bio-diversity and environmental integrity. For that reason 
a policy has been formulated which will integrate the human needs and aspira-
tions of national parks’ neighbours in its conservation mandate’.74 Obviously not 
the people as such who are the prime reason but their being a threat to the 
Board’s conservation principles. No such or any other programme has been 
developed so far in the context of private wildlife conservancies. There are 
individual conservancies which embark on similar programmes, but there is no 
official policy regarding neighbouring communities at the level of the NCA for 
instance. The subject is also never writ large in the Newsletter. One conser-
vancy in KwaZulu-Natal thought it wise to engage someone to start a commu-
nity-relations programme so they attracted an employee for that job and sent 
him to all kinds of courses to learn the ‘tricks of the trade’. After he had 
finished all that and had been working only three weeks, he was found dead, 
shot, with his two assistants in his brand new 4X4. They never found out who 
exactly did it or for what reason, but the fact remains that a community-rela-
tions officer was murdered.75 
 The conservancy concept was taken over from South Africa by Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. Namibia will not be dealt with in the context of this book because 
the conservancy concept is mainly applied to communal conservancies by the 
government.76 A description and analysis of the developments in Zimbabwe 
                                                           
 
Local Communities, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, The World Wildlife Fund, 
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73  Pp. 31, National Parks Board of South Africa, Annual Report 1993-1994. 
74  Pp. 49, National Parks Board of South Africa, Annual Report 1994-1995. Italics 
added. 
75  Personal communication with Conservancy Officer NPB, 2 November 1998. 
76  Jones, B.T.B. (1995), Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal 
Areas: Benefits to Communities and Improved Resource Management, Windhoek: 
Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 
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with regard to the development of conservancies in relation to the history of the 
Land Question is the topic of the next chapter. 
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Private wildlife conservancies and 
the Land Question in Zimbabwe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zimbabwe has much in common with South Africa. They have shared much 
common history throughout the twentieth century. Both were granted effective 
independence from Britain under white minority rule, South Africa in 1910 and 
Southern Rhodesia in 1923. Both countries experienced a war as a result of 
responses to black liberation movements, and international sanctions in support 
of these movements, to remove the white minority from political power. Many 
of the early radical ideas of black resistance in Zimbabwe, going back to the 
first half of the twentieth century, came from South Africa through Zimbab-
wean men who worked in the mines or who went to South Africa for education.1 
In both countries whites were forced out of political power, but their economic 
power remained largely intact.2 Much of that power is vested in the unequal 
land distribution between black and white in these countries. The resulting 
imbalance in land ownership and possession was further aggravated by unequal 
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access to support services. Economic and institutional support favoured the 
white above black farmers.3 In both countries the relations between black and 
white have always been dominated by their struggle for the possession and use 
of land.4 
 Here I want to relate the development of conservancies in Zimbabwe in the 
1990s to the historical developments of the Land Question in Zimbabwe 
primarily till 1999. It also serves as an exploration of the rival identities of black 
and white related to land in the particular context of Zimbabwe. After a short 
description of the physical features of Zimbabwe, I shall commence my 
description and analysis on the day the first white people arrived in this part of 
southern Africa in 1890 with the Pioneer Column5 and started a process of land 
appropriation. Black farmers made vociferous protests about this process. In 
first instance mainly locally, but the process grew out into a national and more 
or less united struggle over land in the 1970s in the struggle for independence.6 
In 1980 a black majority government took over and I shall describe what 
happened in relation to land policy in the 1980s, up till 1992 when the radical 
Land Acquisition Act was installed. I shall end this chapter by describing and 
analysing the impact of this latter Act for the development of conservancies in 
Zimbabwe in the period between 1992 and 1999. 
 
 
                                                           
3  Pp. 98, Keith, T. (1994), Lessons from Southern Africa, In: Minnaar, A. (ed.)(1994). 
4  Pp. 128, Denoon, D. (1972), Southern Africa since 1800, London: Longman. 
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Publishing Group.  
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The physical features of present-day Zimbabwe 
 
An understanding of the physical aspects of Zimbabwe is essential because they 
have a direct bearing on the answer to the question of whether a wildlife 
conservancy is tolerated and accepted by the government as form of land use or 
not. In particular parts of Zimbabwe, conservancies were not allowed because it 
was considered good land for agriculture in particular cash crops for food or 
export. This is an upshot of a conjunction of the soil conditions and the climatic 
circumstances in particular parts of the country. Zimbabwe is a landlocked 
country with no direct access to the sea. The shortest distance to the sea by rail 
or road, 287 km, is via Beira in Mozambique.7 Zimbabwe is dominated by a 
plateau at 600-1300 m. above sea level. The gentle undulating landscape is 
often broken by bornhardts, enormous, usually upstanding, bare rocks and 
smaller kopjes, isolated granite hills, which makes cultivation difficult. This 
typical aspect of the country is most common in the two provinces in which the 
SVC is located, Masvingo and Manicaland Provinces.8 The country is physi-
ographically divided into four zones, based on the criterion of altitude: High-
veld, 1200-1500 metres; Middleveld 600-1200 metres; Lowveld, below 600 
metres and a separate category for the Eastern Highlands, which raise above 
1500 metres (see Map 2).9  
 Zimbabwe’s climate is moderate because of its altitude and dominated by 
three seasons: 
• A hot dry season, from mid-August till the onset of the rains between the end 
of October and January; 
• The warm to hot wet season which can last till March or April, temporarily 
interrupted by a dry spell in February; 
• Cool to warm dry season from April till August with cool nights and warm 
sunny days.10  
Without going into detail of soil types, slopes, percentages of rainfall and the 
like it is important for my argument to remember that Zimbabwe is mapped and 
divided into five Regions, I to V, which are in fact agro-ecological zones. The 
Regions correspond to a large extent to the physiographical areas mentioned 
above. Only the Lowveld is subdivided into two regions. The categorisation into 
Natural Regions is used as a basis for land-use planning, including land desig-
nation and resettlement schemes.  
                                                           
7  Moyo a.o. 1991: 21. 
8  Ibid: 23. 
9  Pp. 304, Moyo, S., O’Keefe, P. & Sill, M. (1993), The Southern African 
Environment. Profiles of the SADC Countries, London: Earthscan Publications. 
10  Ibid: 305. 
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 Map 2: Physiographical division of Zimbabwe in four zones 
  (Source: see footnote 85) 
 
• Natural Region I: Characterised by high altitude, cool temperatures and high, 
reliable rainfall of over 1000 mm. It comprises 5835 km², being the Eastern 
Highlands in Manica Province, bordering Mozambique; 
• Natural Region II: This is the region where most large-scale commercial 
farmers are to be found with an average rainfall between 700-1000 mm. 
annually. Here most maize and tobacco farmers are to be found. It comprises 
72,745 km² mainly in the northeast of the country around the capital Harare; 
• Natural Region III: This region contains a high proportion of communal 
land. Rainfall is between 650-800 annually, but usually comes in infrequent 
heavy storms. The area comprises 67,690 km²; 
• Natural Region IV: Rainfall is between 450-650 mm. per annum. The 
Region forms the transition area between the middleveld and lowveld. The 
area is prone to seasonal droughts. Together with Region V this area was 
particularly hard-hit by the 1982-1984 drought and the drought in the early 
1990s. The area comprises of 128,370 km² with a high proportion of 
Communal Land; 
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 Map 3: Categorisation of Natural Regions in Zimbabwe 
  (Source: see footnote 85) 
 
• Natural Region V: This final category is reserved for the low-lying zone of 
the lowveld with an annual rainfall of less than 450 mm., which is on top of 
that also unreliable. Without irrigation only extensive animal husbandry is 
possible. And even that proved not to be a viable economic option in the 
long run. Apart from agricultural crops like sugar-cane, based on extensive 
irrigation, wildlife utilisation, for example through tourism of all sorts, is 
today considered one of the most economically viable options for this 
region. The area covers 112,810 km² (see Map 3).11  
                                                           
 
11  Ibid: 306. Droughts occur(ed) regularly in southern Africa. An overview since 1800 
for instance shows that there were (severe) droughts almost every twenty years. 
1820-1830 was a severe drought period. Not only for southern Africa, but for the 
whole continent. 1844-1849 were five consecutive drought years. Over the period 
between 1875-1919 rainfall gradually decreased in southern Africa, ending with a 
severe drought in 1910. 1921-1930 saw severe droughts in the area. From 1930 to 
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The Land Question in Zimbabwe, 1890-1980 
 
First contact 
In 1889 the British South Africa Company (BSAC) was granted a Royal 
Charter by the British government. Under this charter the company was author-
ised to enter and exploit territories north of the Limpopo River, but no further 
then the Zambezi River. The BSAC, that is, Cecil John Rhodes, expected to find 
great mineral wealth in the area designated by the charter, just as they had found 
diamonds in Kimberly and gold in Witwatersrand.12  
 This Royal Charter illuminates the location of the south and north boundary 
of present day Zimbabwe, namely the Limpopo River in the south and the 
Zambezi River in the north. In the east it was necessary to deal and negotiate 
with the Portuguese who were also a signatory to the Treaty of Berlin and who 
ruled over Portuguese East Africa.13 In the west the charter was bounded by the 
British Protectorate of Bechuanaland or ‘the road to the north’ as it was called.14 
These were all ‘European’ constraints. Rhodes also had to deal with the African 
population which in the west of the chartered area was comprised of the 
Ndebele, led by their king, Lobengula.15 He is described as an impressive man 
                                                           
the second half of the 1960s rainfall was pretty good with an occasional bad year. 
From 1967 till 1973 the region was fairly dry again. Finally in the 1980s and early 
1990s there were many droughts: 1981-1982; 1982; 1983; 1986-1987 and finally in 
1991-1992 the worst drought in living memory (pp. 91, Southern African Research 
& Documentation Centre (SARDC), IUCN & SADC (1994), State of the Environ-
ment in Southern Africa, Harare: SARDC.  
12  Thomas 1996: resp. 154-160 & 161-163. 
13  Pp. 425-430, Best, J. & Zinyama, L.M. (1985), The Evolution of the National 
Boundary of Zimbabwe, Journal of Historical Geography, 11 (4): 419-432. 
14  Pp. 348, Wesseling, H.L. (1992), Verdeel en heers. De deling van Afrika, 1880-1914 
(translation: Divide and Rule. The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914), Amsterdam: 
Uitgeverij Bert Bakker. The British, or rather Rhodes’, expansion in southern Africa 
from south to north, especially north of the Zambezi, former Northern Rhodesia, 
now Zambia, brought him into conflict with the Portuguese who had envisioned a 
‘contra-costa’ empire in southern Africa connecting Mozambique in the east with 
Angola in the west. Rhodes’s march and annexation literally bisected the Portuguese 
ambitions (ibid: 370-371). 
15  Pp. 2, note 5, it is important to differentiate between the Transvaal Ndebele and the 
followers of Mzilikazi, who eventually settled in present-day Zimbabwe. Lobengula 
was the son of Mzilikazi. The Transvaal Ndebele live in KwaNdebele in South 
Africa, Paton, E.M. (1999), Population pressure and land degradation: historical 
perspectives on population and resources in KwaNdebele, paper presented at the 
conference African Environments, Past and Present, 5-8 July, St. Anthony’s 
College, Oxford. 
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who was considered ‘every inch a king’.16 As a king he owned ‘absolutely land, 
subjects, cattle and grain’.17 So, if the BSAC planned to launch any exploration 
in the north, it had to negotiate a deal with Lobengula. In 1888 Lobengula was 
visited by a delegation from Rhodes, headed by one of Rhodes’s trusted 
companions, Charles Rudd. After long days of negotiations, he was eventually 
able to press Lobengula to sign a favourable concession18 in which they were 
granted ‘complete and exclusive charge of over all metals and minerals situated 
and contained in my [Lobengula HW] Kingdom, Principalities and Dominions, 
together with full power to do all things that they may deem necessary to win 
and procure the same...’.19 In exchange for these favours they paid Lobengula 
with a 1000 Martini-Henry rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition and a steam-
boat to be delivered on the Zambezi River. Over and above this, Lobengula 
would receive a stipend of £100 a month.20 ‘The Rudd Concession is considered 
the modest beginning of the Land Question in Zimbabwe’.21 although in actual 
fact it was not a grant in land but a concession of mineral rights. In other words, 
it was a grant in a particular form of exploitative land use; land became, 
contrary to African notions of land, an exchangeable commodity. Rhodes 
thought that he had reached a historic deal opening up all the land of the 
Ndebele and of their tributaries, the Shona falling under them, who were living 
in the east of present-day Zimbabwe. He thought he had covered the whole area 
in one deal with Lobengula. But that was in fact not true at all.  
 Rudd’s party and Rhodes had taken Lobengula’s rhetoric in which he 
claimed that he was the ‘undisputed ruler over Matabele land and Mashonaland’ 
at face value. But, although Lobengula raided the Shona and extracted tribute 
from them, he did not rule them. In fact, his kingdom did not extend any further 
                                                           
16  Rotberg in Wesseling 1992: 366. 
17  Mutambara 1981: 144. 
18  Although the negotiations were not what we would call ‘fair’, Two people played an 
important role in ‘convincing’ Lobengula, a missionary by the name of Helm, who 
was a trusted interpreter of Lobengula, and the Imperial Deputy-Commissioner of 
the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland, Shippard. The first deceived Lobengula 
with verbal promises, which were never put into the concession document. The 
second assured Lobengula that England would only like to see a peaceful and 
friendly relationship with the king, while in actual fact he wanted the Ndebele 
kingdom destroyed, which would come to pass a few years later (Thomas 1996: 
192-195) See also the beautiful narrative account of this period by Zimbabwean 
writer Samkange, S. (1966) On Trial for my Country, Oxford: Heinemann. 
19  Known as ‘The Rudd Concession’, 30 October 1888, pp. 262, Rotberg, R.I. (1988), 
The Founder. Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
20  Thomas 1996: 196. 
21  Mutambara 1981: 154. 
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than a sixty-mile radius around Bulawayo.22 It is said that Rhodes and Rudd’s 
party went along with the king’s rhetoric for strategic advantage of having to 
deal with only one authority covering the whole area.23 There is also a possibil-
ity that it might also have been an authentic belief of Rhodes and those with him 
consonant in line with the observation that the British were far more sympa-
thetic to warrior states like the Ndebele, than to peasant states like the Shona. In 
historiography scholars have paid more attention to the heroic warrior state of 
the Ndebele than to the peasant and sedentary Shona.24 From this perspective it 
was considered only ‘natural’ that the Ndebele ruled the Shona and that if the 
negotiators agreed on a deal with Lobengula, that this would also imply the 
inclusion of Shona territory. This tendency was reinforced and reproduced later 
in history when ‘it was part of the Rhodesian mythology that the Shona were a 
miserable, cowardly lot who had only been saved from extinction at the hands 
of the Ndebele by the coming of colonial rule, for which they were remarkably 
ungrateful’.25 
 Parallel to Rhodes’s initiative, at the beginning of 1889, between 1500 and 
2000 Boers decided to migrate from Zoutpansberg (South Africa) and settle in 
Shona domain across the Limpopo River. Louis P. Bowler claimed that he 
received permission from a Shona Chief for this. Frederick Courtenay Selous, 
the famous white hunter, also claimed that he was granted a concession by two 
Shona chiefs for exclusive mineral rights in a large chunk of land in their 
country. When he heard about the Rudd Concession, he began to write articles 
in newspapers claiming that Lobengula had no claim on Mashonaland at all and 
that consequently Rhodes had no legal claims to that area.26 In other words, 
Selous contested Rhodes’s claims. What complicated the matter even further for 
Rhodes was that Selous was invited, he was fluent in Ndebele and very popular 
in Britain on the strength of his 1880 book A hunter’s wanderings in Africa, 
when two of Lobengula’s indunas (generals) visited Queen Victoria to consult 
her about the white men entering his country. Because of Selous’s presence, the 
official interpreter, Colenbrander, had no other option than to translate correctly 
without being able to favour Rhodes’s cause through selective or twisted 
translation.27 This resulted in a situation in which the Queen gave a written 
answer to Lobengula which his two indunas had to deliver to him personally. In 
                                                           
22  Ibid: 42, note 71. 
23  Thomas 1996: 197. 
24  Pp. 11, Beach, D. (1994), The Shona and their Neighbours, Oxford, Cambridge 
(USA): Blackwell. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Thomas 1996: 202. 
27  Ibid: 204-205. 
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it she made clear that the negotiations had not been carried out with the Queen’s 
authority and that Lobengula should not exclude other willing and deserving 
men from deals with him. ‘A King gives a stranger an ox, not his whole herd of 
cattle, otherwise what would other strangers arriving have to eat ...?’28 This 
opened the doors wide for Rhodes’s competitors and was lethal to his own plans 
in the area. He countered this danger by opening a diplomatic offensive on the 
key-players in Great Britain in this scramble, by offering them money or shares 
in the BSAC and a place in his encompassing vision and scheme to rule Africa, 
if only they would support his cause. Aware of every trick, he took care that the 
Queen’s letter to Lobengula was only delivered much later. By that time the 
major players in London were all firmly behind Rhodes’s plans (that is, bought) 
and whatever the Queen’s letter advised Lobengula could not have undermined 
Rhodes’s plans anymore. It became a ‘major victory’ for Rhodes29 in terms of 
his enormous capabilities of winning, persuading and buying people to adopt 
his course and vision, although it would turn out not to be a victory for the 
African people.30 These developments also made it perfectly clear to Rhodes and 
the British government that they had to make haste with settling people in 
Ndebele and Shonaland. Rhodes ordered Johnson to recruit a group of pioneers, 
and especially to select a large enough group of people from influential, largely 
English-speaking families. If Lobengula then decided to attack them or cut them 
off, the prominent fathers of the pioneers would demand assistance and imperial 
forces could come to the rescue. But who could be best approached to guide 
them through the still unknown land? Who knew the country best? Unfortu-
nately for Rhodes it was Selous. He was familiar with that part of Africa. He 
even shot his first elephant there, although Selous was not the first white hunter 
to wander through Lobengula’s country. That ‘honour’ has to be accorded to 
William Finaughty who preceded Selous by several years and who also went 
into Mashonaland, north of Lobengula’s territory. Rhodes had to convince 
Selous to guide the pioneer group into Matabeleland.  
 Characteristically he also ‘sold him out’ for ‘£2000,- in cash, a hundred De 
Beers shares, of which he was chairman and through which company in gold 
and diamonds he amassed great financial fortune, a grant of 21,000 acres in 
Mashonaland and a salary of £2 5s a day’.31 Selous promised not to write any 
more damaging stories and his concession with Chief Mapondera was ‘folded 
into the Company’.32 To be prepared should Lobengula decide to attack them, as 
                                                           
28  Ibid: 206. 
29  Ibid: 206-207. 
30  Ibid: 206-212. 
31  Thomas 1996: 217. 
32  Rotberg 1988: 295. 
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Selous and Jameson had warned Rhodes,33 the column was fitted out with ‘all 
the paraphernalia of modern warfare’,34 like machine-guns, Martini-Henry rifles, 
searchlights, rocket launchers and the like, all loaded on 117 wagons. In this 
fashion they could leave on the 26 June 1890, in a Pioneer Column which 
stretched for two and a half miles35 to go ‘up-country’36 for the ultimate goal of 
finding gold, just like in South Africa in Witwatersrand. The consummation 
which they expected on the high plateau of Mashonaland.37 All the people on the 
column were promised they would be allowed ‘to peg out fifteen mining claims 
each’38 after the demobilisation when they had reached their goal. In actual fact 
they were promised land. From that perspective the Rudd Concession can 
indeed be interpreted as the beginning of the Land Question in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Annexation of the Lowveld 
 
The first resting place of the Pioneer Column was Fort Victoria39 (now Bula-
wayo). From there on a group moved further north in the direction of Fort 
Hampden (now Harare). A small contingent of the Column stayed in Fort 
                                                           
33  Their warning was based on the rage of the Ndebele and Lobengula’s indunas about 
the deal their king had struck with Rhodes. To vindicate himself before his people, 
Lobengula condemned his personal advisor on the Rudd deal, Lotshe, to death, 
together with all his family and descendants, which was directly and literally 
executed (Thomas 1996: 212). 
34  Rotberg 1988: 299. 
35  Thomas 1996: 218-219. 
36  ‘There’s magic in these words for all old South Africans. (...) “Up-country” will 
bring back to the Pioneer of the ‘nineties a recollection of the creaking wagon; the 
patient, straining bullocks; the unearthly scream of a hyena breaking in on the soft 
silence of the veld at night; the camp fire at the outspan, and the cool, early trek 
when the morning star is paling before the grey-green dawn. (...) Only the pleasant 
experiences are remembered. The discomforts are forgotten, or merely recalled with 
a grin.’, pp. 7, Marshall Hole, H. (1928), Old Rhodesian Days, London, MacMillan 
and Co., Ltd. 
37  Rotberg 1988: 295. 
38  Ibid: 300. 
39  Pp. 22, note 1, The appendage ‘Fort’ was soon dropped, but in 1921 it was officially 
renamed Fort Victoria. ‘Notice 270 in the Government Gazette No. 1392 read that 
‘it is hereby notified His Honour the Administrator has approved of the alteration of 
the name of the town to ‘Fort Victoria’ by which name it shall be known for all 
official purposes as from 1st July 1921’. It appears that the reason for this change 
was that for some time there had been a muddle in the mail whereby post for 
Victoria, Rhodesia, was being sent to Victoria, Australia, and vice versa.’ Sayce, K. 
(1978), A Town Called Victoria, Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia. 
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Victoria prompted to do so by an ‘unshakeable faith in the mineral wealth of the 
district, a belief no doubt fostered by the evidence of the gold-mining activity of 
the ancient in the precincts of the nearby Zimbabwe Ruins’.40 The ruins were the 
first target in the pioneer’s endeavours to try and find gold. Under the guise of 
doing archaeological research and excavations, a company, called Rhodesia 
Ancient Ruins Ltd., acquired a concession to dig at the site. But, instead of 
laying bare the remains of an African civilisation, they ‘dug the ground, sifted 
the gold they found thereby and assigned it to the melting pot’.41 The largest 
company looking for mineral wealth in the area was the Consolidated African 
Copper Trust, a company which not only had concessions in Matabelland but, 
by 1905, also ‘held most of the Sabi [Mashonaland] copper claims, including 
the original Bradley’s Coper, which was renamed Umkondo in 1903’.42 This is 
interesting to note because the remains of the Umkondo claim now form part of 
the SVC. Although the expectations were sky-high, not many minerals were 
found. The exception was Umkondo, where there was copper in sufficient 
quantities but transport difficulties ‘caused work to decline slowly till the mine 
was compelled to shut down in 1910’.43 
 In 1893 and 1896, the Matabele rose in revolt in protest about unfair white 
claims to the land, which resulted in violent clashes between the Matabele and 
the white imperialists. Selous was still active in helping Rhodes and helped to 
suppress the two Matabele uprisings. Superior firepower secured and consoli-
dated Rhodes’s power in Rhodesia, battering the warrior state of the Matabele 
into subjugation.44 As a result, the BSAC jurisdiction over Matabeleland was 
confirmed by Order in Council on 18 July 1894, which authorised Jameson, 
Rhodes’s aide in Rhodesia, to allot farmland and gold claims. The Order of 
Council set the boundaries for the new state of Southern Rhodesia, encompass-
ing Matabele and Shonaland and Manica.45 Rhodes could be satisfied with these 
developments as ‘Rhodesia was ... to him (...) as her first-born (...) to a 
                                                           
40  Sayce 1978: text on dustcover. 
41  Ibid: 64. In fact Rhodes’s dream that he would find a ‘second Witwatersrand’ had 
already been shattered in 1894 when a survey concluded that Rhodesia contained 
various mineral resources like nickel, copper and coal, but only some (very) modest 
supplies of gold (Thomas 1996: 279). 
42  Sayce 1978: 92. 
43  Ibid: 102. 
44  Rotberg 1988: 418-449 & 551-580; Thomas 1996: 234-260. 
45  Thomas 1996: 259. By 1893 there were some 3000 Europeans in what would 
become Southern Rhodesia (pp. 39, Yudelman, M. (1964), Africans on the Land, 
Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University 
Press). 
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woman’.46 More important than Rhodes’s sentiments is the fact that the white 
invaders ‘brought with them new ideas and technology, most importantly the 
notions of exclusive access to land and the concept of fixed boundaries (...)’.47 
What Scoones has called ‘the politics of straight lines’ in colonial Zimbabwe.48 
These straight lines had been translated in South Africa in the 1880s into the 
erection of fences, following the introduction of fencing in many other parts of 
the Western world.49 At the first agricultural census in 1918 the Cape Province 
alone lists 15,000 farms completely fenced and 13,000 partly fenced on a total 
of 31,000 farms. For the Union of South Africa the figures were respectively 
38,000 and 30,000 in a total of 76,000 farms.50 The material for the fencing was 
imported mainly from the United States of America. After 1922 barbed wire 
became popular and was imported in much larger quantities than smooth 
fencing wire.51 Just like in America, wire fences were made to ‘keep things 
apart’. The effect of wire fences in a country already segregated in terms of 
black and white can be easily guessed. It follows as the night the day that wire 
was used with great enthusiasm for fencing National Parks. In Kruger National 
Park there was a ‘steely desire for hard edges’. In the apartheid years a fence 
came to be seen as of ‘National importance, given the fact that it will form the 
boundary between White and Bantu districts’.52 In Zimbabwe, as in Botswana, 
fencing assumed great importance as a control measure for the periodic 
outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), when these countries started to 
export beef to the European Economic Commission (EEC) in the 1950s and 
                                                           
46  Stent in Rotberg 1988: 555. 
47  Pp. 5, Mitchell, L.J. (1999), Land and ASocial Constructions on the Cedarberg 
frontier. Contested Resource Use in Colonial South Africa, c. 1725-1795, paper 
presented at the conference African Environments, Past and Present, 5-8 July, St. 
Anthony’s College, Oxford. 
48  Pp. 44, Scoones, I. (1996), Range Management Science and Policy. Politics, 
Polemics and Pasture in Southern Africa, in: Leach, M. & Mearns, R. (eds), The Lie 
of the Land. Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment, London: 
The International African Institute in association with Oxford: James Currey and 
Portsmouth (N.H.) Heinemann. 
49  Pp. 5, Archer, S. (1999), Technology and Ecology in the Karoo: a Century of 
Windmills, Wire and Changing Farm Practice, paper presented at the conference 
African Environments, Past and Present, 5-8 July, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford. 
There were pioneers who already experienced with wire fencing in South Africa in 
the 1870s (ibid: 7). 
50  Ibid: 7. 
51  Ibid: 8. 
52  Pp. 31-32, Bunn, D. (1999), An Unnatural State: Tourism, Water, and Wildlife 
Photography in the Early Kruger National Park, paper presented at the conference 
African Environments, Past and Present, 5-8 July, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford. 
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1960s. The European Commission (EC) refused to accept unspecified meat and 
blocked its export when there was even the slightest indication or fear of a 
possible contamination by FMD.53 In order to control the disease the Depart-
ments of Veterinary Services used an extensive fencing systems, with no room 
for negotiation and manoeuvring. A fixed boundary in the form of a barbed wire 
fence then becomes a statement in itself.54  
 The whites in Africa introduced these fixed boundaries and later, to combat 
FMD and poaching, fencing became a common practice throughout southern 
Africa, accompanied by a rising tide of protest against the practice. The fence 
came to symbolise the segregation of black and white on either side of the 
frontier it represented. It also became a symbol of the written and fixed 
boundary of the fence by whites versus the especially oral and flexible 
boundary of the Africans.55 The fence became the white ‘signature’ on the land.56 
 Right from the start white pioneers in present-day Zimbabwe claimed and 
demarcated territory (not straightaway with fences but eventually this was the 
case), which was also the primary incentive for joining the Column in the first 
place. From their first point of arrival at Fort Victoria, they spread out further 
inland claiming land, setting boundaries and ‘writing’ them into the land. 
Already by 1893 a group of people had moved on from Fort Victoria to the east 
where a group of white farmers had been settled across the Sabi River in the 
northern Chipinga Hills since 1891. That first group endured many hardships to 
reach their destination, a story recounted in a book about the village of 
Melsetter in Chipinga District. The group, headed by Dunbar Moodie, reached 
the Sabi River on the 5th February 1891. ‘No kraal, no boats, no food, damn 
all’, recorded Dunbar, who then rode downstream and eventually found a native 
canoe which they used to ferry their possessions across. For another fortnight 
they struggled through barren deserted Lowveld, their horses and carriers 
completely exhausted and they themselves desperately ill with malaria. Eventu-
ally, forty-four days after leaving Penhalonga [South Africa], they reached 
                                                           
53  Pp. 301, Owens, M. & Owens, D. (1985), Cry of the Kalahari, London: Collins. 
54  A poem by W.H. Auden puts it as follows: ‘Between two hills, two villages, two 
trees, two friends 
 The barbed wire runs which neither argues nor explains’. Cited in ‘The Wiring of 
America’, pp. 74-76, The Economist, 19th December 1998. 
55  Pp. 59-77, Chapter 3, ‘The spoken word and the barbed wire’ in Hofmeyr, I. (1993), 
“We spend our years as a tale that is told”. Oral Historical Narrative in a South 
African Chiefdom, Portsmouth, (N.H.): Heinemann; Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press; London: James Currey. 
56  Compare also Coetzee, C. (December 2001), ‘They never wept, the men of my 
race’: Antjie Krog’s Country of my Skull and the White South African Signature. 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 27, no.4, 685-696.  
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Manhlagazi’.57 They were followed in 1893 by a group of fourteen men, four 
women and three children, who left Fort Victoria in seven wagons. Again the 
Sabi had to be crossed with a great deal of effort. They also traversed the 
Lowveld to settle finally in the healthier area in the Chipinga Hills, close to 
what is now the Eastern Highlands, north east of where the SVC is located. 
 Afflicted by endemic malaria the area of the Lowveld, and more specifically 
the Sabi Valley, was long considered ‘unsuitable for white settlement’ which 
was printed in red capital letters on the Government map of Southern Rhodesia, 
at the time.58 Nowadays, when one drives from Bulawayo to Chiredzi in the 
Lowveld and takes the turn off at Ngundu, there is still a corroded sign saying 
‘Malaria Area’ with a drawing of a malarial mosquito to make things even more 
clear. But this was precisely the reason that in 1919 Lucas and Despard Bridges, 
sons of missionaries in Tierra del Fuego, South America, wanted to settle there, 
because of an ‘old longing to blaze new trails and to reclaim unused land 
[sic]’.59 After an initial exploratory journey with an experienced hunter and 
transport driver, Albert Hamman, Lucas ‘quickly made arrangements with the 
British South Africa Company to acquire the land [where the Devuli and Sabi 
Rivers join], and had cabled his cousin John Yeoman to proceed to this spot 
under the guidance of Ally Hamman and start constructing the camp’.60 The two 
brothers Bridges are considered the ‘1920 settlers of the Rhodesian lowveld, 
(...) who pioneered European settlement in the Sabi River valley and (were) 
responsible for opening up a large area that had been considered uninhabit-
able’.61 Devuli Ranch, as it was called, comprised some one million acres of 
land in the Lowveld. Despard Bridges and his wife are buried on the land of the 
former headquarters of Devuli Ranch, which is now part of the SVC, and was 
bought by a former General Manager of the Devuli Ranch, Derek Henning, who 
renamed the property Chishakwe. After the Liberation Struggle, in 1981, the 
                                                           
57  Pp. 16, Sinclair, S. (1971), The Story of Melsetter, Salisbury: M.O. Collins (pvt.) 
Ltd. 
58  Pp. 513, Bridges, E.L. (1948), Uttermost Part of the Earth, London: Hodder & 
Stroughton. This is the  autobiography of Lucas Bridges. 
59  Pp. 190, Tschiffely, A.F. (1953), The Man from Woodpecker Creek, London: 
Hodder and Stroughton Ltd. This book is based on the autobiography of Lucas 
Bridges mentioned in the previous note and additional notes and stories. 
‘Woodpecker Creek’ refers to the name the Indians gave him while he was living 
with his parents in Fireland, Lanooshwaia, meaning ‘Man from Woodpecker Creek’ 
(pp. 19). 
60  Pp. 55, Sommerville, D.M. (1976), My Life was a Ranch, Salisbury: Kailani Books 
(edited by his daughter Veronica Sommerville). D.M. Sommerville was the General 
Manager of Devuli Ranch for 30 years, 1935-1965. 
61  Ibid: 63. 
 
56 CHAPTER 2 
western part of the Devuli Ranch, 78,434 ha, was purchased by the government 
for resettlement. ‘It was the biggest single property purchased by the govern-
ment for peasant resettlement’.62 The southern boundary of Devuli Ranch was 
formed by the Turwi, or Turgwe, River. An earlier general manager of Devuli, 
Sommerville, bought a large piece of land laying south of the Turwi River, in 
partnership with someone who followed in the early Bridges’ footsteps, James 
Whittall, and created Humani Ranch.63 Whittall was descendant of the famous 
British merchant family of Whittall in Turkey.64 They bought a 17,000 acres 
ranch with 900 head of cattle.65 Later on, around 1958-1959, Sommerville was 
bought out by the brother of James Whittall’s mother, Hingston, after which 
Humani became the sole property of Whittall. Cattle and trading were there 
main economic activities in those early years.66 The contours and boundaries of 
Devuli and Humani together cover most of the area, which has become the SVC 
in the 1990s. 
 Much more will be said about developments at the micro-level in relation to 
land appropriation in the Sabi Valley in the next chapter when I discuss the 
origins of the SVC. What is important for this chapter is to note that the land in 
the Sabi Valley was appropriated by white settlers through arrangements with 
the BSAC of Rhodes only in the 1920s, because before that time endemic 
malaria had frightened them off. White settlement in the area is thus relatively 
recent. Nowadays you can still speak to the children of the first settlers, but the 
land surrounding the Valley was already taken by settlers, in the wake of and 
soon after the Pioneer Column reached Fort Victoria in 1890.  
 Through his judicious mixture of initiatives and plotting, Rhodes was the 
central figure in all these developments. He was able to energise and stimulate 
people to help him realise his plans. Once again returning to the little town of 
Melsetter on the east side of the Sabi River, it is remarkable to note how they 
describe a visit of Rhodes to this small outpost: ‘Rhodes was very pleased with 
his visit; he found the settler contented and thriving and bravely determined to 
face and overcome all difficulties. He encouraged them to come to his camp and 
tell him their troubles but found they had very few. He had a knack of making 
                                                           
62  Pp. 363, Zinyama, M., Campbell, D.J. & Matiza, T. (1990), Land Policy and Access 
to Land in Zimbabwe: The Dewure Resettlement Scheme, Geoforum, 21 (3): 359-
370. 
63  Sommerville 1976: 98. 
64  Pp. 118-119, Whittall, J.W. (1901) Frederick the Great on Kingcraft, London, New 
York, Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co. 
65  Pp. 64, Anonymous, not dated, The Whittalls of Turkey, 1809-1973, Great Britain: 
Faith Press. 
66  Interview with landowner Humani, 10 September 1998. 
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people feel at home, and arranged for coffee, cigars and cigarettes to be passed 
round while he chatted with them for hours. (The settlers) told Rhodes that they 
looked upon them as a father. (...) His visit was a great excitement for the 
children as he brought the first toys they had ever received seen from a shop 
(...)’.67 Even many years after his death in 1902, Rhodes’s reputation and exam-
ple seemed to be able to inspire people to devote their lives to his ideals which 
is aptly demonstrated by the description of the General Manager of Devuli 
Ranch when he saw Rhodes’s statue for the first time in Cape Town in 1920: 
‘Near the top of the Gardens, I came to a large bronze statue on a massive 
granite plinth, in the middle of the pathway. It was of Cecil John Rhodes, the 
founder of Rhodesia. I had read and heard so much of him, but felt I knew so 
little. This was, in fact, the first likeness I had seen of the man who was at one 
time Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. I stared intently at the bareheaded 
bronze figure, square and stocky with a fine strong face. As I stood there in the 
quietness of the Gardens, I began to understand something of this visionary 
who, in life, had led the way North, and in death continued to encourage others 
to do the same. My eyes travelled down the granite plinth in which one smooth 
slab bore the lettering: 
 
 Cecil John Rhodes 
 1853-1902 
 ‘Your Hinterland is there’. [pointing north]  
 
Just that simple wording and no more, but it gave me a genuine thrill of 
pleasure and set me tingling with excitement. Here surely was a message for me 
personally. I wondered what forces had guided me so directly to this spot (...) 
today it seemed that the message was intended for me especially. I felt that I 
was being offered part of a great heritage’.68  
 
 
Further land alienation and African responses 
 
It was a heritage that proved to be a double-edged sword one, which turned 
directly at the heart of the imperialist dreams developed and cherished by the 
white settlers. To a large extent this was because the land, its very soil is 
considered sacred to the Africans and is therefore indelible part of their social 
                                                           
67  Sinclair 1971: 45. 
68  Sommerville 1976: 19. 
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identity.69 Right from the start, white decisions about land distribution and land 
use have been contested and protested about through African spirit mediums. 
They were speaking on behalf of the ancestors who were considered to have the 
ultimate authority over the land. Mwari was seen ‘as the final authority behind 
their ancestors. (...) Mwari was believed to control the fertility of Shona 
occupied country, to give rain in times of drought and advice on the course of 
action in times of national crisis’.70 The Mwari cult therefore played an impor-
tant role in the 1896-1897 rebellions.71 It continued to be a paramount influence 
in the resistance to white domination of the land ever after, culminating in the 
Liberation Struggle in the 1970s.72 ‘Given the belief in the power of the spirits 
of the ancestors to influence natural events related to land, it follows that 
conquest must set up an ambiguous relationship between the victors and the 
vanquished since the victors have no direct communication with the spirits of 
the ancestors of the autochthons. The very weakness of the vanquished in a 
sense becomes their strength. The consequence of this is that these beliefs 
provide the mechanism through which the formerly hostile groups may be 
linked together in a common society’.73 If only the conquerors would be willing 
to recognise and respect the spiritual ownership of the land as vested in the 
ancestors and High God, then a situation could emerge in which political and 
secular authority over land would have resided in the hands of the dominant 
group, but the spiritual authority and ownership of the land in the hands of the 
autochthonous population.  
 This seems to have been the usual pattern in much of southern Africa. The 
Ndebele entering what is now Zimbabwe, recognized Mwari of the Matopo 
                                                           
69  What Roosens (1998: 11) calls ‘primordial autochtony’. ‘Dit principe kent aan 
individuen en groepen ten aanzien van een bepaald territorium een bijzondere 
kwalificatie toe omdat ze afstammen van ouders en voorouders die als ‘eersten’ op 
deze grond hebben gewoond’ (translation: This principle accords a special 
qualification to individuals or groups in relation to a certain territory, because they 
descend from parents and grandparents who were the ‘first’ to have lived on that 
land. Roosens, E. (1998), Eigen grond eerst? Primordiale autochtonie. Dilemma 
van de multiculturele samenleving (translation: Own Soil First? Primordial 
Autochtony. Dilemma of the Multicultural Society), Leuven, Amersfoort: Acco. 
70  Pp. 15, Daneel, M.L. (1970), The God of the Matopo Hills. AnEssay on the Mwari 
Cult in Rhodesia, The Hague, Paris: Mouton. 
71  Ranger, T.O. (1967), Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7, London: Heineman. 
72  Ranger, T.O. (1985), Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War, London: James 
Currey. See also Lan, D. (1985), Guns and Rain. Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in 
Zimbabwe, London: James Currey. 
73  Pp. 8, Mitchell in Schoffeleers, J.M. (1992), River of Blood. The Genesis of a 
Martyr Ccult in Southern Malawi, c.A.D. 1600, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin 
Press. Italics added. 
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Hills as the ultimate owner of the land, despite the fact that they ruthlessly 
subdued the Shona people.74 This was obviously also an option open to the new 
white conquerors. Mwari recognized them as ‘His white sons’ and some of 
them have even paid tribute to him, in the sense that they actually sent him gifts 
to his most important shrine in the Matopo Hills, Matonjeni.75 But that was 
certainly not standard procedure, which made Mwari highly critical of European 
settlers because they were ‘always ‘fighting with the land’’.76 Not only did they 
not pay sufficient respect to the owners of the land and recognise his authority, 
they insulted and violated this authority quite blatantly. With the commence-
ment of white settlement in the area, aggravated by their definite sense of 
cultural superiority and disregard for and ignorance of local cultural norms, it 
could only lead to antagonistic and rivalling identities, coinciding with a racial 
divide between black and white related to the land: the whites relating to 
landscape and Africans relating to the soil. The inescapable conclusion was that 
the African people would protest and rebel against this state of affairs. How 
rival identities related to land and socio-political developments shape(d) history 
in Zimbabwe is beautifully described in a book by Ranger. I want to draw upon 
this book in more detail, because many parallels can be drawn between his 
historical case study, starting in 1897 and rich in personal detail, of the relation-
ships in terms of social identities between black and white in and around the 
Matopos Hills and my case study of the SVC in the 1990s. They follow, and to 
a certain extent complement, each other in time. His study ends by the end of 
the 1980s. He describes the first half of the 1990s as a rough sketch. The SVC 
was officially inaugurated in 1991. The parallels and similarities in the two case 
studies suggest that the processes described within the particular contexts of 
each of them carry the potential for some broader generalisations, both theoreti-
cally as well as empirically.  
 The Matopos Hills have a very idiosyncratic landscape. ‘It contains some of 
the most majestic granite scenery in the world. The landscape has been carved 
out from an almost flat surface of granite by millions of years of weathering, 
resulting in great ‘whalebacks’ and domes, and castle-like formations. Mzili-
kazi, king of the Matabele, who led his people here from Zululand,77 was so 
                                                           
 
74  Ibid. 
75  Daneel 1970: 73. 
76  Ibid: 83. 
77  Mzilikazi was the father of Lobengula and ‘chief of the House of Khumalo, a minor 
Zulu clan’. He had abandoned the famous Zulu king, Shaka, after a quarrel over the 
distribution of loot and had taken 300 of his followers to the north. After being 
pushed further north by the Great Trek of the Boers in 1837, they finally settled in 
Mashonaland. The Sotho tribes he defeated on his way called his warriors 
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impressed that he gave them the name Matabo, which means ‘bald heads’’.78 
There are many Mwali or Mwari shrines in the area and ‘the cult came to 
express the essence of their extraordinary landscape. (...) The great rocks [Bald 
Heads] stand for Mwali’s authority (...) and Mwali (...) speaks from the rock 
itself’.79 Hence the title of Ranger’s book, Voices from the Rocks. Mwali fused 
nature and society, because the Rocks were not only considered to be his voice, 
but were also held responsible for giving (or withholding for that matter) water. 
Water is considered ‘a gift from the rock’80 with which agriculture can be 
developed. Mwali is not only about landscape or nature or natural features, but 
also about the people living in that nature as a society who have to seek for their 
livelihood. Mwali merged nature with culture. When the whites entered on the 
scene, under the leadership of Rhodes, they began straightaway to create 
frontiers between different parts of the Matopos and separate nature from 
culture by mapping the area in general and the mapping out of future farms in 
particular.81 Part of the mapping consisted of designating a certain part of the 
Matopos for the creation of a national park, which became fact on 19 November 
1926,82 when the Rhodesian government proclaimed an area of 224,000 acres of 
the Matopos the first national park in Rhodesia. Culture and nature were force-
fully separated. Although it had been a human habitation and under cultivation 
for generations, it was described and (re)imagined by the whites as ‘African 
wilderness’ and (re)made accordingly. Because at that time there was not yet a 
government department for national parks, that only came in 1949,83 it was put 
under the custodianship of the Forestry Department.84 The materialisation of the 
different types of land-use planning was the fencing off of the areas and thus 
their physical demarcation from each other. These sharp and visible boundaries 
                                                           
Amandebele (that is, ‘people of the long shields’). It became anglicised as 
‘Matabele’. Their capital became Gubulawayo, ‘The Place of the Killing’ because 
there, people were sacrificed for rain (Thomas 1996: 182-184). 
78  Text from a brochure produced by the Matabeleland Branch of the Wildlife Society 
of Zimbabwe, ‘Matabo National Park’. 
79  Ranger 1999: 21. 
80  Ibid: 25. Notice the beautiful parallel with the Biblical story about Moses who smote 
a rock from which water instantly sprang to nurture the thirsty people of Israel 
wandering around in the desert. 
81  Ibid: 42. 
82  Matopos National Park was the first game sanctuary in the country. By 1933, there 
were already four areas devoted to game, Wankie, Victoria Falls, Kazuma Pan 
Game Reserve and Matopos National Park (pp. 259, Mutwira, R. (January 1989), 
Southern Rhodesian Wildlife Policy (1890-1953): a Question of Condoning Game 
Slaughter? Journal of Southern African Studies, 15 (2). 
83  Ibid: 260. 
84  Ranger 1999: 62. 
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were simultaneously an acute expression of segregation; demarcating land 
claims as much as rival identities on either side of them. The ideology sur-
rounding Mwali had stressed man’s co-existence and reciprocal relationship 
with the environment. These reciprocal ties were broken in the process of 
creating (white) boundaries.85  
 After the proclamation of the first national park in 1926, more areas 
followed. In the southeast Lowveld suggestions were put forward for the 
creation of a game reserve in the Chipinda Pools area. The idea failed to gain 
the support of the Chief Entomologist because the creation of the reserve would 
interfere with land use by European ranchers and with the Matibi No. 2 Native 
Reserve. There was another attempt in 1933. ‘The major constraint to the 
proposal was [again] that a total of 1500 people would have to be moved from 
the area earmarked for the new game reserve’. The Fort Victoria Publicity 
Association campaigned especially hard the cause of this game reserve and was 
supported in its effort by the Umtali (present-day Mutare) Publicity Association. 
The latter tended to stress the potential for tourists coming to Umtali after 
having visited the reserve. The Minister for Commerce and Transport also 
began to support the idea and in 1934 the Gona-Re-Zhou Game Reserve was 
established by Proclamation Number 3.86 In the second half of the 1930s, the 
potential for tourism became an important argument and part of the discourse 
arguing for the creation of game reserves and national parks. In 1938 the 
Minister of Agriculture and Lands formulated the matter as follows and the 
words proved to be prophetic: ‘I think that the game of the Colony in the future 
is going to be not only a great attraction but also a valuable asset to the 
Colony’.87 
                                                           
85  See for another parallel example of this process of separating nature and culture by 
white boundary creation, Moore’s description of the process of the establishment of 
Nyanga National Park in the Eastern Highlands in Zimbabwe. In this example, the 
local chief, Tangwena, also claimed that a particular piece of land within the park 
boundaries, Kaerezi, was inalienable his peoples, which is underpinned with cultural 
practices like ‘propitiating ancestral spirits, recognizing sacred features of the land 
scape [compare with Matopos], and enforcing “respect for the land” (kuremekedza 
nyika)’ (pp. 135, Moore, D.S. (1996), Marxism, Culture, and Political Ecology. 
Environmental Struggles in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands. In: Peet, R. & Watts, 
M. (eds), Liberation Ecologies. Environment, Development, Social Movements, 
London, New York: Routledge. 
86  Pp. 76-77, Masona, T. (1987), Colonial Game Policy: a Case Study of the Origin 
and Administration of Game Policy in Southern Rhodesia – 1890 to 1945. 
Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Zimbabwe. 
87  Ibid: 79. 
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 In association with emergence of game reserves and national parks came the 
state regulation of hunting. The general rule was that requests to kill game to 
feed Africans were refused.88 Only in rare instances were these stringent laws 
suspended.89 The reason for this strict state monopoly on hunting had to do with 
a fear for the economic depletion of wildlife resources but also, and maybe even 
more importantly, with the political reason that the ‘Government was reluctant 
to pass the skill of the use of guns to Africans (...) Many of them who kept guns 
had old muzzle loaders bought before colonialism from Portuguese traders’. 
One of the main reasons economic depletion was not considered paramount in 
this respect is that much of the game was shot in large numbers anyway in an 
attempt to eradicate and control the tsetse fly. In the early 1920s the government 
thought that, in order to eradicate the tsetse fly, they had to accompany the 
process of eradicating game with intensive settlement. Europeans were sceptical 
about this development because they dreaded the idea that Africans would settle 
in areas in which the whites would prefer to settle. This led to a situation in 
which large areas of marginal land were completely fenced, after which the area 
was cleared of any game. Only after this operation had taken place were 
Africans allowed to move into the reserve.90 It is therefore not astonishing that 
‘(t)he criminal records in the Zimbabwe National Archives are full of cases of 
Africans imprisoned for hunting with dogs or for setting traps on European land 
[and that] African opposition to government policy was widespread’.91 While all 
this was happening private farmers were pressing for more freedom to hunt 
game on their own land without restrictions. In 1914 the wildlife law was 
amended to include the proviso that ‘(t)he owner of any land or the occupier 
thereof with the consent of the owner or any holder of land under Permit of 
Occupation from the British South Africa Company or any European person 
duly authorised by such owner or holder, may take or kill game upon such land 
at any time’. The game licence cost £1 and did not put any restriction on the 
number of game that could be killed at any time.92 In 1917 there could be no 
shadow of doubt that landowners were making the most out of their freedom to 
the extent of the extermination of nearly all wildlife on their land, not so much 
                                                           
88  Although certainly not all the game was protected under the Ordinance. All fish, 
crocodiles, baboons, lions, cheetahs, leopards, wild dogs, hyenas and a few others 
did not fall under the Ordinance. They were considered vermin, and there was a 
reward for their extermination (Mutwira 1989: 253). But most of these animals are 
not considered edible by Africans, like impala, kudu, reedbuck and the like are. But 
these were all protected! 
89  Ibid: 259. 
90  Ibid: 258. 
91  Ibid: 257 & 261. 
92  Ibid: 255-256. 
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because of their own occasional sport hunting but by contracting private hunters 
to supply for structural trade in biltong and hides. This was an unfavourable 
development from the perspective of the preservation of species and the 
government tried ‘to prevent people from being employed to shoot game for the 
purpose of trade. But (it was) maintained that certain latitude should be given to 
owners of cultivated land and to persons who had put up fences’.93 This liberal 
attitude contrasted strongly with the difficulties Africans experienced in 
obtaining licences to hunt. One could conclude with Masona that ‘the licenses 
and permits given to whites were so liberal that one had to be extremely 
extravagant to breach the law. For the non-white, the story was completely 
different’.94 
 
 
Acts of legitimation 
 
The Government played an important role in legitimising the land appropriation 
by white settlers through the formulation and implementation of different Acts. 
The most important in this respect are the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the 
Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. The 
Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which was preceded by a study of the Morris 
Carter Land Commission, can be seen as the legal document legitimising the 
land segregation at the time. All three Acts are to be regarded as an ex post 
formalisation of already existing practices. Before the Land Apportionment Act 
of 1930, Africans had already been living separately from white settlers in 
African reserves since 1902, a situation ratified by the Imperial Government in 
1908.95 The Act though was not about the African Reserves, but about the 
remaining land which was classified into four types: European Area, Native 
Area, Undetermined Area and the Unassigned Area. In a Native Area, other 
than in the Reserves, the African could buy land himself. The European Area 
was strictly reserved for Europeans and Africans were only allowed to occupy 
portions of it were they to supply labour in return. Whites, on the other hand, 
were allowed to settle in African areas for all matters ‘deemed beneficial to the 
Africans’, like trading, education or religious matters.96 When land in the 
Undetermined Area passed into African hands, it became part of the Native 
Area. The Unassigned Area could be assigned to either African or white after 
which the land would become either part of the European or the African Area. 
                                                           
93  Masona 1987:93. 
94  Ibid: 97. 
95  Mutambara 1982: 310. 
96  Ibid: 456. 
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With the legal backing of the Act, Africans were ordered to leave the European 
Areas for the African Reserves within a period of six years. But the Reserves 
could not absorb all the Africans evicted from European land. To tackle the 
problem the Government decided to extend the deadline from 1936 to 1941.97 
This did not help very much and many Africans began to look for other 
opportunities in urban and mining areas and a process of land alienation got 
underway, which created a willing labour pool for the sake of the capital 
accumulation of the few. The subsequent migrations themselves then created 
problems for urban and industrial areas. The implementation of the Act caused 
major problems not only because it was difficult to find additional land, but also 
it was virtually impossible to find the combination of ‘suitable arable and 
pastoral land with permanent water for persons and livestock’.98 Despite its 
problems, and every successive Rhodesian Government has had to struggle with 
it ever since 1930, the Act did institutionalise the division between black and 
white land, a heritage which still exists and is contested right up to today.99
 The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was intended to be a (white) 
conservation measure to curb environmental problems in the Native Areas 
caused by overgrazing in particular and in general by African farming methods. 
Instead of apportioning any blame to the unequal land distribution in the 
territory which caused the overcrowding of the Reserves, the Rhodesian 
government made the Africans culpable because of their ‘shifting cultivation 
and other practices which are not conducive to profitable farming’, claiming 
this was the root cause of environmental degradation.100 The Act contained five 
parts. The first formulated what were considered ‘good farming methods’ like 
the construction of contour ridges and destocking of cattle. The second dealt 
with grazing rights for various classes of Africans. Part Three was meant to put 
                                                           
97  In that same year an entirely new Land Apportionment Act appeared containing the 
two Amendments to the 1930 Act in 1936 and 1937. The 1941 Act was based on the 
same principles as the 1930 Act. For that reason it is better concentrate on the 1930 
Act in the main text. In an Amendment to the 1941 Land Apportionment Act, the 
category Native Land was renamed as Native Purchase Area. 
98  Mutambara 1982: 480. 
99  See for a more in detail description of the consequences of the Land Apportionment 
Act of 1930, ibid: 453-489. See also pp. 16, Maposa, I. (1995), Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe. An Inquiry into the Land Acquisition Act (1992) Combined with a Case 
Study Analysis of the Resettlement Programme, Harare: Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe: ‘It is this piece of colonial legislation (that is, the 
Land Apportionment Act) that entrenched and institutionalized land alienation as we 
know it today’. 
100  Pp. 131, Moyana, H.V. (1984), The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe, 
Harare: Mambo Press. 
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an end to part-time farming, whereby Africans farmed only during the planting 
season after which they moved to urban areas to seek employment, only to 
return the next planting season. The fourth part made provision for the 
establishment of rural townships and businesses on the Reserve, where it was 
thought the landless could reside. The fifth and final part contained regulations 
for the compulsory use of African labour in the Reserve for the construction of 
roads and the like.101 As a whole the Act ‘sought to:  
• Provide for good husbandry farming and protecting of natural resources by 
all Africans wherever they farmed. 
• Provide security of tenure to the good farmer. 
• Limit the number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity and as far as 
practicable to relate the stock to the arable land available. 
• Allocate the arable and grazing ground as far as possible in economic units. 
• All land outside the arable land was held communally not individually. 
• Provide for the setting aside of land for towns and business centres in the 
Reserves’.102 
 It is hardly surprising that the land-use reorganisation under this Act led to 
even further insecurity of land tenure within communal areas.103 Although the 
Land Husbandry Act promised security of tenure, it was tied to ‘good farming 
practices’. Within the rigid boundaries of the Land Apportionment Act 
described above, the increasing population of the reserves could never live up to 
the requirements of ‘good farming’ laid down in the Native Land Husbandry 
Act, even had they wished. Plots were too small for sound agricultural practices 
and land would only be allocated to people who actually worked the land at the 
time of implementation. Those who were working in urban areas were left out. 
When they looked across their narrowly defined boundary in the reserve they 
could see the enormous stretches of empty and often under-utilised European 
land. National protest was building up and racial tension and political agitation 
were inexorably linked.104 By 1958 49% of the land in Southern Rhodesia was 
alienated or reserved for Europeans, while they constituted only 7.1% of the 
total population.105 
                                                           
101  Ibid: 134-135. 
102  Ibid: 132-133. 
103  Pp. 83, Moyo, S. (1995), The Land Question in Zimbabwe, Harare: SAPES Books. 
104  Blanckenburg formulates it rather undiplomatically: ‘Even the Native Land Hus-
bandry Act of 1951 which, viewed with today’s concern for environmental issues, 
appears future-oriented in many parts, was refused by black farmers, largely because 
some conservation measures, such as contour ploughing, were put through by force’ 
(italics added), pp. 17, Von Blanckenburg, P. (1994), Large Commercial Farmers 
and Land Reform in Africa. The Case of Zimbabwe, Aldershot, Singapore: Avebury. 
105  Yudelman 1964: 19. 
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 Finally the Land Tenure Act of 1969 should be noted in this context of 
favouring white appropriation of the (best parts of the) land. This Act replaced 
the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 and was primarily aimed to secure 
separate developments for black and white. The total acreage of land would be 
classified and divided in two, although the whites only constituted some 5% of 
the population at the time. In the 1969 Constitution of Rhodesia, European land 
was fixed at 18.1 million ha while the Native Areas, which were renamed Tribal 
Trust Lands (TTL),106 contained 18.2 million ha.107 74.2% of this land was 
located in Natural Regions IV and V, with the poorest and most unreliable 
rainfall in Zimbabwe.108 Prime (European) farmland was approximately 75% of 
Region I and 66% of Region II.109  
 
 
The Land Question after independence, 1980 –1992 
 
Let us briefly return again to the case of the Matopos as described by Ranger. 
The examples mentioned above and the formulation of the different Acts make 
it abundantly clear, that in order to allow the different plans of white land use to 
materialise, it was necessary to move Africans around constantly to places not 
claimed by whites for farming or national parks. In effect black people had to be 
placed somewhere outside the fenced white areas, which was either white 
commercial land or National Park. This resulted in a structural sense of insecu-
rity of land tenure among the Africans. The interest groups, which developed in 
the Matopos to protest this state of affairs, like Sofasihamba and Sofasonke, 
were all related to the shrines of Mwali and developed a strong social identity as 
their foundation, which almost seems in reverse proportional to the insecurity of 
the land tenure. The more insecure, the stronger their identity and sense of 
unity. Protests were centred on the Matopos National Park. Many of the protests 
were expressed by the cutting of fences and by poaching,110 not only these of the 
National Park, but also of the white farmers.111 When protests had turned into a 
full-fledged Liberation Struggle in the 1970s, ‘guerrillas promised that the 
                                                           
106  TTL was renamed Communal Land after Independence in 1980. 
107  Ibid: 18-19. 
108  Moyo 1995: 83. 
109  Pp. 17, Copestake, J.G. (1993), Zimbabwe. Country Overview, in: Wellard, K. & 
Copestake, J.G. (eds), Non-Governmental Organizations and the State in Africa. 
Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agricultural Development, London, New York: 
Routledge. 
110  Ranger 1999: 186-187, 192. 
111  Ibid: 236. 
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National Park fences would be torn down and the animals in the Game Park 
barbecued’.112 In 1980 it seemed as if the fight had been won by the Africans 
with the help of Mwali. They said that ‘(t)he power to fight (...) came from the 
mhondoro spirits together with Mwari. That is why we won the land! The 
people saw it was the truth’.113  
 But in the Matopos National Park nothing much changed in relation to the 
Land Question under the new black majority government, partly as a result of 
the environmentalists’ appeal to the international conservation and wildlife 
organisations in the world. When the new constitution was drawn up at 
Lancaster House, the British negotiators saw to it that National Parks were en-
trenched in it in the same sense as under the white minority regime. Another 
reason why time has virtually stood still is because the new government, just 
like the Rhodesian government, ‘recognizes [only Western] property boundaries 
as they are written in title deeds and demarcated with beacons placed by the 
office of the surveyor general, not as they are remembered in oral tradition’.114 
Even when land was taken over by the Mugabe administration because white 
farmers left their property, ‘there was no question of allowing peasant cattle on 
to the land. (...) The Mugabe government was as much at loggerheads with the 
people of the Matopos as the Rhodesians had ever been’.115 In other words, strict 
and fixed boundaries of land-use (a white invention), National Parks and private 
wildlife areas in particular, demarcated by fences, remained the cutting edge. 
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National Parks and the ecology-conscious white farmers share a common 
interest in conservation and tourism, and display a general negligence towards 
local communities. ‘At Shumba Shaba Lodge, for example, [Ranger formulates 
rather rhetorically], I picked up Valerie Gargett’s The Black Eagle, a book 
which celebrates birds of prey rather than human beings’. In 1996 the Mugabe 
government decided on the construction of a dam in the Mtshabezi River in the 
eastern part of the Matopos. Ranger relates that when he visited the dam site in 
August 1996 ‘it soon became clear that the technological project of the dam had 
overridden local cultural considerations’.116 White colonial and black govern-
ments in Southern Rhodesia, respectively Zimbabwe, seem to share sudden 
characteristics. Ranger ends his study by wryly noting that in conservation 
circles nowadays it is increasingly recognised that communities should be 
included in conservation efforts. This also holds true for the Matopos National 
Park. ‘The Park’s survival in the present climate depends upon the Communal 
people obtaining substantial benefit from its existence’. To stress the ideological 
shift in the conservation scene Ranger calls the spokespersons of this line of 
thinking ‘born-again’ environmentalists.117 The first half of the 1990s is where 
Ranger’s book ends and where I pick it up with my case study on the process of 
the SVC in trying to initiate a form of organisational co-operation with its 
communal neighbours. Will history repeat itself, like the Zimbabwean govern-
ment repeated aspects of Rhodesian government? Or will things turn out 
differently this time? Is government’s role different in terms of compassion, 
empathy or any other way towards ‘its own’ people from that of the much 
demonised colonial government? One must not forget, following Ranger’s 
argument above, ‘that the current government, when it was a guerrilla move-
ment, opposed the wildlife industry as a whole’.118 
 This section shows inevitably that the issue of land has been very important 
in the relations between black and white in Zimbabwe ever since the Rudd 
Concession. Protests from Africans about the way land was handled and used 
by the white settlers in first instance and later the colonial government was 
present all along. The struggle for land did not commence with the Liberation 
Struggle in the 1970s but it was one of its main themes because it has been the 
main theme in black and white relations dating back to their very first contacts. 
Locally, as I showed earlier, war raged over this issue before the formal start of 
the Liberation Struggle. At the national level the 1970s are reserved for the 
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‘real’ political struggle over land. When Southern Rhodesia turned into present-
day Zimbabwe in 1980, expectations were sky-high that at long last the land 
issue would be settled in a just way, restoring the reciprocal relationship 
between the soil and the people. But as Ranger’s analysis of the Matopos Hills 
illustrates nothing much happened. It would appear that the reverse was the 
case. It seemed as if nothing had changed, only the colour of the government. 
Especially in relation to wilderness areas like national parks and game reserves, 
the government prolonged a policy in which people were not allowed to live 
within the boundaries of the park. A chief in the Eastern Highlands of Zim-
babwe, cited by Moore, puts it as follows: ‘The National Park wants to burn 
huts in my area. We thought the whites had returned’.119 Especially in relation to 
this type of land use, land remained a stumbling block between African peasants 
and government.  
 The post-independence government inherited a land tenure system which 
basically comprised three forms of tenure.120 
• National (or State) land, which comprised mainly national parks and state 
forests; 
• Communal Areas (CA), which were formerly known as the Tribal Trust 
Lands (TTLs); 
• Commercial land, which consists of large-scale commercial farms, mainly 
white, and small-scale commercial farms, mainly black and formerly known 
as African Purchase Area. 
Considering that land was the major motivation for the Liberation Struggle, not 
much seemed to happen in this field after Independence in the 1980s. Despite 
the rhetoric not as many people as expected were resettled and not that much 
land was expropriated from the former colonisers. This can be partly attributed 
to the Lancaster House Agreement which marked the transition from colonial 
domination to political independence. The Agreement, which would be valid for 
a period of ten years, till 1990, ‘tended to reflect a result less than that which 
might have been expected of a national liberation movement had it won an 
outright victory on the battlefield’.121 ‘Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House Consti-
tution resulted in a major compromise by the liberation movements’.122 The 
Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 contained two important stipulations 
which hindered a radical land programme after 1980. The first was that ‘all land 
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acquired by the government be purchased on a ‘willing seller-willing buyer’ 
basis, and secondly that owners of any land seized by the government must be 
compensated in foreign currency’.123 The Agreement signified the political 
strength of the white commercial farmers, which was to a large extent built on 
their economic power vested in freehold land tenure. In 1991 ‘(t)he large 
commercial farm sub sector contributes to the market delivery of maize, cotton 
and groundnut about 40%, to that of wheat, soybean, tobacco, coffee, tea and 
sugar cane 90 to 100%. 80% of all commercial beef sales through the Cold 
Storage Commission [CSC] and virtually all milk deliveries to the Dairy 
Marketing Board originate from large commercial farms’.124 But the position of 
whites in Zimbabwe was also secured through the Lancaster House Agreement 
because of more geo-political considerations. The United States especially was 
afraid that Zimbabwe would be driven into the arms of the Russians. For that 
reason Kissinger insisted that Zimbabwe should be (financially) assisted by the 
USA and UK in its transition to black majority rule, on the promise that they 
would not expel the white minority.125 The ‘Kissinger Billion’ was to ‘(...) 
provide for Governmental purchase and redistribution of large white owned 
holdings of fertile farmland, an essential component of national reconstruction 
in a country where the white, 4% of the population, occupied most of the 
commercially viable land’.126 ‘Thus the Lancaster House constitution was instru-
mental in restraining land acquisition throughout the decade’,127 not only 
constitutionally but also financially. 
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 Despite these institutional constraints the new government was undeterred 
and set up an ambitious resettlement programme.128 It developed three resettle-
ment models: 
• Model A: individual smallholder arable production with communal grazing; 
• Model B: cooperative farming with communal living; 
• Model C: individual smallholder production with a centralized estate’.129  
Its first target in 1980 was set to resettle 18,000 families on 1.1 million ha. of 
acquired commercial farmland over a period of three years. In 1982 a more 
ambitious figure was laid down in the Transitional National Development Plan 
of 162,000 families on 9 million ha. of land. This adjusted, optimistic figure 
was probably derived from the fact that in the first years after Independence the 
government was able to buy all the whole white farms which had been 
abandoned during the war or were sold just before or after Independence at very 
low prices, by people fearing the policies of the new black government.130 The 
new target implied that commercial farmers would have to give up 60 % of their 
total land of 15 million ha. but in 1985 only 36,000 people were resettled on 
2.46 million ha. of land. In 1991, some 53,000 people were allocated land and 
the government had acquired 3.3 million ha. ‘The pace of land acquisition 
increased from year to year, whereas that of the actual resettlement de-
creased’.131 In the period between 1981 and 1991 a yearly average of 4800 
settlers started farming, which is only about one-third of the target of 15,000 a 
year, set in 1985.132 In 1988 the Government reduced its land acquisition budget 
by more than 50%, from Z$ 11 million in 1987 to Z$ 4 million in 1988.133 At the 
end of the 1980s the whole land resettlement programme had lost much of its 
reputation. The principal reason was that, although the Government acquired 
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land and resettled people, it did not give the resettled farmers any security of 
tenure. The state retained ownership of the land and controlled it by monopo-
lising the issuing of permits for usufruct.134 Actually, the ‘resettlement areas 
were often characterized by a degree of bureaucratic control which was all too 
reminiscent of past colonial schemes’.135 In 1990 the Lancaster House Agree-
ment expired and a time, untrammelled by the constraints and excuses of the 
Agreement, could begin. The Government introduced a new land policy 
programme in which they adopted the concept of land designation. Land could 
now be acquired by the government on a compulsory basis. The programme 
was aimed especially at Regions II and III, which cover the better soils and 
climatic conditions and in which large-scale commercial farmers have an over 
proportional share.136 A complication which mired the prospects in comparison 
with the situation in 1980 was that now several black powerful politicians, 
government ministers, had become large landowners in their own right and had 
joined the powerful representative body of the commercial farmers, the 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU).137 ‘For some members of government, 
indeed, land redistribution might now signify taking land from themselves, 
rather than giving it to peasants’.138 
 
 
New attempt to redistribute the land, 1992-1998 
 
By now it will have become incontrovertible that the land issue has been a 
dominating theme under the Rhodesian government and that it remained one of 
the most important issues after Independence. At first, ambitions had to be 
restrained for institutional reasons like the Lancaster House Agreement and 
financial considerations following it. Hopes were high that after the Lancaster 
House Agreement expired in 1990, new opportunities could be created to try 
and attempt to redistribute the land in Zimbabwe more equally. Whatever the 
outcome realisation will also have dawned that not all the blame can be put on 
the constraints of the Lancaster House Agreement. Land resettlement was just 
not a first priority on the national political agenda. One possible explanation for 
this state of affairs was, at least till February 2000 when Mugabe lost the crucial 
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referendum, that the commercial landowners (majority white139) contribute 
considerably to export earnings140 and were consequently major taxpayers, 
which made the Zimbabwean government in the earlier years reluctant to pursue 
their course too radically in terms of implementation and execution. (Political 
rhetoric about the issue is, as we have seen, another matter all together.) In 1983 
the budget of the Minister of Lands was cut by 53%, which was the largest cut 
for any ministry that year. In 1986 the Ministry of Lands was abolished as a 
separate ministry and put under the Ministry of Agriculture. Only around 
general elections did the issue of land redistribution resurface. In 1985, there 
was a weak attempt to revive the land issue on the national agenda through the 
formulation of the Land Acquisition Act which stated that all land in Zimbabwe 
put up for sale should be offered to the Government first. Only after it had 
refused the offer could any other interested buyer be approached. Furthermore 
the Act stated that the government could seize derelict land and, importantly for 
the 1990s, identify under-used land for involuntary appropriation.141 This latter 
aspect proved to be the upbeat for the controversial Land Acquisition Act of 
1992. 
 The Act is presented as ‘An Act to empower the President and other authori-
ties to acquire land and other immovable property compulsorily in certain 
circumstances; to provide for the designation of rural land; to provide for the 
establishment of the Derelict Land Board; to provide for the declaration and 
acquisition of derelict land; and to provide for matters connected with or 
incidental to the foregoing’.142 It is the part on ‘compulsorily designation’ 
especially that is important in the context of my argument, because conservan-
cies are co-operative structures between several landowners. In the case of the 
SVC, twenty-four landowners all together. This means that if one or more 
properties were designated, this would have implications for the whole SVC 
and not only for the individual landowner. In Part II, Section 3 of the Act the 
acquisition of land is described as follows, which seems like a mirror image of 
Rhodesian formulations on the matter: ‘Subject to this Act, the President may 
compulsorily acquire 
 
(a)  any land, where the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town 
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and country planning or the utilization of that or any other property for a 
purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section of the public; 
(b)  any rural land, where the acquisition is reasonably necessary for the utiliza-
tion of that or any other land – 
(i)  for settlement for agricultural or other purposes; or 
(ii)  for purposes of land reorganization, forestry, environmental conservation 
or the utilization of wildlife or other natural resources; or 
(iii)  for the relocation of persons dispossessed in consequence of the utilization 
of land for a purpose referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii)’.143 
 
On top of that the Act ‘provides for the following [if compared with the 
Lancaster House Agreement]: 
1. Payment for land acquired is to be in local currency only. 
2. Government can now compulsorily acquire land which is being fully utilized 
whereas before in the amendment of the Zimbabwe Constitution in 1990 
only ‘under utilized’ land could be acquired. 
3. Government can now pay a ‘fair price’ within a ‘reasonable period’ instead 
of ‘adequate’ compensation ‘promptly’. 
4. Compensation is to be assessed by a ‘compensation committee’ made up of 
six people. 
5. Where there is a dispute as to the amount of compensation, the parties can 
appeal to the Administrative Court for arbitration. However, the Administra-
tive Court may not set aside an assessment on the basis that compensation is 
not ‘fair’. 
6. It does away with the willing-seller/willing-buyer principle. (...)’.144  
 
The long and short of it is that it seems anything could happen. The Act makes 
provisions for (nearly) every possible acquisition of land without allowing the 
proper possibility of appealing to any court. This particular aspect of the Act 
comes to the fore when the Land Acquisition Act is related to the Constitutional 
Amendment no. 11, 1990. This amendment was thought necessary after the 
Lancaster House Constitution had expired and removed the restrictions imposed 
on the government under Section 16 of that Constitution145 especially in relation 
to the possibility of appeal over matters of ‘fair compensation’. According to 
Maposa, the main contention in amendment No. 11 in relation to the above 
mentioned points is that: 
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1.  ‘Any land can be acquired ... even if it is properly utilized. 
2.  The legislator can set right provisions for assessing compensation and these 
will be applied without regard to the particular circumstances of each case. 
3. The removal of the right of the court to assess whether the compensation is 
fair. (...)’.146 
His analysis brings Maposa to the conclusion that the Land Acquisition Act 
(1992) is ‘bad law’ and a ‘gross violation of individual rights’, as it denies 
people ‘the most basic natural principle of law’, to recourse to courts of appeal 
if disputes over the fairness over matters of compensation should arise.147. 
 Although the Act generated a maelstrom of political turmoil, strangely 
enough not much happened afterwards in terms of grand-scale acquisitions. In 
the period between 1992 and 1997 only some hundred farms have been 
designated, including some wildlife ranches.148 Some of the farmers complained 
that they had not received a fair compensation in terms of the real market value 
of the property.149 Nevertheless, the fact is that it made perfectly clear that the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1992 was a major threat to wildlife ranches in general 
and conservancies in particular, because the government could ‘simply step in 
and seize any farm it wishes’.150 Conservancies might expect to be specifically 
targeted in this operation because the Ministry of Lands claimed that ‘some 
farmers were diversifying into game ranching to escape designation. Presuma-
bly, the Ministry of Lands thinks that farmers perceive they will be ‘politically 
covered’ by the Department of National Parks, whose conservation philosophy 
encourages private wildlife ranching’.151 In the political rhetoric surrounding the 
Act, another edge became paramount (again): the racial aspect of the Land 
Question: ‘there is a tendency on both sides to see the issue in, quite literally, 
black and white terms’.152 It has been this theme which has mainly dominated 
the popular discussion about the land designation process since 1992. This is of 
particular relevance to my argument. Although the discussion is a gross 
simplification of the process153 in which many more factors and processes are at 
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play and intermingle, it does make clear that in terms of identification and 
identity construction, the colour divide is and remains a powerful force, uniting 
the respective sides and at the same time separating the two parties on either 
side of the racial divide. A division which is symbolically demarcated by the 
colour of skin, but physically by fences separating commercial and communal 
land. Despite its racial overtones, care has to be observed not to equate the 
division immediately with blatant racism on each side. One of the consequences 
of the division on either side of the fence was that it ‘perpetuate[d] the social 
distance between the races, thereby limiting the opportunities for Whites to 
understand both the ambition for advancement and the fact of its occurring’.154 It 
is to be expected that from their side of the fence the whites could only imagine 
how the black people were living, rather than by knowing it from interaction or 
being among them. The only blacks with whom they actually interacted (that is, 
giving orders) were their servants or employees. According to Godwin and 
Hancock, there was also no genuine interest in knowing more about the black 
people. ‘Consequently, social distance bred and fed upon dislike and ignorance, 
and encouraged a polite amusement or bewilderment’.155 The things they did 
know only reinforced the stereotyped images of the black people. Everybody 
could reproduce and reiterate the stories that ‘THEY smelt’, were too noisy, 
demanded hand-outs, breast-fed their children in public, created long queues in 
the Post Office, never said ‘Thank You’, or never showed any practical 
gratitude’.156 Godwin and Hancock therefore come to the conclusion that 
‘ignorance born of distance rather than of an innate racism or idiocy – was [a] 
mark of Rhodesian-ness’.157 Nevertheless Godwin and Hancock note that the 
discourse on race was the bonding factor for Rhodesians and used to invent an 
identity and a tradition.158 Despite their discourse there was a widely-held and 
sincere belief, that ‘most Africans benefited from, and even preferred, the forms 
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of segregation and discrimination which did exist; and that Rhodesia continued 
to have the best race relations in the world’.159 
 In November 1997 the Zimbabwean government took a next step towards 
the realisation of (some of) its rhetoric about land redistribution based on the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1992. It published a list of 1471 farms to be designated 
in the Government Gazette on 28 November 1997. The government used five 
criteria to identify land for designation: if it was derelict, under-utilised, 
multiple-owned, foreign-owned, or contiguous to communal areas.160 Mugabe’s 
step was hailed by some and abhorred by others. At a ZANU PF ceremony to 
celebrate National Unity Day in Harare Province in November of that same 
year, the speech which was published in The Herald said: ‘On Land Acquisi-
tion: We hail the Patriotic stance taken by His Excellency the President and his 
People’s Government on the land designation and acquisition programme. We 
must never listen to the shrieks and cries of settler white farmers and their lame 
excuses for hanging on to the best land whilst our heroic people are packed like 
live termites in the tribal trust lands-poverty zones (...) Instead of extending a 
reciprocal hand of reconciliation our white farmers are trying to amputate the 
extended hand by: (...) Trying to turn the whole land issue into a black and 
white confrontation. We urge the Government never ever, to spare the so-called 
conservancies which are just white enclaves in this exercise which must be 
ongoing’.161 Which directly links this political exercise to the (further) develop-
ment of private wildlife conservancies in Zimbabwe. Mugabe added to the 
upheaval in his speech to the Fourth National People’s Conference, which took 
place on 5 December 1997 in Mutare, by stating that ‘(t)he recent designation of 
1488 [?] farms on some 4 million hectares of land is only the beginning of a 
process that is meant to completely reverse an unacceptable colonial legacy’.162 
 In the SVC, three properties were to be found on the list.163 During the weeks 
and months following the publication of The List, all stakeholders in the process 
gave rent to strong opinions about the subject which were reflected in the news-
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papers. The government, headed by Mugabe, reiterated time and again that there 
was no question of going back on anything and that the time for negotiation was 
over,164 especially claiming sovereignty vis à vis Great Britain.165 Individual 
farmers and their powerful representative body, the CFU, tried to persuade the 
government to come back to the negotiating table and try to solve the land issue 
in a more combined effort.166 Wildlife ranches, including private wildlife 
conservancies are also part of the CFU, through the Wildlife Producers 
Association (WPA) which had over 400 members in 1994.167 In Zimbabwe, 
unlike in South Africa, there is no separate representative interest association 
for conservancies. The economically important subgroup of tobacco farmers 
also reacted strongly to the plans of the government by stating that the tobacco 
farms included in the list168 did not fall under the official criteria of being under-
utilised or being unproductive land.169 The commercial farmers who were on the 
list, were given thirty days to appeal against their compulsory acquisition.170 By 
the end of 1997, the Land Secretary, Dr Takavarasha, indicated that of the 1471 
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farmers on The List only sixty did not appeal against their acquisition.171 One 
interesting detail in relation to the racial divide in land tenure is that of the 1471 
farms on the list, it was said that 240 belonged to indigenous (that is, black) 
commercial farmers. Their representative organisation, the Indigenous Com-
mercial Farmers Union (ICFU), said that ‘it failed to understand why farms 
owned by black farmers were designated alongside those belonging to white 
commercial farmers’.172 The President of the ICFU, Mr. Nherera said that, even 
if these black farmers were under-utilising their land, it was because they were 
not given the same support as white farmers. If they were given similar support, 
he added, they would have even surpassed the productive levels of the white 
commercial farmers.173 Right from the start the international community, crucial 
to financing the programme, failed to respond favourably to the plans. The rich 
donor countries especially warned Mugabe to handle the land acquisition 
process with the utmost transparency, a characteristic which they thought had 
been lacking so far.174  
 The hopes of the black Zimbabweans were raised to a considerable height by 
political rhetoric and expectations that matters would turn out for the better in 
terms of land distribution in 1998 were paramount. Some villagers even seemed 
to feel that at long last it would become pay-back time and a moment to settle 
scores with neighbouring (white), large-scale commercial farmers. The rhetori-
cal Sunday Mail paid special attention to the relationship between landowner 
and the neighbouring communities in the context of the designation programme. 
This relationship became very important for the landowner because, if the 
surrounding communities were to testify that they benefited from the economic 
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activities on the farm, that would make a strong point in an appeal against the 
designation and a pro for delisting.175 In two consecutive weeks it ran an article 
on the subject. The first article emphasised the spiritual relationship between 
Africans and their land, which made them wary of co-operating with the land-
owner. In the second article, it was the particular relationship between land-
owner and community that stood in the way of co-operation. I shall quote both 
articles at length to allow the tone of the article speak for itself.176 ‘Scores of 
commercial farmers in Mashonaland Central whose farms were listed for 
designation are now frantically lobbying for support from chiefs in a desperate 
and rare attempt to have their farms exempted from designation. The farmers 
(...) reportedly spent the whole week driving up and down to Chiefs’ home-
steads presenting their grievances and appeals against the stand taken by the 
government. Chief Coria Chiweshe said: ‘They [that is, white farmers] have 
become so generous. One of them approached me and said I should, at the party 
congress in Mutare, tell the ruling party that he is a good man who lives well 
with the local communities. But he is forgetting that he is the same man who 
has punished my people for a long time’. ‘Villagers have had their livestock 
confiscated and asked to pay a fine for letting their cattle stray on his farm. He 
has been refusing the locals to fetch water or fish in the dam on his farm and 
even had some of the villagers arrested and fined for doing so. Now he needs 
my support. I cannot be seen betraying my people. We want land and this is 
what people have been waiting for’. Chief Anke Chitsinede Negomo said the 
Chiweshe area had been robbed of land which belonged to the highly respected 
spirit medium of this country, Mbuya Nehanda, when whites arrived in Zim-
babwe’.177 The second article, one week later went on in the same tone: ‘Some 
white commercial farmers whose farms had been listed for designation in 
Hurungwe were reportedly (...) lobbying for support from neighbouring villages 
to have the decision reversed, according to the Zimbabwe Information Service 
[ZIS]. Villagers of Kasimure in Hurungwe told ZIS that a farmer from Kuti 
                                                           
175  The tone of the articles is particularly relevant in relation to the stance taken by the 
government towards conservancies where the stress is put on the stipulation that 
they are only allowed to exist, despite the fact that they have no statutory definition, 
if they establish a ‘formal and meaningful relationship’ with the neighbouring 
communities. 
176  It should be noted of course that these are newspaper stories of a very government-
minded newspaper in Zimbabwe. As in all newspapers we can never be completely 
sure about the authenticity or level of verification of the words or issues mentioned 
in the articles. But in terms of indicating the general politicised atmosphere 
surrounding these issues the articles are good examples. 
177  Sunday Mail, 7 December 1997, Farmers in Desperate Attempt to Have Farms 
Exempted from Acquisition. 
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Estates in Lomagundi district had approached them with papers to sign 
objecting to the Government’s intention to acquire his three farms. The 
villagers, whose relation with the farmer have always been tense, refused to co-
operate, reminding him of longstanding disputes. The villagers refuted the 
contents of the letter of appeal which said they enjoyed benefits from the 
farmer. Other farmers were allegedly forcing their employees to sign their 
letters of appeal against, despite deplorable living conditions they were being 
subjected to by the farmer, including poor housing and wages’.178 
 More than half a year later the same newspaper came up with yet another 
story in which neighbourly relations between landowner and communities were 
put forward as hidden but extremely powerful criteria for designation; essential 
even if the official criteria did not readily apply. ‘Member of Parliament for 
Beitbridge, Cde Kembo Mohadi has urged the Government to acquire all farms 
it recently delisted in the district before disgruntled landless peasants illegally 
resettle themselves on the properties. (...) He said of grave concern was the fact 
that most of the delisted farms belong to cruel landlords who had over the years 
impounded livestock from neighbouring communal areas for straying into their 
land, demanding heavy fines. (...) ‘One of them for instance is impounding 
livestock from the communal areas and charging a fine of [Z]$85. This man is a 
bad neighbour. How can they delist his farm?’ asked Cde Mohadi’.179 It was 
these kinds of stories which led the Zimbabwe Independent to conclude that 
‘(t)he perception remained that the government had used land to punish its 
critics, both black and white, and to reward its favourites’.180 The articles are 
exactly in line with the political rhetoric of Mugabe who ‘raised the peasants’ 
expectations with his speeches on the land issue. During his country-wide tour 
[in 1997 HW], he assured peasants he would have acquired the land by last 
December [1997 HW] and resettlement would have gathered momentum by the 
beginning of [1998’ HW].181 The racial card was skilfully manipulated by 
Mugabe who ‘has made it clear that Britain should take responsibility for 
compensating ‘its white children’’.182 In Mugabe’s view, whites will obviously 
never be considered Zimbabweans.  
 Oral rhetoric was no problem, but the government found its hands tied as far 
as words and statements went in 1998 and it was hamstrung by financial 
                                                           
178  Sunday Mail, 14 December 1997, Campaign to Fight Land Acquisition. 
179  Sunday Mail, 5 July 1998, MP not Amused with Delisting of Farms. 
180  Zimbabwe Independent, 21-27 November 1997, Designated Farms List Out. 
181  Zimbabwe Independent, 18 September 1998, Donors Demand Transparency Before 
Funding. 
182  Zimbabwe Independent, 9 January 1998, Zimbabwe Land Acquisition Contravenes 
Accord: UK. 
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constraints. The Zimbabwean Government had already found itself in gigantic 
financial difficulties, quite apart from the complicated land issue. In the first 
place these stemmed from promises Mugabe had to make in 1997 to war 
veterans after violent demonstrations in which they demanded financial 
compensation and appreciation for their contributions to the Liberation 
Struggle, which resulted in ‘them receiving Z$ 50,000 each in gratuities and Z$ 
2000 a month each as pension’. Over and above this ‘they were promised 20% 
of the acquired farms’.183 A second reason for Zimbabwe’s financial problems 
was because of his involvement in the war in former Zaire, now the Republique 
Democratique de Congo (RDC), probably, and maybe only, for reasons of 
personal gain and to help a nephew with commercial interests in the Congo as 
some suggest. This involvement is costing him an estimated US$ 400,000 a 
day.184 A cartoon in the Zimbabwe Independent summarised the financial 
situation in Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 2.185  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Cartoon about financial situation Zimbabwe 
(Source: see footnote 185) 
 
                                                           
183  Pp. 38, African Business, May 1998, Mugabe Sinking in Land Quagmire. 
184  Pp. 14, New African, October 1998, An African World War? 
185  Zimbabwe Independent, 18 September 1998. 
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 The Zimbabwean economy was already not in good shape and had been 
depreciating for years, but it finally crashed as a result of these combined 
problems in the second half of 1998.186 
 In this context the Mugabe government was not in a position to do anything 
to materialise the high expectations raised by the land designation and resettle-
ment programme. This meant that despite the fact that he boasted of his 
independence of former colonisers and international public opinion, he had to 
come back to both of them for financial support. In order to finance the 
programme, the government organised a donor conference in September 
1998.But before the conference began, communal farmers in Svosve seemed to 
become so impatient that they started to invade private farms before official 
designation procedures had taken their course.187 Racial overtones were never far 
away as a quote from an article in The Herald makes clear: ‘About 70 angry 
villagers from Svosve communal lands in Marondera, Mashonaland East, 
stormed nearby Topsland Farm on Thursday protesting against racial utterances 
by the owner, who alleged that her sheep had died because some ‘Africans from 
surrounding villages and compounds’ were relieving themselves on the farm 
(...) She made the derogatory comments at her farm last week when she was 
answering the Governor of Mashonaland, Cde David Karimanzira, and other 
delegates to the recent international donors’ conference on land (...)’.188 The 
example from Svosve was soon followed by other farmers in other parts of 
Zimbabwe, including properties in the SVC, especially Angus Ranch, Mukazi 
and Mukwazi Ranch.189 In the Svosve case, President Mugabe ordered the 
protesters to move, which they refused to do, unless the government speeded up 
the resettlement programme and resettled them on the invaded farms later. 
Mugabe glibly made promises and at the same time ruled out the use of police 
force against the invaders.190 This implied that the police would not remove the 
invading people from private property or prosecute them, although they were 
openly and intentionally trespassing. Maybe Mugabe thought that ‘impatient’ 
black farmers would put the donors under pressure to support the Zimbabwean 
land programme financially. There were even rumours that the farm invasions 
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had been orchestrated by the government itself for this reason.191 But the donor 
conference, which took place on three days in September 1998.192 was a 
disappointment in terms of financial promises by donor countries and of the 
expected Z$ 21,6 billion which was hoped for and expected to be raised for a 
total of Z$ 40 billion to finance the total land reform programme, only Z$ 17 
million was realised.193 The donors reasons for withholding their bounty primar-
ily boiled down to their earlier criticism that the whole process of land designa-
tion was not ‘transparent’194 and a United Nations Development Programme 
Report concluded that the designation programme was ‘biased’.195  
 The donor conference was much more than a disappointment, first and fore-
most it was a definite set back for the Zimbabwean government. It seemed that 
it would have to abandon its high flight of its rhetoric and initial intentions to 
satisfy international donors and allow the latter far more say in the whole 
process than it would have liked them to have. This would have been an 
expectation though based on the usual narrow and one-dimensional economic 
assumption often (mis)taken in the West when analysing international relations 
and national agendas in Africa, that Mugabe and its government would take the 
further economic development of Zimbabwe as a whole as a prime motivation 
to guide their decisions. Seen from that perspective they could not risk loosing 
donor aid and the approval of the international community for their land 
programme, in order to keep their national economy more or less up to 
standards. But in this case the Zimbabwean government seems to have turned to 
a mixture of elements of the earlier white minority governments in Rhodesia 
with some rhetorical ‘leftovers’ from the Liberation Struggle. In the first place it 
challenged and blatantly provoked the international community, especially after 
Mugabe lost the constitutional referendum in February 2000. They did this by 
forcefully and violently trying to drive the white commercial farmers off their 
land through organising land invasions by ‘war veterans’ (and at the same time 
try to re-strengthen their own political position and hold over the local popula-
tion and intimidate the political opposition, the Movement for Democratic 
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Change (MDC)). Actually Mugabe does what early settlers and white minority 
regimes in Southern Rhodesia did with the black Africans, that is, force them 
off the land. Secondly the Mugabe government legitimises their actions by 
adopting national legislation, that is, sanctioning their actions juridically ex 
post, as the Acts did I described earlier, sanctioned white land appropriation. 
During my fieldwork in 1998, when the debate between white economic power 
and black political power was heating up again, the SVC had to prove to the 
government, through its programme of organisational co-operation with its 
neighbouring communities, primarily one thing: that the enormous buffalo 
fence that separated them from their neighbouring communities was only a 
physical barrier to keep the wildlife in and not meant to keep people out or to 
stand as a symbolic reminder of land segregation. If the SVC wanted to survive 
this political turmoil about land, it would have to satisfy the wish of the minister 
that in 1998 they were heading for a ‘formal and meaningful relationship’ with 
their neighbours. In the next chapter I will describe the genesis and main themes 
in the development of the SVC and analyse what can be derived from that to 
suggest an answer to the question how ‘formal and meaningful’ the relationship 
with the communities could become. I will show in the next two chapters that it 
was definitely and undeniably formal, but that the core of what could have 
made the relationship truly meaningful for the communities was lacking from 
the start and even before it officially started. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
The Savé Valley Conservancy:  
Genesis and the longing for 
buffalo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As I described in the previous chapter the appropriation of the Sabi Valley by 
white settlers occurred fairly late in history, because of its endemic malaria and 
tsetse fly. It was indicated that the Sabi Valley was ‘unsuitable for white 
habitation’. The first white settlers entered the stage only in 1923 when the 
Bridges family obtained land from the BSAC which would become Devuli 
Ranch, named after the river which formed its northern boundary and joins the 
Sabi River.1 In the 1930s, a second tract of land, south of Devuli Ranch became 
white land, bought by the General Manager of Devuli, Sommerville, later in 
conjunction with James Whittall, who had come to Africa drawn by the 
example and writings of the most famous white hunter in Africa, Frederick 
Selous. Whittall, like Selous a generation earlier, went to Rugby School in 
Britain, and was also an avid hunter. Later the Whittalls bought Sommerville 
out and became the sole owners of what became Humani Ranch.2 The main 
economic activity, right from the start until the end of the 1980s was extensive 
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cattle farming. Only in the 1960s did the production of sugar and citrus begin in 
the Lowveld under a new irrigation programme, running parallel to cattle 
farming.3 It was mainly one of the sons of James Whittall, Roger, who kept up 
the white hunting tradition and who set aside parts of Humani for wildlife 
utilisation.4 It was only when in the 1980s it finally became clear that cattle 
farming was not a viable economic activity in the area (anymore) because of its 
unreliable rainfall and when the Devuli Ranch was carved up and sold to 
different and new (white) owners that the idea of starting a joint operation on 
wildlife utilisation took root and finally led to the formation of the Savé Valley 
Conservancy (SVC) in 1991.  
 The official formation of the SVC should not be seen as a point in time, 
before which there was nothing related to SVC type activities. Nor that at the 
time of formation there was a fully organisationally developed conservancy 
structure or wildlife utilisation scheme. In June 1991 a group of landowners 
signed the constitution of the SVC, but even that constitution was a temporary 
one which was amended in the time following the signing.5 The establishment 
of the SVC is more of a particular moment in an ongoing process, which had 
already begun years before its official installation, for instance on Humani, and 
has continued afterwards. It actually went on, especially in efforts to find a way 
to relate to the neighbouring communities as I shall describe in the next chapter. 
The year 1991 is a ‘beacon-date’ for the history books only and should not be 
interpreted as indicating any stage of finality. At best its installation should be 
seen as a symbolic expression of the consensus amongst the landowners that 
they should opt for wildlife utilisation as a land-use alternative in this part of the 
Lowveld. This interpretation also implies that chronology cannot tell the story 
of the birth of the SVC exactly. Things have happened since the inauguration of 
the SVC, which can still explain parts of the process leading up to its formation 
in the first place in earlier years. Things that were anticipated and came true. 
The drought of 1991-1992, for instance, actually coincided with this period and 
after the strict formation date of the SVC. Even so, this drought has explanatory 
value as it strengthened, and in a way confirmed and proved, the earlier consen-
sus amongst the landowners to go into wildlife utilisation through a conser-
vancy structure. The same holds true for the parts of land sold by Devuli after 
the inauguration of the SVC in the first half of the 1990s. It followed the trend, 
set in the southern part of the SVC on Senuko and other properties before 1991, 
                                                           
3  Yudelman 1964: 31; pp. 69-70, Haw, R.C. (1966), Rhodesia. The Jewel of Africa, 
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of attracting buyers who were not planning to go into cattle, but to pursue 
commercial interests through tourism, thereby making the conservancy structure 
more opportune.  
 The basic idea of the SVC was to restore the environmentally degraded area 
after years of cattle farming, restock it with wildlife which had been thoroughly 
eradicated for the purpose of cattle ranching in the previous period, over and 
above the black rhino for which they were already providing a safe haven on 
their properties. They wanted to let conservation pay for itself and make a 
financial profit through wildlife utilisation, primarily by launching hunting 
operations, which are referred to as ‘consumptive tourism’.6 The buffalo is the 
most sought-after, and therefore the most economically profitable, hunting 
trophy in Africa. For that reason the SVC wanted to restock the conservancy 
with buffalo, alongside many other forms of wildlife like giraffe, wildebeest, 
kudu, sable, waterbuck, zebra and the like. One of the strict requirements 
imposed by the DNPWLM in Harare was that in order to buy and later on hunt 
buffalo, the area first had to be fenced off by a double electrified fence, in co-
operation with the DVS, with a stretch of seven metres of cleared land in 
between, to prevent buffalo of contaminating cattle outside the conservancy 
with the much dreaded FMD.7 The erection and maintenance of the fence and 
the pursuit of buffalo to restock the conservancy are the dominating themes of 
the SVC in the 1990s. The influence of these two issues is not confined to the 
SVC alone, but has even more serious and severe consequences for the relations 
between the SVC and the surrounding communities. Firstly the huge fence 
denies the communities access to the natural resources they were used to 
exploiting inside the SVC when it were still separate cattle farms, like thatching 
grass, firewood, building poles and the like. Secondly, they fear the contagion 
of FMD for their own cattle, as they are the closest neighbours of the SVC. 
Thirdly, the fence seems to symbolise and to mark the relationship of exclusion 
between black and white social identities in the Save Valley. 
 In this chapter I shall describe the conservation record and tradition of 
wildlife utilisation in the Lowveld of Zimbabwe and its almost inevitable 
continuity in the formation of the SVC. On the basis of this historical descrip-
tion, I shall describe in detail the issues of the fence and the buffalo as they are 
not only essential to understanding the development of the SVC itself, but seem 
even more important for its paradoxical consequences on the reciprocal 
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exchange relationship with the neighbouring communities. On the one hand it 
seems clear that, in order to be able to invest financially in community relations, 
the SVC needs to earn money, which is done most successfully by offering 
hunting operations, especially buffalo, to tourists. For that reason it seems only 
logical and natural that the SVC should erect a fence in order to be formally 
allowed to pursuit that most favourable economic opportunity.  
 On the other hand the fence and the buffalo mean that the white landowners 
of the SVC and the black members of the neighbouring communities are 
physically separated from each other, making the fence seem to become a fatal 
symbol of the general history of black and white relations, in the context of 
land, in Zimbabwe. In a way the fence could be said to block and facilitate the 
development of a reciprocal relation between the SVC and the surrounding 
communities simultaneously. 
 
 
The ‘inevitability’ of the SVC 
 
The first development was that already at an early stage the Rhodesian 
Government initiated the formation of Intensive Conservation Areas (ICA), 
which divided all commercial, read white, land into ICA’s. The ICA was there, 
living up to its name, to promote conservation on commercial land. As the ICA 
was especially created to discuss matters about natural resources on commercial 
land, game was a regular item on the agenda, for example if a landowner was 
overshooting. The mandate of the ICA also implied that ‘poaching’ was always 
on the agenda. Ranch by ranch there was a report of what poaching they had 
experienced and what they had done about it. In the Lowveld they formed the 
Sabi Valley ICA, which included land on both sides of the Sabi River, including 
Devuli Ranch, Humani Ranch, Sabi Tanganda and Sabi Experimental Station. 
Even before the Liberation Struggle began in the 1970s, the ICA had split up 
into two, with the Sabi River forming the boundary. The west side of the river 
kept the name of Sabi Valley ICA, while the east side became to be known as 
the Mid-Sabi ICA. The northern boundary of the Sabi Valley ICA was formed 
by Birchenough Bridge and in the south by the Mkwasine River. The main 
reason for the split was that on the west side of the river the focus was on cattle 
ranching, while the east side was primarily devoted to agriculture. Another 
consideration was that the distances between east and west, with only a few 
official crossings at Birchenough Bridge and the J. Quinton Bridge on the 
Ngundu-Tanganda road, were too long for effective communication. The Sabi 
Valley ICA at the time was dominated by representatives from the big ranches 
in the area like Devuli and Humani, whose general managers or owners, in the 
case of Humani, often acted as chairmen of the body. During the time that the 
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ideas about the SVC began to take root, Derek Henning, managing director of 
Devuli Ranch, was chairman of the ICA and because of that also became the 
first chairman of the SVC-to-be.8 The ICA met every month.  
 During the years of the Liberation Struggle, or ‘The War’ as it is (often) 
referred to by whites, it only held meetings every second month. In those years 
it was not easy to travel around freely and the ICA meetings became one of the 
very few occasions on which people from the white community could actually 
meet and socialise. For this reason the ICA meetings took on the connotation of 
a social event and of being a strong medium for social bonding and 
(re)confirmation of white social identity, rather than running the business of a 
strict conservation body. Members planned the meeting for a particular day and 
then took lunches with them and the day was mainly used for socialising. The 
ICA meetings consolidated as a very strong medium for a sense of belonging 
among the white community in the Sabi Valley: ‘that was what kept us 
together’ as one prominent member formulated it pointedly. During the peak 
years of the Liberation Struggle they had to drive to the meetings in cars 
armoured with steel plates attached to the bottom of the car in case they should 
drive over a land-mine and they always travelled in armed convoys in order to 
prevent to be ambushed. Despite these hindrances they were eagerly prepared to 
make these sacrifices to visit and attend the ICA meetings simply to be able to 
meet and socialise with other people. In the memory of Anne Whittall,9 the ICA 
played a very important role in the conception of the idea to form a conser-
vancy. She told me the story that she still clearly remembers, standing out like a 
kind of beacon in her memory, how at one ICA meeting on Angus in 1989-
1990, Jeremy Baldwin, then co-owner of Masapas stood up, saying with Pete 
Henning (no family relation with Derek Henning), ‘we are sitting on a 
goldmine’ and related how people in South Africa made good money out of 
wildlife and proposed to ‘go gamewise’, especially because they, that is, the 
ICA, had people ‘like Roger [Whittall] doing safaris’. Baldwin was, according 
to Anne, referring to MalaMala and Londolozi game parks in South Africa. It 
proved to be a spark, but one which was fanned into a flame a ‘few days after 
that meeting’ when Raoul DuToit from WWF/DNPWLM came in and brought 
them the idea about putting black rhino on their private land in order to protect 
them from poaching. I shall come back to this proposal of the WWF later in this 
chapter. It was the co-owner of Masapas, Pete Henning, who later contacted the 
Conservancy Officer of the NPB in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, asking it to 
                                                           
8  Derek Henning was Director on the Board of Directors of Devuli Ranch from 1970 
to 1980 and its Managing Director from 1980-1995. Information based on interview 
with landowner Chishakwe, 14 October 1998. 
9  Interview with wife of landowner of Humani, 12 August 1998. 
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send someone to come over to Zimbabwe and advise the SVC on the formula-
tion of their constitution. Henning himself is a farmer from Louis Trichardt in 
South Africa, and the officer’s report on his trip to the SVC mentions that 
Henning made ‘numerous phone calls asking about detailed aspects of our 
conservancy work’. At a later stage the WWF officer in charge of the Rhino 
Conservation Project, also contacted South Africa, Sabi Sands in the eastern 
Transvaal in particular, to ask the people there if they could sent a copy of their 
constitution to the SVC-to-be, which could be used as a guideline for their ef-
forts. For the further development of the argument in this chapter about the 
main themes within the SVC, interesting to note that the Sabi Sands constitution 
was considered too restrictive to landowners with regard to fencing. ‘Much time 
has been spent (...) trying to soften the Sabi Sands’s constitution and thus 
making it more acceptable to the Zimbabwean group of farmers’.10 The upshot is 
that the SVC stands very much in the tradition of the South African conser-
vancy movement and that the people who were trying to get the SVC off the 
ground in the first place actively sought to learn from, and also follow the 
example of, South African conservancies. It could be added that where I argued 
that the South African conservancies strengthened the boundaries between the 
(white) conservancy and the neighbouring (black) communities, the SVC was, 
in first instance at least, even more strongly attracted to the idea of creating a 
fenced-in island of wilderness, in the midst of communal lands. Or in the words 
of Neumann in his study on Arusha National Park in relation to its neighbouring 
communities in Tanzania, right from the start the landowners were ‘imposing 
wilderness’ on an island in between densely populated districts.11 
 In the 1990s, the ICA was subsumed into the Natural Resources Sub-
Committee, which became part of local government, Rural District Council 
(RDC), and was chaired by the District Administrator (DA). The Sub-
Committee is answerable to the Provincial Natural Resources Officer who in 
turn reports to the Natural Resources Board headquarters in Harare. The 
restructuring was meant to enhance the power of RDCs, including their say 
about commercial land. But, according to one source, the ‘structure collapsed. 
Maybe not all over Zimbabwe, but anyway, here it is non-existent’. The Sub-
Committee eventually also encompassed Communal Land, which ‘wasn’t the 
idea of the ICA in the first place’. The new structure is considered ‘not as 
relevant anymore, but they have the legal authority’. The Sub Committee is 
                                                           
10  Pp. 4, Report Markham on his visit to the SVC, 20 to 25 April 1991. What a nice 
symbolic coincidence that they especially asked the Sabi Sands for an example of 
their constitution, as Sabi used to be the name of the Save River! 
11  Neumann, R.P. (1998), Imposing Wilderness. Struggles over Livelihood and Nature 
Preservation in Africa, London, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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considered ‘relevant only when there is a proper problem’.12 The ICA and later 
the Sub-Committee were running parallel with the development of the inception 
of the SVC. The agendas for the different meetings all contained more or less 
the same structural points and areas of attention, which is not astonishing 
considering they were all about the same topic related to the same region with 
most of the same people involved: conservation in the Save Valley. Later, when 
the SVC was finally established, it simply seems to have ‘taken over’ the 
function of the ICA13 as a white platform for conservation issues on private land 
and the later day Natural Resources Sub-Committee, although it has remained 
member of the Sub-Committee. ‘The objectives of the ICA and SVC are 
identical’ as one interviewee answered my question about this issue.14 In effect, 
it could be said that the SVC became the ICA New Style, concentrating on 
private land only, and for that reason, especially in the Lowveld, dominated by 
whites.15 
 What is the status of the Land Question in the Save Valley as the second 
relevant development in the establishment of the SVC? The largest part of what 
is now the SVC was appropriated by whites in the 1920s and 1930s, the Bridges 
and James Whittall of Devuli and Humani Ranch respectively. Devuli Ranch 
used to own all the land within the SVC north of the Turwi River. And south of 
the Turwi River it owned Masapas and Angus, which by then also included 
Mukazi and Mukwazi.16 Humani later bought Bedford Block north of the Turwi. 
This covers the north nicely but leaves part of the southern half of the SVC 
unexplained, to wit Senuko, Levanga, Mkwasine, Potential, Hammond and 
Impala. Up till 1973 this was State Land / Crown Land. At that time it was not 
sold as commercial land, because the soil was considered unproductive. So it 
was only in the 1970s and early 1980s that this part of the present-day SVC 
became commercial land.17 It is interesting to note the reason the State Land was 
                                                           
 
12  Interview with landowner of Chishakwe, 14 October 1998. 
13  Only the property Impala, located on the southern side of the Mkwasine River never 
formed part of the Sabi Valley ICA. In 1998 it waspart of  the SVC. Information 
from interview with Chairman of the SVC, 8 July 1998. 
14  Interview with landowner Chishakwe, 14 October 1998. 
15  Information in this section based on interviews with wives of landowners of 
Humani, 12 August 1998, and landowner Humani, 10 September 1998, unless 
indicated otherwise. 
16  Devuli purchased Angus in 1944, Sommerville 1976: 189. 
17  In how far also more political reasons were active in selling this State Land at the 
level of the old white government in 1973 I do not know and my interviewees were 
very evasive in their answer or response to questions probing into this subject. As 
they were equally evasive about all questions related to their role and position in the 
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sold: it was considered unproductive. This meant that the people who bought 
the land did not buy it directly in order to make it productive and economically 
viable through cattle or agriculture. The sale attracted people with other 
interests in the land, for investment reasons (absentee landowners), or with the 
idea of creating tourism opportunities. Senuko, Hammond and Impala were all 
finally sold to people who wanted to make a tourism destination out of them, 
with either a strong undercurrent of hunting or even with this as the primary 
aim. The landowner of Senuko18 is deeply immersed in eco-tourism, but did do 
some serious hunting in his early years in Gonarezhou as Honorary Officer of 
the DNPWLM,19 and in 1998 he did send in his request for a hunting quota on 
his property. Hammond was finally bought by an old American hunting client 
of Roger Whittall, a former high-ranking manager at Sara Lee/DE. Impala was 
bought by Naudé, a local farmer and business entrepreneur as part of an invest-
ment strategy, betting on the tourism potential of the SVC. Even if buyers did 
not buy properties right away to fulfil their own ambitions in the tourism 
industry, with or without hunting, they certainly bought them as an investment 
taking a gamble on the tourism potential they are trying to build within the 
SVC.  
 This process of attracting certain buyers to the land was accelerated when 
Devuli Ranch began to sell off its property in bits and pieces after realisation 
had dawned after the drought in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s that cattle 
would be hard to sustain in the Lowveld.20 Devuli had already taken a serious 
beating during the Liberation Struggle, which only reached its peak in and after 
1976 when ‘(...) the Lowveld became the new and bitterly-contested ‘sharp end’ 
of the war’.21 At the beginning of the Liberation Struggle, Devuli began with a 
herd of 28,000 head of cattle. There were only some 6000 left at Independence 
in 1980. Some cattle had been sold, but the large majority had been stolen.22 The 
                                                           
 
Liberation Struggle. The information on this aspect of the land falling under the 
SVC is derived from an interview with Chairman of the SVC, 8 July 1998. 
18  Son of one of the ‘sugar-pioneers’ in the Lowveld, Sir Ray Stockil, who with people 
like MacDougall took the initiative in the 1940 to grow sugarcane in the region 
(Haw 1966: 69-70). See also Saunders, C. (2001), ‘Great Characters of the Lowveld 
– The Triangle ‘Guinea Pigs’. Heritage of Zimbabwe, no. 20, 39-60. 
19  An Honorary Officer is specifically asked by National Parks to become an officer 
because of a certain expertise. It is a non-paid job and voluntary. The Chairman of 
the SVC was Honorary Officer from the 1970s onward till 1985. 
20  Information in this section is from two interviews with landowner of Chishakwe, 18 
June and 14 October 1998 and personal observations, unless otherwise indicated. 
21  Godwin & Hancock 1997: 156. 
22  Compared to Humani, Devuli lost far more cattle during the Armed Struggle. 
Humani lost ‘only’ an estimated 10% of cattle. Humani had certain advantages over 
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reason for this grand scale action was that the Freedom Fighters wanted to break 
the economic power base of the white community. To really hit the heart of 
economic power in the Sabi Valley meant to hit the cattle. So the Freedom 
Fighters ordered the local population to have fresh meat in their house at all 
times that the soldiers might ask them for meat, that is, checking them. And ‘all 
times’ meant ‘all times’, day and night. If this was found not to be the case, the 
people involved were severely punished. This resulted in constant pressure on 
the cattle farmers. The problem for Devuli Ranch was particularly severe at 
Angus, which borders a large stretch of Tribal Trust Land, now Matsai 
Communal Land. In this particular context of the Liberation Struggle this 
created a huge problem and within a short period of time all 3000 head of cattle 
were stolen from Angus, plus all the wire from the fences and the water pipes. 
The bordering TTL was known as a ‘no-go area’ for whites as there was no 
white habitation, which allowed the freedom fighters to use it as a ‘rest and re-
group area’. This proximity of a rest and re-group area probably also contrib-
uted to the fact that cattle theft was so intense here. The assistant manager of 
Angus was ambushed and killed after he had been dipping his cattle. Later, the 
homestead was destroyed as well.23 From there on it was no longer useful to 
keep Angus occupied and so the other managers where withdrawn to Devuli 
Head Quarters, present-day Chishakwe, and left Angus abandoned, only to 
return and reclaim it in 1982-1983.  
 In 1998 Devuli Headquarters exudes an atmosphere of days gone by. You 
reach it quite simply by driving along the Humani Road to the north and at a 
certain stage you catch sight of buildings on your left hand, visible from the 
road. The main entrance is guarded by and decorated with two silver-plated / 
painted spooked wheels on either side of the gate. The story behind the wheels 
                                                           
Devuli. On the east side Angus (Devuli) formed the border. On the west side there 
was the Sabi River. The eastern border especially meant that Humani people could 
pursue cattle thieves over a far greater distance than Devuli people who had to stop 
at the border with the TTL. Humani could also follow them onto Devuli property. In 
this fashion many of the Humani cattle were retrieved. Humani patrolled the fences 
from the ground and from the air, using game scouts and managers. When cattle 
thieves were seen from the air they threw hand grenades at them. When found on the 
ground thieves were shot, as nobody wanted live witnesses to tell others who had 
caught them as they were fearful of reprisals. Furthermore the policies between the 
two ranches differed with regard to cattle theft: Devuli hired mercenaries during the 
Armed Struggle to protect it and its cattle, but they always stopped the pursuit at the 
border of the TTL and went after compensation from the government. One source 
estimated that they only got a meagre 30% compensation for all their losses. Humani 
was far more set on catching the thieves and less concerned about compensation, 
according to this source. 
23  Interview with landowner of Mukwazi, 11 August 1998. 
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is that they are the wheels, gun-carriage wheels used in World War I, that were 
on the ox wagon which arrived in this area in 1915. The office is decorated with 
old wooden furniture, including a huge rectangular desk; an old grey safe stands 
in one corner. The outside wall of the office is covered with faded maps of the 
old Devuli Ranch, showing the markings of the more recent split up. On one 
wall of the office is a large, that is, approximately 1.2 metres, rectangular black 
and white photograph, placed in a wooden frame behind broken glass. It is a 
picture of the Sabi River at the spot where they would later build Birchenough 
Bridge in 1934. Remarkably the Sabi River then looked like a majestic stream, 
while nowadays it seems only full of sand.24 The pioneers of Devuli Ranch, 
Despard Bridges and his wife, are buried just outside the gate of HQ. At the 
gate you turn straight to the left and follow the fence for some 500 metres and 
there the graves are to the left of the road. The graves lay within a typical 
‘English type’ wooden fence, which is in a state of collapse at some points. The 
graves are not well kept; the text on the grave is by now difficult to read. He 
died on 4 February 1935 and the text says: ‘God keep his vision clear in our 
hearts through the dark day[s] unti[l] the da[y] breaks’. Some letters, as you can 
read, have fallen off the tomb stone. 
 Straight after the Liberation Struggle in 1980, Devuli set to work to try to 
rebuild its herd, beginning with Head Quarters and leaving the other properties 
lying idle for the time being. A large chunk of land, 200,000 ha., was sold to the 
Government in 1982. This is now known as the Devuli Resettlement Scheme, 
situated to the east of the northern part of the SVC. In the second half of the 
1980s and beginning of the 1990s Devuli was subdivided even more and sold 
off.25 The process began in the south with Masapas on 9 July 1986. Angus, 
which was divided in three, followed in 1988. Lot 1 (Mukwazi) was sold to Rob 
Cunningham (and later sold again to an Italian family who are also vivid 
hunters), Lot 2 (Mukazi) was sold to Pete Wenham, and Angus proper was sold 
by and to Derek Henning himself. Later on he sold it to the Hunters’ Associa-
tion of Zimbabwe, who in turn sold half of Angus to Barrie Duckworth, a tough 
hunter in the same tradition as Roger Whittall, who had bought Mokore 
(originally known as Ouse) on 1 October 1992. On that same day Humani 
                                                           
24  Sunday Mail, 12 October 1997, An environmental disaster, ‘In its current state, the 
Save River (...) has been converted from a surface water source to virtually a 
groundwater system. Here and there, there are patches of what once was a mighty 
river but which has since been choked to ‘death’ but tonnes of silt. The Save has 
simply become the sand river, existing more in name than in reality’; see also The 
Herald, 14 October 1998, Siltation..., presenting a picture of the Save River at 
Birchenough Bridge where a man is digging a trench in the sand to reach the water.  
25  All information from an interview with landowner Chishakwe, 18 June 1998. 
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bought Bedford Block. On 31 March 1989 three lots were sold in the north. Lot 
2, which is now Matandere, Lot 3, now Gunundwe, and Lot 4, now Mapari. On 
15 April 1989, these lots were followed by Lot 5, now Msaize, Lot 6, now 
Chishakwe, which Derek Henning bought himself, and finally Lot 7, now 
Chanurwe. In 1991, Lots 8 and 9, Chapungu and Sabi River, were sold. These 
were again sold on 19 January 1994 to a German industrialist and hunting 
enthusiast, Willy Pabst, who also bought Musawezi. He renamed the combined 
property Sango. Savuli was sold on 1 February 1992 to a group of buyers, a 
combination of a local farmer and people in the tourist business in Harare. 
Umkondo is a former mine, see Chapter 1, and formally belongs to the Zim-
babwean Government. Willy Pabst has made a bid for that property, but he has 
other competitors who want to buy or lease Umkondo. I shall return back to this 
particular issue in the next chapter. This list demonstrates unequivocally that the 
new landowners in the valley cannot be regarded as successors in the cattle 
business. There has been a definite shift towards owners interested in hunting 
and the related field of tourism. Even when the properties were bought after the 
date of the official inauguration of the SVC, the scenario reinforces the idea that 
it is mainly hunters and tourist operators who are interested in buying land in 
the Save Valley. The money earned with the splitting up and selling of Devuli 
Ranch was primarily used to pay shareholders in Devuli Ranch, who had not 
seen any returns for years. The name Devuli Ranch still exists but now operates 
as an investment company. The Bridges family still has some shares in the 
company but nothing major or significant. 
 A third, but far less controllable or predictable issue which made the creation 
of one or another kind of organisational structure for wildlife utilisation in the 
Save Valley virtually inevitable at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 
1990s, was the droughts which wiped out every hope of ever recovering a 
serious and viable cattle business in the Lowveld. In 1982-1983 a severe 
drought hit Zimbabwe. Once again, the writing was on the wall: it is impossible 
to make cattle farming economically viable in Regions IV and V. Struggling 
against environmental degradation, that is, that ‘the vegetation could no longer 
sustain viable stocking rates’, the beef profits declined.26 Or in the words of the 
Chairman of the SVC, in a discussion organised by the Centre for Private 
Conservation in Washington (U.S.A.): ‘We saw soil erosion. We saw over-
grazing. We saw the loss of perennial grasses. And we were forced, by the end 
of the 1980s to sit down and really think about what our future was. Where 
were we headed? It was absolutely certain that we were headed for an economic 
                                                           
26  Pp. 255, Goodwin, H.J., Kent, I.J., Parker, K.T. & Walpole, M.J. (1997), Tourism, 
Conservation & Sustainable Development: Volume IV, The South-East Lowveld, 
Zimbabwe. Unpublished report. 
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disaster, let alone an ecological disaster. (...) And (...) when the better quality 
grasses disappeared, our carrying capacity started taking a knock, and you could 
carry less stock on the land. At the same time, the viability of cattle production 
was on the decline. The returns per head were less (...)’. They compensated by 
putting more stock on which exacerbated the problem even more and soil 
erosion was the inevitable result.27 One of the consequences was that the cattle 
farmers had to seriously consider destocking their ranches. But in order to 
destock there must be an alternative to make the land productive. The final 
‘incentive’ came when another drought hit them in 1991-1992. It was ‘one of 
[the] worst droughts in living memory. The rainy season, that normally lasts 
between November and March, almost completely failed and the rains were 
patchy and unpredictable (...) rivers and lakes dried up and many trees died’.28 
The farmers had to look for another land use option, and (very) quickly. 
Ranches, which were solely dependent on cattle and did not have any agricul-
ture alongside it to compensate for the loss of cattle through the drought, 
especially faced severe problems. The droughts rode roughshod over the 
farmers, forcing them to act willy-nilly. The drought accelerated the process of 
finding an alternative land-use option. One particular option had already been 
suggested by WWF/DNPWLM and was in operation on a few properties in the 
Save Valley: wildlife, in particular the rhino, which forms a fourth development 
on the road to creating the SVC.  
 Black and white rhino are indigenous species to Zimbabwe.29 The white 
rhino had already become extinct earlier in the twentieth century, but was later 
redeveloped from South African stock in smaller recreational parks like Kyle 
and the Matopos. The black rhino was kept in the large wildlife areas, such as 
the Zambezi Valley. This area was very accessible from neighbouring countries 
like Zambia. In the second half of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s there 
was an enormous increase in commercial rhino poaching, especially in the 
National Parks which had low staffing levels and this allied with the easy access 
of the Parks made them easy prey to poachers who could retreat quickly over 
the border after their ‘hunting’ expeditions. Why there was such an upturn in 
                                                           
27  Pp. 7, Centre for Private Conservation, Conservation through Commerce. A 
Roundtable Discussion, Washington: Centre for Private Conservation, January 1999, 
italics added. 
28  Pp. 2, Brown, J., Cooke, E., Smith, R., & Stelfox, H. (1992), Devure 1992. A Study 
of the Effects of Drought on the Large Mammals of Devure Ranch, Zimbabwe, 
Oxford University Expedition Report, unpublished. Driving through the SVC in 
1998, one could still see the many silent witnesses, that is, dead trees, to this 
drought. 
29  Information in this section from: Backgrounder Black Rhino, (undated), The 
Zambezi Society, 6 pp. 
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the 1980s, virtually to disappear again after 1993, is difficult to explain. ‘Many 
questions remain unanswered, in particular concerning the international trade in 
rhino horn’.30 Nevertheless, the problem was acute in the 1980s and the 
DNPWLM launched Operation Stronghold to protect the rhino in the National 
Parks better by raising personnel numbers plus better intelligence, awareness 
and education. But it never received the funding it needed for the project and 
the black rhino continued to decline. Inexorably it emerged that the DNPWLM 
could not protect the black rhino in its own sanctuaries because of a shortage of 
funding. In 1989 it put forward the Black Rhino Conservation Strategy in which 
it proposed, among other ideas, the creation of eight Intensive Protection Zones 
(IPZs), where extra protection could be guaranteed. Secondly, and most 
importantly for the development and creation of the SVC, was the decision for 
‘(t)he development of translocated breeding nuclei else where in Zimbabwe – 
that is, on private land, and particularly where groups of landholders were 
prepared to establish co-operative ‘Conservancies’ – as a second-line insurance 
policy’. 
 The project leader of the Rhino Conservation Project, whose task it was to 
sell the idea to private landowners is, as I already mentioned above, Raoul du 
Toit.31 His official title is Project Executant Rhino Conservation Project. In 1998 
he worked full-time for the WWF Zimbabwe again, but used to be seconded to 
the DNPWLM.32 The WWF offices in Harare are situated in a quarter where the 
majority of the embassies are located as well as several offices from multilateral 
organisations like the IUCN. The office is conveniently placed on the corner 
where Lanark Road debauches on busy, four-lane Second Street. The office 
itself is housed in a stately old home with parking space in front of it, often full 
with landrovers and other four-wheel drive vehicles with the familiar and world 
famous panda-logo on their doors. A visitor entering the building through the 
main entrance comes face to face with a big wooden bookcase with glass doors, 
largely filled with written documents held together by plastic spirals, indicating 
its report status, even before the reception counter in the left corner of the hall is 
discerned. Because these houses were originally not designed for efficiency or 
to be divided in offices in an orderly and mathematical manner, it is not easy to 
find the way to a particular office. To find Du Toit’s office, I went into the 
building on ground floor and then had to go out again, go along a tiny corridor 
in order to enter his cramped office with orderly registered files piling up 
against every wall. In 1989, in line with the Rhino Conservation Strategy, he 
                                                           
30  Ibid: 1. 
31  This section of the text is based on an interview, 25 June 1998, with the project 
leader of the Rhino Conservation Project and personal observations. 
32  Markham 1991: 4. 
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was looking for private land on which to house ‘his’ rhino. The spot had to be 
sufficiently far away, geographically, from the Zambian border where it was 
believed the poachers came in. The Lowveld seemed to fit this criterion and 
luckily the climatic conditions were close to those in the Zambezi Valley. 
Finally, as the Lowveld is in Region IV and V, it is gazetted for wildlife as a 
form of land use. The Lowveld was an ideal spot for creating a safe haven for 
rhino. That same year, 1989, he was also, strictly coincidentally, asked by the 
landowner of Senuko to evaluate Senuko to assess its wildlife production 
potential. There was immediate rapport between these two men which ‘did the 
trick’. The landowner of Senuko suggested that they might breed rhino on 
Senuko. Than they remembered there were also rhino on Humani. This 
naturally led to the idea of joining Humani and Senuko and using this combina-
tion to try to convince other property owners to join them as well. Roger 
Whittall especially deserves ‘conservation credits’ for his role in this process. A 
domino effect of landowners joining the initiative was the result. Du Toit could 
arrange a grant from the Beit Trust to finance the necessary fence, management 
and anti-poaching unit. Z$ 1,000,000 was granted for the fence. The funding 
was made conditional in the sense that the conservancy would repay the grant 
by spending an equal amount of money on restocking the SVC. So their 
‘repayment’ of the grant was made productive through restocking. An extra Z$ 
320,000 was granted for the management and anti-poaching unit.33 Twenty-four 
rhino were brought in at that time. With the SVC, two other conservancies were 
created for the same purpose: the Chiredzi River Conservancy, located close to 
the SVC near Chiredzi, and the Bubiana Conservancy, located near West 
Nicholson on the right side of the road to the border-crossing at Beitbridge.  
 Now there was a Rhino Conservation Strategy and there were safe havens to 
put them in, but the ratification of the Rhino Conservation Strategy first had to 
go through the Department’s Directorate and the Parks Advisory Board.34 After 
that it had to be approved by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, which 
took another two years. The WWF did not wait until the Strategy was officially 
recognised, but went ahead and translocated black rhino to the above-mentioned 
conservancies. This was sheer piece of good luck for the rhinos because the 
DNPWLM continued to face huge problems in trying to protect the rhinos in its 
                                                           
33  Savé Valley Conservancy – Financial obligations of members, 22 April 1991. 
Attachment to Report Markham 1991. See also: WWF, Multispecies Animal Pro-
duction Systems Project. Funding policy for Beit Trust/WWF conservancy project, 
31 March 1991. Here it also said that ‘(i)t is envisaged that the Beit Trust / WWF 
support for the overall conservancy project will extend until the end of 1995’. 
34  This section is, again, based on information from the ‘Backgrounder Black Rhino’, 
including the citations, unless indicated otherwise. 
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reserves, hampered by financial constraints and ‘bureaucratic obstructiveness 
that resulted largely from the faction fighting that has plagued the Department 
[NPWLM]’. ‘In contrast to the dismal scenario within the public Parks estate, 
the major rhino Conservancies were becoming well established, and represented 
the only really secure nuclei of black rhino in the country’. Despite this success, 
or maybe because of it, the (white) conservancies got a very bad (black) press. 
It was said that ‘the Parks estate has been stripped of its rhino populations in 
favour of private Conservancies’. It was also suggested that the conservancies 
were making large financial profits, money which should have gone to the 
State, mainly from the presence of the rhino. This circuit of gossiping and 
make-believe produced an atmosphere of ‘suspicion and distrust, and have 
given rise to all kinds of ‘conspiracy theories [around the conservancies] (...) 
Particularly saddening has been the way in which the ‘race card’ is being 
played, by some NGOs as well as by individuals within government’. In other 
words the stereotyped image of white identity in southern Africa once more 
came up trumps. The subsequent interaction between black and white was 
contaminated in the sense that the image stood in the way of trust building, 
taking first steps in a reciprocal relationship and thus co-operation. Image as the 
basis for exclusion between black and white, and simultaneously for inclusion 
of people of the same social identity, of the ones belonging to ‘us’. There is also 
a time factor at work in this development. In negative reciprocity, as in 
generalised reciprocity, there is no stipulated time for repayment. Repayment 
depends on strategic opportunity. The Land Issue simmered on between black 
and white for most of the 1980s, but now the establishment of conservancies 
offered an opportunity to demand the appropriated land back. The Back-
grounder concludes that it ‘is the communal lands that currently represent the 
‘missing link’ in rhino management’. By that conclusion it was already 
suggesting that some form of co-operation between private and communal land 
might be necessary to secure the political and social acceptability of conservan-
cies and with this the long-term survival of the rhino in safe havens. But the 
quotations just cited already indicate that it will probably be an uphill battle to 
generate that co-operation. The next chapter is entirely devoted to the recipro-
cal-exchange-road of trials and errors negotiated by the SVC to try and create 
that missing link. In conclusion, all conservancies were born of the idea of 
stopping further rhino poaching. This focus and raison d’être for conservancies 
in Zimbabwe, their links with and guidance from South African conservancies 
and their being on (white) commercial land and corresponding to white social 
identity make them highly susceptible to the idea that they are nothing more 
than a continuation of bygone colonial days and will almost inevitably arouse a 
storm of protest for that reason. 
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 There is yet one more fifth argument to put forward to explain why the SVC 
almost had to be created, inexorably like a force of destiny. The argument is the 
development of international tourism in Zimbabwe until 2000, the underdevel-
opment of the Lowveld in this respect, and the related upsurge in wildlife 
utilisation on private land throughout the region of southern Africa. It is also an 
argument which again seems only to add to the national and local suspicion of 
this conservancy movement, on top of the ones mentioned above, as the tourism 
sector in Zimbabwe is dominated by whites.35 Tourism contributed an estimated 
5% to Zimbabwe’s GNP in 1992 and provides jobs for some 50,000 people, 
both directly and indirectly.36 The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report 
Zimbabwe stated in 1996 that the number of visitors rose to 1.4 million in 1995, 
which was 33% higher than the year before. The report also states that the 
‘potential [of tourism] remains enormous’.37 In 1997 there were 1.7 million 
tourists visiting Zimbabwe and the Minister of Mines, Environment and 
Tourism, said in an interview in 1998, he expected more than two million 
visitors by the turn of the century.38 The Zimbabwe tourism sector has grown at 
an average of 20% annually since 1990.39 Zimbabwe’s share of the African 
tourism market is 3%-4%.40 This was the picture in 1998. In the second half of 
2001 the situation has been changed completely due to two major issues which 
influenced the tourism sector in general and in Zimbabwe in particular. The first 
is the drop in the number of tourists world wide as a result of the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washing-
ton on 11 September 2001. Secondly the number of tourists had already taken a 
heavy beating after the lost constitutional referendum in February in 2000. So in 
that context the situation in 1998, with its hopes for a bright future with lots of 
opportunities in the tourism sector has been shattered in 2001.  
 Tourism in Zimbabwe is primarily based on the Parks and Wild Life Estates, 
which constitute some 13.1 % of the country. The two government bodies 
responsible for wildlife tourism are, the DNPWLM and the Zimbabwe Tourism 
Authority (ZTA), which are both responsible to the Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism.41 Conservation and tourism are inextricably linked in Zimbabwe 
because of this bureaucratic arrangement. Wildlife tourism used to be concen-
                                                           
35  Goodwin et.al. 1997: 6. 
36  Ibid: 5. 
37  Pp. 19, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report Zimbabwe, Third Quarter 1996. 
38  Zimbabwe Independent, 9 October 1998, Tourism Seen as Major Economic Anchor. 
39  The Financial Gazette, 8 October 1998, Zim Pins Economic Hopes on Fast Growing 
Tourism Sector. 
40  Goodwin et al.: 6. 
41  Ibid: 5. 
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trated in National Parks, like Victoria Falls NP and Hwange NP. Although the 
tour operators were mainly white,42 at least the parks were run by a black 
governments department. But by the end of the 1980s wildlife utilisation was 
increasingly advertised as optimum land use for private land (white-dominated) 
for semi-arid areas in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and for the Lowveld in 
Zimbabwe in particular. This was actually a process which for Southern Rhode-
sia/Zimbabwe had already begun in the early 1960s when Dasmann and 
Mossman where asked to make an assessment of the possibilities of cropping 
and culling game to be sold to Africans, without harming the wildlife popula-
tion on the property. They did a case study and experiments to this end on the 
Doddieburn Ranch and came to the conclusion that wildlife was a more 
economically viable land use option than cattle in this respect.43 Although the 
results of Dasmann and Mossman’s study and subsequent experiments were 
positive about wildlife as land use option in the Lowveld, the idea did not take 
off to any large extent,44 albeit the amount of land devoted to wildlife increased 
steadily in Zimbabwe, especially in the 1970s.  
 Between 1974 and 1989 the area devoted to wildlife in Zimbabwe increased 
62%, from 59,7000 to 97,000 hectares.45 In the 1980s new attempts were made 
to convince farmers that wildlife utilisation was a profitable land use option and 
in publications it was stressed, again, that wildlife utilisation was a more 
economically viable land-use option than cattle raising, especially in Regions 
IV and V.46 Everything in the garden seems rosy but the results and conclusions 
                                                           
 
42  In December 1994, only 10% of the tour operators in Zimbabwe were black (called 
‘indigenous’). At the Zimbabwe Professional Hunters and Guides Association, only 
2,5% of its (voluntary) members are indigenous, Goodwin et.al. 1997: 7. 
43  Dasmann, R.F. & Mossman, A.S. (1960), The Economic Value of Rhodesian Game, 
Rhodesian Farmer, 30: 17-20; Dasmann, R.F. (1962), Game Ranching in African 
Land Use Planning, Bulletin of Epizootic Diseases of Africa, 10: 13-17; see also 
chapter 17, Robins, E. (1964), Afrika’s wilde dieren (translated from the English 
original: Africa’s Wildlife (1963)), Baarn: Uitgeverij Bosch & Keuning. 
44  Pp. 12, Martin, R.B. (1994), Alternative Approaches to Sustainable Use: What Does 
and Doesn’t Work, Paper presented to conference Conservation Through 
Sustainable Use of Wildlife, 8-11 February 1994, Brisbane, Australia. 
45  Skinner, J.D. (1989), Game Ranching in Southern Africa, in: Hudson, R.J., Drew, 
K.R. & Baskin, L.M. (eds), Wildlife Production Systems. Economic Utilisation of 
Wild Ungulates, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
46  Child, B.A. (1988), The Role of Wildlife Utilisation in the Sustainable Economic 
Development of Semi-Arid Rangelands in Zimbabwe, Unpublished D.Phil. Thesis, 
University of Oxford; Bond, I. (1992), The Financial and Economic Returns of 
Cattle and Wildlife Production Systems in Commercial and Communal Farming 
Systems in Zimbabwe. Unpublished Report prepared for the Zimbabwe Wildlife 
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were not as unequivocal as some want us to believe. In conversations and publi-
cations on the subject, the authors often refer to a study by Jansen, Bond and 
Child of the WWF in Zimbabwe to ‘prove’ their point that wildlife is more 
economically viable than cattle.47 In a conversation they will tell you that ‘re-
search has proven’ that wildlife is economically more profitable than cattle. But 
Cumming and also Jansen et al. are actually very cautious in their conclusions. 
In 1990, on the basis of material from Child and Martin from the DNPWLM, 
Cumming concluded that ‘(t)here is some evidence that greater wealth can be 
generated from semi-arid rangelands under wildlife than can be generated from 
livestock’.48 Two years later, Jansen et al. state that their ‘results indicate that 
the answer to the question ‘cattle, wildlife, both or neither’ is far from simple – 
and not the undisputed ‘wildlife’ that many have advocated (or hoped for). It 
appears that cattle ranching is economically viable in some areas of Natural 
Regions IV and V and could be financially rewarding if the negative effects of a 
number of government policies could be removed. Wildlife, on the other hand, 
is financially and economically viable in many areas – but not all areas and not 
for all activities’.49  
 Nevertheless these vague indications have had major effects on land-use 
policy, for both communal and commercial land. The world famous 
CAMPFIRE was introduced by the government on semi-arid stateland.50 On 
                                                           
Management and Environmental Conservation Programme. World Bank/Price 
Waterhouse. 
47  Pp. 249, Barnes, J.I. & Kalikawe, M.C. (1992), Game Ranching in Botswana: Con-
straints and Prospects, in: Van Hoven, W., Ebedes, H. & Conroy, A. (eds), Wildlife 
Ranching: a Celebration of Diversity. Proceedings of the Third International 
Wildlife Ranching Symposium. Pretoria: Centre for Wildlife Management. 
48  Pp. 17, Cumming, D.H.M. (1990), Developments in Game Ranching and Wildlife 
Utilisation in East and Southern Africa, in: Renecker, L.A. & Hudson, R.J. (eds), 
Wildlife Production: Conservation and Sustainable Development, Alaska: Univer-
sity of Alaska Fairbanks. Italics added. 
49  Pp 42, Jansen, D., Bond, I. & Child, B. (1992), Cattle, Wildlife, both or neither. A 
Summary of Survey Results for Commercial Ranches in Zimbabwe, WWF Project 
Paper no. 31, italics added. 
50  Bond, I. (2001) CAMPFIRE & the Incentives for Institutional Change, in Hulme, D. 
& Murphree, M., African Wildlife & Livelihoods. The Promise and Performance of 
Community Conservation, Cape Town: David Philip, Harare: Weaver, Zomba: 
Kachere, Nairobi: E.A.E.P., Kampala Fountain Publishers, Portsmouth (N.H.): 
Heinemann, Oxford: James Currey; Africa Resources Trust & CAMPFIRE Asso-
ciation (1996), Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE. Empowering Rural Communities for 
Conservation and Development, Harare: Africa Resources Trust; Patel, H. (March 
1998), Sustainable Utilization and African Wildlife Policy. The Case of Zimbabwe’s 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). 
Rhetoric or Reality?, Cambridge (USA): Indigenous Environmental Policy Center. 
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private land in Regions IV and V many farmers turned (partly) to wildlife 
utilisation schemes. This latter development in particular took off fairly well 
and the SVC also got off to a promising start. The SVC, three years after its 
official inauguration as a rhino conservancy in 1991, asked Price Waterhouse 
for an assessment of the wildlife potential specifically for the SVC, that is, to go 
beyond only being a safe haven for black rhino.51 ‘The major conclusion of this 
land use report (...) was that tourism offered considerably greater economic 
potential than cattle ranching, and that the conservancies should implement a 
range of wildlife utilization activities, with an emphasis on high-quality 
tourism’.52 In the Price Waterhouse study it was also concluded that hunting, 
especially the buffalo, would enhance the viability of the scheme considerably.53 
Because so far the SVC had been a cattle area, all buffalo had been previously 
eradicated to remove contagion of FMD. In order to get permission from 
Veterinary Services for the re-introduction of buffalo, the ranchers had to get rid 
of all their cattle, to which the SVC-members decided in 1992. In that sense the 
Price Waterhouse document only legitimised the course of action and develop-
ments later followed by the SVC, but the ongoing developments on commercial 
land made them a direct competitive threat for the already established wildlife 
tourism facilities in the country run by the DNPWLM.54 This put the relations 
between the DNPWLM and the private sector under severe strain. I shall come 
back to this relationship later on in this chapter when I discuss the ‘main 
                                                           
51  Price Waterhouse et al. (1994), The Lowveld Conservancies: New Opportunities for 
Productive and Sustainable Land Use, Save Valley, Bubiana and Chiredzi River 
Conservancies. Harare: Price Waterhouse. 
52  Pp. 18, Attwell, C.A.M. (July 1998), Environmental Impact Assessment for Loan 
Application to the IFC for the Restocking of Wildlife Species in the Savé Valley 
Conservancy. Unpublished report. 
53  Price Waterhouse 1994: 100-105. 
54  Sunday Mail, 11 August 1996, Hotels Lose Tourists to Game Farms, ‘Farm and 
ranch accommodation has become so popular that an increasing number of tourists 
are shunning the established hotel system to spend time in private properties, 
hunting and sightseeing. It was (...) the hunting excursions offered at these 
properties that are money spinners’. See also The Herald, 9 August 1996, 
Conservancies Set up to Pull Tourists to Lowveld: ‘With one large National Park 
situated in the extreme south-eastern end of the country, as the only tourist 
attraction, the region appears to be neglected as far as investments in the hospitality 
industry was concerned. Several local members have set up conservancies to ‘create 
tourist attractions’ in the form of game parks, bird sanctuaries, and natural forests 
(...)’; Sunday Mail, 9 August 1998, Game Farming to Boost Tourism; The Herald, 7 
April 1997, Chiredzi Gets More Tourists: ‘More tourists are now visiting the south-
eastern Lowveld following the establishment of private wildlife conservancies in the 
area. The Gonarezhou National Park has not been able to attract a lot of tourists’. 
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themes’ of the SVC. For the time being and to raise the level of suspense, it is 
enough to say that permits from the DNPWLM are a prerequisite for all wildlife 
activities in Zimbabwe, including buying and translocating buffalo and other 
species. 
 In a nutshell it can be said that the SVC did not come ‘out of the blue’. There 
were several inter-related factors which contributed to its almost inevitable 
birth, further development, and also its concentration on the two ‘main themes’, 
which will be introduced later. The continuation of the white hunting tradition 
in the heartland of the SVC on Humani and the fact that they were already 
heavily involved in wildlife utilisation, both consumptive and non-consumptive, 
and restocking wildlife, including black rhino in the area since the 1970s can be 
considered crucial to the later inception of the SVC. This still gives Humani a 
status aparte within the SVC, not because it wants to be compensated for its 
years of investment in wildlife, but more because its owners are direct descen-
dants of the first pioneers in the area and are the living history of the area. The 
other landowners arrived on the scene much later. South of the Turwi this began 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and north only by the end of the 1980s and beginning of 
the 1990s when Devuli was split up and sold. Many of the new owners were 
attracted to the idea of buying property in the area because they were keen on 
hunting, just like Roger Whittall, and this has strengthened the hunting ethos 
and white identity construction within the SVC as a dominant force considera-
bly. A potent force, but there were other factors contributing to the formation of 
the SVC as well, like the droughts, the Rhino Conservation Project, the studies 
which predict better economic returns in semi-arid lands if they turn to wildlife 
utilisation schemes and tourism, and, very important, the example of conservan-
cies, both conceptually and in terms of practical examples for drafting constitu-
tions and other technical details, in South Africa. Finally it is fair to say that the 
creation of the SVC is just a formalisation of a certain stage in its development, 
of which the organisational climax, potential and maturity has not yet been 
reached.  
 
 
Description and formal organisation of the  
Savé Valley Conservancy 
 
In order to understand the main themes dominating the policy discussions of the 
SVC right from the start, I need to describe the geographical area, the formal 
organisational structure and objectives of the SVC, because they directly relate, 
influence or form a perfect image or metaphor for the dominating policy issues. 
Let me begin by giving a general impression of the SVC in terms of location 
within the structure of Zimbabwe’s provinces, districts, and wards, geography, 
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physical features and flora and fauna. Such a description is also essential to 
understanding the local political struggles between the SVC and neighbouring 
communities I shall describe later on.  
 The SVC is situated in the southeast Lowveld of Zimbabwe with its southern 
boundary approximately forty-five kms northeast of the town of Chiredzi, its 
eastern boundary being the Save River after which the conservancy is named,55 
its northern boundary lies not far from to Birchenough Bridge and its western 
boundary in the northern part of the SVC being formed by a resettlement 
scheme on land of the former Devuli Ranch and to the south by Matsai Com-
munal Area. Some sixty kilometers to the south of the SVC lies Gonarezhou 
National Park, the second largest national park in Zimbabwe, bordering 
Mozambique and South Africa. The SVC is located in two provinces, Masvingo 
and Manicaland, and two districts, Chiredzi and Bikita and is surrounded by 
another three districts, Zaka, Buhera and Chipinge District (see Map 4). The 
SVC is a co-operative structure comprising twenty-four private, individual 
cattle ranches (see Map 5). They were converted ‘into a single co- operatively 
managed commercial wildlife reserve’56 of 3387 km². It is the largest private 
wildlife area on the African continent. In Table 357 there is a list of properties, 
related to owners, commercial operations and acreage in 1998. 
 The property owners range from family-owned businesses, like Humani and 
Levanga for instance, to foreign investors like Pabst Holdings (Germany) and 
Mid-West Ranching (USA), to large companies like Zimbabwe Sun, part of 
Delta Corporation, one of the largest firms in Zimbabwe.58 The SVC main office  
                                                           
 
55  The river on the eastern boundary of the SVC used to be called the Sabi River. In the 
1980s this name was changed to Save River to approximate the pronunciation of the 
word by the local Africans more closely, using a soft ‘v’ which sounds like in-
between a ‘v’ and ‘w’. The SVC added an accent on the ‘e’, making it Savé River, 
for foreign marketing purposes, so that potential clients would not confuse the word 
Save with the verb ‘to save’. 
56  Attwell 1998: 18. 
57  Goodwin et al 1997: 251, updated August 1999. Of the owners only these of 
Chishakwe, Humani and Senuko, also live on their property. The rest of the pro-
perties is run by their managers. There is not one property owner in the SVC who is 
solely dependent on the earning from the commercial operations. This means that all 
owners can see their property in the SVC as an investment opportunity (interview 
with Conservator, 4 June 1998. Information on ‘commercial operations’ from 
interviews with Conservator, 20 April and 7 May 1998). 
58  In 1998 Delta Corporation was ranked the third largest company in Zimbabwe, 
behind Zimploy, a manufacturer of agricultural equipment, Hippo Valley, part of 
Anglo-American and a sugarcane growing and milling company, also located in the 
southeastern Lowveld. Delta Corporation is into a wide range of products in the 
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mass market, like beverages, retail business and touri
Survey – Supplement to The Financial Gazette, 15 OcMap 4: SVC and surrounding districts 
(Source: Price Waterhouse 1994: 19) 
sm (pp. 9-13, Top Companies 
tober 1998). 
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Map 5: SVC and individual properties 
(Source: See footnote 51) 
 
 
 
in 1998 is an old guardhouse of the Mkwasine Estate Police Force, which they 
moved into in September 1997.59 Mkwasine Estate is a sugarcane plantation 
bordering the SVC to the south and the SVC office is located in the middle of 
large paddocks with sugarcane in different stages of maturity and processing. 
 
                                                           
59  Interview with Conservator, 23 April 1998. 
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Table 3 
SVC list of properties, owners, operations and area (ha) 
Ranch Owner Operations Area (ha) 
Matandere Pioneer Capital Safari camp*/hunting safaris 13,123 
 Partners/ARDA 
Gunundwe B.J. Gous Safari camp 11,374 
Mapari H.J. Vorster Safari camp/Stop Inn  23,153 
Chishakwe Rovambira (Pvt) Ltd Construct camp/hunting safaris 9,977 
Msaize Powerlock (Pvt) Ltd Safari lodge/hunting safaris 16,340 
Chanurwe Pabst Holdings (Pvt) Ltd Safari camp/hunting safaris 44,348 
Chapungu Zimbabwe Sun Ltd Will be building camp 12,976 
Musawezi Pabst Holdings (Pvt) Ltd Directors camp**/hunting safaris 12,662 
Sabi Pabst Holdings (Pvt) Ltd Idem 18,790 
Umkondo ‘Leased’ to Pabst Holding Idem 6,627 
 (Pvt) Ltd? 
Savuli Savuli Property Investments Safari camp/hunting safaris 5,529 
 (Pvt) Ltd 
Mokore Mokore Ranch (Pvt) Ltd Safari camps/hunting safaris 7,451 
Bedford Block Dunmow (Pvt) Ltd Idem Humani 12,215 
Angus Sabi Star Enterprises Safari camp/hunting safaris 15,792 
 (Pvt) Ltd 
Humani Humani Estates (Pvt) Ltd Safari camps/hunting safaris 41,158 
Mukazi River Mukazi River Ranch (Pvt) Safari camp/hunting safaris 11,457 
 Ltd 
Senuko Senuko Ranching (Pvt) Ltd Safari camp 24,120 
 & Savé Lodges (Pvt) Ltd   
Levanga Kingsbrook (Pvt) Ltd Safari camp/hunting safaris 13,040 
Masapas Bateleurs Peak Farm Building safari camp/  15,437 
 Holdings (Pvt) Ltd hunting safaris  
Mukwazi Wenhope (Pvt) Ltd Safari camps/hunting safaris 12,549 
Hammond Mid West Ranching Ltd,   
 Nyerzi Safaris Safari camp/hunting safaris 12,109 
Potential Agricultural and Rural   
 Development Authority Safari camp/hunting safaris 12,146 
 (ARDA) 
Mkwasine Mkwasine Ranching Co. Hunting safaris 12,547 
 (Pvt) Ltd 
Impala Fair Range Estates (Pvt) Ltd Safari camp/hunting safaris 8,097 
 
Total   373,017 
* Alongside safari camps there are also often more sober hunting camps available. I have not 
distinguished between ‘camp’ and the often more luxurious ‘lodge’ as the line between them 
is too arbitrary to be of use in this general description. 
** Only for directors, clients and guests of Pabst Holdings. 
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 The physical features of the SVC are dominated by a gently undulating 
topography with scattered granite kopjes. The altitude varies from around 500 
m in the south to around 600 m in the northwest extremity of the SVC. The 
highest hills and ranges rise up to 250 m above the flats, but most of them are 
around 100 m high. The vegetation of the SVC is dominated by mopane open 
woodland. Apart from the distinctive granite kopjes the landscape is character-
ised by many baobob trees which are a typical feature of the Lowveld.60 The 
biggest baobab in Zimbabwe even seems to be located in the SVC, on Makore. 
It has a circumference of 27.61 metres and a height of twenty-one metres. It 
competes for the title of the largest baobab in Zimbabwe with another huge tree 
of the same species near Victoria Falls, which has to be permanently guarded to 
prevent tourists from damaging it by carving their names in its trunk. But its 
circumference is ‘only approx 20 mts.61 It is quite difficult to describe the 
landscape of the SVC as one landscape. The area encompasses several land-
scapes, which makes it such a beautiful place.62 There are stretches covered with 
mopane woods, but also open bushlands where huge termite mounds lend a 
distinctive character, riverine areas with big trees, natural pans with tall, thin 
malala palms, together with yellowish fever acacias and hilly countryside. And 
these types of vegetation are home to all kinds of mammals, many re-introduced 
in the area after the inception of the SVC, since they had been wiped out during 
the cattle years, and birds. There are many antelope like kudu, impala, and eland 
to be seen. There are giraffe, waterbuck, wildebeest, buffalo, zebra, nyala, 
greysbok, bushbuck, sable, warthogs, hippo, crocodile and of course the rhino 
to name just the better-known animals. There is also a healthy population of 
elephants in the SVC. It began with the elephants introduced on Humani. 
During and after the drought in 1991-1992 a huge group of 510 elephants, 130 
in 1992 and 380 in 1993,63 were translocated from nearby, overpopulated 
Gonarezhou National Park, where they were dying from lack of water.64 As the 
                                                           
60  It is no wonder that the logo of the SVC contains a baobab and a rhino, against the 
background of a setting sun. 
61  Pp. 25, Tayler, D. (1992), The Largest Baobab, The Hartebeest. The Magazine of the 
Lowveld Natural History Branch of the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe, 24th Edition. 
62  This landscape has probably changed considerably since 1998 due to the political 
unrest in the country. Landinvasions went together with a lot of destruction of 
natural resources for instance through the chopping of trees and clearing of the land 
for buiding accommodation and preparing fields for cultivation (personal communi-
cation). 
63  Pp. 24, Tayler, D. (1993), Save Valley Happenings, The Hartebeest. The Magazine 
of the Lowveld Natural History Branch of the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe, 25th 
Edition. 
64  Based on information from brochure from Senuko Safari Lodge. 
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SVC was traditionally land on which cattle were raised and cattle had to be 
watered daily, the SVC has a far better water development than Gonarezhou. 
The different properties comprising the SVC have pump stations in the Save 
and Mkwasine Rivers to deliver water to large water reservoirs, which in turn 
supply watering points for game all over the SVC.65 In 1993 elephants were 
translocated in complete breeding herds, which was a world first. The SVC paid 
Z$1000 per animal, regardless of size. The operation was made financially 
possible by funds made available by the US Department of Fisheries and 
Wildlife and Care for the Wild. The operation was carried out by Clem Coetsee 
of Wildlife Management Services.66 His record catch for one day was thirty-two 
elephants. If everything went smoothly and transport was available, twenty-five 
could be moved per day.67 As we have seen from the examples of rhino 
translocation to Humani described earlier and elephant translocation to the 
SVC, the relations between SVC and the DNPWLM were good and co-opera-
tive. The SVC also houses some species of predators, although there is no 
consensus yet among the members, about the species and numbers of predators 
that should be allowed in the SVC. In 1998 there is a healthy population of 
leopard, for which the SVC is specifically marketed to potential hunters,68 and 
cheetah and hyena have returned and there is a nucleus of a lion population. 
Conservation-wise it is important to note that three to four packs of African 
wild dogs, or painted hunting dogs roam the SVC.69 They occur only in Africa 
and the wild dog is an Appendix I endangered species on the CITES list. There 
are only some 5000 left on the continent. The SVC has fifty to sixty of them.70 If 
you go to the bar at Senuko Safari Lodge there is a huge, very beautiful drawing 
of wild dogs by Lin Barrie, hung above the fireplace. Senuko also organised a 
special wild dog weekend in 1998 when the wild dogs were denning. As well as 
all this large wildlife there is also an abundance of species of birds, estimates of 
which range from 20071 to more than 40072 registered species of birds. The most 
                                                           
65  Goodwin et al 1997: 248. 
66  Information taken from pp. 15, Putterill, G. (1993), Elephant Translocation - 
Gonarezhou, The Hartebeest. The Magazine of the Lowveld Natural History Branch 
of the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe, 25th Edition. Since 1991 some 1600 animals 
have been brought into the SVC at a cost of approx. Z$ 7.000.000 (Goodwin et al 
1997: 254). 
67  Pp. 17, Havnar, P. (1993), Elephants on the Move - 1993 Translocation from 
Gonarezhou, The Hartebeest. The Magazine of the Lowveld Natural History Branch 
of the Wildlife Society of Zimbabwe, 25th Edition. 
68  Brochure Savé Valley Safaris & Roger Whittall Safaris. 
69  Goodwin et al 1997: 253; brochure Senuko Safari Lodge. 
70  Presentations on wild dogs during Annual General Meeting, 15 May 1998. 
71  Brochure Savuli Safari. 
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common species to be seen are the southern yellow-billed hornbill and lilac-
breasted roller and among the rare(r) birds seen in the SVC belong the Mada-
gascar squacco heron and the bateleur eagle. 
 It is against this physical landscape and the office in a former police station 
that the constitution of the SVC describes its three objects: 
• ‘To develop and maintain opportunities for the conservation and sustainable 
utilization of natural resources in the Conservancy area and its environs, 
through coordinated and mutually supportive action between landowners 
(...); 
• To assist where possible in the attainment of national objectives for wildlife 
conservation, notably the protection and breeding of endangered species, in 
the hope that these species shall become components of a sustainable land- 
use system; however the conservation of endangered species within the 
Conservancy would not be necessarily dependent upon economic incentives 
(...); 
• To promote bona fide research into ecological and economic aspects of 
natural resource management (both to guide the development of the Conser-
vancy and to yield information of relevance to land-use in similar areas) and 
to develop monitoring systems appropriate to the needs of Conservancy 
management’.73 
 
The organisational structure of the SVC is simple and rather flat (see Figure 3).74 
The Chairman of the SVC is chosen every year at the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM), which takes place in May. Clive Stockil is Chairman of the SVC in 
1998, a position he has held since May 1992. The first Chairman of the SVC 
was Derek Henning. The Chairman is mainly responsible for chairing the 
Conservancy Committee Meetings (CCM) and maintaining external relations 
with relevant institutions like the DNPWLM and the Veterinary Services in 
Harare. He is also responsible, if you can describe it that way, for keeping the 
coalition of landowners who form the SVC together, which is a pretty diplo-
matic task for there are many sensitive issues at stake about land (use) and 
decisions with long-term consequences for individual owners. The Conservancy 
Committee represents the twenty-four members, property owners, who are 
together forming the SVC. For the year 1998-1999 the Conservancy Committee 
consists of twelve members. They are chosen on a yearly base, also at the 
AGM. They have a meeting once a month. These meetings are held on a  
 
                                                           
72  Information sheet Senuko Safari Lodge. 
73  Constitution SVC, section 3, version 28 January 1997. 
74  Drawn for me by the Conservator, 4 June 1998. 
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Figure 3: Organogram SVC 
(Source: see footnote 74) 
 
 
rotational base on the different properties in the SVC. Official minutes are taken 
at the CCM by the SVC Secretary, officially proposed for approval and 
secondment at the next CCM and thereafter signed by the Chairman, and kept in 
a minute book at the Conservancy Office. The Conservator is an important 
function as he represents the oil lubricating the works of the SVC. He is the 
Executive Official of the SVC.75 He is actually the man ‘on the spot’ and has to 
arrange a thousand things all at once to keep all the different activities of the 
SVC on the road. He could be described as the liaison officer between the 
members of the SVC. His tasks are mainly concerned with the internal opera-
tions of the SVC itself. In contrast to the Chairman’s responsibilities, he has no 
major external representational functions. There is no official job description for 
the Conservator but the present office-holder made one himself. His main tasks 
involve the inspection and maintenance of the perimeter fence, compiling fence 
reports through his fence patroller and liasing about the fence (maintenance) 
with the different property owners or their managers. His main aim is actually 
to keep the Veterinary Department in Harare satisfied. It sends someone to 
check on the status of the fence every year. If it ever finds anything wrong with 
the fence, like low voltage or breakages, the SVC can be in deep trouble, 
 
                                                           
75  In 1998, the SVC had had one Conservator and one Field Co-ordinator since its 
launch in 1991. The current Conservator started in July 1994. Interview with 
Conservator, 4 June 1998. 
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because the Veterinary Department can come into the SVC, for instance, and 
shoot all the buffalo to prevent FMD from contaminating neighbouring cattle by 
escaping through a broken or malfunctioning fence. Before the inauguration of 
the SVC, it had already taken such measures once on Humani. This again was 
the situation in Zimbabwe in 1998. In 2001 the situation also with respect to this 
issue has been completely changed as poaching, fence cutting and land 
invasions have, literally and figuratively speaking, perforated the veterinary 
system in Zimbabwe almost completely. But in 1998 the situation was as I 
describe it here. As the SVC is a huge area, the length of the fence is accord-
ingly, 313.5 km in total,76 cutting straight through rough bushland and crossing 
rivers. It is a formidable challenge to keep it up to standard. The Conservator is 
also responsible for organising the CCMs, which implies sending out notices, 
compiling reports, taking the minutes and fitting together information that 
seems relevant to the Committee. He is in charge of the Security Officer and the 
Boom Guards. Another of his major tasks is related to the wildlife within the 
SVC. First and foremost working in tandem with his Security Officer he has to 
run the anti-poaching side of things, while also trying to earn money through 
wildlife by hunting. And wildlife cannot be just hunted. In order to hunt the 
different properties first need to be granted a hunting quota. In order to get this 
hunting quota, the wildlife has first to be counted. That is a tremendous task if 
one looks at the size of the SVC or even at the size of the different individual 
properties.  
 The Conservator does not have to do the game count himself but he assists 
the property owners in the task, collecting the data from the different owners 
and compiling these into a document for the yearly Quota Meeting. He has to 
collect information on hunting, like trophy sizes, numbers and so on, from the 
different properties to be sent to the DNPWLM for inspection and control. He is 
the primary liaison person for the WWF Rhino Programme, which also requires 
regular reporting. The scouts must report all sightings of individual rhinos in the 
SVC. These sightings must then all be recorded to the SVC Office which than 
has to enter them into spreadsheets, complete with time, place, condition, and 
which particular rhino it was. Every six months a report on the rhino monitoring 
has to be sent in to the DNPWLM. If ever there is a problem with a rhino, for 
instance causing difficulties with the fence or anything else, he must act to solve 
it. In between these major responsibilities, many smaller and ad hoc matters 
crop up. The Fence Patrol Officer, the Security Officer and Rhino Monitor are 
primarily responsible for gathering information in their specific fields and 
handle the common incidents themselves. In other cases they have to turn to the 
                                                           
76  Information sheet at SVC Office, July 1998. 
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Conservator. The Secretary is there basically to assist the Conservator. Finally 
there are the Boom Guards and Scouts. The Boom Guards man and work the 
two booms of the SVC, Bravo I and Bravo II, in the south and north of the 
conservancy.77 The boom must be operated twenty-four hours a day, which is 
done in shifts. The scouts are the eyes and ears of the Conservator in the field, 
especially for issues related to poaching and conservation. 
 One final aspect, which has to be described before I can start on the main 
themes dominating the attention of the SVC, is the financial obligations the 
members have towards the conservancy. There are basically two levies the 
members have to pay the SVC on a yearly base: 
• Annual levy: to pay for the running costs of the SVC, amongst other things 
to keep the SVC Office going. The SVC tries to keep this levy to an absolute 
minimum by doing its best to generate profit-making enterprises within the 
SVC, like the selling of venison and firewood (although in October 1998, 
neither has worked out); 
• Fence maintenance levy: to keep the perimeter fence up to required standard. 
I shall come back to this specific levy in discussing the main themes of the 
SVC. 
On top of these two annual levies, the AGM can decide to add extra levies, 
although it is quite reluctant to do that too easily because as long as the SVC is 
not really making (much) profit, landowners are reluctant to continue and spend 
money on the SVC in the form of levies. Nevertheless, for the year 1998-1999 
they added another three levies to the two mentioned above: 
• Game levy: this is a levy paid into a restocking fund, which was established 
prior to the application for a loan at the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank in 1998. It was decided at the Special General 
Meeting in October 1996 that the members would contribute to this fund on 
an equal footing. The contribution was set at Z$ 10,- per acre;78 
• Fence upgrading levy: made necessary because of requirements from the 
Veterinary Department, following a FMD outbreak in the southwest corner 
of the SVC in 1997. The Department required that the SVC add veldspan to 
the already existing fence over a length of seventy km bordering Matsai 
Communal Land (see for a detailed account of this case Chapter 3); 
• Repayment levy: the SVC applied for a (soft) loan from the IFC of the 
World Bank for US$ 1,000,000. They did receive the loan, which they will 
                                                           
77  The SVC has twenty-five, mostly locked, gates, excluding the pedestrian entrances. 
The two Bravos are guarded and opened day and night. Mukwazi and Mapari have a 
guard on permanent duty during the day. The other entrances are opened on 
occasions, interview with Conservator, 30 April 1998. 
78  Chairman’s report to the AGM, 15 May 1998. 
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have to repay. The individual owners pay to the SVC a levy and it will start 
repaying the loan, because it is the legal entity that applied for it. It would 
not have been possible for the IFC to give a loan to all individual land-
owners.  
These disparate types of levies underline what seem to be important issues 
within the SVC, the restocking of the SVC and the maintenance of the fence. 
The restocking of the SVC is important because the opportunities of wildlife 
tourism cannot be fully exploited if the area is not sufficiently stocked with 
wildlife. ‘But some pigs are more equal than others’ to cite George Orwell’s 
Animal Farm, and the SVC is particularly keen on reintroducing buffalo for 
hunting purposes, because it is the most wanted trophy among the African Big 
Five, that is, rhino, elephant, leopard, buffalo and lion, and thus the most 
financially lucrative option in wildlife tourism. Just to emphasise that the 
importance of the fence cannot be overestimated let me repeat just once again 
that to be allowed to keep buffalo, the area has to be securely fenced to prevent 
the animals from spreading the dreaded FMD. If the Veterinary Service is not 
satisfied with the fence, which it checks once a year, it is in a position to shoot 
all the buffalo. For that reason the SVC considers the related issues of fence and 
restocking (buffalo) to be of prime importance if it is actually to make wildlife a 
viable land-use option. This again has a direct bearing on possibilities for 
organisational co-operation with neighbouring communities. On the horns of a 
dilemma the SVC needs to earn money in order to be able to invest in the 
organisational co-operation, for which means that the buffalo and the fence are 
important not only to the SVC, but indirectly also to the neighbouring commu-
nities. But the fence is literally and symbolically a major obstacle to the 
communities in their relationship with the SVC, because it demarcates the 
appropriation of the land and prevents their utilisation of it. In the next section I 
shall discuss these two issues of the SVC in more detail. 
 
 
Main themes within the SVC related to organisational co-operation 
with neighbouring communities 
 
The main themes of the SVC are primarily derived from a systematic analysis 
of the minutes of the CCM taken, since it was launched in 1991. During my 
fieldwork in Zimbabwe in 1998 I was allowed to attend the CCMs for observa-
tion. For a general introduction I want to give a short description of the ritual of 
an at random CCM I attended in 1998. It is a typical example of the way the 
SVC handles its CCM. The way they organise such meetings has probably not 
changed since the inception of the SVC as can be concluded from the same 
words, which are reiterated after every CCM, only the location and thus the 
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people responsible vary: ‘The Chairman said he would like to thank Mr. And 
Mrs. Whittall for their excellent lunch and for the use of their facilities (...)’.79 
Whatever property was chosen to host the CCM, the trip to the property always 
began by travelling a longer or shorter distance along Humani Road, which 
stretches right from south to north through the SVC.80 Somewhere down the 
road you then have to turn left or right, depending to which property you have 
to go, in The North or in The South, in order to reach the homestead or safari 
camp, where the CCM usually takes place. The CCM always commences at 
nine o’clock, which means that if the meeting is in The North, people have to 
set out some one and a half to two hours in advance. At that time usually all 
sorts of wildlife crosses the road, like impala, kudu, wildebeest, zebra and so 
on, in a beautiful early sunlight. The CCM is opened at nine o’clock and 
continues straight away and without interruption for drinks or anything else till 
the agenda has been gone through, which is usually between twelve and one 
o’clock. Then lunch is served. Most CCM members stay for lunch, some leave 
if they have other business to attend to. During the dry season the meetings 
usually take place in a shaded area in the garden if it is a homestead or under a 
shelter in a safari camp. This means that there is always a chorus of ‘noise’ 
from wildlife and/or domesticated animals. When the CCM was held at Savuli 
Safari Camp, some twenty fruitbats were hanging upside down in a tree just 
outside the shelter where the meeting took place. On the small but steep hills on 
the other side of a small pond facing the camp, there was a group of baboons, 
probably settling some sort of hierarchical dispute, a process which was accom-
panied by a crescendo of barking and quick charges creating clouds of dust. Let 
me give a description of a typical CCM against this background. ‘Again a 
meeting in the north of the SVC, at the same turnoff as the CCM in May. The 
reception is always nice with tea and coffee and in this case also nice home-
made muffins. I was (jokingly) welcomed by the Financial Secretary of the 
SVC with the words: ‘are you coming again to spy on us’? The setting is the 
same as the May CCM, with the Chairman and minute-taker sitting behind a 
table with a table cloth and the members sitting before them like an audience 
[watching a film]. [Everything outside in the garden]. The atmosphere during 
the meeting is informal and jovial but they also speak out their minds very 
straightforwardly and during discussion they do not address each other directly 
but through the Chairman, officially calling him Mr. Chairman [as if he is a 
satellite sending the sound waves through to the other members]. This is in 
                                                           
79  Minutes CCM, 12 November 1991. 
80  Humani Road is actually a public road. So, although it runs through private 
properties, the SVC is not allowed to close it to any ordinary traffic wanting to drive 
over it. That is also why it must be kept open for twenty-four hours a day. 
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sharp contrast to the strict informal use of first names right from the moment of 
being introduced to each other. In conversations between whites they use some 
typically white Zimbabwean terminology, like the frequent use of ‘eeh man’ or 
‘I tell you’, or ‘I hear what you say, but...’. One of the other ‘trademarks’ of 
their conversations is the use of nodding with their head in combination with a 
slight closing of the eyes, to indicate a place or location elsewhere and far away. 
In general there is what I would call a masculine atmosphere, with members 
telling each other male coterie stories about encounters or incidents, which 
happened to them ‘one day’. Many members of the CCM smoke heavily, almost 
all only cigarettes, mostly Madison. The most common beer brands they drink 
(in the bar and sometimes during the lunch following the CCM) are Castle, 
Hunters, Bohlinger or Pilsener. Zambesi (‘Zimbabwe’s own Larger’ as it is 
advertised) is not often drunk. [The Chairman allows the discussion free to run 
without much interference or direct manipulations on his part, but gives a clear 
and good summary at the end linked to a sense of direction for the decision 
needed]’. It is at these meetings that the main themes within the SVC are 
discussed and take shape.81  
 
 
The fence 
 
The SVC and the DNPWLM are well acquainted with each other.82 The Chair-
man of the SVC used to be an active and well-respected Honorary Officer of the 
Department and the SVC, and Humani in earlier years, who had pioneered 
successfully in the field of translocation of rhino and elephant. The top 
management of the DNPWLM, Nduku and Martin, were sympathetic to the idea 
of rhino conservancies turning into full-time wildlife utilisation. There was a 
positive exchange between SVC and the DNPWLM. There were also positive 
relations between the Veterinary Department and the SVC. And the top rungs of 
these three organisations communicated on a regular basis in the early days of 
the SVC. One of the meetings in 1991-1992 was of particular importance to the 
later development of the SVC. Both the directors of the Veterinary Department 
and of the DNPWLM were present and spoke on behalf of their departments.83 It 
was an official meeting in Harare and minutes were taken. At that meeting the 
                                                           
81  Description from fieldnotes 10 June 1998. Between brackets is from fieldnotes from 
another CCM, 6 May 1998. 
82  Information in this section is take from interview with the Chairman of the SVC, 8 
July 1998. 
83  The Veterinary Department does not fall under the DNPWLM, but is a department 
of its own, under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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director of the DNPWLM, Nduku, promised the SVC a 1000 buffalo per year to 
be available for sale over a period of three years, totalling 3000 buffalo. Condi-
tional for the sale of the buffalo was the erection of a ‘buffalo fence’ around the 
SVC. The director of the Veterinary Department, Hargreaves, promised its co-
operation in formulating the criteria for the erection of the fence. Although 
minutes of the meeting were never received at the SVC, they went ahead and 
began to erect a fence.84 
 The fence had to be a double fence.85 An outer fence, which is called a 
perimeter game fence, and an inner, so-called buffalo fence. The outer fence 
was funded by the Beit Trust, through the WWF (Z$ 1.2 million), and the inner 
fence by the landowners themselves (Z$ 3 million). A general problem within 
the SVC is that not all properties are equal in size, especially not in relation to 
the length of the fence running over their property. Some have large properties 
but these do not border the outside and so they do not need much fencing. Some 
properties are small(er), but because of their position within the SVC, adjoining 
the Communal Lands, need much fencing. To spread the costs of the fence 
equally the SVC took the then total acreage of the SVC (845,000 acres) and 
divided it by the complete length of the fence (345 km).86 This led to a figure of 
0.4 km of fence per acre. Every 10,000 acres had to fund four km of fencing. 
All landowners could now pay pro rata, that is, per unit, for the erection of the 
fences. Both fences have to be constructed according to strict specifications 
from the Veterinary Department.87 The game fence must have a minimum height 
of 1.9 metres and should contain ten strands of wire. The standards (at least 
fifteen cm Ø) must be twelve metres apart, with droppers (nineteen-twenty-five 
mm Ø) every metre. There must be two positive and two earth electrified 
strands situated no less than twenty-five cm above the ground (lower) and one 
metre (upper) The minimum voltage should be five KV, that is, 5000 volts. The 
fence must be patrolled on a daily base, and breaks should be repaired immedi-
ately. Every twenty km of fence should have one patrol officer. The buffalo 
fence must have a minimum height of 1.2 meters and should contain six strands 
of wire (high-tensile steel (2.25 mm of 2.36 mm gauge or barbed wire). The 
                                                           
84  Conversation with Chairman of the SVC, 1 October 1998. 
85  This section is based on interview with Conservator, 23 April 1998. 
86  This length had to be changed when Hammond joined the SVC. Hammond was 
bought by Schenk, an American and old hunting client of Roger Whittall. The length 
of the fence became 313.5 km. The entrance to the conservancy had also to be 
removed from Senuko to Hammond, just past the bridge over the Mkwasine River. 
They were in the process of constructing the new boom, with appropriate 
accommodation for the boom guards, in October 1998. 
87  Attachment to minutes Fence Meeting, 25 February 1996: Standards of fencing as 
prescribed by Department of Veterinary Services. 
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standards must be seven metres apart and sunk ‘at least’ one metre into the 
ground, and a dropper (eighteen cm Ø) every half metre. Straining posts to 
support the fence may not be further apart then 400 metres. The fence must 
have one electric wire, 800 mm above the ground. The voltage and patrolling 
are the same requirements as pertaining to the game fence. The buffalo fence 
should at least be 7,5 meters away from the game fence. The area in between 
must be kept clear at all times, up to a distance of one metre on the outsides. 
The SVC employs one fence patrol officer. He circumnavigates the complete 
fence twice a month on a bicycle and reports to the Conservator on the general 
condition of the fence, and he pays specific attention to the voltage. The 
Conservator puts this information in a monthly fence report.88 The day-to-day 
maintenance, repairs and control is the responsibility of the individual proper-
ties, which employ fence guards for this purpose. The fence report started in the 
beginning of 1996 with two patrol officers who reported separately every 
month, but this actually gave too much information to put on a spreadsheet 
twice a month. The Conservator himself tries to inspect the complete fence 
twice a year, but in practice only manages to do so once a year. He does the tour 
on a motorbike in between the fences, checking voltage and general condition at 
random. It takes a few days to complete the tour and he camps overnight in a 
tent. The fence patrol officers have two sheets: one the general ‘fence inspection 
record sheet’ in which they fill in the most basic of information about date, 
position, time and comments about the two fences, especially about their 
voltage, four wires all together, and the grass under and in between the fences. 
There is also a more extensive sheet which is called the ‘fence breaks and 
animals seen questionnaire’. It is specifically designed to find out if there are 
any buffaloes or other wildlife, roaming in the vicinity of the fence and if these 
caused any damage to the fence, or even worse, if they left the SVC. Should 
buffaloes escape, this must be reported to the local and provincial Veterinary 
Officer, within twenty-four hours. It also asks questions about how much 
livestock from the communal and resettlement areas is seen in the SVC. This is 
because FMD not only breaks out when wildlife, that is, buffalo, gets out of the 
SVC, but also when cattle wander into the SVC and having grazed go out again, 
                                                           
88  I was never allowed to see any monthly fence report, because they are ‘fairly 
sensitive’ the reason being ‘some landowners perform better than others’. A few 
fence reports though slipped through ‘the security system’ as they were part of 
material I was given at a Conservancy Committee Meeting. Going through them you 
can see that voltage and grass under and in between the fences are the major 
problems. The fence report lists all the properties and reports on the status of their 
fences and maintenance. 
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always with the danger that they take FMD with them. To make that perfectly 
clear, the questionnaire ends by saying: ‘The fence guard must be told that: 
1. If the fence is broken so that a buffalo can get out of the Conservancy, this 
must be closed immediately and reported to the manager/landowner as soon 
as possible. 
2.  If buffalo ever get out of the Conservancy this must be reported immediately 
to the manager/landowner and the Conservancy. 
3.  If cattle ever come into the Conservancy, this must be reported immediately 
to the manager/landowner and the Conservancy. The cattle must be driven 
straight away to the headquarters and put in a secure enclosure. 
4.  Whenever there is any kind of break in the fence, it must be repaired 
immediately, if it is not possible to close it because some tools or materials 
are need then it must be closed with thorn bush and repaired as soon as 
possible’.89  
That this fear for FMD is not exaggerated, and that it also has a tremendous 
influence on the organisational co-operation between SVC and neighbouring 
communities although not even explicitly mentioned, was proven in 1997, when 
there was an outbreak of FMD in the southwest corner of the SVC, in the 
Matsai Communal Area. The outbreak occurred on Mukwazi Ranch in August 
1997 and was used by the neighbouring communities as a vehicle to present all 
the grievances built up over the years, going back to the alienation of their land 
as ‘commercial land’. It is also a case which clearly shows all the major 
ingredients presented as crucial to understanding the relations between SVC and 
neighbouring communities in this book, namely hunting, land and fences in a 
context of reciprocal exchange. As this chapter focuses on the internal affairs 
and main themes of the SVC, this case will not be presented here but in Chapter 
3 in which I describe and analyse the relation between SVC and neighbouring 
communities in terms of reciprocal exchange. 
 To control the spread of FMD the Veterinary Department has divided Zim-
babwean territory into five zones: 
• Clear Zones / EC Offtake Area: cattle from this zone is meant for export to 
the countries of the EC. They go to specific abattoirs for slaughter and then 
proceed to Europe; 
• Clear Zone / No-Offtake Area: all other clear areas; 
• Green or Buffer Zone: the zone between Red and Clear zones. Here cattle is 
permitted to move within the zone or to the red zone, or to abattoirs of the 
CSC for slaughter. Cattle here are not vaccinated against FMD. The zone is 
                                                           
89  ‘Fence breaks and animals seen questionnaire’, SVC. Italics in original. 
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bounded by cattlefences which are patrolled and maintained by the Depart-
ment of Veterinary Services. No buffalo are allowed in this zone; 
• Red Zone or Vaccinated Zone: this zone is in between a Buffer Zone and a 
wildlife area. Cattle are allowed to move within the zone or to the abattoirs 
of the CSC. Again no buffalo allowed in the zone; 
• Wildlife Zone: the areas falling under the DNPWLM, that is, National Parks 
and Safari Areas, and Forest Land. Some commercial farms in Masvingo 
Province and Matabeleland North are also included as is some communal 
land in the latter; 
• If there is a FMD outbreak Veterinary Services can impose three other 
categories on land: Buffalo Presence Areas, FMD-infected and Quarantined 
Areas, and FMD Areas. 
Over and above this control and division of areas, the DVS also controls the 
movement of animals. Here they make a distinction between: 
• Controlled species which may not be moved without a DVS permit: buffalo, 
wildebeest, warthog and bushpig;  
• Cloven-hoofed animals, including all Artiodactyls not mentioned above; 
• Other species, which include elephant, zebra, rhino, hippo, ostriches and 
other birds, crocodiles and other reptiles.90 
The DVS has to be very strict about these rules and regulations as export to the 
EC is at stake and Zimbabwe is a beef exporter. Many cattle farmers who export 
to the EC are located in Masvingo Province. These farmers were not happy to 
see a wildlife area of such huge size created next to their cattle operations, and 
have followed the fencing of the SVC with great care. They even went with the 
DVS official who came to inspect and control the fence after completion.91 
 The SVC itself is categorised as a Red Zone because of the buffalo and is 
surrounded by several other categories of DVS. On the eastern boundary it 
borders a Red Zone. In the south the SVC is within a Buffer Zone, because of 
the proximity of Gonarezhou National Park. To the north and west it borders 
clear zones, which in turn are the bordering areas of the FMD Free Zones, 
where cattle are reared for export. Export zones for cattle in Zimbabwe are 
concentrated in the centre (with an extension to the southern Masvingo 
Province), north and north east of the country.92 The outbreak in 1997 occurred 
                                                           
90  Attwell 1998: 30, 32-33. 
91  Minutes CCM, 7 march 1995. 
92  Information from Veterinary Services Office, Chiredzi, 21 May 1998. One can 
imagine how this veterinary security system has been broken down in the political 
turmoil in Zimbabwe as a result of all the farm invasions, fence cutting and 
poaching. 
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on the southwestern boundary of the SVC, on a property previously falling 
under Angus, part of Devuli Ranch, bordering a Clear Zone.  
 
 
The SVC fence and the urge to hunt 
 
In the previous section the fence featured prominently in its function of 
preventing the spread of FMD between red and clear zones, in this case 
corresponding with commercial and communal land. Although the fence was 
primarily erected for veterinary reasons, the construction has hardly ever been 
considered in that specific context by the SVC members. The fence was 
perceived in relation to its ultimate function, first of keeping the rhino in the 
conservancy by a single perimeter fence, but very soon after that, of making it 
possible to (re)introduce buffalo which ‘unfortunately’ required a double fence 
to prevent the spread of FMD in the SVC for hunting purposes. It was their 
wish to reintroduce buffalo and therefore they had no option but to erect the 
fence. At that level the SVC had mainly to negotiate with the DVS for the fence 
and the DNPWLM for the buffalo. So let us return again to the beginning of the 
SVC in 1991, the year it were formally inaugurated as a rhino conservancy. To 
be a rhino conservancy it (only) needed a single perimeter fence, with no heavy 
interference from or control by the DVS. It is interesting to note that none of the 
members of the SVC at that stage really had clear ideas about how to erect a 
fence, what materials to use and how to organise the operation. So in the first 
CCM there was discussion about the materials that should be used for standards 
and droppers. One point up for discussion, for instance, was that landowners 
and managers wondered if steel standards would be better for the fence than 
wooden ones, because the white ants would surely find them (and destroy them) 
and they needed constant, strict maintenance. But the Rhino Executant said that 
field trials in Botswana had learned that steel standards are ineffectual as they 
‘did not penetrate deep enough into the moist sub-soil to significantly increase 
the earthing current’.93 And what droppers should you use? Wooden ones need 
to be replaced fairly often. And what type of wire? Barbed or plain? And if 
every landowner/manager were to be responsible for building his own fence, 
would it be according to uniform standards or could everyone decide for 
himself? When they agreed on the material, the next question was where to 
order it.94 Prices of steel, for instance, rose steep in November 1991, with an 
estimated increase of 80% to 90%. Who had old prices and what were the 
                                                           
93  Ibid. 
94  Minutes CCM 12 November 1991. 
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delivery conditions? Would it be held in general stock in the SVC or on the 
different properties? In 1992 the first Conservator of the SVC resigned because 
he was fed up with the slow progress, first that of the fence but that of the SVC 
in general. Thwarted by the slow progress he could not see any future in the 
project and he ‘was frustrated over the enormity of the poaching problem’ 
especially in a context in which communication was a major problem.95 He was 
succeeded by a field co-ordinator and work on the fence continued. 
 It was at this time that the first inklings of making it not just a rhino conser-
vancy but to go beyond this and make wildlife pay for itself began to be 
mooted. The Chairman told the Committee that ‘he had paid a visit to the Sabi 
Sands Conservancy which borders onto the Kruger National Park in South 
Africa (...) He said the Sabi Sands area was very similar in its makeup to that of 
the Save Conservancy. The Sabi Sands Conservancy was founded by a group of 
private ranchers, who gave up their cattle because of the poor rainfall and veld 
conditions in the area, and turned to game. He said they were making a vast 
profit (...) (The Chairman) proposed that the Conservancy be turned into a total 
wildlife block with all the internal fences removed and to have the big game 
species brought back into the area’. To make the carrot even more attractive he 
said that he had heard that 300-500 buffalo would be culled in Gonarezhou and 
that he preferred them to be brought into the SVC. For that reason he had paid a 
visit to the DVS, in the company of Roger Whittall, and the DVS had 
‘stipulated that the cattle had to be removed from the area, and a strong fence 
along its boundaries’.96 If all the landowners could be convinced about this 
specific future for the SVC, the fencing would become a far stricter project. The 
final decision about the future of the SVC could be taken at the AGM in May, 
which was scheduled to be held, where else would be better for symbolic 
reasons, on Humani. At the next CCM the Chairman could tell the Committee 
that members both in the north and south of the SVC were supportive of the 
idea. The next item on the agenda was to order a feasibility study on the project, 
which was decided upon.97 But first it had to be officially decided at the AGM. 7 
May 1992, ‘all members agreed that if the feasibility study proved that wildlife 
was more viable than cattle, they were prepared to go into a game-only opera-
tion’. The head of DNPWLM was also present at the AGM and said that ‘he 
would give the Conservancy the necessary input of game’.98 In anticipation (and 
expectation) of a positive outcome of the feasibility study, the process of 
fencing could continue, but now it had to focus on a buffalo fence, which 
                                                           
95  Minutes CCM, 14 April 1992. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Minutes CCM 12 November 1991. 
98  Minutes AGM, 7 May 1992. 
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implied a plethora of consultation with the DVS, which would be the final 
institution to approve of the fence. First there were ‘smaller’ questions to be 
answered. Would the buffalo be held in a confined area within the SVC or 
would they roam freely all over the SVC? Would a single buffalo-proof 
perimeter fence be sufficient? They decided that one well kept and electrified 
perimeter fence would be sufficient for the SVC.99 The buffalo could be bought 
from the DNPWLM, that is, Gonarezhou for Z$ 100,-, excluding capture and 
transport.100 But unfortunately in January 1993, it was reported that the DVS, in 
the person of its director, was ‘not prepared to consider a standard [single] 
fence’ as perimeter fence for the SVC. The DVS would visit the SVC and 
would give recommendations ‘on a minimum standard of a fence’ which 
became a double fence as described above. While this was underway the CCM 
considered reaching out to the communities to inform them about the SVC and 
possible community projects.101 In the meantime the feasibility study was still 
not finished,102 but nevertheless the SVC forged on. It was working on the 
buffalo fence and expected it to be ready by August 1993.103 Unfortunately in 
July it had to be reported to the CCM that, especially in the south of the SVC, 
they were not going to make the deadline of August and they asked for an 
alternative plan. Matter of factly it was also reported that the DNPWLM was 
probably going to be made a parastatal and if it succeeded, they would have ‘to 
manage their resources from an economic point of view’. The far-reaching 
consequences this would have for the relations between SVC and Parks, and the 
availability of buffalo, could not yet be envisioned.104 The fence was not finished 
in August, five properties had still to do their bit, but the SVC still wanted the 
buffalo. Therefore they erected bomas to put them in for the time being. But the 
bomas had to be inspected by the DVS first before they could let the buffalo 
come in.105 At that stage no one was under any illusion that the fence would not 
become a bone of contention between the landowners and the SVC. The SVC 
could not go ahead if all landowners did not shoulder their part of the work. In 
November it was stated that once the buffalo were approved a final date would 
be set for the completion of the fence. If landowners or their managers did not 
manage to keep the deadline, the SVC would do the job and would charge the 
                                                           
99  Minutes CCM, 22 June 1992. 
100  Minutes CCM, 1 July 1992. 
101  Minutes CCM, 5 January 1993. 
102  Minutes CCM, 22 February 1993. 
103  Minutes CCM, 8 June 1993. 
104  Minutes CCM, 1 July 1993. 
105  Minutes CCM, 9 September 1993. 
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landowner later.106 By March 1994, the buffalo fence was still not finished in 
terms of electrification. In the north alone some thirty-six km of electrification 
had yet to be finished. The game fence was already in place. In the south the 
situation was not much better. Again the CCM threatened that it would do the 
fencing if the landowner would not take his responsibility, and bill him after-
wards. A firm deadline was decided upon: the fence, both game and buffalo, 
had to be ready by 31 May 1994!107 However, in April a representative from the 
DVS did an initial informal check on the fence and came to the conclusion that 
he was ‘not impressed with the fences in general and got the impression the 
Conservancy was not serious about getting buffalo’. The permission to be 
allocated buffalo was postponed (again).108 In August the CCM reports that the 
bomas for the buffalo were ready for inspection by the DVS, despite the fact 
that the perimeter and buffalo fence were still not up to standard.109 
 In the minutes of October it is reported that the buffalo had arrived but with 
regard to the fence, things had still not changed for the better and, rather 
desperately, the CCM stated that ‘all members of the Conservancy who do not 
have their fences (both game and buffalo) complete by 31 October will be 
charged for all feed for the buffalo while they are kept in the bomas’.110 But 
again, in November, the sad conclusion had to be drawn: new deadline of 30 
November will not be met, as twelve (!) properties have still not did have the 
fences erected up to standard nor had all the properties discarded their cattle111 
and they ended the year with the fence still incomplete.112 In 1995 the struggle 
continued. Buffaloes were held in bomas but could not be released either 
because of an incomplete fence and because there were (even) still cattle around 
on different properties. The Cattle Producers Association (CPA) was following 
the activities of the SVC with respect to the fencing very closely and undoubt-
edly heard the rumours about the difficulties with regard to the fence. At the 
beginning of 1995, it was announced that the DVS would inspect the fence by 
the end of February and that, a few weeks before that date, the Conservator will 
do a pre-inspection, which would give the SVC ‘time to iron out any 
problems’.113 The biggest problem seems to have been to obtain the minimum of 
five KV on the electrics. Although the fence receives the most attention in 
                                                           
106  Minutes CCM, 17 November 1993. 
107  Minutes CCM, 15 March 1994. 
108  Minutes CCM, 11 April 1994. 
109  Minutes CCM, 25 August 1994. 
110  Minutes CCM, 4 October 1994. 
111  Minutes CCM, 9 November 1994. 
112  Minutes CCM, 13 December 1994. 
113  Minutes CCM, 12 January 1995. 
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relation to animals, the fact that the government was looking to the SVC to 
check if it kept its promises with regard to helping the communities was not 
overlooked.114 By now tension was rising in the SVC, as the final inspection of 
the DVS was approaching apace. It hired two persons who would do weekly 
inspections on the state of the fence in the north and in the south of the SVC. In 
response to the critical questions posed by the government a Liaison Officer 
was attracted and employed for one month (!) to pay attention to the community 
relations.115 He was not hired directly by the SVC, but by the Trust which the 
SVC had created for this purpose. An extensive description of the development 
of the Trust will be given in the next chapter. Sufficient for now is to note that 
the creation of the function of Liaison Officer and the creation of the Trust were 
taking place at the same time that the fence was reaching its completion. This 
was partly in answer to the critical monitoring of the government, but was also a 
response to the fact that several communities had already protested about the 
location and erection of the buffalo fence. Luckily for the SVC the DVS was 
delayed and announced that it would only be able to come for inspection by 
mid-March.116 This was also the time, the DNPWLM placed a temporary ban on 
the movement of buffalo, but the chairman of the SVC declared that the 
decision was in no way linked to conservancies, ‘but purely [had to do with] 
inhouse fighting at the parks head office’ and there was a ‘feeling that the issue 
will resolve sooner rather than later’. The fence inspection finally took place on 
30 May and landowners signed agreements about the maintenance of the fence 
and a statement that all their cattle were off their property. With this in hand the 
                                                           
114  Minutes CCM, 8 February 1995. 
115  The Community Liaison Officer was financed with money from the Beit Trust (pp. 
10, Du Toit, R. (1998), Case study of policies that support sustainable development 
in Africa: the Savé valley Conservancy, Zimbabwe, Paper presented at the Scandi-
navian seminar college workshop on An African Perspective of Policies which 
Support Sustainable Development, Harare, 28-30 September). Later, August 1995, 
he would be financed with the same money, but this time it went through the Trust, 
especially created by the SVC to relate to the communities. It is symbolically 
meaningful to note that the same Beit Trust which helped to separate the SVC from 
its communities through financing the fence, also financed ‘the bridge’, that is, 
Liaison Officer, (also no coincidence, as it also financed Birchenough Bridge!) 
between the two. Another meaningful observation is that as soon as the Trust was 
created in August of that same year, the Liaison Officer was attached to the trust and 
to the SVC. So in fact he is working for the communities, within the context of the 
SVC. The contrast between two fence patrol officers for 345 km of fences and one 
Liaison Officer for one month for 119,000 people in the five surrounding districts is 
a striking one to note in terms of priorities! 
116  Minutes CCM, 7 March 1995. 
 
128 CHAPTER 3 
director of the DVS could sign and issue the release for the buffalo.117 This took 
another two months to complete and only in August 1995 could the DVS say 
that they had ‘received the fax containing signatures from all landowners saying 
that all cattle had been removed from the conservancy’. There was a fly in the 
ointment as by this time the DVS was already expressing its concerns that ‘the 
agreement entered into by the landowners and the veterinary department would 
not be adhered to and fences will not be maintained as specified’. It took some 
quite convincing rhetoric on the part of the chairman to convince the DVS that 
the fence would be properly maintained. Still the DVS wanted quarterly reports 
and periodic blood testing to keep records of the developments with regard to 
FMD. With these assurances ‘the chairman was very pleased to present the 
official release permit for the buffalo. ALL BUFFALO CAN BE RELEASED 
AS OF 2nd AUGUST 1995’.118 He did not say that the fence was approved, but 
implied that by this specific formulation. The fence was seen purely in the light 
of a function to make the buffalo possible in the SVC. Priorities in this respect 
are very clear. 
 Building a fence is one thing, but maintaining it presented the SVC with its 
own particular problems. It seems that the maintenance remained a struggle, if 
we are to believe the words of the Conservator that the fence is ‘the bane of my 
[his] life’.119 No wonder that I was not allowed to see the fence reports. The 
main problems seem to be the grass growing under and between the fences, 
areas which should be kept clear according to the regulations, and the voltage. 
As early as 25 February 1995, a special Fence Meeting was held on Humani to 
try and sort out the difficulties with the fence and to explain once more the idea 
of a fence levy introduced at the AGM in 1995. The basic idea was that every 
property was responsible for its own fence maintenance, but also paid an annual 
fence levy of Z$ 0.90 per acre. This levy then created a fund with which the 
SVC could maintain the fence in case the property not be keeping its fence up to 
the required veterinary standards. If a landowner maintained his fence properly 
would be reimbursed at the end of the year per kilometre of fence for which he 
was responsible. The owners who did not do a proper job on the fence would 
receive a reimbursement minus the costs of the job done by the SVC. He also 
informed the members that a ‘risk assessment team’ would visit the SVC, the 
DVS was obviously still not sure about the fulsome promises of the SVC to 
‘access the cost benefits of buffalo in situations such as ours and the possibili-
ties and risks of the spread of Foot and Mouth Disease’. The DVS had warned 
the SVC about the serious consequences of the team’s findings in the sense that 
                                                           
117  Minutes CCM, 28 June 1995. 
118  Minutes CCM, 2 August 1995. Emphasis in original. 
119  Conversation with Conservator, 23 September 1998. 
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íf there were problems with the fence, the outcome of the assessment could 
mean that there never would be any further problems, as, ‘with no buffalo, there 
will be no need for the buffalo fence’. This special meeting ended with a full 
report on all the fences.120 The risk assessment team came in at the beginning of 
1997 and in June the results were received by the CCM, which were ‘better than 
expected, [but] there was still some concern on the maintenance, monitoring 
and action thereof’. Rather prophetically there was the observation of the team 
that maybe impala jumping out of the SVC were a greater risk for spreading 
FMD than were buffalo.121 At the same meeting the fence maintenance was 
discussed once more but ‘this matter was not resolved’.122 
 In 1998 the fence maintenance costs are estimated on figures from 1996-
1997. The figures are based on responses from ranches, asked to give financial 
details on their fence maintenance.123 The response was not particularly high, 
and of the total length of approx. 345 km they only received figures represent-
ing 116,3 km. Out of these figures came a calculated cost per annum of Z$ 2210 
per kilometre of fence. The costs are structured as follows per km / per annum 
in Z$: 
 
• Labour costs (these include tractor driver, herbicide team  
 (incidental), fence guards (permanent). A fence guard earns 
 approx. Z$ 510, - per month) :  1327,- 
• Tractor costs (to operate between the fences: 331,- 
• Herbicides (to keep clear between fences): 92,- 
• Material (for reparation of the fences): 385,- 
• Other: 75,- 
 
 Total:  Z$ 2210,- 
 
Despite the special Fence Meeting and the report of the risk assessment team, 
maintenance of the fences remained a problem. The DVS is constantly threat-
ening the SVC that it will wield ‘the big stick’,124 that is, come in and shoot the 
buffalo if the SVC is not maintaining its fences properly. One of the problems 
with the conservancy concept in this respect is that it is a voluntary association 
of landowners which leaves the individual properties a great deal of leeway. 
                                                           
120  Minutes Fence Meeting, 25 February 1996. 
121  Conservator’s report, June 1997; compare with outbreak of FMD later in the year on 
Mukwazi in chapter 3. 
122  Minutes CCM, 25 June 1997. 
123  Interview with Conservator 30 April 1998. The maintenance costs for 1998 were 
based on reporting on only 82 km of fence. 
124  Minutes CCM, 12 February 1997. 
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And the conservancy does not have much, if any real, sanction to force the 
individual members to live up to their promises. One ‘escape’ the SVC pursued 
was that it told the individual landowners and their managers that the DVS had 
sent it a letter stating that the DVS would hold the SVC, instead of the different 
properties, responsible for the maintenance of the fence, which would mean too 
much administrative hassle. Now the SVC, legitimised by the letter of the DVS, 
could interfere directly in the fence maintenance programme or lack thereof of 
the individual properties. If such a letter ever really came is a matter of 
surmise.125 The SVC and CCM can only try to persuade the different properties 
to comply. For the maintenance a single double row of fencing gives problems. 
The fence levy did not solve the problem because in the end many landowners 
did not pay it,126 because there were those with a large acreage but with a rela-
tively short fence, which meant that they still had to pay a fair amount and 
could be modestly reimbursed. And visa versa, there are those with small 
acreage but with a long fence who could expect a healthy sum as reimburse-
ment. At one stage they thought of abandoning the idea of a levy altogether but 
the DVS was so much on their backs the vice-chairman told the CCM in May 
1998, stating that it was ‘sick and tired’ of the casual attitude of the landowners 
to the fence,127 especially after the outbreak of FMD in 1997. Under the circum-
stances its only option was to keep up the levy to show its commitment to the 
fence issue, which it did for the financial year of 1998-1999.128 No matter what it 
did to try and organise it, the fence continued to be a problem right through 
1998. In September I went with the Conservator to have a look at the upgrading 
of the fence on Mukwazi. On our way back, the Conservator made random 
checks on the voltage of the fences, which was simply not present. We also 
came across fairly loose hanging wires instead of tight, straight ones, plus brittle 
droppers and high grass. These observations were revealing, as this is certainly 
not the most difficult stretch of fence to maintain in the SVC.129  
 All this goes to show ineluctably that the fence is a major issue within the 
SVC. It is a big issue because there is a strict veterinary requirement about 
keeping buffalo within bounds. And buffalo it wants, to be able to hunt them. 
                                                           
125  Conversation with Conservator, 23 September 1998. 
126  ‘As will be discussed under finances, $150,000 out of $ 273,000 of the fence 
maintenance levy has NOT been paid’. Minutes CCM, 9 April 1997. 
127  CCM, 6 May 1998. 
128  Interview with Conservator 30 April 1998. 
129  Personal observations, 23 September 1998. I had already made similar observations 
on another occasion in another part of the SVC when I was travelling in the north of 
the SVC with the Liaison Officer and we, completely at random, visited a stretch of 
fencing near the Devure River. Here the fence was riddled with large holes, which 
had been stuffed fairly loosely with some thorny branches, 28 May 1998. 
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The SVC wants them to hunt because the Price Waterhouse feasibility study 
indicated (ex-post) that buffalo would make the wildlife operation economically 
viable. The buffalo forms part of a broader restocking plan of the SVC. So for 
that reason the fence assume a primary importance for the SVC for the simple 
reason that it wants to be able to have buffalo to hunt. Although what has just 
been said could lead one to think that not everybody in the SVC seems serious, 
determined and fully committed to the project. The reasons for the attitudes of 
the different properties can only be guessed. It was noticed in the CCM at a 
certain stage that the landowners had ‘different agendas’ in relation to the 
creation of the SVC.130 The light-hearted attitude with which some property 
owners seem to treat the fence issue, and the fact that the seriousness has to be 
stressed over and over again reinforces this general image. Then it can be 
observed that the power and authority of the SVC over the landowners is more 
theoretical, that is, in the constitution, than practical. Although the SVC 
threatens the landowners it will charge them and so forth, this step has never 
been taken. Not because there was no inducement, but because it would 
probably put the coalition in jeopardy. The fence is a perfect illustration of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the integration of the SVC. Thirdly, the broader 
context, it can be noted that having committed itself to the financial investment 
in the fence, the SVC also reached a financial point of no return. Should a 
property leave the SVC now, it would cost the owner a wad of money to fence 
itself out in the first place and after that re-fence the property, not only 
outwardly towards the communal areas, but also in relation to neighbouring 
properties. Furthermore, he would still have to pay and round off his financial 
obligations to the SVC for earlier investments, like the restocking levy. So the 
fence is a strong indication about the internal functioning and operation of the 
SVC. But as I shall show in the next chapter in describing the reciprocal 
exchange between SVC and neighbouring communities in several different 
cases, for the communal farmers the fence means much more than a physical 
and visible barrier for buffalo only plus being a clinical preventive measure. For 
communal farmers the fence ‘embodies the reality of the boundary and suppos-
edly writes it permanently into the earth’,131 that is, the demarcation between 
commercial and communal land. The fence is seen ‘as a type of demarcation or 
‘writing’ that fixes white authority in the countryside’.132 Broadly speaking the 
                                                           
130  When I asked the Chairman about this he could not give any clues as to what these 
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131  Hofmeyr 1993: 77 
132  Ibid: 61. 
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erection of fences is understood as being part ‘of a wider net of white control’.133 
In the next chapter I shall show that consequently the organisational co-opera-
tion between the SVC and the neighbouring communities can best be described 
as a ‘war of the fences’.134 A war that would later intensify dramatically after 
Mugabe lost the constitutional referendum in February 2000.135 This war is 
waged within the wider context of a historical line of reciprocal exchange 
between black and white in the area, related to land and hunting. All that can be 
noted so far, is that the SVC created an organisational structure to deal with the 
local communities and employed a Liaison Officer. Nothing in the minutes 
refers to any other, more personal interaction between the SVC and neighbour-
ing communities, or between individual farmers and their direct neighbours. So, 
what has been done to reach each other over the fence, Trust, Liaison Officer, 
meetings and the like, seems more like an exchange of intentions then anything 
else. Or in the literary words of Farah, they seem more ‘fond of developing a 
more intimate relationship with rituals than with people’.136 In the next chapter I 
shall delve deeper into describing the formal structure of organisational co-
operation within the context of this war of the fences, replete with its acts of 
domination and resistance. But let me first turn to the other main, but very 
related issue which has dominated the discussion with the SVC from the early 
day: the buffalo. 
 
 
                                                          
The buffalo as a symbol of economic prosperity 
 
‘Big game hunters have continued to elaborate on the cunning, aggression and 
almost supernatural strength of the African buffalo for the last hundred years.’137 
Captured in a formula it reads like ‘B + LS = F’.138 This means Buffalo + Lousy 
Shot = Funeral. Stories of buffalo hunts do not seem to dry up, and in 
Zimbabwe there are plenty. ‘As you have often said in your “Zimbabwe Hunter 
Edition” there have been many stories about buffalo hunting, and there will still 
 
133  Ibid: 71. 
134  Ibid: 73. 
135  Between June and November 2000 the SVC lost some ‘160 kilometres of six-strand 
electrified fencing and approximately 160 kilometres of barbed-wire fencing to 
theft’, Michler, I. (February 2001), Zimbabwe’s Killing Fields. Africa. Environment 
& Wildlife, vol. 9, no.1, pp. 33.  
136  Pp. 12, Farah, N. (1992), Gifts, London: Serif Publishers (in association with 
Baobab Books, Harare). 
137  Pp. xvi, Prins, H.H.T. (1996), Ecology and Behaviour of the African Buffalo. Social 
Inequality and Decision Making, London, New York: Chapman & Hall. 
138  Capstick in Prins 1996: xvi. 
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be many more to come’.139 The buffalo is considered by big game hunters to be 
the ‘epitome of wild Africa’.140 If, on top of that a feasibility study concludes 
that a wildlife utilisation programme is economically viable when commercial 
buffalo hunting is included, it is easy to understand why the SVC was, so 
obsessed with obtaining buffalo. 
 In 1985 the number of buffalo in Zimbabwe was estimated at 66,500.141 In 
1995 it was estimated that there were (only) some 48,000 buffalo left in 
Zimbabwe. In the 1950s their numbers had already markedly decreased, mainly 
as a result of tsetse fly control measures which eliminated buffalo from com-
mercial farming areas, including the SVC area. In the 1960s this was followed 
by elimination of buffalo because of FMD. In the 1980s and early 1990s their 
numbers decreased drastically as a result of severe droughts. In Gonarezhou 
National Park especially, many died during the drought of 1991-1992. Most 
buffalo are confined to the State protected Parks & Wild Life Land and the 
adjacent communal lands, especially where the communal lands form part of a 
CAMPFIRE District. In the 1990s FMD-infected buffalo were allowed on 
private land, that is, conservancies, after the approval of the DVS had been 
obtained as the former section on the fencing of the SVC has described (see 
Table 4).142  
 As I indicated above the buffalo are a key species in safari hunting and 
therefore it is important to describe their position in Zimbabwe as an essential 
context to understanding the development of the relations between DNPWLM 
and the private sector wildlife utilisation industry, of which the SVC also forms 
part. Especially when marketed together with hunts for dangerous game like 
elephant, lion and leopard, it forms a highly attractive package for hunters. The 
buffalo forms the second most valuable species after the elephant. Elephants 
contribute some 22% to the national trophy fees earned annually, while the 
                                                           
139  Pp. 28, Sauzier, C. (September/October 1997), Another Story of Buffalo Hunting, 
Zimbabwe Hunter, 3 (3). 
140  Interview with professional hunter, Managing Director Hunters & Guides Africa, 12 
March 1998. 
141  The Cape Buffalo was nearly wiped out in east and southern Africa by the turn of 
the nineteenth century through a ‘plague of Biblical proportions’, rinderpest, which 
also affected domesticated cattle in a unprecedented way (Watkin, J. (1997), ... and 
buffalo?, Swara. East African Wildlife Society, July/August, 20: 4). The Maasai of 
East Africa, lost some 90% of their cattle and called the rinderpest enkidaaroto, ‘the 
destruction’ (Adams & McShane 1996: 36). The rinderpest spread south and arrived 
in Zimbabwe in 1896 and wiped out nearly all buffalo (Child 1995: 149). 
142  Pp. 144-147 & 150, Foggin, C.M. & Taylor, R.D. (1996), Management and 
utilization of the African buffalo in Zimbabwe, In: Proceedings of a Symposium on 
the African buffalo as a Game Ranch Animal, Onderstepoort, 26 October. 
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buffalo earns some 13%, followed by sable antelope with 11%. In 1993 the 
revenues from hunting trophies in Zimbabwe were US$ 12,826,360,-. Between 
1986 and 1993, the trophy prices of buffalo rose 62%, from US$ 654 to US$ 
1084,-.143 In CAMPFIRE areas, the average trophy price in 1997 was US$ 
1163,-. See for the development of average prices of trophies of the four key 
species I already mentioned in CAMPFIRE areas Table 5.144 
 
 
Table 4  
Number of African Buffalo on private land, present and projected145 
Property Area Fence length Projected area No. of buffalo No. of buffalo 
 (ha) (km) (ha) present projected 
Savé 330,000 341 330,000 384 5,000 
Chiredzi 1,200 10 81,600 158 1,800 
Towla 20,250 59 180,000 133 2,000 
Chipimbi 125 17 1,250 42 90 
 
 
Table 5  
Average trophy fees of the four key species in CAMPFIRE areas (US$) 
Species/ year 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Buffalo 918 1052 1114 1163 
Elephant 6781 6796 7712 7908 
Leopard 1756 1980 2779 1720 
Lion 3000 2228 2693 3200 
 
 
 In order to understand the role and impact of the buffalo in the context of the 
SVC and the consequences for the organisational co-operation between the 
SVC and its neighbours, it is necessary to describe three related aspects. The 
first of these is the quota-setting of buffalo for hunting purposes. Only with a 
sufficiently large herd of buffalo it is possible to realise an economically viable 
offtake through hunting. The second aspect is the way the SVC tried to finance 
its restocking operation. This not only applies to buying buffalo, but also other 
species considered to make the area (more) attractive to potential (hunting) 
tourists. In all the routes it tried to fund their restocking programme, the 
organisational co-operation with the neighbouring communities was put 
forward as an important aspect of the application. Thirdly, and evenly funda-
                                                           
143  Ibid: 152. 
144  Unpublished data WWF Zimbabwe, 1998. Two districts bordering the SVC are 
CAMPFIRE Districts with Appropriate Authority, Chiredzi and Chipinge. 
145  Ibid: 150. 
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mental to understanding why the organisational co-operation with the neigh-
bouring communities is considered so crucially important to the sustainability 
of the SVC, is the relation between the SVC and the DNPWLM in relation to 
buying buffalo.  
 The market price for buffalo trophies depends on their quality, which is 
strongly related to their size. In order to make the hunting business sustainable, 
it is necessary to set quota for the offtake of animals, to guarantee that ‘wildlife 
populations maintain themselves and continue to survive biologically into the 
future’, so that they may also be hunted in future years and remain economi-
cally viable.146 In order to decide on a quota, base-line data have to be collected. 
We need to know the growth rate of the population, which for buffalo is 
typically about 7%. Offtake quotas will always be equal or slightly less than the 
growth rate. It is also essential to know how large the population is in order to 
decide on the exact numbers. This can be estimated by various types of game 
counts. I shall return to this later. And finally it should be known what kind of 
offtake will take place, trophy hunting or cropping for meat or a mixture of 
both. Trophy hunters aim specifically at certain age classes of bulls, which is 
between eight and twelve years of age. In this age class they are mature, with 
large horns and a hard boss. In other words, trophy hunters are selective. If the 
buffalo are cropped, they are killed more randomly over different age strata. It 
is estimated that only 2% males of a buffalo population reaches maturity every 
year. This means that if the offtake is for hunting purposes only, the hunting 
quota, is set at 2%. Cropping is non-selective, which would mean that the 
offtake could be set at 7%. A mixture of both forms of offtake would give 
figures in between these two extremes. Although the percentages are quite 
stable indicators, much depends on the estimates of the actual population in the 
field. There are basically four methods to estimate the numbers of animals in an 
area: 
 
• Aerial sample surveys; 
• Ground based methods; 
• Walked transects; 
• Road strip counts.  
 
Let me describe all of these briefly. The aerial survey is done in the dry season, 
because there is not much vegetation and the animals can be readily seen. It can 
only be used for the larger species like elephant and rhino, which can be seen 
                                                           
146  Pp. 9, WWF (November 1997), Quota Setting Manual, Harare: WWF. The rest of 
this section is also based on information from this manual, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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from the air. It is a convenient way to cover large areas. Aerial surveys are 
carried out by trained staff from the DNPWLM, with assistance from the WWF. 
Ground-based methods can be divided into two. The walked transects ‘are lines 
or strips of people of a limited size that are walked by a person or group of 
people counting animals as they go’. They can follow either fixed or variable 
routes. Finally the road strip counts are ‘made from the back of a vehicle by 
counting the animals seen on either side of the road’. This is probably the most 
difficult one in terms of calculation. ‘The average distance from the road in 
which the animals are seen forms a strip in which all animals are assumed to 
have been seen. If the length of this strip is known, the area of the strip can be 
calculated. If we assume that the number of animals is the same inside and 
outside the strip for the same area, we can then make an estimate of the animals 
outside the strip’. The best way to estimate population size is to use a triangula-
tion of different methods and compare its outcomes over a series of years. Then 
it is also possible to see the trends in the population.  
 The SVC introduced game counts in 1996 in order to decide the offtake. 
They use (or intend to use) different methods: the road strip count, ‘sweep 
count’ (= walked transects), and an aerial count, although the last has so far not 
been used. They also use two other methods which do not fall strictly into the 
categorisation described above, the ‘Manager’s Estimate’ and ‘Water Point 
Count’. The first one especially is an interesting in relation to the buffalo. For 
the sake of comparison I shall describe the game count figures for 1998 of a 
(very) common species in the SVC, the impala, and a scarce one, the buffalo. 
For 1998 all the properties gave a manager’s estimate of the number of impala 
on their property, which totalled 77,289 head within the SVC. On top of that, 
most of the properties did a road strip count, which number totalled 62,566 
animals. The difference between the two figures can be (to a certain extent) 
attributed to the six properties who did not do a road strip count at the time. 
Although there is a difference in figures, the manager’s estimate and the road 
strip counts roughly coincide. The recommended trophy offtake for impalas is 
4% and for cropping the figure is 6%. The final applied percentage of the 
offtake is based on the managers’ estimates and for trophies is 2.15% and for 
cropping 8.88 %.147 The interesting thing is to observe that the offtake is based 
on the managers’ estimates. Let us now turn to the same Quota Data Sheet, but 
this time for the buffalo. The population estimate for this sheet is based solely 
on the managers’ estimates. Seven properties did not produce any figures. The 
rest together came to a figure of 1005 buffaloes(!). One property also did a 
                                                           
147  Two properties also did a water point count, which totalled 8428 impalas and finally 
three properties did a sweep count, totalling 2788 impalas. Information based on 
Quota Data Sheet SVC for impala, 1997 Offtake and 1998 Quota Application. 
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water point count, which gave a significantly higher number of animals than 
estimated by the manager (estimate 230, water point count 339). One property 
did a sweep count, which also resulted in a higher number of animals (estimate 
80, sweep count 148). But 1005 buffalo in the SVC is definitely more than I can 
identify from other sources, mainly the IFC loan application from July 1998 in 
which appendix 10.4 indicates only some 261 buffalo, being purchased and 
progeny, to 31 March 1997, Foggin and Taylor’s article in 1996 which gave a 
number of 384 buffalo for the SVC as I indicated above, and the General Quota 
Meeting of January 1998 which indicates ‘around 550 animals’.148 If Foggin’s 
estimate was accurate for 1996 and with a growth rate of 7% that would mean 
for 1998, a maximum population of 438.149 If the IFC Application is what we 
base our calculations on we would end up with a putative population of buffalo 
of 279,150 nothing near the estimate at the General Quota Meeting, let alone the 
accumulated managers’ estimates. Nevertheless, a percentage of 1.69% is 
recorded on the official Applied Trophy Offtake, which is well under the 
recommended 2% of trophy offtake. The actual Approved Quota Number of 
buffalo is seventeen but then whether out of 1005 (1.69%) or out of 279 
(6.09%) or 438 (3.88%) or 550 (3.09%) buffaloes makes a huge difference, 
especially in relation to the age structure of the herd. This gives a strong 
indication that the buffalo is being overhunted in the SVC if all the buffalo 
hunts are sold to clients, which in turn indicates the eagerness of the properties 
to be able to sell profitable buffalo hunts. This goes a long ways towards 
explaining why they tried so hard to find money to restock the SVC with 
different game species, including the buffalo, which again featured prominently. 
Although the reasons for applying for funds varied slightly from document to 
document, the relations with the neighbouring communities were always 
prominently wielded as a social and political legitimation, for ultimately 
attaining economic purposes. 
 The attempts to find money for restocking the SVC can be divided in three, 
the ‘donor route’, the ‘shares route’ and the ‘loan route’.151 The donor route was 
‘kicked off’ in 1995 with a document on the Savé Valley Conservancy Trust, 
presented in a beautiful brochure, printed on good quality paper. It has a dark 
green cover, decorated with a full-colour African-style drawing of an African 
                                                           
148  Minutes General Quota Meeting, 15 January 1998. 
149  An annual increase of 7% on a population of 384 is 26,88. A figure based on 1996 
would indicate for 1998 a population of 438 (2x27=54 + 384). 
150  An annual increase of 7% on a population of 261 is 18,27. A figure based on 1997 
would indicate for 1998 a population of 279. 
151  Interview with Conservator, 21 May 1998. The donor-route and share-route were 
tried almost simultaneously. 
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village in which wildlife seems to be integrated into daily life as a woman with 
a pot on her head walks beside a cheetah, a giraffe and a bit further on is an 
elephant which is gently strolling around. The aim of the document was ‘to 
raise the sum of Z$ 69 million (in 1998 approximately US$ 7.7 million) over a 
period of five years for the Savé Valley Conservancy Trust. Z$ 65 million of the 
funds raised will be invested in Savé Valley Wildlife Services Limited on 
behalf of the communities surrounding the Savé Valley Conservancy (...). This 
company will, utilising these funds, purchase designated species of wildlife to 
restock the Conservancy (...). In so doing the communities will attain a 
proprietary participation, together with the owners of the land, in what is 
arguable the most significant conservation initiative in Africa today’.152 For this 
purpose a Trust representing the community was formed on 9 August 1995,153 
and trustees were chosen on the Board of the Trust. They were selected 
primarily for their expected ability to bring in the donor money for the Trust. 
The Chairman of the Trust was a senior manager from Delta Corporation and 
the Secretary of the Trust was the retired Price Waterhouse consultant who 
wrote the document in the first place. Both were white. At this stage I shall not 
go into further detail about the Trust or its relationship with the SVC not to 
mention the reaction of the people it seemed all about, the communities 
surrounding the SVC. The next chapter will go into those aspects of the Trust. 
Here it is enough to explain the basic idea, which was to create a joint venture 
with the communities through the Trust. This would be achieved through the 
following organisational structure, see Figure 4.154 
 As in any commercial joint venture structure, the two partners would partici-
pate in the new company according to what they were bringing into the 
company. The landowners would bring in their land, which would give them a 
36% share in the company. The communities, through the Trust, would have a 
64% share, based on the donor money they were supposed to attract. With that 
money they would buy wildlife and restock the SVC. As the wildlife is 
ultimately state- owned the landowners would pay a levy to the Trust starting 
with 2% in year one, and increasing to 5% over a five-year period.155 With that 
money the Trust would be able to initiate all kinds of community-based  
 
                                                           
152  The Savé Valley Conservancy Trust, (1995), Proposal to Create an Interdependence 
between the Surrounding Communities and the Savé Valley Conservancy in the 
South East Lowveld of Zimbabwe, Savé Valley Conservancy Trust. The document 
was written by a retired Price Waterhouse consultant in Harare. 
153  Ibid: 11. 
154  Ibid: 7. 
155  Ibid: 5-8. 
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 Figure 4 Organogram joint venture SVC and neighbouring communities 
 (Source: see footnote 152) 
 
 
development projects in the wards surrounding the SVC. And apart from this 
direct flow of capital, the surrounding communities would also benefit from 
‘increased employment opportunities (...) in both the construction of the various 
tourist facilities and thereafter in their on-going operations. Indirect employ-
ment opportunities will be created in businesses supportive of and complemen-
tary to those in the Conservancy’.156 Before this document was even finished, it 
had already asked a consultant to look into the possibilities of community-based 
development projects. This report was finished by October 1994.157 With this 
proposal under their arm, the Chairman and the Secretary of the Trust toured the 
UK to find donors interested in putting money into the project. They came back 
and reported their findings to a Special General Meeting of the SVC in October 
1995. The Secretary told the members that people had reacted enthusiastically 
to the proposal. When one of the members asked what it was the donors were 
‘exited about’, he told them that ‘it was the idea of a living example of 
 
                                                           
156  Ibid: 24. 
157  Cunliffe, R.N. (October 1994), Savé Valley Conservancy Community-Based 
Projects: Overview and Presentation of Project Concepts. This unpublished report 
was prepared for the Beit Trust, WWF and DNPWLM. 
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sustainable development, something they have been interested in for a long 
time. They were aware that if the conservancy is successful than the 
communities around it will prosper and they like that idea’.158 Their excitement 
must have remained within bounds as not one single donor was prepared to put 
any money into the project. The Chairman, whom I interviewed in 1998 about 
it, said it quite plain that the message of the donors was loud and clear, that it 
was an ‘interesting idea’, but because ‘you are private sector we cannot sponsor 
it’.159 End of Act one. 
 If the non-profit sector cannot sponsor a project in the private sector, then it 
should look for an alternative within the private sector itself. It tried this 
through the ‘share route’. A booklet similar to the donor document, but the 
drawing had been replaced by a photograph of a stately elephant standing under 
some trees against a beautiful sunset was produced. ‘The prospectus seeks to 
attract investment in the company “Savé Valley Wildlife Services Limited” 
formed to fund the restocking of the conservancy with the full wildlife spectrum 
of wildlife indigenous to the area. The company will exist in partnership with 
owners of the land comprising the Conservancy. (...) This prospectus seeks to 
raise a sum (...) of Z$ 69 million (US$ 8 million) which will be used to fund the 
restocking of the area with restocking designated indigenous species currently 
not present’.160 The emphasis from investing in the SVC through the Trust has 
been replaced by direct investment in the company. The communities were not 
entirely forgotten, or left altogether. It mentions the Trust, which was formed, 
according to this document, ‘with the aim of ensuring that the benefits created 
by the Conservancy flow beyond the perimeter fence and include the communi-
ties that surround it’. In terms of this offer 3,686 million ordinary “B” shares are 
being allotted to the Trust against wildlife (...) and perimeter fencing that has 
been donated to the Conservancy by external donor agencies. It is also the hope 
of the company that the purchasers of the “B” shares offered in terms of this 
document will donate some or all of their future dividend flow to the Trust in 
order to further these aims’.161 Obviously, some aspects of the charitable donor 
route have left their traces in this commercial enterprise. Tourism, both 
consumptive and non-consumptive, is considered ‘the basis of revenue genera-
tion for the area’.162 However attractively the deal was presented, it also failed to 
                                                           
158  Minutes Special General Meeting, 11 October 1995. 
159  Interview with Chairman of the SVC Trust, 25 June 1998. 
160  Savé Valley Conservancy, (25 September 1995), Private Placement Document for 
Savé Valley Wildlife Services Limited, Savé Valley Conservancy. Unpublished docu-
ment. 
161  Ibid: 6, italics added. 
162  Ibid: 1. 
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strike a chard. Although at the AGM in 1995 the Secretary of the Trust said 
‘that there is a very good chance of success in raising these monies, but needs to 
get feedback from international companies once they have seen the prospectus. 
Various local companies have also shown great interest, namely Anglo 
American, Mobil, BP/Shell, Barclays and Willovale’.163 The Chairman and 
Secretary of the Trust then toured the USA and the UK with the idea and had to 
come back with the message that it was a ‘nice idea’, but ‘not commercial 
enough’. Individuals and companies told them that they could consider donating 
money to the idea on the basis of philanthropy, but would not buy shares on a 
commercial basis. They were ‘caught in between the commercial and donor 
world’.164 End of Act two. But their ‘in-between’-status fortunately caught the 
attention of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the commercial branch 
of the World Bank, which gives out loans through the funding of the Global 
Environmental Fund (GEF). It finances projects which fit the SVC case like a 
glove, being commercial in orientation but with a strong undercurrent of 
environmental and development issues. 
 For that reason, the next extensive document produced was the IFC loan 
application in 1997. Up till then, the Trust had always been presented as an 
integral part of the SVC. The SVC had created the Trust and it was structurally 
related to it. In both former attempts to find funding the Trust was central to the 
operation in the sense that funding or donor money would go through the Trust. 
With the IFC matters assumed a different course. The IFC loan application had 
to persuade the IFC in three fields of project sustainability: environmentally/ 
ecologically, economically and socio-politically. Under the latter heading the 
Trust resurfaced, presented as a ‘philanthropic agency for supporting local 
community development’. This latter was definitely necessary as ‘(t)he negative 
political image of the electrified game fencing and upmarket eco-tourism 
adjacent to over populated communal lands must obviously be converted into a 
positive context for local communities. However, experience elsewhere in 
Africa has shown that relationships between rural communities and adjacent 
wildlife/tourism venture are highly unstable if they are based merely on political 
appeasement and largesse. The interaction between the commercial and 
communal sectors must be one of genuine economic symbiosis, rather than a 
one-way outflow of a token proportion of earnings from the wildlife/tourism 
industry’165. To live up to these statements it applied for a loan of US$ 
1,000,000, of which 50% would be ‘debt forgiveness’, which meant that 50% of 
                                                           
163  Minutes AGM, 26 May 1995. 
164  Interview with Chairman of the Trust, 25 June 1998. 
165  Pp. 3 Loan application, Savé Valley Wildlife Services Limited to IFC/SME Pro-
gram, 17 June 1997. 
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the money repaid would go to a project in support of the original project.166 
Further benefits of the loan were considered: 
• ‘a 4% grant for administration which comes out of the US$ 1 million. 
• There is a US$50.,000 grant to the WWF for environmental capacity 
technical assistance’.167 
The organisational structure which was presented in the loan application was 
the following, linking the communities and the SVC through the Trust, Joint 
Committee and Working Committee, see Figure 5.168 
 
 
 
Trust SVWSL
SVCWorkingcommittee
Joint
committee
R
U
R
AL
 D
IS
TR
IC
T 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
S
LAN
D
O
W
N
ER
S
 
 
Figure 5:  Organogram joint venture SVC and neighbouring communities for IFC  
 application 
 (Source: see footnote 167) 
                                                           
166  Ibid: 11; see also minutes CCM, 25 June 1997. 
167  Minutes CCM, 25 June 1998. 
168  Ibid: 4, IFC loan application. The acronym SVWSL stands for Savé Valley Wildlife 
Services Ltd. 
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 But in their negotiations with the IFC, the latter did not want to get involved 
with the Trust, because, according to the Chairman of the Trust, a similar 
project of the IFC in South America ‘went sour’. It adjusted the plan accord-
ingly. The Trust would not receive the 50% debt forgiveness, an amount of 
approximately Z$ 10 million at that time, this would now go to the SVC. The 
SVC would commit two million to the Trust to give them a starting capital to be 
able to apply for their own GEF funding.169 With this new development the Trust 
became far more than it had been before, a separate entity. At least in the 
organisational structure the Trust and the SVC-Company were no longer 
allowed to be linked.170 The Joint Committee and Working Committee were 
strictly speaking no longer necessary and became superfluous. The idea was 
now that the Trust, after having found its own funding, could buy wildlife, lease 
it to the SVC and also receive money for the progeny of that stock. It sounded 
promising but the financing of the restocking operation which in the donor route 
had gone entirely through the Trust, had to be abandoned under pressure of the 
IFC. The charity of the shares-route, through which shares were allotted to the 
Trust against wildlife and where dividends were meant to go into the Trust, was 
also abandoned. The Trust was on its own, receiving a starting capital, and then 
it has to make its own way.171 
 Besides to the loan application itself, the IFC required an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) to be written. The SVC approached a consultant from 
Harare, C.A.W. Attwell, who was approved by the IFC.172 Formally this EIA 
was not yet necessary in the legal context of Zimbabwe because, although 
Zimbabwe does have an EIA policy, it has not so far got EIA legislation. But it 
was a strict IFC requirement. The objectives of the EIA are: 
• ‘Highlighting potential negative impacts on both environment and local 
communities, and 
• isolating potential situations under which sustainability of the project may be 
threatened, viewed in the light of the three “sustainability sectors”, [ecological, 
economic and socio-political]’.173 
                                                           
169  Minutes CCM, 11 February 1998. 
170  Minutes CCM, 10 June 1998. ‘EIA had to be redrafted, as the SVC Trust and the 
Company had to be shown as separate, and the original EIA dealt with the Company 
and the Trust linked’.  
171  At the same time, as I shall describe in the next chapter the original (majority white) 
Trustees were replaced by a new group of (majority black) Trustees. 
172  Minutes General Meeting, 16 October 1997. 
173  Pp. 27, Attwell, C.A.M. (July 1998), Environmental Impact Assessment for Loan 
Application to the IFC for the Restocking of Wildlife Species in the Save Valley 
Conservancy. Unpublished report. 
 
144 CHAPTER 3 
 The final text of the EIA had to lie on public display for sixty days in 
Washington. Only then could the final decision about the loan be made by the 
IFC. The three sustainability factors all had their own particular sensitivities and 
had to be regarded in the context of the difficult situation in which Zimbabwe 
(already) found itself at that particular time, in relation to The Land Issue, 
economically and socio-politically. The three sustainability aspects were all 
judged by separate divisions within the IFC. The sensitivities on the ecological 
aspect of the project were strictly on the SVC side, mainly related to the fact 
that the document had to go through a sixty-day period of public scrutiny in 
PWashington. It was a form of public exposure of a white commercial initiative 
in southern Africa in relation to the environment, which could be potentially 
dangerous if ideologically motivated groups took it into heads to protest about 
the project publicly. Economically and financially the sensitivity was also a 
SVC matter, which lay in the fact that the SVWSL,174 the commercial company 
of the conservancy, has no assets with which it could guarantee the loan by any 
means. Luckily for it the Delta Corporation175 was prepared to ‘stand guarantor 
for the loan’, but in order to do that they needed the financial commitment of 
the individual members and to substantiate the commitment all members had to 
give a profile of their financial ability to repay the loan in ten years’ time. This 
meant that they had to give Delta ‘a letter from the member’s auditor or banker 
indicating that the member has sufficient resources to meet the financial 
commitment of the loan’.176 Their commitment would thus imply a point of no 
return for at least ten years and expose their actual financial capability. The 
SVC had probably already reached a point of no return after all the investments 
in the fencing, but with the IFC loan the project would become definite. It was 
made clear that the SVC was only an option for financially well-to-do landown-
ers, investors who had sufficient amounts of money to wait for a longer period 
of time to receive a return on investment. Finally the socio-political aspect was 
of crucial importance, not so much to the SVC, it was in favour of linking the 
Trust to the loan and organisationally to the SVC, to the IFC. It insisted on a 
split between the two. This aspect required a great deal of time before it was 
straightened out and the final text of the EIA could be laid down for public 
scrutiny.177 Another aspect of the procedure which absorbed a considerable 
                                                           
  Minutes General Meeting, 16 October 1997. 
174  The SVWSL would function as a commercial intermediary between IFC and SVC, 
which was required by the IFC, and would on-lend the IFC-loan to the SVC, 
Minutes CCM, 25 June 1997. 
175  Also shareholder in Senuko Safari Lodge, the up-market tourism facility of the 
Chairman of the SVC. 
176
177  Minutes CCM, 5 August 1998. 
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amount of time was that the IFC required a letter from the Minister of Mines, 
Environment and Tourism in which he endorsed the plans of the SVC. This 
requirement had come up just when the Zimbabwe government had announced 
its land designation operation in November 1997. For the IFC it was crucial to 
know if land in the SVC would be designated and used for resettlement in the 
near future, that is, within the ten-year period in which the loan had to be 
repaid. If that were the case, the loan would not be opportune from an environ-
mental and restocking perspective anyway, apart from the equally important 
question of who would then repay it. The IFC later agreed that a letter from the 
Permanent Secretary (PS) would also suffice.178 The Chairman of the Trust 
would draft a letter and send it to the PS for approval and a signature, after 
which it could be sent to the IFC. The Project Executant of the Rhino 
Conservation Project wrote two and a half pages of suggestions for this draft, 
summing up positive quotes made by the government and other officials in the 
course of time about conservancies in general and the SVC in particular, 
indicating that the SVC was observing all requirements laid down by the 
government in tolerating conservancies.179 The Chairman of the Trust and the PS 
also met personally to speak about the issue and the PS had made it clear that 
the SVC could not expect any definite answer on the land issue, or a letter of 
total recognition. Guarantees like that could not be given under the present 
political circumstances. The most it could expect was a letter of endorsement of 
the specific project. The Chairman of the Trust drafted a letter which he sent to 
the IFC for approval. The draft letter ‘contained the least of the things the IFC 
wanted to read and the most the PS was prepared to put on paper’.180 After some 
delays the letter could be passed on to the IFC and the final approval for the 
loan was given on 27 September.181 One of the main problems in prising the 
letter from the PS was, of course, that the government of Zimbabwe, already in 
1998, was ambivalent in its position towards the conservancies. It is indubitably 
very happy to see the revenues from tourism rise, in which the conservancies in 
the southeast Lowveld in particular are playing an important role. Its problem is 
that the conservancies, mainly white landowners, seem to stand for a continua-
tion of an unequal land distribution between black and white in Zimbabwe. This 
                                                           
178  The PS was considered more in favour of conservancies in general in circles within 
the SVC, than the Minister himself. 
179  Undated notes Project Executant ‘(...) on the core of a letter to PS (...) to push for 
official endorsement from him (...) of Savé Valley’s World Bank and IFC 
proposals’. 
180  CCM, 10 June 1998. 
181  Minutes CCM, 7 October 1998. 
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particular ambivalence is most clearly expressed in the relations between the 
SVC and the DNPWLM. 
 The relations between the SVC and the DNPWLM were launched in 1991 in 
the most cordial and co-operative way. No wonder, because the Chairman of the 
SVC was a highly respected Honorary Officer of the Department with a huge 
success in community conservation in Mahenya, bordering the Gonarezhou 
National Park, credited to him. This was considered to be the foundation of the 
CAMPFIRE programme which was launched so successfully in 1989.182 It so 
happened they were also brothers-in-arms in the field of nature conservation. 
The conservancies saved their black rhino, for instance, which was the founda-
tion for of a broader approach to wildlife utilisation in conservancies. Under the 
old regime, the DNPWLM also promised the SVC buffalo, if it saw to the 
erection of a fence of the required specifications of the DVS.183 Everything 
seemed to proceed smoothly and a bright future for the SVC seemed to be on 
the horizon based on a (very) positive reciprocal exchange between the SVC 
and the DNPWLM. Since then, positions have shifted and in recent years two 
developments have put that relationship under (severe) stress. The first is the 
fact that the director of the DNPWLM, Willie Nduku, and his deputy, Rowan 
Martin, were suspended in July 1995 and subsequently dismissed on allegations 
of illegal financial transactions to do with the translocation of elephants. ‘The 
(12) charges (5 Martin, 7 Nduku) basically relate to authorise the capture, sale 
and translocation of 200 elephants in Gonarezhou National Park in 1993. The 
Minister of Environment and Tourism had to authorise the capture of 200 
elephants by Wildlife Management Services, their sale to that company and 
their subsequent export to a national park in South Africa. She asserts that Dr. 
Nduku, even if he had general delegated authority, did not have the specific 
authority’.184 Not only was the translocation of elephants to South Africa men-
tioned, more harmfully the translocation of elephants to the conservancies was 
‘officially denounced as a form of economic sabotage, through the alleged 
squandering of “state assets” (...)’.185 But as I already described earlier, they 
were very sympathetic to the conservancies and had promised to sell them 
buffalo, after it had erected the required buffalo fence. When they were 
suspended and the director was replaced by an acting director, Willis Makombe, 
the new regime told the SVC that it did not have any agreement with the 
DNPWLM about buffalo, but that Nduku and Martin had only made promises 
                                                           
182  Independent Traveller, Supplement to Zimbabwe Independent, 26 September 1997, 
Mahenye a Success in Eco Sustenance. 
183  Conversation with Chairman SVC, 1 October 1998. 
184  The Herald, 14 March 1997, Parks in-fighting led to charges. 
185  Du Toit 1998: 9. 
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‘as persons’, not officially on behalf of DNPWLM.186 And that was that. Shortly 
afterwards the DNPWLM instituted a ban on the translocation of live animals, 
including buffalo from national parks to private property. And because 
‘(b)uffalo are not available from private land sources in any significant numbers 
(owing to the FMD containment strategy)’,187 this DNPWLM-policy led to a 
serious setback in the development of the SVC into a fully fledged wildlife 
utilisation programme. Whereas the DNPWLM relates the ban officially to 
FMD, informally, many in the field think they are in the know that the ban is for 
political reasons of arising from the dichotomy of the DNPWLM versus 
conservancies. Since 1995 no buffalo have been introduced to the SVC, to the 
utter frustration of the CCM and all members. It came to a point at which one of 
the foreign investors in the SVC wrote a report in which land designation and 
the ban on translocation of buffalo were the two issues at stake. He handed the 
report over to President Mugabe, when the latter was touring Germany in March 
1998, and had probably just listened to his speech on land designation in 
Zimbabwe.188 One of the three goals and objectives of the report is that ‘(I)t is 
respectfully requested that the Government of Zimbabwe: (...) instruct the 
Director of National Parks to issue game catching permits in overstocked 
National Parks for reintroduction of game in general, but Cape Buffalo specifi-
cally, into the Save Valley Conservancy’.189 By the end of 1998, the situation 
had not improved with regard to the selling of buffalo.  
 If 1995 was a problematic year because influential sympathisers of the 
conservancies had to resign their offices at the DNPWLM, the year 1996 added 
another complication to the relationship between the SVC and the DNPWLM 
and put an end to a positive reciprocal exchange. This was transformed into a 
political exchange of accusations, not only with the SVC but with the private 
wildlife sector in general. In 1996 the DNPWLM was set up as a Statutory 
Fund,190 which meant that it had to earn its own money commercially through its 
                                                           
186  Conversation with Chairman SVC, 1 October 1998. 
187  Du Toit 1998: 9. 
188  The Herald, 25 March 1998, President defiant: land issue goes ahead. ‘Addressing a 
meeting of German’s captains of industry and commerce, Cde. Mugabe said Britain 
was against the land reform programme because it wanted to perpetuate its 
colonisation of Zimbabwe (...)’. 
189  Pp. 1, of what is popularly known within the SVC as the ‘Pabst Report’. The other 
two goals of the report had to do with the designation of three properties within the 
SVC, which would break the SVC into three. Italics added. The minutes of the 
CCM, 1 April 1998 state: ‘The Chairman thanked Mr. Pabst for his presentation and 
for championing the cause of the Conservancy and its members’. 
190  The Herald, 8 November 1997, State Suspends Issuing of Leases to Safari Hunters, 
Operators. 
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tourism and other operations, and could not any longer count on state subsidy.191 
This actually meant that the controlling body of wildlife tourism was also 
transformed into a commercial competitor at the same time, a move that has led 
to much criticism and political rivalry between private sector, including the 
conservancies, and the DNPWLM. As a controlling government body, the 
DNPWLM’s reaction to its new position was twofold: centralisation of 
authority and close scrutiny of private sector operations in wildlife tourism. The 
centralisation was essentially focused on the most financially lucrative activity, 
which was financially crucial to conservancies,192 of the private wildlife utilisa-
tion schemes, trophy hunting. Statutory Instrument 76 of 1998, gazetted on 27 
March 1998, introduced strict controls on the export and import of wildlife and 
trophies. It also authorised ‘the Director of National Parks and the Director of 
Customs and Excise to give trade permits on wildlife and trophies’. Statutory 
Instrument 26, which became effective on 13 February 1998, brought strict 
control on hunting and safari operators and ‘granted full ownership of wildlife 
to the Government’. Nick O’Connor, Chairman of the WPA, called the centrali-
sation a ‘total disaster’ for wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe and the 
CAMPFIRE Chairman at the time, Jaconia Nare, also said the new regulations 
gave too much power to the DNPWLM.193 The centralisation was seen by the 
private sector in the context of earlier reports about the malfunctioning of and 
nepotism within the DNPWLM. As hunting is the most lucrative aspect of 
wildlife tourism it should come as no surprise that it was exactly on issues to do 
with the allocation of hunting quotas that the DNPWLM was criticised.  
 It was particularly the Zimbabwe Independent which reported at length on 
this particular issue of hunting quota. ‘Interference from cabinet ministers in the 
allocation of hunting quotas to some safari-operators could damage the 
credibility of National Parks (...) Documents in the possession of the Zimbabwe 
Independent show that over the last two years Environment and Tourism 
minister Chen Chimutengwende has overruled the acting director of the 
DNPWLM, Willis Makombe, and gone against the advice of ecologists in what 
appears to be a campaign to favour selected concession owners. Major benefici-
                                                           
191  In the 1996/1997 budget funding of the DNPWLM was cut from Z$ 90 million to 
Z$ 10 million (!), which was not even enough to pay the department’s salary bill, pp. 
16, Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report Zimbabwe, third quarter 1997. See 
also The Financial Gazette, 12 September 1996, Cash-strapped Parks and Wildlife 
Department faces collapse. 
192  A Tourist Paradise, June-July 1996, The Conservancies. ‘Hunting for conservation 
is an essential part of a conservancy: without it cannot survive financially’. 
193  The Standard, 12-18 April 1998, Shaky Period for Tourism; The Herald, 14 
February 1998, Wildlife Management Regulations Amended. 
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aries of ministerial intervention are based in the Matatsi and Deka safari areas in 
the north-west of the country. On August 9 1995, Hwange Safaris headed by 
Toby Musariri, was advised by Parks that it would be allocated an additional 
eight buffalo, to make a total of 16, despite the advice that trophy quality in the 
Deka pool area was ‘not particularly good’ by Parks ecologist Don Heath in a 
previous document. However, it was emphasised that the favour would not be 
repeated in 1996. In 1996 Musariri went ahead and marketed 16 buffalo in the 
Deka area before appealing to Makombe on March 6 for a doubling of the quota 
to the amended 1995 level. He also asked for an additional lion and informed 
the acting director that six bull elephants, six bull buffaloes, three male lions, 
three leopards, five kudu and two bushbuck had been marketed and deposits 
taken in anticipation of his quota request being approved in the nearby Hwange 
C state hunting area. A request for the hunting of a portion of the state land 
quota in the Deka area in addition was being made on August 7 and was turned 
down a week later on the grounds that the quotas had been set ‘at a safe level at 
sustainable yield’ for each particular area. However, a September 3 communi-
cation between the Department and Musariri shows that the Deka quota was 
‘amended as per minister’s request’. Victoria Falls Hunters had their quota 
upped on Chmutengwende’s instructions on January 4 1996. A further abuse of 
the quota system has manifested itself with the Parks department’s instruction 
on January 24 [1997] that all hunting operators be allocated an additional hunt 
with a bag of an elephant, buffalo, lion and leopard to raise funds for the CITES 
meeting [Oh irony!]. In some of the smaller areas this effectively doubled the 
quota considered sustainable. The Minister of Industry and Commerce, Nathan 
Shamuyarira, also entered the fray on April 30, 1996, by asking Makombe to 
meet him in his offices and instructing him to overrun his decision not to 
allocate a hunt to Austrian businessman, dr. Pissee. When approached by the 
Independent Makombe said he knew nothing of these matters (...)’.194. 
 As a Statutory Fund the DNPWLM was under fire for its commercial 
activities in wildlife utilisation. As state agency and controlling body, it was 
itself in turn scrutinising the private sector safari business on more or less 
exactly the same issue: illegal hunting operations. ‘In January [1997], Criminal 
Investigation Department raided offices of 40 safari operators following 
allegations that some of them had externalised their earnings (...)’.195 This 
followed an allegation in 1996 that the state was losing millions of dollars 
through illegal deals in foreign exchange by safari operators. ‘Following the 
1991/1992 devastating drought, over 200 commercial farmers in the Matabele-
                                                           
194  Zimbabwe Independent, 23 May 1997, ‘Double Standards’ in National Parks Quotas 
Cause for Concern. 
195  Zimbabwe Independent, 25 July 1997, Producers Clash with Parks Over Procedures. 
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land region who previously reared cattle ventured into lucrative game farming. 
Since then, they have fortified their ranches, which have become safaris in 
direct competition with Government-run wildlife tourist attractions’.196 The 
accusations flew back and forth between the DNPWLM and the private sector. 
According to its critics the DNPWLM continued to frustrate the private wildlife 
sector as one Letter to the Editor in the Zimbabwe Independent made very clear: 
(...) ‘they have continued a policy of frustrating all sales and movement of game 
in order to try to paralyse the development of the private land tourism 
industry’.197 In turn DNPWLM continued to look for irregularities in the private 
sector. And when one was found, The Herald made a threatening headline out 
of it, like ‘Bar foreign hunters’. In the end it was about a single incident of a 
farmer in Matabeleland South who had invited a foreign hunter to shoot an 
elephant on his property. The farmer had been hiding behind the notion that this 
elephant had been a ‘problem animal’.198 Sometimes the DNPWLM and the 
private sector were even caught together as in a case about illegal hunting in 
1997: ‘(t)hirty-five tour and safari operators will soon appear in court for illegal 
trophy hunting and overhunting involving more than $80 m. in a scam that is 
alleged to involve some of the officials of the DNPWLM’.199 The end result of it 
all was that the Chairman of the WPA200 at the time, Oosthuizen, could draw no 
other conclusion than that ‘there had been, politically, mistrust and suspicion of 
the wildlife industry resulting in the suspension of top Parks personnel, centrali-
sation of all permits and the assasion of wildlife exports’. He was quoted to 
have said that ‘(...) it is time for Parks to become more friendly and start to 
realise that we [whites] are also Zimbabwean and indigenous’.201 
 Stereotypes and mistrust, resulting in a spiral of negative reciprocity, seem to 
be the outcome of the developments described above. Social antagonism is a 
multi-facetted phenomenon as I have shown above in terms of historical context 
and socio-political and socio-economic processes. In the context though of 
studying processes of organisational co-operation in terms of reciprocity, it is 
worthwhile to focus more explicitly on issues of boundary management in the 
joint venture. It is especially in negotiating boundaries between the partners that 
                                                           
196  The Herald, 23 September 1996, State Loosing Millions in Illegal Forex Deals. 
197  Zimbabwe Independent, 24 January 1997, Letters to the Editor: National Parks 
Resumé. 
198  The Herald, 15 August 1998, Bar Foreign Hunters. 
199  The Herald, 20 March 1997, 35 in Alleged $80 m Hunting Scam. 
200  The Herald, 1 October 1997, Ethical Sustainable Use of Wildlife. WPA was created 
in 1985 ‘to, among other things, promote the ethical conservation and sustainable 
use of wildlife on privately owned commercial farms and ranches’. 
201  Zimbabwe Independent, 25 July 1997, Producers Clash with Parks over Procedures. 
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the reciprocal mechanism comes to the fore. In this specific case the boundary 
between the SVC and the Trust, that is, the communities, is as much physical as 
it is symbolic. The contested boundary in this case is a formidable fence related 
to buffalo. The fence seems to be a kind of beacon in battle in this joint venture. 
In combination the fence and the buffalo seem to function as a magnet attracting 
all systems of reciprocity between the different stakeholders in the process. 
They are the alpha and omega of the organisational co-operation and boundary 
management between the SVC and the Trust. If there were no fence, there 
would be no buffalo and no need to fund restocking of wildlife and there would 
be no need to co-operate and exchange with neighbouring communities through 
the medium of a joint venture. The meaning given to the fence and the buffalo, 
both by commercial and communal farmers and by DNPWLM can only be 
understood in the context of the Land Question and the particular type of land 
use, without doubt one of the most sensitive political subjects in the history of 
Southern Rhodesia and later Zimbabwe. Understanding the historical context of 
land is crucial to analysing and understanding how commercial and communal 
landowners perceive each other in a joint venture related to a particular sort of 
land use, that is, wildlife utilisation. By describing a host of smaller and bigger 
affairs, a pattern inexorably emerges which shows that the context on the 
ground for the organisational co-operation between the Trust and the SVC 
resembles a circus with countless smaller and bigger rings, which, often 
indirectly and often only through image-making or sheer hearsay, are related to 
each other. Such a ring can grow bigger or smaller over time. In the next 
chapter I shall describe and analyse the process of formal organisational co-
operation between the Trust and the SVC in terms of reciprocal exchange 
mainly taking place around the fence. 
 
 4 
 
The Savé Valley Conservancy and  
its neighbouring communities:  
Cases of reciprocal exchange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Reports of white-on-black racism abound in the region where sugarproduction, 
gameranching and hospitality industry pop up all economic activity. Industrial 
powerhouses Triangle, Hippo Valley and Mkwasine Sugar Estates have since 
the great drought of 1991-92 been joined by a host of white-led private animal 
sanctuaries – called conservancies – in creating employment. At most farms 
racism had become institutionalised (...). Unimpressed by the ethnic composi-
tion of the conservancies, Vice-President Cde. Simon Muzenda, recently told 
the white ranchers to include more blacks into their schemes’.1 If it were to 
achieve this, the SVC had two options. The first of these would be to attract 
black landowners to the Lowveld. The different properties within the area of the 
SVC which were sold in the 1990s had all to be offered to the government first, 
which would have given the opportunity to introduce black land ownership into 
the SVC. But this did not happen and the government signed a document of no- 
interest in the land, after which the SVC was free to attract other buyers. They 
all turned out to be white. Apart from ARDA there is no black ownership to 
date in the SVC. The second option open to the SVC was to create an organisa-
tional structure in which it could co-operate with its black neighbours, which it 
                                                           
1 Sunday Mail, 20 October 1996, Lowveld still White Dominated. 
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did in the form of the SVC Trust (SVCT). In the previous chapter I already 
introduced and described the Trust as part of the different ‘funding-routes’ the 
SVC tried in order to finance its restocking operations. The attention of the 
SVC was actually drawn to the neighbouring black communities when the 
Minister answered questions in parliament about the status of conservancies in 
Zimbabwe and stated that conservancies would only be allowed if they were 
able to create a ‘formal and meaningful relationship’ with the neighbouring 
communities.2 This was probably an important reason behind the creation of the 
SVC Trust. The SVCT was presented to the five neighbouring RDCs at a work-
shop in Chiredzi in March 1996, based on the Price Waterhouse document. On 
that occasion the SVCT was more or less window-dressed as the gift of the 
SVC to the communities; it was presented as a golden opportunity for the 
neighbouring communities to take the plunge and participate in the (white-
dominated) tourism sector in Zimbabwe. It was implicitly expected that the 
communities would, as a sort of reflex, use the SVCT to relate and communi-
cate with the SVC and use it as a platform for their concerns and protests. The 
SVCT represented the communities through a Board of Trustees, who were 
mainly white and based in Harare, which meant that even if the communities 
wanted to contact them, this would be no easy task. The Trustees, putatively 
representing the communities, were literally ‘out of reach’ for them. How the 
SVC arrived at this specific composition of Trust and Trustees and how this 
construction developed over time will, amongst other things, be described in 
this chapter. At the same time, parallel with and in relation to the developments 
of the Trust, I shall describe how the neighbouring communities did relay their 
opinions and did exchange ideas about the SVC to the different individual 
landowners by protesting about the erection and location of the fence and by 
claiming land in the SVC. In the previous chapter a fair amount of attention was 
paid to the internal developments of the SVC and its position in relation to the 
surrounding communities. In this chapter the focus falls specifically on the 
process of reciprocal exchange between the conservancy and its neighbouring 
communities. This approach allows more attention to be paid to the position of 
and opinion of the communities about this proposed organisational co-
operation, although my point of departure remains, as in the rest of this book, 
my ethnographic orientation on the SVC as initiator of this process of organisa-
tional co-operation.  
 
 
                                                           
2 Hansard, 14th February 1996, 3971. 
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The development of the SVC trust 
 
As I described in the previous chapter, the SVC proposed, or ‘offered’ would be 
a better word in relation to a gift, the construction of a Trust to the communities. 
The Trust would be a joint venture-like partner of the SVC, its share and 
influence proportional to the donor money it would be able to attract. The 
figure, which was visualising the gift of the SVCT to the communities, seemed 
impressive because the shares were presented as being overwhelmingly in 
favour of the communities with 64%, and only 36% for the landowners. But the 
figure for the Trust was a virtual one, based on things hoped for (that is, donor 
money), while the figure for the landowners was based on the ‘hard currency’ 
of land. The SVC tried to transform the virtuality of the Trust by appointing 
Trustees who were considered capable of attracting the necessary donor-money. 
If only the status of the Trust could be based on solid donor-money, the figure 
would probably impress the government with the gift of the SVC to its 
neighbours. So while the Trust was set up to represent the communities, its 
priority lay in attracting the required donor funds. If donor funding proved slow 
in coming, the Trust would remain an empty shell and a structure on paper only. 
The Trustees were selected with this consideration in mind. Nine Trustees were 
chosen, one representative of each surrounding District and four from Harare. 
The four from Harare especially were chosen with an eye to attracting donor-
funds. A senior manager from Delta Corporation was appointed chairman. He 
was the one especially charged with working in conjunction with the writer of 
the ‘Trust-proposal’ charming money out of donor pockets. This was an illusion 
as I described in my disquisition on the different routes taken to fund the 
restocking programme in the previous chapter. The chairman of the Trust was 
very active and energetically he pursued the issue of donor money for the Trust, 
but he was doomed to disappointment. And despite his indubitable activeness in 
going after donor-money, the complete Trust of nine members never met in 
actual fact. This means that, even if the communities would have liked to have 
communicated with the SVC through their representatives in the Trust, there 
was never an official opportunity created by the SVC, a lapel which might be 
considered indicative of the SVC priorities with the Trust. The same could be 
said for the later structure of organisational co-operation with the neighbouring 
communities that the SVC presented in its loan application to the IFC, in which 
it proposed the Joint and Working Committee. Only the Joint Committee met. 
The Working Committee never did. In this context it is interesting to note that 
the Joint Committee consisted of RDC members only, without containing any 
representative from the SVC. These members did come together. The Working 
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Committee, comprising of representatives from the communities.3 and three 
members of the SVC, including the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, never 
saw each other or spoke to each other in the formal context of a meeting.4 Can 
this state of affairs be explained? As we have seen in the previous chapter there 
is a veritable sea of official written material from the SVC in which the gift of 
the Trust takes a prominent place. But is it attention and emphasis on paper 
only, which never got off the ground in real life? Is the Trust just a token-gift 
with no commercial promises behind it? Is the Trust no more than a make-
believe decoy to put government officials and policy makers in Harare off the 
scent in an answer to the written answers to the Minister? Is it a form of ritual 
exchange between the SVC and Harare, mentioning the communities for 
rhetorical reasons only hoping to get a return gift from DNPWLM in the form 
of buffalo? Let me return to the inception of the idea of the Trust. 
 The (proposal to constitute a) Trust was presented to the RDCs at a work-
shop on 28-29 March 1996.5 This was the first time that the RDCs were 
informed about the initiative. There had been no prior consultation about the 
Trust with the RDCs. Under the heading of ‘The strategic choices for local 
communities’, the paper plunges straight to the heart of the matter saying that 
‘one strategy for the local communities [would be] to advocate that Government 
should designate the land occupied by the Savé Conservancy for resettlement by 
the local communities’. But, after considering this option, Metcalfe comes to 
the conclusion that neither resettlement nor designation of the land to be used 
for wildlife by the communities would work out and in conclusion suggests that 
‘the distinction between private land and communal land remains’. He states 
that the division can only work out ‘if a joint venture is established which binds 
the two land use systems, through a mutually agreeable arrangement’.6 The 
Land Question, which is so important to the identities of both black and white in 
Zimbabwe where land is considered inalienably theirs by the Africans, is 
brusquely brushed aside in this formulation. The solution to the land issue is not 
redistribution but co-operation, but co-operation on the conditions set by the 
SVC. It is slightly more nuanced than this and it would be unfair to typify the 
situation as the whites simply consolidating their power over land. The SVC 
also gives opportunities to communal landowners, that is, the RDCs, in its 
                                                           
3  Four out of five were the same as those on the Joint Committee, information from 
interview with Liaison Officer, 22 April 1998. 
4  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 28 May 1998. 
5  Metcalfe, S. (1996), Benefits of the Savé Valley Conservancy to Local People, 
Workshop on the Savé Valley Conservancy Trust, 28-29 March. Unpublished 
proceedings. 
6  Ibid: 2. 
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conservancy coalition. RDCs could participate by granting land-use rights to the 
conservancy while retaining ownership: ‘(t)he Conservancy would relocate the 
game fence and the community would join the Conservancy as full members’.7 
The paper concludes by formulating that ‘(m)any things may be possible but 
little will happen without a spirit of trust and genuine commitment to a common 
vision for the future’.8 
 This first workshop in March 1996 at which the creation of the Trust was 
explained and rationalised, had a follow-up in April 1996. At this an initial (and 
as far as I know only) draft of a ‘project identification plan’ for the RDCs 
surrounding the SVC, in which Metcalfe formulated the ways in which the 
communities could benefit from the proposed Trust was tabled.9 This follow-up 
was asked for by the RDCs at the workshop in Chiredzi. The draft contained a 
range of benefits, like direct and indirect employment opportunities, meat 
supply, fuel supply, technology transfer, develop managerial capacity and so on, 
but this April document also already pinpoints constraints laid on the social 
environment by the project: ‘Local communities have recently witnessed the 
erection of a substantial wildlife fence around the conservancy’. As I explained 
in the previous chapter, the fence was necessary because of veterinary regula-
tions related to ‘foot and mouth’ disease and contingent isolation of buffalo, 
considered essential by the Conservancy, from cattle (essential to communal 
agriculture). ‘The fence symbolises a separation between commercial and 
communal, black and white ethnic groups, and between livestock and wildlife 
as a land use. There is minimal social interdependence between the conservancy 
members and the local communities’.10 In line with this observation, actually 
directly after the Introduction it concludes, that ‘(i)t is the complete contrast 
between these two communities, the conservancy community and the neigh-
bouring communities, that threatens the stability of the Conservancy’s plan [that 
is, to establish a form of organisational co-operation through the Trust]. The 
contrast in ethnicity and wealth is obvious. This combustible reality is what puts 
an imperative on the creation of an interdependency between these two primary 
stakeholders’.11 A second follow-up was given in May 1996 with a report on the 
                                                           
7  Ibid: 5. 
8  Ibid: 6. Recollect (once again) that the Zimbabwean Government signed a document 
of ‘no-interest’ in the different properties in the SVC which were put on the market 
in the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. With this in mind it seems like a good 
idea to propose a joint venture instead. 
9  Metcalfe, S. (April 1996), Enhancing the Capacity of Neighbouring Communities to 
Benefit from the Proposed Save Valley Conservancy Trust, Zimbabwe Trust. 
Unpublished report. 
10  Metcalfe April 1996: 14 
11  Ibid: 4. 
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responses in the field, that is, of the communities surrounding the SVC, to the 
establishment of the Trust, written by the same consultant. This report was also 
specifically prepared for the RDCs, as the appropriate authorities on the 
communal lands and representing the communities through democratic 
elections at their request.12 There are a few issues which are mentioned by 
nearly all respondents to this fact-finding-mission, and which directly relate to 
the issues raised in earlier chapters: the (location of the) fence and related to that 
that ‘this project cannot be seen as separate from the ‘land issue’ but as a 
progressive response to it’.13 This is not to say that they ‘dismissed the SVC 
proposal out of hand’ but that ‘the process (...) by which the SVC proposal was 
formulated was flawed [and] (a)lso the conservancy fence lacked diplomacy 
(...)’.14 What is striking about this document is its straightforward formulations, 
both by the local authorities and communities and by the consultant who wrote 
the report, who dared to write it all down without bothering to wrap it up in 
diplomatic flummery. At the RDC level, for instance, it is mentioned that the 
RDCs feel that they ‘have effectively been presented with what appears like a 
‘blueprint’ (the proposal [to create the Trust]) e.g.: 
• the conservancy is established; 
• the fence is sited and situated; 
• the SVC Trust is established; 
• 5 Trustees (white) are already appointed and apparently others already 
approached, (whom the RDCs are assured are ‘trustworthy’); 
• the SVC Trust proposal is already published in final form; 
• the SVC Trust wants to fundraise as soon as possible on behalf of the 
beneficiaries, who are not well informed of their new status in regard to the 
SVC’.15  
The RDCs are well aware that what the SVC proposes is in actual fact based ‘on 
a trade off between economic and political strengths, each party having more of 
                                                           
12  Metcalfe, S. (May 1996), Report on Response of Local Authorities and Neighbouring 
Communities to the Proposal by Save Valley Conservancy to Establish a Community 
Development Trust, Zimbabwe Trust. Unpublished report. It should be explicitly noted that 
RDCs do certainly not automatically represent local community interests in general and in 
conservation issues in particular. The CAMPFIRE experience has made this abundantly clear 
particularly in relation to the distribution of communal wildlife revenues (Bird, C. & 
Metcalfe, S. (1995), Two Views from CAMPFIRES in Zimbabwe’s Hurungwe District. 
Training and Motivation. Who Benefits and who Doesn’t? London: IIED, Wildlife and 
Development Series, no. 5. See also Patel 1998). This means that although the RDC is the 
official representative body of the communities, and I treat them as such in my writing, I 
certainly do not mean to see them as synonymous. 
13  Ibid: 3. 
14  Ibid: 3 & 2. 
15  Ibid: 4. 
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one than the other’. The commercial farmers have economic power, while the 
communities have political power. The RDCs feel that they are being seduced 
with economic incentives by the SVC and they are not sure that the price, that 
is, the gift of the SVCT, the SVC is prepared to pay is high enough. The way 
the SVC handled the presentation of the Trust does not seem to indicate that it 
rated, literally, the communities and local authorities highly. It did not seem to 
deem it necessary to communicate with the communities in order to ask them 
what gift they would like for their goodwill. Instead it gave them a ‘take-it-or-
leave-it’ offer, wrapped up, in economic development language. And the SVC 
did not give the RDCs time to consider their position and for that reason there 
was no ‘courtship ritual’ between the partners ‘to explore each other’s attitudes 
and motives’ on the other side of the fence.16 At the community level the major 
issue was the fence and the relationship with their ‘farmer next door’. The 
communities do not really relate to the SVC as one organisation but have to do 
with the farmer whose boundary they happen to share. And ‘(n)o amount of 
Trust supported development will cover up for bad relations on the ground’.17 
Only interaction on the ground will be able to build up a relationship of trust. 
This seems to be what has happened with Gunundwe, whose management has 
given five bulls to the neighbouring communities as ‘an offer of friendship’, not 
a ‘once off’ gift, but ‘hopefully the start of a ‘give and take’ relationship. In 
return, the ranch hopes to be able to work out ways and means to protect the 
ranch from poaching and general hostility’.18 Although they were not the only 
one who considered the SVC creating a Trust as a gift, ‘provided the 
communities respect the boundary and do not poach’.19 This is how the SVC 
sees the reciprocal relationship: it offers the gift of the Trust and the return gift 
from the communities is a priori defined and should consist of respecting 
boundaries and no poaching. The communities obviously do not want to reject 
the gift straightaway, but do have a natural suspicion accepting it because they 
are not sure they want to pay the expected return gift. Especially not because the 
communities are already paying for the SVC by their denial of access to SVC 
land and the fence cutting them off from their natural resources. Communities 
also expressed their concern that if they excepted the gift of the Trust to be like 
‘manna from heaven’, they would cede any possibility of claiming the land for 
resettlement or other purposes.20 The difference in expectations of what a 
reciprocal relationship between SVC and communities involves comes 
                                                           
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid: 6. 
18  Ibid: 9 (Appendix I). 
19  Ibid: 16. 
20  Ibid: 3 (Appendix I). 
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specifically to the fore in the border area between Matsai Communal Land and 
the SVC. The Matsai people already stated at that particular stage of the SVC 
development that they wanted to settle the local land issue of the seventy-two 
families first before venturing any further into deeper waters with the Trust. I 
shall describe this Matsai case in more detail later on. The buffalo fence was 
generally seen as a ‘hard edge’ between the parties. Rather prophetically at the 
time, one participant stated that ‘we will see you coming back again’ (the 
business is not over)’.21 It seems obvious that the communities were not very 
willing to accept the gift and its implications of a return gift straightaway, if at 
all. Without beating about the bush the report plainly reveals that it is not only 
the institutional, structural and organisational co-operation which is essential to 
the success of the interdependency between SVC and communities, but also, 
and maybe even more so, the relationship between the individual commercial 
farmer and his direct neighbour in the communal lands. But no matter what the 
relationship is between farmer and community, there has been a ‘general 
outcry’ over the fence line.22 Because relationships on the ground are so 
important to the communal farmers, and thus for the SVCT representing them, 
it is worthwhile to ‘visiting’ the different hotspots around the SVC where fence 
wars are raging or have been part of the ongoing reciprocal exchange process. 
 
 
Cases of reciprocal exchange between SVC (members) and 
communities 
 
The Sango-Maronga case 
Bordering Sango, the Maronga people protested about the fence line which was 
put on the eastern side of the river on the land from the Mid-Sabi Irrigation 
Scheme fence, because it cut the people off from the important riverine area 
which supplies all sorts of natural resources like reeds, firewood and water for 
their animals.23 But the fence was erected there at the explicit request of and in a 
formal agreement with the Mid Sabi Irrigation Project.24 According to the DA of 
                                                           
 
21  Ibid: 10 (Appendix I). 
22  Ibid: 15 (Appendix I).  
23  Minutes of a meeting held at Makore Camp of Sango Ranch, 19 December 1997: 
‘The meeting had been prompted by the Maronga peoples complaints about the 
Sango boundary fence which crosses the Save River and follows a boundary on 
State Land – former Tongogara Refugee Camp and on ADA land – thus Midle Sabi 
for about 28 km’. 
24  However, nothing seems to have been put down on paper about this agreement and 
the man who negotiated the deal with them representing the Mid-Sabi Project has 
been moved to Harare and they have lost track of him. They did try to locate him to 
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Chipinge, it was for all the small-scale white farmers whose land adjoined Mid-
Sabi who put pressure on it to ask the SVC to put up the fence on their side of 
the river, with the specific idea of preventing the villagers from reaching it and 
depleting its resources.25 The Liaison Officer tells a somewhat different story 
saying it was not so much the small-scale farmers as a Zimbabwean NGO, En-
vironment 2000, which put pressure on the project in an effort to save this part 
of the Save River by erecting a fence.26 Actually the SVC fence does not 
encroach on the land of the Maronga people themselves. The fence is on the 
land of the Mid-Sabi Project a little to the north and as such belongs to the latter 
and not to the Maronga people. The fence crosses the river again at the former 
Tongogara Refugee camp, where in earlier days refugees from Mozambique 
were housed, stopping short of entering Maronga Communal Land. Despite this, 
the DA of Chipinge described the fence as coming ‘from across the river’, that 
is, from white commercial farmers, on land which is not theirs. The interpreta-
tion is that of white farmers taking their land again. A further complication to 
the issue is that the Save River also marks the boundary between the Bikita and 
Chipinge Districts. The fence is therefore seen as a Bikita fence encroaching on 
Chipinge land.27 The fence once scrawls again its white signature on the land as 
the Maronga have also complained that their cattle were impounded when they 
crossed the fence and that they themselves were prosecuted for trespassing 
when they passed through the fence.28 The landowner of Sango, claims the fence 
location is exactly on the spot which was agreed with the Mid-Sabi Project. And 
he is very much in favour of keeping the fence there to rehabilitate the riverine 
area. In order to convince the RDC Chipinge as well he invited its members on 
a tour in his helicopter to fly over the area,29 to show them the difference 
between the fenced-in stretch of land and the riverine land to which the 
communities have straight access. It is a contrast between lush vegetation and a 
depleted landscape. Although the difference is striking and obvious, the 
complaints from the Maronga people have persisted. When the manager of 
Sango visited the Maronga community to speak to the people about the 
possibilities of exchange between them and Sango, that is, for instance cheap 
                                                           
ask about any minutes or other formalities relevant to their agreement. Interview 
with manager Sango, 5 August 1998. 
25  Interview with DA Chipinge, 11 September 1998. 
26  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 11 September 1998. 
27  Interview with DA Chipinge, 11 September 1998. 
28  The Herald, 30 July 1998, DA Seeks Solution over Row of Save Fencing. 
29  The landowner of Sango uses his helicopter in the SVC, as I used a car. When he 
was in the country and attending a CCM, his helicopter stood parked alongside cars 
of other landowners. 
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meat, helping them with the upgrading of the school, providing building poles 
and thatching grass in exchange for refraining from poaching, the discussion 
almost inevitably turned to the fence and the debate really heated up, with 
people starting to shout and make wild gestures at the manager. One of the 
villagers even had to be taken away by his fellow villagers when his shouting, 
yelling and gestures began to get out of hand.30 When I left in November 1998, 
no solution to the problem had yet been found. This is not a problem in the legal 
sense of the word: nothing about the fence is illegal, but the sensitivity about its 
location seems almost ineradicable and has to be dealt with one way or the 
other, because it can add to the already existing political image that conservan-
cies are only about securing land titles and even expanding them through these 
kind of operations.31 
 
The Mapari/Chapungu-Mutema case 
A similar case of fence location cutting off peoples’ access to the riverine 
section is where the boundaries of Mapari and Chapungu meet at the Save 
River, where the people under Chief Mutema live. In earlier days, when both 
properties were still part of Devuli Ranch, they had cattle on the land and had 
eradicated all wildlife, except for some impala and the like. Obviously the Save 
River was important for watering the cattle. The routine was that they brought 
the cattle to the river every day and let them drink, after which they were 
brought back within the fences which were roughly one kilometre inland, not 
closing off the riverine section. Both communal and commercial farmers had 
access to the river, although legally, that is, in terms of title deeds, the boundary 
of the property ran through the middle of the river. In the cattle-farming era the 
communities could water and graze their cattle in the riverine area. When both 
properties joined in the initiative to form the SVC and ‘turned to wildlife’, it 
was no longer possible to bring the animals to the river, let them drink and then 
bring them back again. Wildlife had to have free access to the river to drink. For 
that reason, the fence was erected as much as possible in the middle of the river, 
following their official boundaries. Where there are large sandbanks in the river 
it proved especially easy to put up a fence. The communities complained about 
the location of the fence through their chieftainship, the local authorities, 
                                                           
30  Visit and observations at meeting between manager Sango and Maronga people, 7 
September 1998. 
31  Hughes came to similar conclusions for Chimanimani: Hughes, D. (2001), Water as 
a boundary: national parks rivers, and the politics of demarcation in Chimanimani, 
Zimbabwe. In: Ingram, H. & Blatter, J. (eds), Reflections on Water: New Ap-
proaches to Transboundary Conflicts and Co-operation, Cambridge (MA): MIT 
Press, 267-294. 
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landowners, their managers and the SVC. They demanded that the fence be re-
erected on the old location so that the banks of the river would be free again. 
But the fence remained where it was. Only some sections were relocated, not 
because of the complaints of the Mutema people but because they were too 
easily washed away during the rainy season. When the consultant toured the 
communities they said to him that ‘(b)y putting up on the new fence line 
without local consensus the relationship with the farmer could be said to have 
taken a step backwards’.32 In 1998 an unfortunate incident happened which 
exacerbated the situation. In July 1998 Mapari game scouts arrested the 
councillor and a team of people who were on Mapari Ranch to harvest ilala 
palm as was the custom. They said they were unaware of the fact that the 
arrangement had been cancelled by the landowner who ‘had been given 
negative reports on his neighbours’. The people were angry about the arrest 
because it was considered a ‘sign of lack of respect on one of their leaders 
[which] was very worrying to the community as a whole, especially when (...) 
the landowner snubbed the Councillor when he made an attempt to meet him 
after this incident’.33 
 
The Levanga-Gudo case 
Yet another case along the riverside of the SVC is where Levanga borders with 
the land of the Gudo people. This case has nothing to do with access to the 
riverine section, but arises from symbolic value of land. Levanga is one of the 
most inaccessible properties of the SVC, but also very beautifully endowed with 
natural pans in which hippos and crocodiles reside. It has also most of the 
elephants in the SVC. The case of the Gudo people basically concerns a protest 
to do with the signature of the fence on the land. The Gudo people claim that 
they used to bury their chiefs and perform rituals on certain koppies on 
Levanga. Levanga also contains particular natural pans at which the Gudo 
people perform rain rituals at prescribed times. The councillor wrote a letter 
about the issue to the DA in Chiredzi asking him to intervene and to begin the 
process of designating the land. It is worth quoting extensively from this letter, 
because it summarises in a nutshell and in a localised setting the basic clash 
between black and white identities in Zimbabwe as related to land. ‘As you may 
be well aware, there is a portion of land falling under a Mr Otterson which lies 
between Save River, Chirovamupande River and Dombo Hills and this land is 
endowed with the Sadziwe Marshes. You might also be aware that upon Dombo 
                                                           
32  Metcalfe May 1996: 15 (Appendix I). Other information from interview with 
Liaison Officer, 18 May 1998. 
33  Minutes of a meeting held at Manesa Rest Camp, 24 July 1998. 
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Hills, is the burial place for the Chiefs of the Gudo people. That land is of 
devout Cultural importance to the people and I cannot over-emphasise the value 
placed on it by them. My consultations with elders of the land reveal how 
worried the people are, with the plan by the current title holder of the Estate, to 
develop that portion of land into a lucrative sugar plantation. Whilst the people 
do respect the law and the right to dispose subject, use alienate or conversion of 
one’s land as the owner deems fit, they are afraid the efforts of the whiteman, to 
put the land under irrigation shall not only spoil the sacredness of the land, but 
shall pe[r]vert its cultural significance and cut the umbilical cord between their 
ancestral spirits and themselves. They are afraid and indeed extremely worried, 
that they are being forgotten irrespective of the fact that, the title-holder of the 
land forcefully took it away from them the rightful and hereditary sovereigns. It 
is sad to note that much is not being done to assist the people reclaim their pride 
and appease their provident ancestors. As a useful reminder, the Gudo people 
used the Sadziwe Marshes to perform their ritual ceremonies. They held annual 
cultural ceremonies which included not only a fishing festival but also convened 
to summon rain (mutoro). They would also gather to thank their Ancestral 
spirits for providing and protecting them, in the course of the year, and would 
purge the spirits to continue to provide for them, and to protect them. The 
holding of these ceremonies is a conspicuous characteristic of the Gudo people, 
without which they are not unified and identified. It will be a traversity of their 
loyalty and respect for someone to arrogantly erect a building on top of the 
graves of their ancestors. It is such a mockery and relentless contempt for a 
white man to plant sugar on sacred marshes where ritual ceremonies were 
conducted from time immemorial. It is such immense cruelty to cut the Gudo 
peoples’ ties with their history. It is sad to realize that against such a back-
ground of relentless deprivation, no-one has ever attempted to assist the Gudo 
people to assert their worries and to revert back the established mutual contact 
with their ancestral spirits’.34 On the basis of these arguments the councillor asks 
the DA to designate portions of Levanga to be handed over to the Gudo people. 
In the same month he also took the story to the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (ZBC), which put the item on the radio news, emphasising that a white 
farmer was destroying a black cultural heritage.35 The latter move seems to 
represent a similar process to that described by Carruthers in her paper on a 
comparison between the Aborigines in Australia and the San in South Africa, 
namely that is that through their claims to land the local people aim ‘to 
                                                           
34  Letter Councillor Ward 1, Chiredzi District, to DA Chiredzi, 12 March 1998. 
35  Interview with Liaison Officer, 18 May 1998; interview with manager Levanga, 11 
June 1998. 
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recapture their (...) culture’.36 From this perspective it should not even come as a 
surprise that at first they did not mention the issue at all to the new manager, 
and only recently have become aware, or (re-)realised the importance of land. 
‘Land claims may (...) re-open a frontier, which has been closed for a long 
time’, as ‘’country’ brings people into existence, it is integral to their ‘being’’.37 
Through this process though land (once more) assumes the status of ‘contested 
landscapes’.38 
 Levanga was bought in October 1986. Before that time the property had 
been without a manager living on it for a period of two to three years. Gudo 
people could come onto the property at anytime without any interference.39 
Before that time, Levanga was stateland used as a bufferzone to the Tribal Trust 
Lands, which probably also implied that people had free access.40 At the hand-
over of the property nothing was mentioned about Gudo claims on parts of the 
land. When the manager, who happens to be the landowner’s brother, visited 
Chief Gudo to inform him about his plans for Levanga, nothing of the like was 
brought to his attention. Approximately 95% of his labourers are from Gudo, 
but no one ever told him anything about the issues at stake. They only came up 
with the claim in 1989. The Liaison Officer, who at that time was still in local 
government, suggested that they would check on the claims at the Surveyor 
General’s office, which they never did.41 The manager did notice that people 
came and went on the property to harvest natural resources, in particular meat. 
Moonlit nights are especially favourite times for setting and checking snares 
because they can work without the use of artificial light. They put rows of 
snares in game tracks and after some two to three days come and check if they 
have caught anything. If that is the case they take the animal with them and 
leave the other snares. If an animal is unlucky enough to be caught at a later 
date by such a snare, it just dies and rots.42 In their first year on Levanga they 
collected some 300-400 snares a month. It was at a time that the fences were 
still made of plain wire, which is ideal for constructing snares. Consequently the 
                                                           
36  Pp. 3, Carruthers, J. (1999), Past and Future Landscape Ideology. The Kalahari 
Gemsbok National Park and Uluru – Kata Tjuta National Park Compared, paper 
presented at the conference African environments past and present, Oxford: St. 
Anthony’s College, 5-8 July.  
37  Ibid: 4 & 8. 
38  Ibid: 12. 
39  Interview with manager Levanga, 11 June 1998. 
40  Liaison Officer at meeting with manager Levanga, the DA Chiredzi, Councillor of 
Ward 1 and representatives of Chief Gudo, 27 May 1998. 
41  Conversation / interview with Liaison Officer, 14 July 1998. 
42  Conversation with manager Levanga while visiting him with my Head of Depart-
ment, 1 July 1998. 
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fences were cut in order to set snares on the property. The manager began to 
employ five guards from the Gudo community to whom he offered 5c a snare. It 
was a productive move, although he said he realised that they would probably 
not pick up snares of family or relatives. The manager claims that it was 
precisely at this particular point in time, when he was seriously counter-forcing 
poaching that the problems with the community commenced. What exacerbated 
the problem is that on occasions he also caught their cattle, which he found 
grazing on his property, and sold them back to them for Z$1 a head. If they 
were not willing to pay, he threatened them he would ‘follow the official proce-
dure’, which meant that he would impound the cattle and report the matter to 
the Veterinary Department. To retrieve their cattle the Gudo people would have 
to pay the Veterinary Services some Z$ 10 per head. One day the manager’s 
cattle were found grazing in the maize fields on communal land. The Gudo 
people caught them and he had to pay Z$30 per head to get them back. In total 
he had to pay Z$1200, Z$600 for the damage done to the maize field and Z$600 
to get his cattle back.43 According to another source, the official dealing with the 
issue had said to the manager that ‘they were actually not talking about the 
issue, but about your relationship with your neighbours’.44 Or to put in the words 
of yet another source, ‘the manager’s reputation followed the case like fire 
finding its way through dry grass’. Probably a minor reciprocal reckoning 
amongst the broader reciprocal reckoning about land. 
 In 1998 two major economic developments on Levanga, the introduction of 
cash-crops, citrus and paprika, on seventy ha of irrigated land and a newly built 
safari camp which he has leased to Senuko for five years. It is precisely these 
two economic centres of the property that are claimed by the Gudo people. His 
safari camp is built on the borders of the natural pans and his cash-crops seem 
to be located at the burial sites the Gudo people have mentioned. According to 
the manager, he tried four times to come to an agreement with the Gudo people 
about using the natural pans for their rituals. But, according to the manager 
again, on each occasion they did not keep their part of the bargain. The first 
time they asked him if they would make use of the pans for ritual purposes in 
1989-1990, he granted them full freedom to do so unconditionally. They came 
in and to his astonishment caught all the fish. The same happened the second 
and third time. The fourth time they negotiated an access regulation for some 
three weeks in 1996. An MP was even invited to participate in the talks. The 
Gudo people wanted to come as a whole group, but the manager refused. The 
Liaison Officer of the SVCT also joined the talks and the final agreement was 
                                                           
43  Interview with manager Levanga, 11 June 1998.  
44  Interview with Liaison Officer, 14 July 1998. 
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that eleven people would be allowed to come, for half a day and to catch eleven 
to fifteen fish. They would police the activity themselves. Nothing about the 
agreement was committed to paper. The whole agreement was an oral one. 
Despite the agreement, they all came in and ‘slaughtered his pond’. Another 
source told me that it was rumoured that, when the ritual was taking place the 
manager’s brother, the landowner, was on his way over from Chipinge. He 
claimed that when he saw that all the fish had been taken from the pond, he 
kicked the representative, that symbolically means kicking Chief Gudo, and 
confiscated the fish, which he later sold himself in Mutare.45 The cash-crops 
were not yet there in 1998, but the manager was then clearing the bush and 
building the irrigation network. He was planning to plant paprika, which is sold 
as a cash-crop to the dyeing industry, and oranges. 
 On 27 May 1998 a meeting was planned with all the stakeholders involved 
to discuss the issue on Levanga. Present were the councillor of the ward (and 
the writer of the letter I quoted before at length), the DA Chiredzi, three 
representatives from Chief Gudo, the liaison officer and the manager. It is with 
this meeting that I began my introductory chapter right at the beginning of this 
book, because it so clearly shows the differences in identity between black and 
white in relation to land in Zimbabwe. When they had finally found the 
manager on his property, he was working somewhere at the new clearings. He 
invited them to come over either to his new safari camp or his house to talk over 
a cool drink. Deaf to all such offers, they insisted that they would hold the 
meeting under a shady tree on the border of the new clearing. It was around 
11.15 hours and the sun was hot, but they did not want to create a situation in 
which they would have to put pressure on someone whose hospitality they had 
enjoyed and whose drinks they had drunk. In other words, they did not want the 
small reciprocal obligations to stand in the way of the bigger reciprocal 
reckoning over land. So the meeting started with a few opening lines from the 
liaison officer. The ward councillor was the one who took the lead in the dis-
cussion and claimed that in earlier days, the land at present falling under 
Levanga had been theirs and it had been forcefully taken from them under ‘the 
old regime’. Now they had come to negotiate about that land, in particular the 
burial places and the natural pans. At first it seemed as if he wanted to discuss 
access to these places only. The manager replied that he did not know about any 
burial place, but if they would point them to him he would take care not to 
disturb them in the process of clearing the land. The councillor explained Shona 
culture precludes any direct pinpointing of a burial place, because to do so is 
improper and considered a bad omen. With regard to the pools, the manager 
                                                           
45  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 14 July 1998. 
 CASES OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE 167 
told the delegation that he had already once negotiated access to them, which 
ended up with many people coming onto the property and ‘slaughtering’ the 
pond. So, access could be discussed but within firm conditions. A trench war 
loomed. At that stage the DA took over and tried to steer towards a compro-
mise, but the councillor in a manner verging on the aggressive interrupted him. 
He said that he could not face the Gudo people he represented with a compro-
mise, they would have to obtain the pieces of land claimed in ownership. He 
said that he could not return with a message that he had negotiated a deal 
whereby so many people for so many minutes were allowed access to their 
burial and ritual sites. The manager in his turn said that anyone interested could 
see his title deeds, which would show the exact boundaries of his property. The 
councillor said that he had seen ‘another map’ on which the boundaries are not 
at all clear. Questioned he could not be more specific about it and was also to 
produce the map. The manager said that he had not expected the Gudo people to 
claim the land, but to negotiate access only. The councillor replied that he had 
written a letter concerning their claims to the land to the chairman of the SVC, 
in the expectation that he in turn would inform the manager of Levanga. Again 
he could not prove his point by showing the letter. Only later did I found out 
from the chairman that there was indeed a letter, the letter from which I took 
that long quote. But obviously that letter has never been communicated to the 
manager of Levanga as it was not a letter specifically addressed to the Chairman 
of the SVC, but to the DA Chiredzi. The councillor and the manager did most of 
the talking, while the DA tried to remain impartial. The representatives of Gudo 
where consulted in Shona on a few occasions during the meeting but, because 
the discussion was in English, the manager does not speak Shona, they were not 
able to participate directly in the discussions. Nor was the discussion in English 
translated for them by anyone. Despite this hitch in communications it became 
clear that here were two parties standing opposed to each other with neither 
prepared to compromise. The Gudo people adhered to their land claim and the 
manager to his title deeds. After the Liaison Officer explained that what the 
Gudo people described as their land had probably previously been state land to 
which they had had free access, so that it seemed as if they owned it. This 
image of previous ownership is reproduced in the Gudo community over and 
over again and the double fence reminds them daily that someone else took it. 
This evokes a strong desire to protest about this state of affairs. After one hour 
of arguing the two parties split again and went home without any further 
progress being made. The councillor concluded that the two parties were the 
victims of cultural misunderstanding: the manager could not understand their 
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rituals and they did not understand anything about tourism development. What 
began as a meeting to negotiate access to certain pieces of land ended up with a 
straightforward land claim.46 
 Nothing was solved at the meeting and the struggle continued.47 In Septem-
ber 1998, the Gudo people began to organise systematic cane-cutting on 
Levanga by youngsters between the age of eight and fifteen at night. They were 
later seen selling the sugarcane on the Mutare Road. Six of those youngsters 
were said to come from one family, and their father has one house in Chipinge 
and one in the Gudo community. Chief Gudo promised the Liaison Officer that 
he would talk to the father and warning him that if it should happen again, he 
would be expelled from the community. The trouble was that the cane-cutting 
was not the only problem to beset Levanga. The Gudo people also caused two 
veldfires and continued to cut the fences in the cattle section to make snares out 
of them. Pigs found their way onto the property through the holes in the fence 
and proceeded forage in the cane fields, uprooting the sugarcane. This continues 
to happen despite the fact that meetings in which they try to solve this matter 
have taken place.48 For his part the manager seems to try to make a serious effort 
to build up some kind of relationship with the community by sending the chief 
meat and supplying the community with building poles, thatching grass and 
firewood. He also arranged transport to bring it to take it to their villages.49 The 
minutes state that, despite his donations and gifts, the Gudo people ‘repay him’ 
by poaching, stealing cane plus the cutting and theft of wire. This is made even 
worse because there is ‘also the lack of co-operation to deal with the lawless-
ness in the area’. The overwhelming importance of the land as an inalienable 
possession taken from them long ago still seems to trigger off a spiral of 
negative reciprocities, despite trials of launching a positive exchange by gifts to 
and supplying the Gudo people with necessities. The manager considers it a 
                                                           
46  It is interesting to note that, on the way back with the Gudo delegation in my car, it 
came out that they were not a united front as they presented themselves at the 
meeting. The DA nearly bitterly laughed at the idea, so fiercely defended by the 
councillor, that near the end of the twentieth century negotiations took place ‘about 
something like a little pond and an ancient burial site’. So where I talk about ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, white and black, I certainly do not want to give the impression that there 
is only unity and consensus within the groups. In that sense it is an intellectual 
abstraction to talk about ‘us’ and ‘them’. This holds true for the coalition of land-
owners who form the SVC as well as for the surrounding communities. 
47  Information from Liaison Officer, 6 October 1998. 
48  Minutes of a meeting held at Dombo Primary School, 21 September 1998. 
49  Ibid: During the meeting it is mentioned what the manager had already given to his 
neighbours: 1500 bundles of thatching grass, 224 tons of cane tops, 900 building 
poles, 1700 cords of firewood and supplied transport. 
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lack of gratitude and has ordered that if pigs from the neighbouring communi-
ties are seen on the property, they will be shot, instead of being caught and 
returned them to the community, where it is asked whose pigs they are. In 
October 1998 a group of poachers from Gudo was followed by the game scouts, 
but all escaped save one. He was being held by the game scouts on Levanga 
overnight so that they could take him to the police the next day. But, when 
evening fell, a group of Gudo people came to where he was being held bearing 
bows, arrows and sticks and intimidated the game scouts to let their fellow 
poacher go or else... And the game scouts, although armed with rifles, (had to) 
let him go.50 
 Within the SVC the Gudo people have won themselves a reputation of being 
‘difficult’. In his annual report 1997-1998 the liaison officer writes that ‘Gudo 
area has since been identified as an area posing the biggest threat to the SVC in 
terms of illegal hunting, veld fires, thefts etc. It was also discovered that the 
people in this area work in close collaboration with Chipinge people’.51 Faced 
with this obduracy, the chairman and the liaison officer wanted to start a 
community project aimed especially at co-operation with the Gudo people and 
in 1996 proposed that they build a traditional village along the route to the SVC. 
Visitors to the SVC could than be guided through the traditional village, pay an 
entrance fee and buy locally-made curios. People under Chief Gudo had been 
the main source of labourers when Senuko was building its lodges. So the 
chairman wanted especially ask them to be the first to be offered a business 
opportunity in co-operation with the SVC. Taking due note of their image it was 
thought that if it could ‘crack this nut’ other communities would follow suit 
more easily.52 However well intentioned, the plan aroused a storm of protest. 
The Gudo people were afraid that it was a strategy of the SVC to ‘grab land 
from them’, in the same way that the land of Levanga had been taken under the 
‘old government’.53 The people opposing the plan were assured that nothing like 
that would happen54 in this case and they selected a committee which would be 
responsible for guiding and organising the erection and building of the tradi-
                                                           
50  Interview with Chairman, SVC 9 October 1998 
51  Yearly Report, April 1997 - March 1998, Liaison Officer.  
52  Interview with Chairman SVC, 8 July 1998. 
53  Although it never was Tribal Trust Land, always Stateland. It never belonged to the 
Gudo people in that sense. 
54  More then five meetings were held with all the stakeholders and the chairman and 
the liaison officer organised a fieldtrip for the chieftainship and the committee 
members to visit Mahenya in the Chipinge District where there is a similar project, 
and where they were able to talk to the chairman of the Mahenya committee. 
Mahenya is also a community project of the chairman of the SVC. After the visit, 
the Gudo people seemed convinced. 
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tional village. The committee consisted of the younger brother of the chief and a 
group of selected and respected elders from the community.55 So far so good 
but, try as they might they could not assemble a labour force. The chairman of 
the SVC was prepared to lend them Z$ 5000, interest free and with no set time 
frame for repayment, in order to hire a crew to do the building for them. On top 
of the loan, the chairman provided building poles, thatching grass and the 
necessary transport. These latter extras were all free of charge. No wonder the 
Gudo people spoke about the project as ‘the baby’ of the chairman and liaison 
officer.56 They eventually commenced building in May 1996, but progress was 
really slow. In March 1998 a meeting was held at which it was noted that the 
building was still not completed and they ‘agreed to a deadline of April 30th to 
complete whatever needed to be done at the village’.57 By May 1998 only some 
60% of the projected traditional village had been build. Despite support of the 
councillor for the ward, the community never seems to have become really 
enthusiastic about the idea. The councillor said that they would borrow no more 
money from Senuko, but supply the labour from the community itself, if only to 
show that the project meant something to them. This was a timely decision as 
by now, building poles and thatching grass were being stolen from the site. 
They even had to appoint a caretaker who was supposed to keep an eye on 
things and prevent material from being stolen. But not after long the caretaker 
was driven away by means by verbal threats that he would be beaten up and by 
intimidation through witchcraft. So, once again the building site of the tradi-
tional village unguarded and the (by now nearly) inevitable happened. In May 
1998 the village was burned down. In August 1998 the chairman and the liaison 
officer set up one last meeting with the Gudo people telling them that they 
wanted to sell the idea for a traditional village to someone else. The people 
asked if they could have one last chance, up to 10 September. That request was 
granted ‘but they were warned that by the due date, 10th September 1998, there 
is no tangible improvement on completion of the project, there was not going to 
be another consultation meeting and the decision will be upheld. The meeting 
ended with a prayer’.58 In September, at a meeting with the Nyangambe commu-
nity at the Nyamgambe school they proposed that these people build a tradi-
tional village, which could be marketed to clients from Mukazi, Mukwazi, 
                                                           
55  Minutes of Dombo Traditional Home Committee Meeting at Dombo School, 21 
May 1996. 
56  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 8 May 1998. 
57  Minutes of a meeting held at Zungudza Primary School, 25 March 1998. 
58  Minutes of meeting held at the Gudo traditional village, 10 August 1998. 
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Hammond and Senuko.59 Later political and economic developments in Zim-
babwe have prevented this to come through. 
 
The Angus-Matsai case 
On the west-side of the SVC one case in the south-west between the SVC and 
neighbouring communities is dominating the scene, that of the Matsai Commu-
nal Land. It is a fitting and major case to illustrate all the aspects of reciprocal 
exchange that I have described and explored in the previous chapters, being 
matters of different identities, material and immaterial exchange, historical and 
national context of black and white relations in southern Africa, The Land Issue 
in Zimbabwe and the symbolic role of the fence and the wish to exploit hunting 
within the SVC. The incidents I will describe here form part of an ongoing 
process of hostility between Matsai Communal Land and commercial land, now 
part of the SVC. It is also the spot, together with Levanga, with the most serious 
problems with ‘war veterans’after Mugabe’s lost referendum in February 2000. 
It can be brought back to the issue of land alienation, which they never accepted 
and protested and continue to reclaim. In 1997 two major ‘vehicles’ occurred 
which could be used separately and in combined cumulative force to (re)write 
their statement about the land issue once more (the lost referendum probably the 
final one). The first vehicle was the FMD outbreak on Mukwazi in August 1997 
and the second the land designation programme, which was published by the 
government in November 1997. These incidents also shed light on the particular 
role of the Trust as mediating body between the communities and the SVC. In 
this case it will be shown that the Trust was not able, nor the Liaison Officer or 
Joint Committee for that matter, to play a significant role in representing the 
communities towards the SVC. Let me start with describing the consequences 
of the FMD outbreak and its major impact on he relations between SVC and the 
Matsai community. 
 After it was suggested, and later verified by laboratory tests, that there was 
indeed a FMD infection in the SVC, it was up to the DVS in Harare to decide 
upon further action. The DVS began by stepping up surveillance in the province 
as well as setting up road blocks in and around the affected areas. Cattle on 
Mukwazi Ranch, which is fenced out of the SVC, are no longer allowed to be 
sold on the hoof. They may only be sold to be slaughtered. One thing became 
clear after the DVS had checked on the SVC fence, namely that the FMD 
outbreak had not occurred because of a break in the fence.60 This meant at least 
that the SVC could not be attacked on their fence maintenance. Nevertheless the 
                                                           
59  Personal observations at meeting with Nyangambe community, 6 September 1998.  
60  Conservator’s report, September 1997. 
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SVC was ordered to upgrade the fence between the Mkwasine River and the 
Turwi River (sixty-seventy km) on its western side, by raising the total height to 
2.4 metres and adding veldspan to it.61 The puzzle was, if it were not buffalo 
getting through the fence, what was the reason of the outbreak? It was suspected 
that it could have been caused by other cloven-hoofed animals like kudu and 
impala which are able to jump over the fence. Hence the demand the fence be 
raised. These cloven-hoofed animals might have been the carriers of FMD, 
having brought the disease into the communal areas by drinking from the same 
water as the cattle. To check this suspicion, the SVC was asked to collect and 
send in blood samples of cloven-hoofed kudu and impala in particular to check 
if they could be identified as the carriers of the disease.62 In the CCM at the time 
the chairman said that he had spoken to someone from the Cattle Producers 
Association (CPA) who had said that ‘apart from a few hotheads making 
allegations and claims, the situation was under control’.63  
 The DVS decided that all cattle for the communal areas had to be vacci-
nated, but this would destroy the ‘clear area’. So on second thoughts they 
decided that, to protect the national herd, all the infected cattle should be 
slaughtered. The beasts would be replaced with clear and qualitatively slightly 
better cattle through the CSC. It all seemed clear and above board but the 
communal farmers in Bikita and Zaka refused the swap, because they doubted 
that the cattle would be of the same value as the ones being slaughtered.64 What 
they meant to say was that they saw the value of their cattle was not so much in 
terms of meat prices, as in draught power, for ploughing their fields. If all these 
animals were to be replaced by new cattle they would lose all their trained 
animals and it will take years before they could school the new cattle to be used 
as draught animals.65 Now the communities were really angry in the sense that 
they had to pay for living next to the SVC, without benefiting from it. At the 
CCM in July 1998, the chairman of the SVC informed the committee that the 
                                                           
61  CCM 8 July 1998 and interview with Conservator, 5 October 1998. 
62  This suspicion turned out to be founded as in seven out of thirty samples between 22 
March and 5 May 1998, they discovered high titres for FMD ‘ranging in value from 
40 to greater than 640 for SATII.(...) The Vet Department are concerned about the 
proportion of positive titres especially with one showing such a high value that it 
was probably showing symptoms of the disease at the time it was shot’, 
Conservator’s report, 10 June 1998. Although impala and kudu ‘will clear the 
disease out of their system after a while’, buffalo contain ‘a maintained infectious 
system’, Minutes CCM, 4 November 1998. 
63  CCM Minutes 3 September 1997. 
64  The Herald, 18 September 1997, Cattle Slaughtering Hits Snag in Zaka, Bikita. 
65  Interview with landowner of Mukwazi Ranch, 11 August 1998. The landowner said 
explicitly that he was empathetic to this argument of the communal farmers. 
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communities see the SVC ‘as a burden, loud and clear’. For that reason the 
chairman, accompanied by representatives from the Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
(ZFU) and the DVS, went to speak to the communities and explained to them 
the possibilities of working together with the SVC in a joint venture-like 
structure, the Trust. The basic idea being that the Trust would buy wildlife by 
finding its own funds and then leasing the founder stock to the SVC. The SVC 
would pay the Trust a lease price and also for the progeny of the founder stock. 
This would create a fund with which the Trust could initiate all kinds of 
community development projects in the neighbouring communities. According 
to the chairman, the ZFU, which represents communal farmers in Zimbabwe, 
was very enthusiastic about the potential of the idea and would have liked to co-
operate on it. Teetering on the brink it asked the SVC to give the communities 
something tangible ‘as a token’ that the SVC was willing to help and invest in 
them. That token could consist of cleaning three infected diptanks. The Chair-
man added that it would be good to work on such a token, as the current 
situation was not conducive to the whole land designation process and the 
position of Angus, Mukwazi and Mukazi, formerly undivided as Angus, in the 
process. None of the three properties was on the official designation list, which 
seems to have irritated the Provincial Government and there are rumours that it 
are trying again to get it on the list.66 It seems the enthusiasm about delivering a 
token of goodwill had quickly faded away because at the CCM in October of 
the same year, the issue resurfaced again with force. The chairman informed the 
committee that he had been called by Chris Foggin, Principal Research Officer 
of the DVS,67 about the FMD issue. Foggin had warned him that the issue could 
remove the head of the DVS, Dr Hargreaves, from his post as the whole issue 
was now ‘turning political’. He had asked the chairman to ‘do his part on the 
ground level’ and convene a meeting with the Matsai people. The chairman 
went on to reiterate that this problem could only be solved through the Trust-
idea and that the SVC should now devote all its energy to the Trust’. ‘If we 
don’t deal with it we will have pressures on our boundaries we have never 
known before’.68 
 The buffalo and other cloven-hoofed animals were seen as a burden by the 
Matsai peoples and not these alone. Nor was it first the desire of the SVC to 
utilise wildlife through commercial hunting in their conservancy, which 
troubled the communal farmers and for which they felt they had to pay the 
price. A major concern had to do with the land itself. When Angus was still 
undivided and belonged to Devuli, it had attracted labour from the Matsai 
                                                           
66  CCM, 8 July 1998. 
67  The Farmer, 27 November 1997, Dr. Chris Foggin Wins 1997 Wildlife Oscar.  
68  CCM, 7 October 1998. 
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community and, as was the tradition in those days, you ‘didn’t pay them, but 
you fed them’.69 So it gave them a small plot on (combined) Angus land to 
plough and plant with their food crops. During the Liberation Struggle, Angus 
was abandoned as I described earlier and left to itself. Surging the opportunity 
the people came onto the property, in a sense illegally, and settled down. Even 
after Independence, Angus was not immediately put back into operation. When 
operations were finally restarted on Angus, the people refused to leave on the 
grounds that they were or had been employees of Angus and therefore had the 
right to live on the property, even after retirement. After Independence the issue 
was ‘politicised’. In 1983, thirty-three families were evicted from the property 
by the then DA of Bikita, because it was discovered that they never ‘officially 
worked for Angus’. Only three families, who had officially been employed on 
Angus, were allowed to stay and live on the property. The rest of the houses 
were burned down. The DA who had been in charge of the operation was then 
transferred to another district and his replacement was ‘a weakling’, so the 
families began to come back on the property and nothing was done about it. The 
new DA claimed that he could not find the file on the issue and the process had 
to begin all over again. The Provincial Governor at Masvingo, who was brought 
in as an arbitrator, believed the families formerly evicted were right. By now 
their number had swelled to seventy-two families and this ‘somehow’ became 
the official figure. The management of Devuli never agreed with that figure but, 
nevertheless, the seventy-two families were granted the right to live there. In 
those days Angus was still a cattle ranch and the veterinary fence was situated 
farther inland than the official boundary of the property indicated. This was 
done for reasons of convenience as it followed an easier landscape than going 
up hill and down dale. It enabled the fences to be monitored from by a 4X4. 
When that veterinary fence was erected inside the legal boundaries of Angus, it 
was no use of erecting another fence according the boundaries of the title deeds, 
which would inevitably be situated, relatively close to a well-kept and main-
tained veterinary fence. This situation persisted as long as Angus remained a 
cattle ranch and the Matsai people took the veterinary fence for the property 
fence, going right up to that fence to build their huts and encroaching on the 
land just behind the veterinary fence. When Angus became part of the SVC and 
had to join in erecting the buffalo fence, it located the fence on the exact 
boundary according to the title deeds, which in the meantime had been divided 
                                                           
69  From this type of quotations you can read that this story is primarily told from the 
perspective of the SVC dominated by legal considerations of property and tres-
passing. 
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into three and sold.70 But the Matsai people started to complain verbally that the 
fence was now on their land. They said that they knew ‘from their forefathers’, 
who could indicate exactly where the boundary was.71 They have persisted 
doggedly in this interpretation, even when Angus became part of the SVC. 
When the SVC presented them with the idea of the Trust, they said that ‘the 
issue of resettling the seventy-two minus families had to be resolved before the 
Conservancy tries to sell its idea [of the Trust] to them’.72 They added that the 
families ‘have very high expectations of getting land from the SVC for 
resettlement’.73 So the SVC had to come up with a solution. 
 The initial solution proposed was an idea namely put forward by the former 
owner of the undivided Angus, Rob Cunningham, and the chairman of the SVC, 
to let the SVC buy roughly one-third of Mukazi and sell that stretch of land to 
the Trust, asking it to exploit it for the benefit of the communities: not by living 
on it but by utilising it for wildlife and in that process create revenue for the 
people. The provincial governor (PG) also liked the idea. But the SVC proved 
to be unable to raise the required funding, repeating its failure to raise funds 
through donors to finance their restocking programme, to buy the land which 
greatly disappointed all parties involved. Mukazi was then bought by a new 
owner who said that he would give them a piece of land and when Mukwazi 
could not solve the problem either they found a ‘solution’ by erecting the SVC 
fence and excluding the families. But, although they were now outside the 
fence, they were still on the property according to the title deeds.  
 To solve the matter once and for all the SVC asked Agritex experts to come 
in and do a survey in order to find a more suitable spot for the families. After 
ground checking they came to the conclusion that ‘(t)he total area of the marked 
out area [for the families] is 688 ha of which only 75 ha is potential arable. 
There is 150 ha (...), which has got very deep soils, but got a slope greater than 
12% which reduces it to class 7. This means that this area can only be used for 
grazing. If this area is to be cultivated then strict conservation measures should 
be followed to avoid siltation of Mkazi river’. So, in fact, that particular piece of 
land could not accommodate the seventy-two families. They selected another 
                                                           
70  The then owner of Angus first had to ask permission from the government to 
subdivide the land, which was allowed. Then he had to offer it for sale first to the 
government. Only when it signed a statement of ‘no-interest’ was he allowed to try 
and attract other buyers, which happened. 
71  Interview with landowner Chishakwe, 18 June 1998. The same story of people 
‘encroaching’ on Angus property was also related to me in an interview with the 
liaison officer of the Trust, interview 18 May 1998 and co-owner of Humani, 10 
September 1998.  
72  Yearly Report Liaison Officer, April 1995 to March 1996, 26 May 1996. 
73  Undated monthly Progress Report Liaison Officer, 1996. 
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area of 500 ha on the property which would be suitable land for the resettlement 
of the families and they came with land ‘of which 300 ha is potential arable, 
150 ha is class 8 and 50 ha is class 7’.74 On early drawings of the SVC it is even 
possible to see a piece of Mukazi which is demarcated as ‘proposed village 
area’.75 The whole process proved very time-consuming. In May 1996 the DA of 
Bikita and a representative of Chiredzi District ‘unanimously agreed that the 
alternative area to the south of Mukazi Ranch which is 500 ha in extend was the 
best option (...)’. It was also agreed that the Conservancy could fence in the area 
that was fenced out, once a favourable decision had been made about the 500 
ha. The families in question were said to be prepared76 to give their labour for 
free to assist in the re-alignment of the fence. ‘(...) The Chairman reiterated the 
sentiments of all the officials by indicating that a solution of the Matsai / Angus 
issue was long overdue and putting it to rest now through a solution acceptable 
to both sides was likely to have positive effects for both the programme and the 
people’.77 In his monthly report to the SVC the liaison officer states that ‘(t)he 
Matsai/Angus issue is now bound to move forward. The officials of Bikita and 
Chiredzi districts have unanimously agreed to a report by Agritex officials’. It is 
expected that these developments ‘will put this issue to rest before the end of 
this year 1996’.78 It would take longer and in August 1997 a final report was 
released which seems to confirm that the matter could now be finalised. Land 
was offered to the affected families by the present landowner of Mukazi and 
Agritex had chosen a suitable section. Although during the final visits of the 
Agritex officials to Mukazi the report seems to indicate that the landowners of 
Mukazi and Mukwazi did not really enthusiastically support the process on the 
ground. ‘The third meeting was scheduled for 30/07/1997 at the lower boundary 
(Mukazi/Mukwazi) to discuss and agree on the boundary of the 500 hectares 
potential arable. Agritex and affected farmers walked the boundary and 
established the 500 ha. The vehicle that we were using had a breakdown and 
had been taken to Chiredzi for repairs. We were also supposed to meet the land-
                                                           
74  Letter Agritex to DA Chiredzi, 7 December 1995. 
75  Undated map of the SVC. On the same map are also two cattle areas indicated, on 
Mukwazi and Mkwasine. 
76  In minutes of a meeting in October 1996 between the stakeholders it is explicitly 
mentioned that the families concerned were ‘more than ready’ to give their labour 
for free to re-align the fence. Minutes of meeting at Chiremwaremwa Business 
Centre, 25 October 1996. 
77  Minutes of meeting at Chiremwaremwa Business Centre, 2 May 1996. 
78  Monthly Progress Report April 1996. When the Liaison Officer started working for 
the Trust, but in fact for the SVC, he used to write a report every month and once a 
year an annual report. But because of the fact that he never got any feed back or any 
other form of reaction he stopped writing the monthly reports later on. 
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owner and manager to finalise on the boundary and arrange that they take us 
back to base. May be due to other commitments they did not turn up and we 
ended up walking for 24 kms to base. On 31 July 1997 affected farmers, Save 
Valley Conservancy representation and Agritex went back to the lower bound-
ary hoping to meet the landowners. Due to the bad terrain of the Ranch and the 
size of our vehicle, we ended up walking for +15 kms to and from the meeting 
point to where we left the vehicle. (...) The landowners and manager again did 
not twin up’. The Liaison Officer reported that ‘(t)he unfortunate behaviour by 
the owners of Mukazi Ranch made it impossible to finalise the matter. A full 
report was compiled by the Agritex officers and copies of this report were 
distributed to all the concerned parties. I think all other concerned parties are 
looking to the farmer to honour his part of the agreement’.79 But despite his 
attitude to the matter, the ‘landowner of Mukazi Ranch (...) finally accepted the 
recommendation by Agritex Chiredzi’80 and the Agritex report concludes with 
the expectation that ‘the affected farmers can actively sit at their new site on or 
before 31/11/1997 which happens to be the start of the rainy season’.81 To make 
absolutely certain a rider that ‘agreements made between Save Valley Conser-
vancy and land owners and/or Manager should be in black and white, signed 
and circulated to other players to remove the element of suspicion’ was added.82 
It was now actually only a matter of Agritex finalising the paperwork. In 
September 1996 the liaison officer was already anticipating the Agritex paper-
work and wrote in his quarterly report: ‘I am happy to report that this matter 
[Angus issue] has been resolved’.83 ‘(...) (T)he fencing was due to start immedi-
ately upon receipt of the relevant documentation from Agritex. This was in 
August 1997; since then the documentation has not been forthcoming. (...) It has 
been agreed by all relevant parties that the settlement of the families concerned 
on this area of land would have resolved the issue completely’.84 But in Novem-
ber 1997 the officially announced land designation programme cut right through 
this solution. By the end of 1998 nothing has been heard or seen from Agritex. 
A reciprocal reckoning for insults received in the process? 
                                                           
79  Progress Report Liaison Officer, May to September 1997, 8 October 1997. 
80  Monthly Report Liaison Officer, August 1996, 4 September 1996. 
81  Report of Agritex to DA Chiredzi, on visit made to Mukazi Ranch, 6 August 1997. 
82  Ibid: 3. 
83  Quarterly Report Liaison Officer, June 1996 - August 1996, 10 September 1996. 
84  Information sheet ‘Background on Angus Ranch’, which I received from the 
manager of Angus during an interview, 15 June 1998. 
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 After the publication of the land designation programme in November 1997, 
the protests and claims of the Matsai people began again with renewed fervour85 
and in August 1998 they started to invade Mukazi, Mukwazi and Angus. At 
first, at Mukazi and Mukwazi, it all happened fairly peacefully, although the 
property owner said that there were some ‘5-6 ex-combattants’ and that the 
group of 150-200 ‘was behaving like primitive people’. The landowner asked 
the DA of Chiredzi to come with him and talk to them and the DA had been 
‘100% co-operative’. The police could not attend, because they ‘had no 
transport’. The landowner said that he would provide for transport, after which 
the policeman said ‘just a minute’ and ‘never came back’.86 When he and the 
DA finally arrived at the spot where the people were invading the property, they 
were, according to the DA, in a pretty violent mood. When he asked them if 
they wanted him to address them on the issue, some said yes and some said no 
and he then decided not to do it, because he thought ‘that it needed only a spark’ 
to ‘let the situation turn violent’. Although there was no police, on this occasion 
he was accompanied by his guards. He himself said he had had a firearm in his 
pocket and if necessary he would ‘shoot to kill’ and had instructed his guards 
likewise. This was not necessary and the people later left the property peace-
fully.87 From that date onward the invasions were regular and grew increasingly 
destructive. The invaders started to cut down trees and threatened people, 
especially game guards. The Conservator reported all the invasions to the CFU 
representative in Masvingo by e-mail, emphasising the lack of support the 
landowners and managers were receiving from the local authorities, specifically 
the police, which he explains as the outcome of ‘instructions from the top’. In 
the e-mails he also indicated that he did not understand what made the invaders 
act the way they did. He specifically mentions the fact that the invaders 
announced that they would begin to disrupt the activities of the labourers 
working on the upgrading of the fence. ‘This type of activities makes no sense 
at all. Even less than the other activities’, like clearing fields on Angus where 
there is no water or trees for felling.88 From the perspective of the underlying 
inalienability of the land and the symbolic role of fences as the signature of the 
landowner, the disruption is in fact perfectly logical and obviously the only 
possible line of action to be adopted. The people want to stop or erase the 
signature of a white landowner and consider the land theirs. In a last, hand-
                                                           
85  Interview with landowner Masapas, 11 August 1998 and Liaison Officer, 18 May 
1998. 
86  Interview landowner Mukwazi, 11 August 1998. 
87  Conversation with DA Chiredzi at the DA Canteen, 24 September 1998. 
88  E-mails Conservator to CFU representative in Masvingo, 13 August and 19 August 
1998. 
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written report on Angus to the CFU representative in Masvingo, the conservator 
observes, much to his surprise, that when told by the police that they were 
acting illegally, invaders had said that they were unaware that what they were 
doing was illegal.89 How can you occupy your own land illegally? The invasions 
were creating intensive radio contact between the properties affected and 
between properties and the head office of the SVC. And because the radio 
system is open, it was possible to follow the process by just listening to and 
noting the communication over the radio. At a certain point the manager of 
Mukwazi reported that ‘they start like chop-chop’, indicating that people started 
to cut down trees and ‘they don’t think they will stop at Mukwazi’.90 Game 
guards were threatened that the invaders would ‘have their arms and legs for 
supper’.91 When people later also began to invade Angus they continued with 
this cutting down of trees. It was done at random and there was no discernible 
pattern, all at about one metre above the ground. They also stripped pieces of 
bark from the trees to make their protests known as a kind of ‘natural graffiti’. 
They even started to clear the bush systematically as if preparing their fields for 
an upcoming agricultural season, and erected temporary huts.92 
 The role of the DAs in this context is ambiguous to say the least. 
Unquestionably they are responsible for all the types of land falling under their 
district, communal ánd commercial land. They have to represent both. But in 
the context of the land designation process this is very difficult as they also 
chair the District Land Acquisition Committee. This committee has to submit 
ideas and applications on properties they think should be designated to the 
provincial level. In this case the whole Matsai community, not only the seventy-
two families to be accommodated, have applied at the DA’s office for the 
designation of ‘the whole of Angus’. So while the DA Chiredzi accompanies 
the landowner to see the people who are invading his property and urging them 
to get off the property, at the same time he is applying for its designation in 
other circles. The landowner is saying that the DA of Chiredzi has been ‘100% 
co-operative’ takes on an ironic twist from this perspective. From the district 
level the application for designation goes to the Provincial Land Acquisition 
Committee, chaired by the PG and finally the application reaches the National 
                                                           
89  Undated and hand-written report of Conservator on Angus invasions. Date probably 
beginning of September, as he mentions the coming visit of the PG on 14 September 
1998. 
90  Radio message 17 August 1998. 
91  Conversation with the person in charge of radio contact on 18 August 1998, when 
Mukwazi was invaded. 
92  Tour to see the damage done on the property and interview with manager of Angus, 
10 September 1998. 
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Land Acquisition Committee, which is chaired by Minister Msika. Although 
there has been an application for the designation of the whole of Angus through 
this process, they did not receive any reply in 1998, although they were expect-
ing a positive outcome soon.93 
 The accommodation of the seventy-two families and the land designation 
programme of November 1997 have considerably delayed the upgrading of the 
fence as a precaution against future FMD outbreaks and in compliance with 
orders of the DVS. In the Conservator’s report of 1 April 1998 it is said that 
‘(t)he Veterinary Department have indicated serious concern that the upgrading 
of the fence has not commenced and have requested that the Chairman and 
myself [that is, the Conservator] meet with the Director of the Department of 
Veterinary Services and Mr. Bob Swift, the CFU deputy director of commodi-
ties to discuss their concerns and issues related to the upgrading of the fences 
(...) The seriousness with which the Department and the cattle producers view 
the fence, should not be underestimated and a decision needs to be made at this 
meeting to proceed immediately with the alterations’.94 In his July report he 
states that ‘(a)ll materials except one load of poles have been received for the 
fence upgrade (...) A person to oversee the upgrade exercise has been found and 
I hope to get this started early next week. The Mukazi fence re-route issue 
requires sorting out before that fence can be upgraded’.95 This last remark was 
repeated in his August report.96 Since Agritex went to ‘finalise the paper work’ 
nothing more has been heard. If the solution were accepted and formalised, they 
would have to take this into account when deciding the exact location of the 
upgraded fence on Mukazi. In the meantime they had begun to upgrade the 
fence on Mukwazi. When the upgrading of the fence was finished on Mukwazi, 
they had to continue the work on Mukazi and needed to know where exactly to 
erect the fence. There was no joy as the Agritex deal was still not finalised. A 
final attempt was made to settle the deal, and the liaison officer convened a 
meeting at Mukazi Ranch on Monday 5 October 1998 with all necessary 
political stakeholders involved, namely representatives of the Matsai people, 
that is, two ward councillors, the DAs of Bikita and Chiredzi, and Agritex. But 
then, in the late afternoon of Friday 2 October 1998, the acting DA of Chiredzi, 
the DA himself was on leave, called the SVC office, while the liaison officer 
was out, to say that the ‘meeting had to be postponed indefinitely’, without 
giving any further reasons. It later transpired that one ward councillor had 
refused to attend the meeting, despite the fact that the higher level hierarchy in 
                                                           
93  Interview with Chairman Joint Committee, 7 July 1998. 
94  Conservator’s report, 1 April 1998. 
95  Conservator’s report, 8 July 1998. 
96  Conservator’s report 5 August 1998. 
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Bikita had asked him to do so. The other ward councillor would have come, 
although he had not been re-elected at the latest council elections, which meant 
that at the meeting, strictly speaking, he could no longer be officially considered 
as representative of his ward. The rumours had it that he was on his way out of 
local government because he was not elected anymore because he had spoiled 
his chances of re-election because he was too positive about the SVC. Not for 
nothing was he the chairman of the Joint Committee of the SVC, mediating 
between communities and SVC. And that was that, and the message from the 
communities resounded loud and clear: we are no longer interested in the plans 
we made earlier, we are after the whole of the Angusses.97 End of solution, but 
not end of story. A few complications have to be added to integrate the case 
even further.  
 In the first place it should be made clear why the Matsai people were no 
longer interested in the plan to peg out a suitable 500 ha of land to be accom-
modated, before the official designation of Angus was still not decided upon. 
Why throw away a good opportunity when a new one is not yet assured? Why 
take the risk? In a meeting between the PG, the DA of Bikita District, the chief 
of the Matsai people, the chairman of the SVC, its conservator and the liaison 
officer of the Trust, held on 20 August 1998, the mouth of the chief let drop that 
the PG himself had said in a meeting with the Matsai people in Mashoko at the 
beginning of 1998 that ‘the whole of Angus’ would be designated by June 1998. 
The Matsai people had waited till the end of July to see if his words would 
come true. When this was not the case, they began to invade the properties to 
make clear their point that they were after the land and wanted the PG to live up 
to his promises. They gave the PG a week to convene a meeting and settle 
things, otherwise they would move in and start building their villages. The 
landowners and their managers were also invited to this meeting.98 It is interest-
ing to note that they were not speaking about the sub-divided Angus, but of 
Angus proper, also comprising Mukazi and Mukwazi. History seemed to be 
repeating itself. It is the Matsai people versus Angus, just as it was during the 
Liberation Struggle. The PG indeed set up a meeting, although not within a 
week. The meeting was arranged for 14 September 1998 at the Old Mashoko 
Mission.99 The excuse of the PG for the late meeting was that he had been out of 
the country, so he could not comply exactly with the demand. Therefore it had 
to be a fortnight later.  
                                                           
97  Participating in conversation at SVC office, 5 October 1998. 
98  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 27 August 1998. 
99   Participant observation and conversations with Liaison Officer during the day, 14 
September 1998. 
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 ‘Coincidentally’, in the meantime, the PG was able to digest the results of 
the disappointing donor conference (9-11 September 1998) which betrayed the 
fact that the donors would not support the programme financially and criticised 
the way the Zimbabwean government was handling the process (see Chapter 2). 
Be that as it may, the PG was too late with his meeting and the people began to 
invade again. This time neither Mukazi nor Mukwazi was their goal, but only of 
Angus. Whereas the invasions on Mukazi and Mukwazi had been fairly peace-
ful, on Angus they did substantial damage by chopping down trees. It is 
pregnant with significance that they continued their invasions on Angus, 
because that property is the name-bearer of the Angus property on which they 
have inexorably set their sights. So if any location would suit their purpose for 
conveying their message that they want Angus designated loud and clear, it 
would be the property still bearing its name. Adding to the plausibility of this 
symbolic interpretation of their invasions is the irrefutable fact that Angus has 
no water. The natural water is on Mukazi and Mukazi, but not on Angus. Angus 
has to pump water from the Turwi. This explains why, after the sub division, 
Angus was never asked to accommodate people and these were sent only to 
Mukazi and Mukwazi. There is simply no water, unless you are able to pay for a 
pump. Even the dam, which is on Angus, is a strictly artificial one, in which 
there is only water because it is pumped into the dam to keep ‘the croc happy’.100 
So the people invaded Angus not because they really envisaged living on the 
property but because its name signifies the historic continuity of their struggle 
over land.  
 At last, the meeting with the PG was settled and they gathered at Old 
Mashoko, which is the traditional and general meeting place if Wards 1,2 and 3 
have something to discuss together. It is an open space sheltered by six huge 
mango trees, which give sufficient shade when the sun burns down mercilessly 
during the summer. It is the same spot at which the PG made his earlier 
announcement that Angus would be designated. The PG came along in his 
chauffeur-driven, air-conditioned Jeep Chrysler to meet the people. While no 
police had ever showed up at any time during the recent invasions on Angus, 
now the police from Bikita and Mashoko were present in full uniform and with 
two cars, Landrovers. Approximately 500 people had gathered, sitting on the 
ground in the shade of the mango trees, while the PG stood in front of them, 
addressing them. From a spectator’s point of view to the right of the PG were 
two lines of chairs for the local leadership, in this case two assistant DAs from 
Chiredzi (under which the three properties fall) and officials from Bikita (under 
which the Matsai Area falls), and three ward councillors from Matsai. No-one 
                                                           
100  Interview with Manager Angus, 10 September 1998. 
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from the SVC showed up.101 During his speech the PG never mentioned the 
three ranches as distinct properties, but constantly referred to all three of them 
as Angus. He was speaking about Angus as it used to be. During his speech the 
PG repeatedly asked the people to pledge their support to the President by 
saying pamberi ne ZANU (PF)(‘Forwards with ZANU (PF)’); pamberi 
naVaMugabe (‘Forwards with Mugabe’), after which the people answered by 
saying pamberi, most of them with their right fist clenched, punching in the air 
in ideological and symbolic anger, just above their heads. Sometimes there was 
applause from the men present and a high pitched ‘iiiiillllllllliiiiiiilllllliiiii’ from 
the women. The PG explained to the people why they were mistaken if they 
expected Angus was already designated, by referring to ‘Phase Two’.102 Phase 
Two in his definition meant farms, which are now being identified for acquisi-
tion but which have not yet been gazetted. Phase Two was to follow Phase One, 
in which gazetted farms are acquired to acquire land on which people would be 
resettled. Phase Two according to the PG was a kind of second round of 
acquisition. The first round had been the List promulgated in November 1997 
and now they were preparing a second round. This would imply, according to 
the PG, that Angus could be designated in Phase Two, perhaps as soon as after 
the coming rains. At 11.55 a.m., the ZBC arrived and when they were ready the 
PG repeated his story about the phases just as if he was adding new material to 
his speech. Because of the back-lighting problems, the PG had to take up a 
slightly different position to that which he had occupied before. The pictures 
were broadcast on the 8 o’clock news on 16 September 1998, showing the PG 
making his statement alternated with shots of the crowd. These latter began with 
a close up lasting approximately two to three seconds of the only white head 
                                                           
101  One property owner gave the reason that his manager could not make it ‘because he 
went to Harare to repair a freezer’. Another manager said that he was ‘tied up at the 
ranch’. The Conservator was on leave on Lake Kariba and the Chairman was 
recovering in Harare from an attack of cerebral malaria. The vice-chairman also sent 
word that he was ‘unable to attend’. It turned out that I was the only white face 
around. When the PG saw me coming he took me for a property owner or at least as 
one of their managers. So he sent a police officer to invite me to the line of chairs in 
the front. I refused, saying that I was only a researcher and preferred to sit amongst 
the crowd under the mango trees, so as not to give the wrong impression to the 
people that I was somehow a primary stakeholder in the battle. 
102  President Mugabe had introduced this term at the introduction of the donor con-
ference, and also continued to use the term later. The exact meaning is not com-
pletely clear. The most plausible interpretation seems to be that Phase One had been 
from 1980 (Independence) up to now, and now they were continuing the land reform 
programme in Phase Two, The Herald, 10 September 1998, Land Programme Wins 
Wide Backing; The Herald, 6 November 1998, President Launches Second Phase of 
Land Reform Programme. 
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attending the meeting, mine, before zooming out to the rest of the audience. 
During the news item they did not mention the three different properties, but 
referred to them collectively as the ‘property, formerly known as Angus’. The 
people attending the meeting were all presented in the news as former farm 
workers of Angus, with nowhere to go and desperate for land. With this impres-
sion we can leave the news item and return to the meeting. After the PG’s 
speech there was time allowed for questions. One ward councillor, the one who 
was not re-elected and chairman of the Joint Committee, asked what stance the 
PG took with respect to the invasions, because that was the reason the people 
had gathered here in the first place. Before answering the question the PG asked 
the people to raise their hand if they had participated in the invasions. Nearly all 
attending the meeting raised their hands. Then the PG continued reiterating the 
stance taken by the Government during the donor conference that invasions 
were illegal, that they had to stop, and that next time the police would intervene. 
‘So please wait so the Government can finish its procedures with respect to the 
designated properties’. One villager alleged to the PG that the white landowners 
and their managers had used foul, coarse language to the villagers when they 
had invaded the properties and had ‘called them names’, implying words like 
‘kaffir’ and the like. According to the liaison officer, they implied that they had 
been provoked by the landowners. The same non-re-elected councillor stood up 
and stated that these allegations did not accord with what really happened, but 
he was shouted down by the crowd.  
 The aftermath of the official meeting between the PG and the Matsai people 
was interesting because it brought the PG into direct face to face contact with 
the manager of Angus.103 The official meeting ended around 12.30 p.m. and then 
the PG suggested, completely unplanned and unexpectedly, that he wanted to 
see the damage caused by the invaders of Angus with his own eyes. As the 
liaison officer was the person best acquainted with the SVC he was asked, or 
better ordered, to mediate between the PGs wishes and the manager of Angus. 
The liaison officer tried to radio the manager to explain the situation and ask 
him to open the gate for the PG and his suite, consisting of two police cars 
packed with policemen, a car, a Landrover donated by British Aid, with Bikita 
dignitaries, and a Peugeot station wagon with villagers, all together some 
twenty to twenty-five people. Try as he might he could not reach the manager 
over the radio. He was also unable to raise the gate guards. In actual fact the 
liaison officer was loath to get involved in this visit anyway as he is attached to 
the Trust and not to the SVC. He does not like being ascribed to the (white) 
SVC, much preferring to be associated with the (black) surrounding communi-
                                                           
103  Information based on participant observation, 14 September 1998. 
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ties. Despite this he still did his best to raise the necessary people. The fact that 
he could not reach them immediately created a situation in which the PG and 
his entourage had to wait in front of the gate for quite some time. When the 
liaison officer finally reached the gate himself he asked the PG to follow his car 
to the house of the manager, but they lost each other, either because the liaison 
officer drove too fast over the narrow, bumpy bush road and did not look in his 
rear mirror or because the PG wanted to take another route. The liaison officer 
again tried to raise the manager on the radio, but once again in vain. Luckily we 
met the manager with his wife and their child at the turnoff between Angus and 
Mukazi. There we learned that the battery in his radio is nearly flat and so he 
turns the radio off to conserve the batteries, only turning it on when he has to 
radio himself. No wonder the liaison officer could not reach him. His wife takes 
the car of the liaison officer to the homestead and the liaison officer joins the 
manager in his Toyota Landcruiser to try and locate the lost PG. The first place, 
how symbolic, they go to is the dam, where the PG had also said he would go 
because the area around it had suffered quite severe damage. But no one was 
there. We drove on to the new safari camp of Angus to see if he was there, but 
again to no avail. At the camp he turned on his radio to contact his wife and tell 
her that he could not find the PG. His wife told him that the PG had been at 
their homestead for more than half an hour. She said she had tried to raise him 
on the radio several times, but because of that same flat battery, had not been 
able to reach him. The manager suggested asking the PG to come down to the 
dam, but the PG replies, with a sense of urgency, that he should come to the 
homestead straightaway. When we arrived, the manager went straight to the PG 
to greet him officially. They talk in front of the closed entrance gate, and rather 
ironically, near the stock of poles and veldspan for the upgrading of the fence 
which are stored there. The liaison officer suggested to me that I inform the 
manager to invite the PG and his entourage inside the gate for something to 
drink. This advice is followed but, because this visit of a large group is 
completely unexpected, there were not enough drinks in the house. The liaison 
officer and myself served out some beers, seven, and for the rest of the group 
we serve chilled water, all to give the manager the opportunity to talk to the PG. 
In the course of their conversation the manager asked the PG why the govern-
ment was resettling people in Natural Region V? To which the PG answered 
that ‘80% of the people live here, so what choice do we have’?104 The manager 
also asked point blank if Angus had already been designated, to which the PG 
                                                           
104  It is not true that 80% of the Zimbabwean population is living in Region V. 
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replied, ‘no, you were designated, but not gazetted. But Angus will be 
designated in the next phase’.105 
 The week after the PG had addressed the people of Matsai in Old Mashoko, 
there were no more invasions, but there was an increase in poaching, the work 
of youngsters who went onto the property with dogs to chase kudus off the 
property, passing them through the fence onto the communal land, after which 
they were killed and eaten. In one week they had poached one kudu from 
Mukwazi and three from Mukazi. But from 28 September 1998, they also began 
to invade Angus again. The appeal made by the PG had obviously not made a 
lasting impression. The conservator informed the police who said that they did 
not have direct orders to do anything about invasions. He also tried to reach the 
DAs of Chiredzi and Bikita, but could not contact either of them. Then the 
liaison officer called the PG directly, who said that he would only be informed 
about this through the DA of Chiredzi and Bikita, and certainly not through the 
liaison officer.106 The conservator tried the police again and to his surprise they 
replied that they would go out to Angus. When the conservator asked them if 
they were going to arrest anyone for squatting or trespassing, they said that they 
could not tell him yet as they had to be ‘very diplomatic’ about the issue. Later 
it emerged that the police had indeed been on Angus but that they did not do 
anything and, following their visit, the people remained on the property 
overnight for the first time. It was rumoured that when the police asked them to 
move they had threatened the officers saying that if the latter did anything, they 
would take up arms and defend themselves. The following day, one of the 
Angus landowners came down from Bulawayo in his plane for the very first 
time during the invasions and stayed overnight on the property, while his 
manager was on leave, and met the squatters the next day. He claims107 he had 
told them that he was ‘the big boss from Bulawayo’ and had shaken hands with 
them, and in order to respond to his gesture many had to put their pangas and 
axes in their other hand. After that he offered them a drink which they happily 
accepted. He suggested that the Angus manager had to apply some ‘reverse 
psychology’ and offer the ringleaders of the invasion jobs on the property. After 
this suggestion, there was no further follow-up as far as I can judge and he left 
for Bulawayo. But the story does not end there. That same day I had the 
                                                           
105  Although there were rumours that the shareholders of Angus include a high-ranking 
Minister in Mugabe’s government and people from the army. The liaison officer 
concluded that if that were the case, the PG was only ‘buying time’. 
106  When the PG had had to wait on a few occasions while visiting Angus he had said to 
the liaison officer that he had ‘behaved badly’. Later in the text I shall return to the 
specific position of the liaison officer in this context. 
107  Conversation with owner of Angus, 1 October 1998. 
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conversation with the owner of Angus the police went to the property again and 
used three teargas grenades to underline the urgency of their message. They 
arrested six people and tore down the temporary structures the invaders had put 
up. The next day I ran into the manager, returned from leave, in Chiredzi town 
where he told me that the same invaders had now come to him to ask if they 
could use the thatching grass and poles they had used for their temporary 
accommodation (!) to which he agreed. On 8 October 1998 they convened a 
meeting,108 between the invaders, a group of thirty to forty people, the police, the 
manager of Angus and a PR Officer of the police, at the place where the 
invaders had settled on Angus. The message from the police was straight 
forward, they had their orders from the provincial level which informed them 
they had to be strict with, that is, arrest and prosecute, any invaders. People had 
to give the government time to go through all the official procedures to 
designate a property. The villagers were told: ‘it is finished’. Much to every-
body’s surprise the invaders replied that ‘it was not finished’ and that they 
would remain on the property, while the police and the manager went their 
separate ways. They also told them, that should they want to talk to them again, 
they could always find them at this same place on Angus. And the police did 
nothing.  
 It was not known if these particular group of Matsai people had anything to 
do with the letter of 6 October 1998, that is, two days earlier, which was sent, 
and signed only with the ‘Bikita farmers’, to all ministers and ministries, 
starting at the President’s office right down to the lowest level, stating that the 
SVC must be held ‘fully responsible’ for the FMD outbreak the previous year. 
They also said that they did not like the idea of swapping their infected cattle 
for ‘clean cattle’, but saw the necessity of it, so they wanted to go along with 
the proposal, under two conditions: 
1.  The SVC must accept and take the complete blame for the outbreak and 
must pay Z$ 9000,- compensation per head of infected cattle; 
2.  The SVC must create a buffer zone of some ten km between the buffalo in 
the SVC and the cattle of Matsai communal areas.109  
The SVC office diary mentioned on 12 October 1998 ‘11 squatters, chopping 
trees + fencing around lands’. 13 October 1998 the police went in again and 
arrested five people, but the Office diary on 15 October says ‘squatters 15 in 
number’. 16 October I again ran into the manager of Angus in town, where he 
told me that he had spoken to the police (again). They had told him that the day 
before they had received ‘an instruction’ that they were no longer supposed to 
                                                           
108  Conversation with manager Angus, 9 October 1998. 
109  CCM meeting, 7 October 1998. 
 
188 CHAPTER 4 
arrest any squatters. The manager could not tell me where the instruction had 
augmated, but the result was that all the people who had been arrested so far 
(eleven) had been released without further punishment. At the local level this 
seemed the end of the game. The CFU representative in Masvingo and the 
chairman, recovered from his malaria, tried to influence the PG in Masvingo. 
The latter promised to look into it, but that did not remove the invaders. Office 
diary entry of 26 October: ‘8 families: cutting trees, digging holes for houses’. 
On 28 October I saw the manager for the last time during my stay in Zimbabwe. 
The next day I was due to leave for South Africa to round up the fieldwork with 
final interviews in Pietermaritzburg. The manager told me that the invaders 
have ‘knocked down some 800 metres of upgraded fence, worth some Z$ 
32.000,-’. It all began with the FMD ‘coming through’ the fence and it has 
ended with the tearing down an upgraded fence. The fence seemed the bottom 
line. Physically it was essential to prevent FMD infecting their cattle. 
Symbolically they hated it, because it separated them from their land. 
 Two short and final aspects of this case. The first concerns the role of 
Humani and the second the position of the liaison officer. The upgrading of the 
fence is in the interests of everybody in the SVC and therefore everybody has to 
pay a ‘fence upgrade levy’. This seems reasonable but Humani refused to pay, 
because it claimed that the SVC still owed them money for their financial 
contribution to the SVC in founder stock and later progeny.110 In fact Humani 
was asking for recognition of the fact that they had had the vision of utilising 
wildlife on the property long before the SVC was even considered. Their role is 
greatly neglected in the mythology about the inception of the SVC. In the myth-
forming the chairman and WWF seem to play a far more important role. Now it 
is repayment time, in a literal sense. The negotiations were tough. An earlier 
meeting with the Financial Chairman of the SVC led to nothing. For the 
upgrading of the fence they urgently needed cash in hand to pay for the 
material,111 and Humani had to contribute a goodly sum because it is a large 
property and the upgrading levy is calculated per acre. Finally the case was 
temporarily settled when the co-owner of Humani ‘said that he would loan the 
fence upgrade money to the Conservancy to enable it to carry on with the fence 
upgrade, until the situation had been sorted out. The Committee felt that whilst 
this was not the ideal response it would be sufficient in the interim’.112 A small 
reciprocal affair in the midst of a case of a big reciprocal reckoning on the issue 
of land. 
                                                           
110  Minutes CCM, 7 October 1998. 
111  Minutes CCM, 5 August 1998. 
112  Minutes CCM, 7 October 1998. 
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 Another reciprocal reckoning was afoot, this time to do with the liaison 
officer in this particular Matsai case. When the squatters on Angus were 
forcibly removed and their huts burned by the DA of Bikita in 1985-1986, the 
liaison officer was the one holding and lighting the matches. For that reason it is 
impossible for him to liase this conflict between the SVC and the Matsai 
people.113 When he tried to speak to a group of people on 12 August 1998, just 
as people started to invade the properties, this was a flop.114 He met them at the 
gate at Mukazi 2, which is the gate on the border between Angus and Mukazi. 
When the group caught sight of the liaison officer they exchanged greetings and 
gathered under a tree near the fence, where they began to dance and chant. The 
liaison officer approached them with a very polite and respectful greeting. He 
also introduced me and I greeted them in the same polite way by bowing my 
head and clapping my hollow hands, not too loud. Again, I was the only white 
man around. The liaison officer began to talk to them in Shona, telling them that 
cutting down live trees was not the correct procedure and that they had to 
protest the government for not fulfilling its promises, instead of blaming the 
landowners. Scarcely had he uttered a few words when an enormous tumult 
broke out and they began to shout and yell, waving their pangas and axes and 
making all kind of angry gestures, pulling angry grimaces. No discussion was 
possible under the circumstances and the people started to walk to the gate, 
waving their ‘trophies’ sieged from Angus, as everybody was carrying some-
thing, ranging from building poles, and thatching grass to firewood. The atmos-
phere grew tenser when they began to yell that tomorrow they would ‘burn the 
grass’ and ‘we will tear the fence down and cut all the wire’. Addressing the 
liaison officer they said that this time they ‘had cut trees, next time we cut you 
to pieces’. They also called him a ‘traitor’, defending the interests of the 
whites,115 referring to his role as liaison officer for the SVC, considered a white 
men’s world and to his role during the eviction of the families from Angus in 
the 1980s. When he tried to drive away they not only continued to yell at him, 
but also banged on his car and even threw a pole at the vehicle hitting it on the 
boot. Again a reciprocal reckoning influencing someone’s attitude and 
functioning within the organisational setting of the SVC and its related Trust.  
 This case makes as clear as day the way in which the fence is symbolic of 
the relationship between the SVC and its neighbouring communities in the 
matters of the ownership of the land and hunting. The exchange between 
communities and the SVC takes place via the fence. The fence is constantly 
                                                           
113  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 24 September 1998. 
114  Observations, 12 August 1998. 
115  Which was probably part of the reason they took him in the first place, conversation 
with Conservator, 23 September 1998. 
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used to make statements in an ongoing exchange about land. An exchange 
within the context of the ultimate exchange, which they have never accepted, 
because it would be to acknowledge that their land had been taken. Land which 
they consider inalienably theirs. Whatever is put forward by the present land-
owners to try to pacify the relationship over land, it is always treated merely as 
insufficient compensation for former crimes of land alienation perpetrated by 
the whites. Everything put forward by the SVC, be this material or immaterial, 
towards the communities is seen as totally inadequate repayment for a crime 
committed long ago. Everything a landowner does for the community is part of 
a recompense, a punishment to be exacted for the crimes of his forefathers. 
Land is the big exchange that can never be. The minutes of the CCM show the 
importance of the fence to the SVC as I described in the previous chapter, but 
for quite other reasons than does obtaining for the communities, namely in 
terms of making hunting possible. That the communities perceive that same 
fence in a completely other context means that deep down the SVC cannot 
understand why communities are not prepared to respect the boundary fences 
when they are the recipients of so many material advantages and gifts from it. 
The ultimate highlight of this gift giving from the perspective of the SVC is its 
founding of the Trust as the symbol of and vehicle for improved and trusting 
community relations: the Trust as the new image of co-operation between black 
and white in private conservation in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
More examples of interaction between SVC (members) and 
communities 
 
Besides to this major case there are many more smaller incidents which have 
taken place around the SVC. From the perspective of the communities, many of 
these basically have to do with the attitude of the landowners towards the 
communities, which engenders all kinds of behaviour which do not ‘bring 
harmony between races’.116 The liaison officer is often forthright and blunt in his 
reports on this matter. He formulates his objective of his work for instance as 
‘(t)o resolve differences between neighbours thereby bring common under-
standing and harmony through change of behaviour and attitude in an environ-
ment of opposing and differing cultures and political background’.117 These 
parties do not interact together easily and the communities often complain to the 
liaison officer about ‘ill treatment of community members by managers/ land-
                                                           
116  Yearly Report Liaison Officer, April 1995 to March 1996, 26 May 1996. 
117  Quarterly Report Liaison Officer, March to May 1996, 10 June 1996. 
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owners [and] injured and sick employees being sent late to clinics/hospital for 
treatment (...)’.118 In order to stimulate the managers and landowners to meet and 
learn to know and appreciate their neighbours which should build up a relation-
ship between the SVC and communities, the liaison officer sent them a list with 
the names of the wards and councillors and where they could be contacted for 
organising meetings. This was all work for nothing and in February 1997 he 
reported that he ‘still await[s] to get some feedback on what progress landown-
ers have made in this respect’.119 Nothing ever happened. He has also never had 
any feedback from the CCM, its chairman or the AGM on his monthly, 
quarterly, and yearly reports, which he began to compile when he took on this 
job.120 Starved by a lack of feedback he began to send in fewer, less extensive 
reports. Most of what has been captured in these reports under the concepts of 
‘attitudes’ and ‘behaviour’ is what is considered normal behaviour between 
black and white in this area of the Lowveld. I have never come across any 
detailed description or examples in any report to what kind of behaviour or 
attitude in daily life it is actually referring. For that reason, I can only depend on 
my own observations in this respect. To give an impression I shall describe a 
few examples of what happened in the interaction between black and white 
within the context of SVC operations when I was near or present, based on my 
fieldnotes. Although most of the landowners and their managers will not admit 
it openly, many consider themselves in a master-servant relationship, that is, a 
‘command structure’, to black Zimbabweans. Some of them are also likely to 
refer to the Bible for religious legitimation.121 It is that basic assumption which 
runs through many, if not all, interaction between black and white. For instance, 
when I went to the new Research Base that the SVC was building on Levanga, 
it was interesting to observe the interaction between a SVC-staff member and 
the builders. We drove up close to where they were building and the conserva-
tor inspected what progress was being made. The builders dropped everything 
they were doing at once and gathered around the conservator. He noted certain 
things and ordered them to adjust these in a voice of command. The workmen 
informed him that they had not been delivered certain material with which they 
could carry on and whether this staff member could take care that he brought 
this in the next time he passed by. After the inspection we got into the car again 
and he drove away. After some 50 to 100 metres he realised that he had forgot-
ten to tell them something and stopped the car. Instead of turning to the building 
site again, he hung out of the car window and yelled. When that did not produce 
                                                           
118  Monthly Progress Report Liaison Officer, May 1996. 
119  Monthly Progress Report Liaison Officer, February 1997. 
120  Interview with Liaison Officer, 18 May 1998. 
121  Interview with a landowner of Savuli, 10 June 1998. 
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the desired effect he banged on the car door with his hand with some force to 
attract their attention. When they realised that he was calling them they came 
running towards the car and waited standing beside the car to hear his next 
remarks. After he had told them what he had in mind, he left without any further 
greeting.122 Of course, these observations and interpretations can be waved away 
as being typical for a Dutchman in Zimbabwe. But recognising disrespect is not 
something particularly Dutch. It also has something to do with a basic attitude 
in human interaction. Beach notes ‘it is quite impossible to quantify the amount 
of personal insult aimed by Rhodesians [or white Zimababweans for that 
matter] at Africans over the years’.123 That is what we are talking about. Every-
day life in the SVC is full of incidents like described above which, perceived in 
themselves, are only  minuscule examples of interaction between black and 
white. Taken together a picture emerges out of them, like a photograph that 
slowly develops its contrasts. It begins with driving through the SVC with a car. 
All whites in the SVC drive cars, many 4X4 Toyota Pickups or Landcruisers. In 
the SVC there are no official transport facilities. There is no bus service. The 
closest public transport comes is a fifteen to twenty minutes drive before 
crossing the Mkwasine River. The bus turns left off the main road into the 
Matsai area. At this point there are always black people waiting for transport 
opportunities to go into the SVC, to visit relatives, and also because many of 
them are employed in the SVC, working in the different lodges and workshops. 
So (most of the) whites drive cars and (most of) the black wait for a lift. The 
black people waiting for a lift know exactly which white drives which car. So 
they also know exactly who usually picks in people for a lift and who does not, 
and this information is rumoured around. Some landowners/ managers have a 
bad reputation for not giving anyone a lift. The same can be said about speaking 
Shona or any other local dialect. Only a very few landowners or managers 
speak Shona fluently. Others do not speak Shona at all or only a few words like 
greetings and farewell. The chairman of the SVC, for example, is known and 
reputed for his fluency in Shangaan, and for that reason can communicate with 
the Gudo people in their own language. Others are notorious for the opposite.124 
                                                           
 
122  Fieldnotes, 23 September 1998. 
123  Beach 1994: 179  
124  Conversation with liaison officer, 8 May 1998. Three properties in the SVC have 
black managers. One of them is the parastatal ARDA. Interestingly enough one of 
the others is the manager of Mukazi, the property with all the problems with the 
neighbouring Matsai. When the liaison officer met the invaders on Angus on 12 
August 1998, the black manager of Mukazi was escorting the group to the gate in his 
Toyota Landcruiser. At the gate he stopped the car, got out leaving the engine 
running and said to me: ‘it is easy to make a big mistake’. According to the 
surrounding communities, black people who work for white initiatives like these 
 CASES OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE 193 
Everyday life in the SVC taught me much about white perspectives on the 
relationship between SVC and neighbouring communities. Many of them are 
wrapped up in a joke. On a few occasions when I arrived somewhere in the 
SVC for the first time and had to introduce myself and say what I was doing, 
people started to make jokes.125 Like asking if I knew the joke about what the 
blacks had invented. ‘Can you name one thing they have contributed in terms of 
inventions to mankind?’ ‘Even if they had invented the wheel they would have 
broken it afterwards’. Roars of laughter. Or when I arrived somewhere and I 
was introduced to the secretary and the man said that I was doing research ‘on 
the economic viability of the SVC or something like that’. When I added that I 
was also interested in neighbour relations he said jokingly, ‘Yeah, what I told 
you, a waste of time’. Or again on another occasion on which I had to explain 
what I was doing and some of the people present had already heard my presen-
tation at the AGM and said that I was in the SVC ‘to see if we do it right with 
our black neighbours’. One of the other people present answered the question 
and said, ‘the answer is ‘no, we don’t’’. Her sally was greeted with gales of 
laughter. Stimulated by this oral exchange, one of the other attendants started to 
imitate a game scout in his dialect, whom she describes as hanging around and 
drinking in a bar, but pretends to his (white) superior over the radio that he is 
(very) actively pursuing an animal on a spoor.  
 One final example from ‘a suitcase full of observations’. There was a 
meeting taking place with a community. A white landowner from the SVC also 
participated, but his body language clearly showed his lack of interest in the 
proceedings. His eyes, for instance, never focused on the speakers nor did he 
react to anything that was discussed during the meeting. The meeting was 
chaired for more than one and a half hours by a councillor who was introduced 
as the chairman for this meeting and who addressed the people gathered, whites 
included, several times during the meeting. After the meeting this councillor 
and chairman wanted to ask to this particular landowner something and ap-
proached him, but was not recognised and the landowner asked someone 
standing nearby in an audible voice, readily audible also to the bystanders, 
                                                           
managers do or the liaison officer for that matter, all ‘speak the white language’ 
(conversation with Liaison Officer, 23 September 1998). It is rumoured about the 
liaison officer that he ‘belongs’ to the ‘white camp’, which is not a good develop-
ment for his job as liaison officer. It was even said that the rumours have grown 
stronger since he drove around a good deal with me, either in my car or his own 
(conversation with liaison officer, 28 May 1998). So far for my presentation of not 
being a stakeholder in the battle (see note 101). 
125  The following examples are from various places at which I made my fieldnotes. For 
reasons of privacy I do not specify them in detail. 
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‘who,... is that guy the Councillor’? All these are anecdotes and observations of 
jokes and funny remarks. It would be far too easy to be judgmental about it. In a 
certain context, things are said which must not be immediately taken to be 
representing complete social reality, but at least they indicate a certain discourse 
about black and white relations in the region. An important aspect of white 
discourse about black communities, which also comprises a plethora of 
rumours, images and discussion, is poaching.  
 From the perspective of the SVC a great deal of the interaction between SVC 
and communities has to do with poaching and the stealing of fence wire. For 
this purpose, the SVC keeps a confidential Investigation Register. They opened 
the register under the first conservator. He was an ex-DNPWLM man who had 
anti-poaching as his first priority because of his upbringing in the Department. 
He began the register zealously, but he was only with the SVC for a short while 
as I described in the previous chapter, and the subsequent field co-ordinator and 
current conservator did not give it as much priority in their work. After a few 
years the latter tried to update it, but as it is already difficult enough to collect 
the necessary information on current cases, let alone on cases which are farther 
removed in time. The police is usually reluctant to give information about 
anything and is usually not very keen on handing over or showing the forms on 
which the sentences of cases are noted. They often say that the records are kept 
elsewhere and that, as a result, it cannot help them any further. This explains 
why the information that they could get hold of is ‘piecemeal, incomplete and 
cannot be completely trusted’.126 Despite these shortcomings the register gives 
an indication of poaching incidents in the SVC. It is divided into four major 
columns: date, place of offence, nature of offence, and final outcome. Browsing 
through the register gives the impression that the majority of the cases is about 
snaring, often with wire abstracted from the fences of the SVC, hunting with 
dogs and fishing without a permit. Many cases have no registered final 
outcome. The ones that do have a registered final outcome are dominated by 
monetary fines ranging from Z$ 50 to Z$300-400, with an incidental higher 
fine. Remembering that the minimum salary of a domestic worker is Z$ 450 per 
month, it takes no great stretch of the imagination to realise that these are 
relatively huge fines. If the offender is not in a position to pay, he (or she in 
some cases) will be sentenced IWL (In With Labour). Usually one month’s 
IWL average Z$100.127 These are the cases which come up before the police. 
                                                           
126  Interview with Conservator, 23 September 1998. 
127  Parks & Wildlife (Law Enforcement) Investigation Register (Confidential), May 
1991-June 1998. The rest of this section is based on conversations and interviews 
with several people in and around the SVC on the subject. For reasons of privacy I 
do not specify the person or the date. 
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Cases in which the police was willing or forced to act. Many cases never reach 
this stage and are dealt with at a property level. This is not considered an 
advantageous development, because the SVC is often accused of taking justice 
into its own hands, arising from the general image that police does not pursue 
the cases seriously. Many point to how reluctant the police were to act when the 
land invasions took place and argue that that is its general attitude towards the 
white community. This leads to a process in which the managers or landowners 
do take justice into their own hands by beating up a suspect or keeping him in 
custody just a bit longer without food or drink. The landowners feel that if they 
do not take action themselves and handed the suspect over to the police, in 
many cases, they will be released very quickly because the police cites ‘incom-
plete evidence’, even though the landowner or his manager is highly confident 
about the nature of the offence. It is especially in circumstances like these that 
the landowner or his manager is not eager to hand over the suspect to the police, 
and makes sure ‘that the message comes across’. The mediating role in these 
exchanges between SVC and communities is played by the game scouts. This is 
probably why the game scouts are often the targets of complaints. Most 
grievances from the communities about the game scouts focus either on the fact 
that they arrest people outside their jurisdiction, that is, outside the SVC, 
especially women bathing or doing the laundry, or shoot dogs who come too 
close to the fence and are suspected of being hunting dogs.  
 For example, Ward 30 in Buhera District formulated allegations against 
game scouts on Mapari whom they wanted to beat up because the ‘game scouts 
come into the communal area with guns [and] (...) game scouts are taking 
people’s wives [and] the game scouts ill-treated members of the community 
especially women and children found near the fence’.128 Another example of 
such an incident erupted in the Chibuwe community, bordering Humani. Game 
scouts had arrested suspected poachers and later ran into them when they were 
relaxing after duty in a beer hall. A fight broke out. Who knows what exactly 
happened between the game scouts and the suspected poachers in the light of 
the above-described context? Are the complaints (completely) fake? Is there 
                                                           
128  Minutes of meeting between Ward 30 and Manager of Mapari, 4 October 1996. 
Similar remarks are made about games scouts in reports of liaison officer about 
issues brought forward by communities about the SVC: ‘unlawful arrests of women 
and demands for sex from the arrested women by game guards (...)’ (Monthly 
Progress Report Liaison Officer, May 1996). The issue also features prominently in 
his Annual Report 1995-1996, in which game scouts are alleged to be involved in 
poaching themselves and ‘game guards confiscating communities’ properties e.g. 
“paggas”, axes, bows and arrows were cited’ (Yearly Report April 1995-March 
1996, 26 May 1996). 
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only ‘a grain of truth’ in them? Whatever the answer, poaching and badly 
behaved game scouts are part of the daily discourse on interaction between the 
SVC and surrounding communities.  
 Usually every incident leads to its own meeting(s) at which the situation is 
discussed among the different stakeholders. Every one of the five districts 
surrounding the SVC has its own share of incidents followed by meetings.129 In 
Chipinge District, for instance, they had a meeting in August 1996 about a lion 
that had come out of the SVC and killed livestock in the communal areas, to wit 
three donkeys and one cow. The people affected asked for compensation, which 
was granted, after which they were informed that ‘the neighbours would be 
expected to reciprocate this understanding move by devising their own methods 
that would initially reduce and eventually eradicate losses in the Save Valley 
Conservancy through poaching, theft and vandalism of property’.130 The 
assumption underlying many of the initiatives taken by the SVC towards the 
neighbouring communities seem to be clarified by this, earlier and later 
examples, showing that it is prepared and willing to bestow economic and 
tangible benefits on the surrounding communities, but at a reciprocal price, first 
and foremost not poaching and for respecting the boundaries. Later, after the 
announcement of the land designation programme in November 1997, as we 
have seen in the extensively discussed Matsai case, the SVC asked and basically 
expected a price in terms of political legitimation of the conservancy concept in 
Zimbabwe. In the same district the liaison officer also had a meeting in June 
1997 about ‘a length of wire which was cut from the fence and stolen’.131 What’s 
new? In Buhera District the same types of stories abound. In 1996, for instance, 
there was a meeting at which the main topic was the issue of the game scouts 
accused of ‘taking wives’ I described above. This coincided with the stealing of 
wire and so it was decided that the community and the landowner ‘find time to 
sit down together and discuss [the fence] matter’.132 In Bikita District the Angus 
vs. Matsai issue dominated the agenda of the different meetings. The other 
properties have had only minor incidents with their neighbouring communities. 
In many cases, big and small, the theme that the economic gifts of the SVC or 
                                                           
129  These are recorded from the time the liaison officer took up his employment and 
was asked to play a mediating role in these kind of conflicts. He keeps files on the 
meetings he has in the different districts. Because I had the opportunity to look into 
the files freely I have quite a complete overview of the official and minuted 
meetings between the SVC (members) and neighbouring communities, mediated 
through the Liaison Officer. 
130  Minutes of a meeting held in Chibuwe, 30 August 1996. 
131  Minutes of a meeting held at Charuma Primary School, 3 June 1997. 
132  Minutes of a meeting near Duwure Bridge, 4 October 1996. 
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the individual properties must be seen as an ongoing process to try and start a 
positive reciprocal exchange with the surrounding communities recurs. The 
problem is that only one fitting return gift is expected (and even accepted): 
respecting the boundary, that is, the fence which also implies no poaching. ‘I 
am also having various lengths of wire stolen from the buffalo fence opposite 
Villages 26 recently, (and reported to ZRP [Zimbabwe Republican Police]) and 
Village 31, some time back. I have supplied thatching grass and poles to the 
people on my south/western boundary this year and I am hoping to do some 
land preparation during Nov/Dec as I did last year. However I do tend to lose 
interest when faced with the above incidents’.133 Only a very small part of the 
territory of Zaka District borders the SVC and I could not find any specific 
minutes on meetings with stakeholders in this district. To finalise the circle 
around the SVC, which started with Chipinge District, Chiredzi District has had 
its fair share of incidents, including the Matsai issue, but it has also experienced 
some promising beginnings. Another typical example of the problems between 
communities and SVC, or rather individual properties, is Mkwasine Ranch. In 
April 1997 there are minutes from a meeting which was set up to ‘try and 
resolve the problems Mkwasine Ranch is facing. (These problems included loss 
of off sets and other pieces of wire through cutting)’.134 Chiredzi District is also 
the home of an incident in which the fence did not create problems because the 
landowner and the people from the Nyangambe community decided together 
where the exact location of the fence would be. It evolved into a process of give 
and take, which produced mutual respect and satisfaction. One advantage is that 
the Nyangambe area is not overpopulated, as it is a resettlement scheme and 
does not carry the heritage of the Armed Struggle, like Matsai.135 It is no wonder 
that this community has now been especially singled out by the chairman of the 
SVC to be offered the ‘golden opportunity’ of building a traditional village after 
the Gudo initiative failed to work out in the end. 
 From all these cases, large and small, it can be concluded that there is quite 
some degree of disagreement between the SVC and individual property owners 
on the one side and the neighbouring communities on the other side. Basically 
the conflict seems to boil down to a question of the ownership of the land. The 
signature of the fence is constantly contested. The fence, which can be consid-
ered a two-sided symbol for the communities, one of land ownership and 
exclusion from hunting. No wonder that it is precisely by these two issues that 
the communities make their protests known: they claim the land verbally or take 
it physically by invading it, or they hunt, most of the time using snares which 
                                                           
133  Letter of partner Savuli to Bikita RDC, 10 October 1996. 
134  Minutes of a meeting held at Mareva Primary School, 30 April 1997. 
135  Conversation with Liaison Officer, 14 July 1998. 
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are made of the same fence which is meant to exclude them from indulging in 
that practice. In fact, they write their signature with the same fence, but for 
other purposes. The wires constituting the fence have an Escherian mirror 
image in a snare. The paradox of legal correctness in terms of title deeds and 
fixed boundaries and its inversion by protesting it for social justice is striking in 
its symmetry. In the context of Zimbabwe in general and of the Lowveld in 
particular, it has been made as plain as a pikestaff that it is often very difficult, 
if not impossible, to find out what ‘really’ happened, because virtually nothing 
is ever written down and most of the agreements and deals are oral. Versions 
from different sources are the only possibility of creating any perspective on a 
case. But, in the light of the paradox I described above, that does not matter or 
creates a difference in understanding the underlying process, which is crystal 
clear, despite its paradoxical character. Strangely enough the clarity and sym-
metry seem to be captured by the paradox, which in turn can only be con-
structed along the lines of interpreting the different cases in terms of reciprocal 
exchange. I shall return to the specific theoretical implications of the relation-
ship between the SVC and its neighbouring communities after I have finished 
my exposé on the development of the specific organisational co-operation 
between the SVC and the SVCT.  
 
 
The further development of the joint venture between SVC  
and SVCT 
 
Despite all these struggles, in September 1996, the major stakeholders in the 
organisational co-operation, that is, RDCs, the SVC and the SVCT, came 
together in the Tambuti Lodge Hotel, now a school, ‘to forge an ‘agreement in 
principle’.136 Although these struggles were ineluctably of particular significance 
in this ritual, was this meeting only one more step in an ongoing exchange of 
earlier rituals, which no longer matched or fitted the actual state of affairs like a 
fictitious play to temporarily escape a harsh reality? A ritual of Neckel’s 
‘functional ego’ in which ‘empirical subjects already seem to have abandoned 
the fruitless quest for the real self (...) [and] (i)n place of the small, sickly, 
constantly endangered ego, a sovereign ego with great pretensions now step 
forward, a personality who can make the most of its opportunities and is not 
afraid of being inferior? (...) Egocentric calculation and ceaseless narcissistic 
desire for gratification come together in seeing the moral claims of interaction 
                                                           
136  Pp. 1, Metcalfe, S. (September 1996), Establishing Interdependence between Rural 
District Councils, Save Valley Conservancy and Save Valley Conservancy Trust. 
Unpublished report on workshop 2-3 September. 
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as mere obstacles to the pursuit of private interests’.137 Or should it be inter-
preted as positive persistence from the side of the SVC determined to not let go 
of its initiative despite major opposition and counter-forces trying to undermine 
it? Whatever the answer, the meeting at the Tambuti Lodge Hotel was based on 
‘(t)he challenge (...) to create a sufficiently robust agreement [for] both side of 
the SVC fence to coordinate the key stakeholders (communal and commercial 
farmers) in perpetuity’.138 The workshop split into four groups to discuss various 
issues and give a report on them afterwards in a plenary session. There was a 
group on general issues, one on the Trust and one on the co-ordination between 
the SVC and the districts. The most extensive report came from the fourth 
group on ‘issues facing SVC/community interdependency’, with the ‘bound-
ary/fence’ being the first issue to be recommended on: ‘Ranch/community SVC 
fence lines (not the legal boundary) should be revisited & mutually agreed & 
ratified by the RDC. Historic precedents & pressing needs for land should be 
addressed’.139 The major outcome of the workshop was an extra investment in a 
ritual exchange within an extended organisational structure in which a Joint 
Committee, consisting of representatives from the five RDCs, would ‘represent 
beneficiary interests’ (see Figure 6140). 
 
 
 
 
SVC Trust
Fundraise,
Distribute benefits
Joint Committee
of 5 RDC’s
Represent beneficiary
interests
SVC Committee
Represent SVC
SVC Working Committee
RDC’s (5 members)
SVC (3 members)
 
 
 
Figure 6   Organogram Joint Committee of RDC’s 
(Source: see footnote 140) 
                                                           
137  Pp. 141-142, Neckel in Berking, H. (1999) Sociology of Giving, London, New 
Delhi: Sage Publications. 
138  Metcalfe September 1996: 1. 
139  Ibid: 4. 
140  Ibid: 8. 
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 As can be deduced from Figure 5, the Joint Committee operates like a buffer 
between the Trust and the SVC. A buffer because, so far, the trustees of the 
Trust have been chosen primarily by the SVC themselves, with little eye to 
choosing people who could be considered really representative of the sur-
rounding communities, but who were selected for their expected fund-raising 
abilities, as I described earlier on. Through the Joint Committee the communi-
ties could exercise a more direct influence on the SVC. This development put 
the Trust on the inactive list as a direct platform for consultation on issues 
between the SVC and the communities, but it still remained a perfect paper 
vehicle to display in the shop window of the SVC, indicating that the SVC was 
establishing community relations. The only active member in the Trust 
remained the chairman, the Trustee from Delta Corporation. The Joint Com-
mittee in turn would not relate to the SVC directly but approach it through a 
Working Committee in which representatives of the Joint Committee and SVC 
would be participating. In effect, it seems as if the communities and SVC were 
being pushed further apart by the creation of extra organisational structures. The 
profit the Joint Committee enjoyed above the Trust was that the creation of the 
Joint Committee was a joint decision between the SVC and the RDCs and not a 
solo initiative undertaken by the SVC alone. Furthermore it was indicated that 
the SVC Trust ‘should be established by consensus between the main stake-
holders’. On paper the Joint Committee and the Working Committee could 
work out a new establishment for the Trust. So far, obviously, the Trust was 
considered by the communities and RDCs as an initiative of the SVC in which 
they were not considered as serious partner in the decision-making process. 
How could the SVC, that is, white landowners, decide properly on who would 
represent the communities best? Through the setting up of the Joint Committee 
the initiative for the filling up of the Trust with representatives, that is, Trustees, 
was effectively taken over from the SVC, which could let its voice heard 
through the Working Committee, but which would not be directly responsible 
for choosing people.141 It has to be reported that this organisation structural 
detour worked in the sense that the Joint Committee did meet. Its first meeting 
was already in December of the same year. Although that meeting was primar-
                                                           
141  The New Trust would consist of two representatives from each RDC surrounding 
the SVC: 5 Districts = 10 representatives. They would in turn choose additional 
members of the Trust: 1 traditional leader, 2 MPs and 3 influential citizens. For the 
last they think of people from the SVC team, for instance the (former) chairman of 
the Trust and the man from the Rhino Project, WWF. Information from interview 
with Liaison Officer, 21 May 1998.  
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ily for selecting the Trustees for the Working Committee142 its very existence 
indicates progress in the process of coming to a more balanced form of organ-
isational co-operation between SVC and surrounding communities. 
 The second meeting of the Joint Committee was in February 1997. Two 
things of interest to do with this meeting are worth mentioning. In the first place 
by now there seemed on the part of the communities a serious interest about 
getting involved in the operation of and thus organisational co-operation with 
the SVC seemed to have developed, as the members expressed their feelings 
that ‘some of the grey areas could be cleared if: 
1.  copies of the Save Valley Conservancy Constitution could be made available 
to them (This was agreed to and [the Chairman of the SVC] was going to 
post these copies to them by Monday the 3rd March.) 
2. representatives were to attend meetings of the Save Valley Conservancy’.143 
The second interesting point to observe about this second Joint Committee 
Meeting is that Mr. Makunde was selected to chair the Joint Committee for a 
term of two years. He was a councillor for a ward in the Matsai Communal 
Area. This development is significant because of the fact that his becoming 
chairman of this committee meant that he played an important role in the 
mandate he received from the communal farmers of Matsai in the controversy 
which developed in 1997-1998, following the FMD outbreak and the Land 
Designation Programme. As I described above in the Matsai case, he was 
considered much too pro-SVC which cost him his local goodwill and, as a 
result, in the following election he also had to forfeit his councillorship because 
of the lack of popular support. Furthermore, a discussion was held among the 
members about the specific 5% levy the SVC would pay the Trust annually. 
Was it a realistic percentage, not too low? The chairman of the Trust, the only 
active trustee of the Trust, promised that he would present an explanation to the 
Committee at the next meeting. That next meeting took place in March. He 
began his presentation by stating that ‘the original formula [of the levy] could 
be flawed because it was designed without the consent of the five (5) Rural 
District Councils (...) and the RDC’s could be forgiven if they perceive it as an 
                                                           
142  Minutes Joint Committee Meeting, 10 December 1996. All Joint Committee 
Meetings were held at Mapari Stop Inn, an accommodation of Mapari, part of the 
SVC in the north. At all meetings representatives from the SVC were present, not as 
members but ‘in attendance’. 
143  Minutes Joint Committee Meeting, 26 February 1997. The constitution of the SVC 
was given to the representatives at the next Joint Committee Meeting in March 
1997. I have not come across any representative from the Joint Committee ever 
attending a Conservancy Committee Meeting. 
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imposition on them’.144 Mea culpa. At the same time it had already become clear 
that, neither the donor, nor the shares-route would result in any funding of the 
Trust for restocking purposes. So the whole idea of a levy on donor funds was 
in jeopardy. The alternative the chairman of the Trust presented was that the 
SVC would pay a levy to the Trust as a ‘biological interest rate on the progeny 
of designated animals’.145 The chairman of the Trust promised the Joint Commit-
tee he would be able to present details on this proposal by the end of March, 
after which the next meeting could be convened. The work took a little longer, 
as the next meeting of the Committee was called only in August. At that time 
the SVC was in the process of applying for a loan from the IFC and a represen-
tative of that organisation was also planning to attend the meeting. At that stage 
the SVC was still under the impression that it could attract a loan from the IFC 
with full organisational involvement of the Trust and so the chairman of the 
Trust explained the situation to the Joint Committee accordingly: ‘(a) conces-
sionary element is included in the proposal, whereby IFC is being requested to 
waive repayment of 50% of the loan on condition that this repayment (US$ 0.5 
million) is instead used by the conservancy to bring in wildlife that will be 
released within the conservancy but will be regarded as an endowment for the 
SVC Trust. The SVC will then be obliged to buy the progeny of the Trust’s 
animals each year, at the prevailing live-sale market price for these animals. 
This will result in an annual return of revenue to the Trust, approximating some 
Z$ 400 000 per annum’.146 With this money the Trust could then finance and 
develop all kinds of community projects which would be put forward by the 
Joint Committee. The proposed deal was made all the more attractive by adding 
that the breeding stock that is brought into the SVC by the Trust would remain 
as ‘an endowment in perpetuity’. This means that if it brings in, say, 1000 
animals, these 1000 animals will remain to be considered the founder stock of 
the Trust, despite the natural mortality in the herd. The annual increase of the 
herd will be a net rate, which means a balance between births and deaths, 
including poaching losses. Every animal over and above the number of animals 
that was originally introduced will be bought, maybe ‘leased’ would be a better 
                                                           
144  Minutes Emergency Joint Committee Meeting, 11 March 1997. At the same meeting 
it was revealed on the basis of investigations by the DA of Buhera that the 
organisational structure of the SVC, company and Trust was ‘quite in order’ and 
thus acceptable to them. At the same time, ‘they warned that Government was wary 
of private ownership of wildlife and the political motive by the Conservancies. (...) 
“Trend carefully on new territory” was the message’. 
145  Ibid. ‘Designated species’ are species that are specifically chosen by the SVC to be 
bought to restock the conservancy. 
146  Minutes Joint Committee Meeting, 29 August 1997. 
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word, by the SVC.147 The representative of the IFC wanted to know from the 
Joint Committee, ‘if communities will accept a wildlife endowment as a long-
term investment. Will they not exploit the wildlife over the short-term?’ The 
reason behind his question was that a tourism development takes many years to 
mature and begin to make steady financial profits. Nevertheless, one represen-
tative replied that ‘the RDC working committee and other regulatory mecha-
nisms are well established and there has been much discussion on joint 
ventures. The need now is for capitalization. Instead of talk there must be 
action’. Not without reason, the representative of the IFC ‘thanked the meeting 
for the strong assurances he had received regarding the environmental, 
economic and social sustainability of the proposed restocking project’.148 By 
August 1997 all official indicators seemed to show that the SVC and the 
surrounding communities were slowly approaching each other and had found 
common ground on which to co-operate organisationally in this venture. This 
was the last Joint Committee meeting which has been recorded in minutes. Two 
incidents rudely interfered with this positive developments, the FMD outbreak 
on Mukwazi and its further consequences for the deteriorating relations with 
Matsai Communal Area (see case description) and later the official publication 
of the Land Designation Programme in November 1997. 
 Despite its setbacks the SVC persevered and stoically continued to get the 
co-operative structure off the ground and there was a further formal meeting and 
workshop of the Joint Committee, the SVC and the SVCT in March 1998 to 
discuss a draft of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SVC 
and the Trust. The report was once again written by the same consultant who 
had also compiled the previous reports on the development of the joint venture 
between SVC and neighbouring communities, Simon Metcalfe. Again the text 
is fairly open and honest in its formulation. ‘Initially, the SVC took it upon 
themselves to establish the trust and a core team of trustees (SVC Chairman, 
Delta Corporation representative and WWF project officer) endeavoured to 
fundraise. While the intent may have been positive there were several flaws to 
this. The RDCs were not in command of the trust nor its fundraising (...) The 
current position is that the Trust Chairman (...) has written to the Chairman of 
Bikita RDC (...) who is the chairman of the Joint RDCs [Joint Committee] (...) 
offering to stand down all the trustees in favour of trustees nominated by the 
RDCs. The trust would then effectively become the fiduciary mechanism 
(company) of the RDCs, through which they could become a business partner of 
                                                           
147  Ibid. 
148  Minutes Joint Committee Meeting, 29 August 1997. 
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the SVC’.149 In other words, the organisational structure of co-operation has now 
entered a phase in which it is increasingly turning into a ‘normal’ joint venture 
structure, in which both parties and partners have an independent stake in the 
process and in deciding which way business should be going as well as in how 
to follow its own strategy within the organisational structure to ensure economic 
benefits from it. While this was going on the process of the loan application to 
the IFC had made it clear that the earlier idea of the SVC of endowing the 
SVCT with US$ 0.5 million could not be pursued any further as the IFC wanted 
the endowment to the Trust separated from their loan to the private sector.150 So 
now the Trust is not only organisationally on its own functioning through the 
RDCs, but also has to find its own funding, although with starting capital from 
the SVC.151 But, at the time of the workshop, the land designation programme 
had run right through the cautiously built-up of the process of organisational co-
operation and ‘(i)t was recognised that the land designation issue had confused 
and destabilised everything for the time being’.152 In the discussion the partici-
pants came to the conclusion that it was not so much the question whether land 
would be designated, but whether it would be used for resettlement yes or no. If 
the land were used for resettlement, then the whole idea of a wildlife venture 
had to be given up. It ‘would be a disaster for the conservancy’. If the land were 
designated, but the pattern of land use remained the same, the RDCs would 
have the option of participating in the SVC as landowners and investors, on 
behalf of the communities (I shall look at this aspect of RDC participation later 
on in this chapter). The coalition of stakeholders in the SVC would change and 
it would ‘accommodate indigenisation and equity policies’. On the basis of  
these considerations the Joint Committee came to the conclusion that ‘in 
principle the idea of the Trust being an RDC instrument for establishing a joint 
venture between the RDCs and the SVC was agreeable’.153 In the MoU it was 
stated that the RDCs, as well as the SVC, would have to study it in more detail, 
‘comb through it’, to see if it ‘represents the basic intents of the parties and [if] 
they must feel happy to commit themselves to its spirit and practical purpose’.154 
It was agreed that the Joint Committee would organise and select trustees for 
                                                           
149  Pp. 2, Metcalfe, S. (March 1998), Report on a Workshop of the Joint Committee of 
Rural District Councils to Consider Proposals Related to the Save Valley Conser-
vancy and the Save Valley Conservancy Trust. Unpublished report. 
150  Ibid: 5. 
151  Z$ 2 million over four years. 
152  Ibid: 9. 
153  All quotes taken from ibid: 10. 
154  Ibid: 9. I will come back to the exact text of the MoU further down in the text of this 
chapter. 
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the Trust in June 1998. It was on this date the RDCs and the SVC would give 
their final response to the MoU. The signing of the MoU and the appointment of 
the new Trustees would all take place at a ceremonial meeting.155 The final 
organisational structure of the Trust would be as presented in Figure 7.156  
 My fieldwork seemed to coincide exactly with the climax of the final stages 
of the organisational co-operation between SVC and the RDCs. 
 With this bright future as background, it is interesting to see what other 
options there were open to the RDCs in 1998 in joining the SVC initiative in 
terms of adding their own land to the conservancy, plus extra options arising 
from the designation programme. In fact this boils down to two options, one in 
the north let me start with the lesser known one in the north, the Buhera District. 
In this development, relocation of people, removal of old buildings and the 
erection of lodges and other such work. They want to try and find that money 
through a commercial set-up, by finding a joint venture partner in the private 
sector, or within National Parks or Government, which would be willing to 
invest in this business opportunity commercially. Of course other donors would 
be welcome as well, but the idea was based on commercial principles. Accord-
ing to the Assistant Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Buhera District, who was 
also a member of the Joint Committee, they had send their proposal to the ZTA 
for consultation and approval some two years ago, but so far had not received 
an answer. They wanted to try and follow it up now as people in the Council 
had begun to ask questions about it. They had targeted the project for March 
1998, but now they were looking at December 1998. At that stage the idea was 
to start out on their own as a communal conservancy and then later join the 
SVC as the first commercial/communal conservancy in the country. If they 
were given ‘the green light’ from the ZTA, they ‘can start talking to the 
communities’. Buhera was also in the process of becoming a full-fledged 
CAMPFIRE district. They were already considered a CAMPFIRE district but 
did not yet have Appropriate Authority.157 The main difference according to the 
Assistant CEO between CAMPFIRE and their idea of a conservancy was that 
CAMPFIRE was managed by the local communities themselves, while their 
                                                           
155  Ibid: 15. 
156  Ibid: 8. 
157  Appropriate Authority in Zimbabwe refers to the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 in 
which the landowner was defined as the appropriate authority for managing wildlife. 
In 1982 the Parks and Wildlife Act was amended to allow District Councils and later 
Rural District Councils to be designated as an appropriate authority to manage 
wildlife (Duffy 2000: 16 & 90). 
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idea was to create a joint venture in which the communities would participate 
through the election of Council members into the RDC.158 
 Another example of a district willing to step into the boat with the SVC was 
Bikita District. The same district which was also heavily involved in the Matsai 
issue, so one wonders what the exact intention of the RDC was. Was it in it for 
business opportunities or was its action another expression of and episode in the 
saga of The Land Issue? Let the case provide the answer on this seemingly 
paradoxical role of the Bikita RDC. It concerned one piece of land in the middle 
of the northern part of the SVC, Umkondo Mine. I have already mentioned it in 
Chapter 1 on The Land Issue in Zimbabwe. It is a beautiful piece of land in 
terms of landscape, although it is full of the left-overs and remains of the 
copper-mining which had once been exploited there. After the mining activities 
closed down the mining equipment for which a buyer could be found was sold 
off and, the rest was left to rot and /or taken over by the bush. At some spots 
this lends Umkondo Mine the image of a ghost town. Strangely enough this 
adds to the picturesqueness of the landscape. The mine shafts were not filled in 
or secured and many metal installations were just left lying around. It was open-
cart mining, which means that it created a huge crater-like hole in the ground. 
The bottom is now filled with water providing home for a crocodile.159 
Umkondo Mine is a piece of State Land, but because it is land-locked within the 
SVC and economic activity there has ceased, the government was willing to 
lease the land to whoever is willing to pay the price. The first to clinch a deal 
was the German landowner of Sango, Mr. Pabst, who launched a leasing 
process. Having at least taken this step he always thereafter proclaimed that 
Umkondo Mine was officially his. The Bikita RDC checked on his story, 
because if Mr. Pabst had indeed leased the property, he also had to pay charges 
to the Bikita RDC. The investigation led to the conclusion that Mr. Pabst had 
applied for the lease but it had never yet been finalised and that he had never 
paid for it.160 This was confirmed in a letter from the Secretary for Lands and 
Water Resources which says that ‘the agreement of lease has not yet been 
concluded and no one has, as yet, taken occupation of the piece of land. The 
reason why the lease agreement has not yet been concluded is that some of the 
conditions of lease are still under discussion’.161 In the meantime, Mr. Pabst had 
                                                           
158  Interview with Assistant CEO Buhera District, 15 July 1998. 
159  Observations during visit, 17 May 1998. 
160  Interview with CEO Bikita RDC, 14 July 1998. He told me than that the Minister for 
Lands and Agriculture had told it to him personally that there is no official lease 
contract between his ministry and Sango. 
161  Letter to the CEO, Bikita RDC, by Secretary for Lands and Water Resources, 8 
August 1996. 
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gone ahead and managed Umkondo Mine, considering the mine his, a convic-
tion which was writ large on small aluminium plates all over the property with 
‘Pabst Holdings’ inscribed on them. One reason that he was so confident about 
the outcome of the discussion around Umkondo Mine was because he knows 
the Minister of Lands, Minister Kangai, personally.162 He wants to rehabilitate 
the mine, beginning by removing all the remains of earlier mining activities, 
which will cost a mind of money. Mr. Pabst also went to Bikita RDC in his 
helicopter and showed them how much it costs just to manage the property, let 
alone rehabilitate it. He claims that this shocked them considerably. Undeterred, 
they continued their struggle to get AA over Umkondo Mine. If they were to 
win, they would have to find a suitable joint venture partner with sufficient 
capital to commence operations. The Bikita RDC and Mr. Pabst were not the 
only players in the game in which the stake was the lease of the Umkondo 
Mine. As the mine falls under Bikita, the RDC was also approached by others 
who were interested in leasing it from them. Among them is another member of 
the SVC, the landowner of Makore, who approached Bikita RDC in 1997 to 
apply for a lease of Umkondo Mine, not to rehabilitate it, but solely for trophy 
hunting. The lease amount would then be proportionate to the available quota. 
The estimated quota would be, two leopards, two eland, four kudu, four zebra, 
four wildebeest, 100 impala and four duiker. He added that ‘(a)s you can see 
this is not a very big quota and by itself does not constitute an economic or 
viable operation. Hence the need for an operator who has the back up of other 
animals and a safari operation to get this lease’.163 In order to make his bid more 
attractive to and opportunistic for the RDC he began a joint venture with a black 
safari operator, who also wrote a letter to the Bikita RDC in which he an-
nounced the joint venture with the words: ‘I here let you know that the two of 
us [Makore and Mjimba] have formed a joint venture safari operations. I hope 
you are aware that this business has been for one section of our community that 
is, the whites. Our government is in pain encouraging that we the blacks be in 
this stream line. We have identified Umkondo state land and the two of us being 
the two different communities together augers very well to what our govern-
ment wants or requires’.164 In fact Makore had two options for Umkondo Mine: 
it could go into it as a joint venture partner with the Bikita RDC directly,165 or 
                                                           
162  Remember that Mr. Pabst was also the man who met President Mugabe during his 
tour through Germany in March 1998. According to Mr. Pabst, he was able to meet 
and speak with Mugabe on five occasions, information from interview with land-
owner Sango, 5 August 1998. 
163  Letter landowner Makore to Bikita RDC, 8 September 1997. 
164  Letter Mr. Mjimba to Bikita RDC, 27 November 1997. 
165  Letter landowner Makore to Bikita RDC, 20 May 1998. 
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could obtain a lease to operate the mine under his joint venture with Mjimba. 
Both options had a similar structure, that Makore did the financing and hunting 
development on the property and the other delivered the political legitimacy. In 
May 1998 Mjimba repeated its offer to the Bikita RDC in an extensive letter in 
which it also mentioned the exact amounts of fees the RDC would receive in 
US dollars were it to lease Umkondo to it.166 There is no official paperwork from 
Sango in the RDC file on the issue. Mr. Pabst only communicated verbally with 
them and offered to rehabilitate the area for them. At that time the landowner of 
Makore still thought that Sango had ‘a 60% chance against him 40%’, because 
Mr. Pabst has ‘connections on the highest political level’, that is, the Minister of 
Lands himself, which makes his position ‘very strong’.167 The problem was that 
as long as the Bikita RDC had no AA, it could not enter into a formal joint 
venture on the Umkondo Mine. So in June 1998 it tried again to put pressure on 
the Minister of Lands and Agriculture through a letter from its representative 
Member of Parliament (MP),168 urging that a decision be made about Bikita’s 
application. “Minister, I am given to understand that Bikita Rural District 
Council has been in touch with your ministry over time in a bid to secure the 
said piece of land [Umkondo Mine] for the said purpose [AA]. What continues 
to worry the council is that your ministry is yet to give a definitive position in 
terms of actually supporting the council in this case. Worse still, there are off-
the-record indications to the effect that the very piece of land may already have 
been leased to somebody else [Mr. Pabst]. Fortunately, on this particular point, 
you assured me that that was not the case’.169 This elicited no response. In July a 
letter was sent to the Minister of Lands and Agriculture to remind him of its 
earlier letter: ‘could we therefor humbly implore you, Cde Minister, to help us – 
and help us as a matter of urgency’.170 The last letter in the file on the Umkondo 
Mine at the Bikita RDC is the reply of the Minister of Land and Agriculture in 
which he says nothing about the AA approval for Bikita, but does say that ‘the 
Leasee is agreeable to go into a joint venture with the council (...)’.171 Without 
                                                           
 
166  Letter Mr. Mjimba to Bikita RDC, 18 May 1998. Mr Mjimbi knows that Makore is 
also applying for a direct joint venture with Bikita RDC. Mr. Mjimba and the land-
owner of Makore are old acquaintances, and have become close friends, who help 
each other out if necessary. 
167  Interview with landowner Makore, 1 October 1998. 
168  Who coincidentally also happens to be the Minister of Education, Sport and Culture.  
169  Letter Mr. Machinga to Minister of Lands and Agriculture, 16 June 1998. 
170  Letter Mr. Machinga to Minister of Lands and Agriculture, 23 July 1998. Italics in 
original. 
171  He is probably legally also not allowed to say anything about the AA application 
because the official line to apply for AA seems to be through the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing (MLGH). With AA status, the provisions of the Parks Act 
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an AA this would not lead anywhere in the long run. In 1998 the case remained 
unfinished. It would be a positive development for the SVC were a black 
landowner with AA to enter onto the scene of the SVC. It would give a tremen-
dous fillip towards legitimising its position politically. At the same time this 
‘salvation’ could come from the same district, which parallel to its claim on 
Umkondo Mine, was a key player as district authority in the Matsai case, which 
was in the process of seriously undermining the SVC initiative. The paradox of 
being a ‘saviour’ and ‘executioner’ at the same time, was made possible in 1998 
by the specific national context of land designation and the historical context of 
contrasting black and white social identities related to land. 
 Despite the extremely bumpy ride the SVC had experienced in establishing 
organisational co-operation with the neighbouring communities, in November 
1998 things finally seemed to come together in a ceremony at which the Trust 
of the SVC was taken over and handed over to a new Board of Trustees, all of 
them black in contrast to the first Board and every Trustee representing some of 
the neighbouring communities. All, except one businessman from Chipinge, 
were from local authorities at the district level. As an elected authority it can be 
considered to represent the local populace surrounding the SVC. The actual 
ceremony took place on 27 November 1998, at Mapari Stop Inn, where the Joint 
Committee has always held its meetings. The meeting had been planned much 
earlier, actually already in June of that year, which can be gleaned from the 
workshop report in March.172 Because of the national context of Zimbabwe and 
the local difficulties, including the Matsai case, the upgrading of the fence and 
the loan application to the IFC, it had to be postponed time and again. For that 
reason I was not physically present at the ceremony, which is to be regretted. 
This means that I cannot give first hand observations, but have to rely on the 
report, which is written by the liaison officer. It is interesting to note that on the 
list of those attending the meeting, there was no DA from any of the five 
districts present. Buhera and Zaka had sent proxies and other representatives 
had been chosen for the remaining districts. There was a strong delegation from 
the SVC and its supporters from the WWF, including the chairman of the old 
Board of Trustees, the chairman of the SVC, the conservator and several people 
from the WWF. Also in attendance were the two representatives of the oldest 
white tradition in this part of Zimbabwe, who are also councillors for their 
respective districts, Humani and Chishakwe, the latter being the former Devuli 
                                                           
take effect immediately. Clearly a matter of an absense of legal clarity which is 
probably also a problem for peoples at RDCs seeking AA. The new Environmental 
Bill tries to resolve these difficulties. Thanks are due to Vupenyu Dzingirai who put 
this matter to my attention. 
172  Metcalfe March 1998: 15. 
 CASES OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE 211 
headquarters. The liaison officer was the facilitator of the meeting. The 
chairman of the SVC was asked to make the opening remarks and to present the 
gift from the SVC, the New Trust to the communities through the new Board of 
Trustees. ‘The SVC Chairman heralded this gathering as a historical event that 
had taken a long journey to materialise’.173 Despite the initial route that the SVC 
had taken to present the communities with the Trust, that is, set up a Trust 
without prior consultation and choosing its own Trustees, the chairman said that 
‘the principles on SVC had been discussed openly to allay any fears and 
suspicions and wished them to adopt the same spirit’. The next speaker was the 
chairman of the old Trustees, who gave a short historical overview of how the 
Trust had developed and emphasised that ‘the Trust idea was holed to the 
success of the SVC [that is, politically legitimising it] adding that the SVC’s 
failure will impede progress of the Trust’. He also mentioned that the SVC was 
borrowing money from the IFC and that the Trust would be granted some Z$1 
million ‘seed capital’ over four years. This is only half of what it had thought of 
in the first place.174 I am rather hazy about the reason for this as it was decided 
upon after I had already left. Finally he reiterated that it is essential to the 
success of the Trust that it find its own funding in order to be able to buy and 
invest wildlife in the SVC. Following these two introductions came the election 
of the chairman of the Trust, the selection of additional Trustees and the 
handing-over ceremony. In the structure of the New Trust there was provision, 
that over and about the representatives from the communities and RDCs, the 
Trust would complement its membership with five additional Trustees who 
would be selected for their strategic importance to the SVC. They were selected 
at this meeting and would be formally approached afterwards. Their declaration 
as Trustee would of course only be possible after they had accepted the offer of 
becoming a trustee. They were looking for two members of parliament, two 
technical advisors and one traditional leader. It is interesting to see who were 
selected for these posts for strategic reasons. As members of parliament, those 
two would approach the Minister of Agriculture and therefore be very influen-
tial in the Land Question. One was minister Kangai, who played a very 
important role in launching and frantically defending the land designation 
programme in 1997. The other member of parliament was the Minister of 
Education, Sports and Culture, Mr. Machinga, who also happens to be the one 
who wrote the letters exhorting Kangai to do something about the claim of 
                                                           
173  Minutes of inaugural ceremony on the hand-over / take-over of the Savé Valley 
Conservancy Trust, 27 November 1998. Following quotes in this section are all from 
this report. 
174  Compared with amount of Z$ 2 million mentioned in minutes CCM, 11 February 
1998. 
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Bikita RDC to the Umkondo Mine. As technical advisers they selected the 
former chairman of the Trust and the executant of the Rhino Conservation 
Strategy from the WWF. The latter who had played such an important role in 
establishing conservancies in Zimbabwe in the first place. As traditional leader 
they selected Chief Mutema. This chief had clashed with the landowner of 
Mapari on several occasions about the exact location of the fence near the river. 
It seems as if the SVC was offering them a piece of the economic cake, a further 
gift of the SVC, in order to pacify them and ask of them a return gift in the form 
of legitimising the SVC and respecting its boundaries. No wonder that at the 
official hand-over after lunch the former chairman of the Trust presented the 
new Chairman with a check of Z$ 10,000 and a copy of the Notarial Deed of the 
Trust. They ‘shook hands in the process. Delegates there applauded to this 
exchange.’175 Now the Trust was officially in the hands of the communities, with 
their own selected Trustees, and it had become an official bridge to structure the 
co-operation between the SVC and the neighbouring districts. The Memoran-
dum of Understanding, the body and soul of the organisational structure of the 
Trust, was not on the agenda during the take-over. That issue would be handled 
and finalised in another meeting. By June 1999 the meeting had still not taken 
place.176 Without the formal recognition of the MoU, the Trust is essentially an 
empty organisational shell, a hollow ritual meeting place. Therefore it is 
interesting to take a closer look at the draft text of the MoU and see what 
elements and emphases of my analysis of the process of organisational co-
operation between SVC and neighbouring communities turn up again in this 
text.  
 I had expected that the key elements of my description and theoretical 
interpretation of the issues at stake between SVC and surrounding communities 
would be made clear as presuppositions right at the beginning of the MoU. And 
I was not disappointed. In the Preamble the following issues, amongst some 
others, are put forward: firstly that the ‘land use within the SVC is established 
as wildlife-based tourism’.177 This means that it lays down the possibilities for 
non-consumptive and consumptive tourism. Hunting is implicated, although 
(still) hidden, in this formulation. Secondly that the Trust ‘has been established 
for the promotion and sponsorship of involvement by the rural communities 
surrounding the area of the Conservancy in the economic and conservation 
                                                           
175  Italics added. 
176  Personal communication with Conservator. 
177  MoU between the Savé Valley Conservancy and the Rural District Councils of 
Chiredzi and Bikita (of which it is part) and Chipinge, Zaka, Buhera (of which it is a 
neighbour), first draft, 30 January 1998. Further quotes in the text without a note are 
also taken from the preamble of this document. Italics added. 
 CASES OF RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE 213 
activities of the Conservancy’. This ineluctably betrays that the Trust can be 
seen as the gift from the SVC to the communities. Implied in the word 
‘economic’ is the hope that the communities may gain material advantages of 
this co-operation. Implied in the word ‘conservation’ is the hope that the 
communities do not poach. But most importantly for the whole argument of this 
thesis is the final formulation of the preamble, which says ‘NOTING that 
although the Conservancy boundary physically provides a hard edge between it, 
as private land, and the surrounding communities, as communal land, the intent 
of this Memorandum of Understanding is to soften that edge through a social 
and economic partnership aimed at the mutual benefit of the Conservancy and 
its neighbours’. This formulation seems to say it all: the fixed boundary, which 
the whites introduced into southern Africa and in the context of the SVC 
demarcated and symbolised through the buffalo fence, will remain to segregate 
black and white. In order to sweeten this bitter pill, the SVC offers a reciprocal 
exchange through the fence, in which the SVC extends economic benefits to the 
communities in return for respecting the boundary.178 On the basis of these 
propositions, the MoU could proceed to describe the objectives of both the SVC 
and the Trust. In effect the objectives must mean a kind of operationalisation of 
the presuppositions formulated in the preamble. In this respect the MoU is 
consistent. In the objectives of the SVC it is noted, amongst other things and 
building on the presuppositions I quoted above, that tourism must be understood 
as consisting of ‘consumptive (that is, game cropping and safari hunting) and 
non-consumptive (that is, tourism179) forms’.180 The communities return in the 
objectives of the SVC by stating that the SVC aims at the ‘development of a 
programme to enhance communication with neighbouring communities and to 
stimulate the economic and social advancement of such communities through 
durable linkages with the Conservancy’s wildlife industry’.181 With regard to the 
issue of the hard-edge boundary, it is stated that the object of the SVC is the 
‘construction and maintenance of the perimeter game fencing to a specified 
                                                           
178  The other two points in this preamble are the description of the SVC as ‘an amalga-
mation of 24 private ranches’ and a description of the Trust as ‘corporate whose 
function is to act as the fiduciary institution for the Joint Committee of Rural District 
Councils’. 
179  This probably does not cover what they mean exactly, as safari hunting is also a 
form of tourism. What they probably mean to say is photographic safaris and the 
like (for instance horse-riding etc.). 
180  Ibid: 1.4. 
181  Ibid: 1.5. It is the only article in the MoU that is presented in a bold letter type. This 
article probably signifies more than anything else the raison d’être of the whole 
Trust idea. Italics added. 
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standard’.182 It is driven home that the fence is there strictly for purposes of 
wildlife management, and does not refer to anything else. The many boundary 
disputes I described above speak for themselves in this respect and contrast 
starkly with the formulation in the MoU. The Trust is formulated as having only 
one objective: ‘to foster co-operation and communication between the Conser-
vancy and its neighbouring communities through beneficial and durable 
economic relations’.183 The rest of the text is devoted to the summing up of all 
the kinds of projects and activities the Trust could potentially initiate for the 
communities. The gift of the SVC to the communities is specified in more detail 
in a section of the MoU, which is summed up under Points 4.1 to 4.9, the 
‘opportunities’ the SVC ‘offers’ to the Trust. The mutuality of the arrangement 
is stressed in the section which sums up the opportunities the Trust should 
ideally offer to the SVC.  
 The political legitimation aspect of the Trust-construction is most clearly 
formulated in the wording of the final opportunity: ‘A joint venture partner with 
whom to collaborate with government agencies particularly the Department of 
National Parks and Wildlife Management in terms of translocation of founder 
stock’.184 Its legitimising character is underlined further in the section on the 
obligations of both the SVC and the Trust: ‘Publicise the Understanding to 
other parties especially the Government of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe public 
at large’.185 Finally, the reciprocal exchange returns in two sections of the MoU. 
Firstly in Point 3, where it is mentioned that ‘it is the intent of the Conservancy, 
through its Committee, and the RDCs through its Trust, to foster a mutually 
beneficial partnership’.186 The mutuality turn up a second time in the section on 
the obligations of the Trust and of the SVC, where it is said that ‘a positive and 
dynamic local agenda [is ensured] including, inter alia: the making of rules 
related to the relationship between the Conservancy and the Wards eg. 
poaching, fence management, fence alignment, access, transport through 
Conservancy etc.’187 That is, from a state of negative reciprocity into one of 
balanced reciprocity. The door between the two stages being the gift of the 
SVC. An interesting solution is envisioned in the section on conflict resolution 
                                                           
182  Ibid: 1.3. 
183  Ibid: 2.a. 
184  Ibid: 5.5. Here also speaks the ultimate wish to buy buffalo for the SVC through the 
Trust. Italics added. 
185  Ibid: 6.6, italics added. 
186  Ibid: 3, italics added. 
187  Ibid: 6.4. ‘Fence management’ in context sounds like a euphemism for respecting 
the boundary by the communities. Not for nothing is it mentioned directly after the 
issue of poaching! 
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between the SVC and the Trust / communities. The SVC, of course, settles its 
own problems in the CCM. All disputes between SVC and communities or 
within communities are delegated to, after the local authority has dealt with 
such matters, either to the Joint Committee (that is, conflicts within communi-
ties) or to the Working Committee (that is, conflicts between farmers and 
specific communities).188 However elegant the formulation and structure may 
seem, this obviates the SVC formally from any form of direct involvement and 
interaction with the communities. In other words, every contact between SVC 
and even individual farmers and communities is transformed into a mediated 
contact. In yet other words, by this formal organisational structure of co-opera-
tion, the interaction between the SVC and communities is, ritualised and objec-
tified; the joint venture joins and separates simultaneously, replicating any 
reciprocal exchange relation. The MoU is concluded by some formal formula-
tions about the duration of the memorandum, amendments to the memorandum 
and finally the agreement which should be undersigned by the Chairman of the 
SVC and the Chairmen of the RDCs.  
 With the Trust and new trustees in place, the SVC has created a formal 
organisational structure for economic co-operation with its neighbouring 
communities. If the Trust and the SVC undersign the MoU the organisational 
structure can be ‘filled’ with some sort of constitution. With the hand-over 
ceremony finalised, I have described the long and complicated process to come 
to a form of organisational co-operation between the SVC and the neighbouring 
communities. It did work out and it did become formalised. But did it also 
indicate that the gift was accepted and that therefore the communities were 
willing to repay them with the expected return gift? Based on the material 
presented in this chapter one would be tempted to answer this question in the 
negative. But what was the reason that the surrounding communities were not 
willing to accept this gift? In the next chapter I will relate all this empirical case 
material and the remaining questions explicitly to the conceptual framework of 
reciprocity as sketched in the introductory chapter. 
                                                           
188  Ibid: 7.0. 
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Following the basic structure of reciprocal exchange as presented by Mauss 
again, three main questions are relevant to my theoretical framework in the 
context of my detailed case study on the organisational co-operation between 
the SVC and its neighbouring communities. The first is: what were the 
intentions of the gift giver (the SVC) in presenting the communities with a gift 
(the Trust)? Secondly, how willing were the communities and the RDCs to 
receive this gift? Thirdly, have the communities presented a fitting return gift? 
Added to these main points should be added the question of what mix of affect 
and effect is present in the reciprocal exchange between the SVC and the 
communities. But before turning to the hermeneutic use of the theoretical 
framework for interpreting the ethnographic data, let us first see if the data 
presented in this book shed new light on the theoretical issues surrounding the 
concept of reciprocity. 
 Mauss’s theoretical exposé on the gift is mainly remembered for the ‘spirit 
of the gift’, the hau. This notion has been severely attacked and deconstructed 
by several authors, as described in the introduction to this book. Mauss’s 
theoretical framework has to a large extent been abandoned and has almost sunk 
into oblivion. It has been replaced by a far more secularised version, a theoreti-
cal shift that seems to fit the move towards increasing secularisation in Western 
society. Theoretically the ‘secular’ and the ‘spiritual’ interpretations of the 
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reciprocal process evolving around gift giving do not often meet. It seems that 
the spiritual interpretation has lost so much intellectual ground that it should be 
forgotten about. I would like to argue that this case study of a highly secular 
structure of organisational co-operation in the commercially oriented private 
conservation sector in Zimbabwe sheds new light on this discussion. I want to 
argue that what the secular gift of the SVC to the neighbouring communities, 
the SVCT, missed was exactly a spirit: it missed the spirit of the gift attached to 
land! And as we know from Mauss, (see Introduction), it is this particular spirit 
that motivates and presses the recipient to feel a moral obligation towards the 
giver to make some return gesture. In the theoretical discussion it was argued 
that every reciprocal process is inherently ambivalent in terms of a sense of 
moral obligation on the one hand and strategic consideration on the other. 
Reciprocal relations are at the same time characterised by affect and effect: 
figuratively speaking the ambivalence is caused by the wandering spirit of the 
gift. This means that the deconstruction of Mauss’s approach was necessary to 
be able to apply analyses of reciprocal relations and gift giving to the secular 
and economic spheres in life too. But this should not mean that Mauss’s 
perspective should be seen as being outdated and of no value. The conclusion of 
this case study can be that theoretically Mauss’s ‘spirit of the gift’ is definitely 
in need of repreciation. The economic bookkeeping approach and the spiritual 
aspect of reciprocal relations go hand in hand in this secular context of a joint 
venture in private wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe. Let us now turn our 
attention to the interpretation of the empirical data along the lines of the 
theoretical framework presented in the Introduction.  
 On the basis of the material presented in the previous chapters it can be 
concluded that relations between the SVC and the communities may be charac-
terised as a reciprocal relation. The complexity of this simple observation lies in 
the fact that the SVC as well as the communities cannot be perceived as single 
entities but should be considered an amalgamation of different groups and 
interests with correspondingly different historical and social backgrounds and 
contexts. This has also led to a specific power configuration between black and 
white in Zimbabwe. It seems as if the whites were always the more powerful in 
this relation. This may be true as far as it concerns military power by the end of 
the nineteenth century, judiciary power as territory under the BSAC and later 
under white minority rule, and the economic power of whites after Independ-
ence. But this power has never been uncontested. In that sense the less powerful 
black population of Zimbabwe has never agreed to the status quo in terms of 
power relations. Throughout Zimbabwean history the black population has 
stubbornly protested against the state of affairs by teasing and testing the 
powerful whites through claiming their land back and taking every opportunity 
to communicate their complaints by not respecting boundaries between 
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communal and commercial land and poaching. It is important to take this power 
aspect into consideration when interpreting the reciprocal exchange between the 
SVC and the SVCT. Giving, accepting or rejecting and returning gifts all have 
strong strategic implications as I made clear in the Introduction with the 
example of the potlatch. Did the SVC intend its gift of the SVCT to try and 
confirm the status quo of the economic power relations between the SVC and 
the communities? If the communities had accepted it whole-heartedly they 
would have accepted and bowed obediently to the more powerful position of the 
SVC in this respect. Would they have answered, to paraphrase Mauss, that they 
are ‘in the shadow of the SVC’? Or would the SVC expect the communities to 
reject the gift in order to challenge the power of the SVC as a continuation of 
their protests against the unequal land distribution throughout the history of 
Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe? In the words of Godelier, should the gift of 
the SVC in the end have been interpreted as an act of generosity, violence or 
humiliation? It is also important to consider what a possible answer to this 
question would mean for the rest of the relations in which the SVC and 
communities engage, that is, the broader context in which the SVC and the 
communities operate, like ministries, NGOs, donor agencies, etc.  
 Taken together, this produces different arenas that are also related, not only 
to each other but also to other levels of interaction with different government 
departments like the DNPWLM, the Veterinary Department and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, multilateral institutions like the WWF, and international funding 
institutions like the IFC. But, as the last chapter showed, the relationship refers 
not only to higher levels of interaction but also to levels closer to the ground – 
between individual farmers and directly neighbouring communities; between 
game scouts and communities; between landowners and the police and through 
the police with the communities. I could go on specifying all the different levels 
of reciprocal exchange which together constitute the system of reciprocities I 
have described in this book surrounding and encapsulating the process of 
establishing a joint venture. What conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
level of interaction between the SVC and the neighbouring communities in 
terms of reciprocity?  
 Let me answer one by one the three questions with which I opened this 
chapter. How can the intentions of the SVC in offering the gift of the Trust to 
the communities be interpreted? It would be (far too) easy to say that there were 
only strategic considerations at play in the SVC. Of course, such tactics were 
important in response to the answers of the Minister in Parliament in 1996. And 
they were definitely important in lobbying for a loan and legitimising the SVC 
project politically and socially. And of course they were important because 
nowadays everybody in conservation circles is paying lip-service to the impor-
tance of community relations, and in order to play along with this it is virtually 
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impossible to escape thinking otherwise. Community relations nowadays have 
similar powers to those of a dominant paradigm in science. Only a conscious 
heretic would argue otherwise. And naturally conservation is a well-respected 
ideology that can be used to defend one’s property in the context of the threat of 
land designation. All these factors are undoubtedly at work but not exclusively. 
There is also a deep commitment to the conservation of the environment that 
springs from a historically built relationship with it. And not only with their 
own land but with the landscape in Zimbabwe and southern Africa in general, 
which naturally implies an awareness of the people populating that land. That 
commitment might be based on an old-fashioned Romantic and British tradition 
of Africa as an unspoilt Eden, populated by ‘good’ and ‘bad’ natives but it 
obviously remains a powerful drive urging individuals and institutions to take 
initiatives. This is the reason why the SVC pays so much attention to conserva-
tion awareness programmes and has formulated its conservation goal as the first 
objective in its constitution. Within the present context of international conser-
vation bodies, this means that communities have to be seen as partners and part 
of the conservation strategy.  
 In conclusion, the intentions of the SVC were primarily conservation-
oriented, which in the present context suggests that communities have had to 
become part of the strategy in terms of sustainable development, which implies 
strategic political considerations. Being a private-sector initiative this meant 
that they went for an option, a joint venture, which in the end turned out to be 
commercial in orientation. Earlier attempts to guide it along another route 
failed. A joint venture is the most common idea put forward to structure wishes 
of organisational co-operation with a commercial orientation. For that reason, 
the SVC had to objectify the other party, that is, the communities, as a partner 
in a legal organisational structure, which became the SVCT. The SVC had to 
take the initiative because there was no other legal private organisational co-
operative structure available to represent the communities on which to build. On 
top of these primary intentions many issues were at play in the context of the 
SVC that forced it also to think and act strategically. This is not meant as a 
moral judgement of any kind but is a plausible conclusion reached on the basis 
of the empirical material presented in this book. It says that the SVC operated 
along the lines of a certain logic, which can be deduced from the process of the 
establishment of the joint venture. This is far from saying that the SVC operated 
in either a good or a bad way. Viewed from its own perspective, the SVC 
operated quite consistently towards the communities, guided by trial and error 
along the way.  
 The second question is how willing the communities were to receive and 
accept the gift of the SVC. The answer should provide me with the necessary 
information to contextualise the operations of the SVC in this field: was its offer 
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well considered? In other words, did the SVC try (hard enough) to place itself in 
the ‘mind of the receiver’ to estimate and calculate their willingness to accept 
the gift? Did it give (enough) consideration to whether the gift was appropriate 
under the circumstances? And was the timing of the gift right? The answers to 
all these questions are relevant in constituting an interpretation of the willing-
ness of the communities to accept the gift with open arms, thus obliging them-
selves to repay it with a fitting return (and confirming the status quo). The 
answer to this second question has implications for the answer to the third 
question about a fitting return gift from the communities to the SVC. From the 
material presented here it can be concluded that the offer was well considered in 
terms of the ideological climate prevailing within multilateral nature conserva-
tion circles in the 1990s. The time was right to head the discourse of community 
relations with a commercial orientation, especially in Zimbabwe. The CAMP-
FIRE programme had paved the way for the acceptance of such an attitude and 
by the time the SVC came up with its idea in 1995-1996, CAMPFIRE was 
enjoying its heyday of political popularity and it was realistic to think that the 
idea of the SVC would find fertile soil among the major Western donors and 
conservation organisations. The gift was also well considered in terms of the 
increasingly difficult relationship with the DNPWLM. The SVC could hardly 
deal directly with the DNPWLM any longer following the suspension of its 
popular support at the top of the DNPWLM. The idea of presenting the 
DNPWLM with a Trust, representing the communities, and buying wildlife 
from the DNPWLM for the benefit of the communities seemed a well-balanced 
strategy. The gift also seemed well thought out in terms of the country’s 
economic situation. Zimbabwe had already begun to slide into a negative 
economic spiral and the first to suffer from its ill effects were the farmers in the 
communal areas. To a large extent, this negative economic development could 
be blamed on the Zimbabwean Government, and so it seemed the perfect 
situation for the SVC to stand up and offer the communities the gift of the 
Trust, especially created to generate future economic benefits for the communal 
farmer. The question of whether the gift was well thought through from the 
perspective of the SVC and therefore if it might be optimistic about the gift 
being accepted with open arms can now be answered positively. But things are 
never what they seem. 
 There were three inter-related aspects of the complicated context that were 
not conducive to the chosen approach of the SVC. In the first place there was a 
general lack of socio-cultural antennae tuned in to the historical role and current 
context of land in the social identity construction of black Zimbabweans. The 
whites in the SVC have never seriously wanted to believe or accept that the land 
they now own and occupy, and which they call their property, is in the eyes of 
neighbouring black Zimbabweans still their land. The land will remain their 
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inalienable right and (almost) nothing can obstruct their claim to that land. From 
their political perspective, virtually no gift in the world, no matter how compre-
hensive, would ever be able to repay the guilt incurred by alienating their land. 
Every gift in this context is primarily judged in terms of compensation for 
earlier ‘crimes’ of land alienation. And they can only be fully compensated if 
they get their land back. Community-based natural resource management only 
has a chance in Zimbabwe if land equity is taken seriously.1 Secondly, the SVC 
failed to consider the communicative ritual surrounding every gift exchange and 
in the context of the Land Question in Zimbabwe it should have been appropri-
ate to aim for a ritual of reconciliation. The SVC just announced the gift to the 
neighbouring communities without any formal announcement or regard for 
etiquette and symbolism, or any other communicative expression of reconcilia-
tion. For instance, the SVC had never asked what kind of gift the communities 
would like. It had a gift in mind, not so much to satisfy the wishes of the recipi-
ent as to gratify its own wishes, expressed primarily in its expectations of a 
fitting return gift, namely respect for its boundaries and, by implication, no 
poaching. These expectations for a return gift were not based on a thorough 
knowledge, obtained for instance through systematic research into the subject, 
of why people from the communities actually poach. They assumed, probably 
without explicitly problematising or researching the matter, that preventing 
poaching would primarily be a matter of tangible compensation. A rational 
choice approach: if you give them more than they receive from poaching they 
will stop poaching. It was only a matter of calculation, enumeration and 
substraction. But the communities probably never saw the gift of the SVC as 
(over-)compensating them for not poaching in the first place. It seems as if the 
gift was given in view of eliciting a return gift from the communities, rather 
than with the idea of making the recipient happy. The paradox is that the return 
gift will not be given if the recipient is not made happy in the first place. Only 
then will the feeling of moral obligation prompt the offer of a return gift. The 
SVC learnt from its experiences and it has ritualised the process to a large 
extent, with appropriate ceremonies and the like. Having made this gesture, the 
communities were prepared to accept the gift by signing the MoU. If they 
accept, the gift will be confirmed in the interpretation of their return gift. But 
the third and last aspect which destroyed the SVC’s hope of being able to 
present an appropriate gift to the communities was the role of the Zimbabwean 
                                                           
1  Compare Murombedzi, J. (1999), Land Expropriation, Communal Tenure and Com-
mon Property Resource Management in Southern Africa. The Common Property 
Resource Digest, 50:1-3. He also concluded that land reform is a prerequisite in 
community-based natural resource management. 
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Government, not only in 1998 but especially in the following years. This third 
aspect relates directly to and activates the first aspect I described. The Zimbab-
wean Government announced an extensive land designation programme in 
November 1997, dished up amid a torrent of political rhetoric. This programme 
cut across all the processes of reciprocal exchange between the SVC and 
neighbouring communities in 1998 and politically legitimised anew the 
complaints of black Zimbabweans towards (mainly) white landowners. It was 
precisely in the immediate aftermath of the land designation programme that I 
did my fieldwork in Zimbabwe. No wonder that I have been able to present so 
many cases of disputes between the SVC and its neighbouring communities 
over land. If the communities ever had a strategic opportunity and were to find a 
willing ear to their claims, it would be in this political context. The downside of 
it all is that it could be argued that the Zimbabwean Government launched the 
programme to stir up old resentments and used it to mask its own incompetence 
in running the country in an economically successful way and for not having 
dealt with the Land Question earlier. If the Zimbabwean Government had 
calculated the costs of the implementation of the programme, it would have 
seen that it would never be able to finance such a scheme, not even with 
generous funding from the international community. It lifted the lid off the 
Pandora’s box and its political strategy raised many expectations and generated 
a stream of broken dreams and promises. The consequences of this political 
manoeuvring were felt on the ground in and around the SVC, as it was the spark 
which triggered a process of negative reciprocity between the SVC and the 
communities, explained in everyday detail in many of the cases presented in the 
previous chapter. Because of these three neglected aspects, the gift of the SVC 
was not properly received in the first place and, as a consequence, not whole-
heartedly accepted by the communities. In the political context of 1998, it was 
judged in terms of the level of compensation for the underlying, over-ruling 
issue, dividing black and white and uniting each side for different reasons: land. 
And on the issue of land, only negative reciprocity remains, although the system 
of reciprocities can, at the same time, also contain elements of positive 
reciprocity. Affect and effect occur simultaneously.  
 In the light of the previous two answers, the third question to be answered is 
whether the communities presented the SVC with a fitting return gift. The 
simplest answer to this question would be ‘no’, at least not in the sense that the 
SVC had anticipated and hoped for, that is respect for the boundaries and no 
poaching in combination with political legitimation at a national level. This is 
not taken lightly within the SVC. It cannot understand that its gift has only been 
partly accepted, but that the communities and their leaders, some of them also 
participating in the SVCT (!), are simultaneously hoping for and working 
towards their designation. In reciprocal terms, the SVC feels rejected and 
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considers the communities ungrateful for the offer and gift of the Trust. So in 
that sense, the gift has perhaps alienated the SVC and neighbouring communi-
ties even more, a feeling reinforced by the formal and ritualised character of 
their interaction through the Trust, Joint Committee and Working Committee, 
which hardly leaves any room for affect, but plenty for effect in the relationship 
between them. 
 The presentation of the different cases has shown quite plainly what has 
been reciprocated between the SVC and the SVCT or the neighbouring commu-
nities. This covers a whole range of things but foremost intangibles. In terms of 
tangible things, it has to be concluded that there is not so much of an exchange 
going on but more a one-sided giving on the part of the SVC and individual 
landowners for which nothing tangible is received in return from the communi-
ties. Nor are they in a position to repay the gifts in kind because of their weak 
economic position, but they are also not expected to repay in a material way. 
They are expected to repay the gift by respecting the boundary of the property 
and abstaining from poaching. After the answers given by the minister to 
questions raised in parliament and the publication of the land designation 
programme, they are also expected to legitimise the existence of the SVC politi-
cally. So there is material giving on the side of the SVC and the landowners for 
which an immaterial gift is expected in return. The problem with this kind of 
exchange is that it has the odour of a buying-off operation especially when 
contextualised by the power relations between black and white in Zimbabwe. 
This is a premature and over-hasty rejection of this form of exchange with an 
over-abundance of moral judgement. It is clear that in 1998 the two exchange 
partners were very much out of balance both in terms of economic possibilities 
and political goodwill. Both could be satisfied by something the other has. From 
this perspective, to institutionalise such a form of exchange in the form of 
organisational co-operation would create a win-win situation. This would 
probably be the answer given by the rational choice type of approach, which is 
also basically the approach the SVC has taken towards the surrounding commu-
nities. But that leaves out the crucial importance of the broader historical and 
social context of black and white relations in southern Africa related to land. It 
is the context that sheds light on the question of why the rational choice option 
is not considered a true choice for the surrounding communities. The context of 
black and white identity construction in southern Africa, related to the Land 
Question in Zimbabwe, that is, its unequal distribution and according power 
relations, means that the surrounding communities perceive and (e)valuate 
every gift only as insufficient compensation for their loss of land. A gift might 
be accepted, but not in terms of creating a (moral) obligation to repay. The 
situation from November 1997 onwards heightened this perception and aggra-
vated the entrenched suspicion aroused by the gift of the SVC (that is, the 
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SVCT) because the political rhetoric once more awakened or provided an 
opportunity to express the sentiments and antagonisms between black and white 
on this issue and to settle the power score through the reciprocal mechanism 
once and for all. Because black Africans perceive land as inalienably theirs, 
they will perceive every gift in terms of (inadequate) compensation. Only if the 
land itself is part of the exchange are they interested, as I have shown in the 
Matsai case of the seventy-two families on Angus who would have agreed to 
accept that piece of land but were stymied by Agritex, which stopped the deal 
after the bigger opportunity of land designation of the whole property presented 
itself. The one example of a neat give-and-take decision process on the exact 
location of the fence, the Nyangambe case, was only made possible because of 
its specific context and situationality as a sparsely populated resettlement 
scheme and a progressive American landowner. These exceptions aside, it is 
clear that land is usually excluded from exchange between black and white in 
Zimbabwe. What is mostly exchanged between the SVC and the SVCT and the 
surrounding communities is intangible: suggestions, mutual expectations, 
intentions, promises, participation in organisational structures, oral exchanges in 
meetings, ideas, and organisational rituals. Many of the intangible exchanges 
are hardly ever operationalised, nor do they have a follow-up in material 
exchanges. 
 A key symbolic role in the reciprocal process between the SVC and its 
neighbouring communities is played by the fence in relation to buffalo. The 
fence can be characterised as paradoxical in different ways, in the first place in 
terms of economic profit and neighbourly relations. In order to maximise the 
scheme of wildlife utilisation, the SVC has to offer safari hunting and to offer 
safari hunting it needs the Big Five, in particular the buffalo as the most impor-
tant trophy animal. To keep these animals in, it needs a buffalo fence for veteri-
nary reasons. So, to maximise the conservancy operation economically, it 
cannot avoid erecting a huge fence. Economic profitability is a sine qua non for 
economic neighbourly relations. Only then will the SVC be able to invest in and 
undertake something with and for the communities. But in terms of social 
neighbourly relations the fence is an insurmountable physical and symbolic 
obstacle because it puts the disputed signature of the white owner and his social 
identity on the land. In that sense, the fence is a symbol of the paradox of 
economic rationality and social consciousness. Another paradox that the fence 
signified in 1998 was that of the economic power yet political powerlessness of 
the white landowners. It was erected on the basis of economic power but has 
been disputed and vandalised ever since by politically powerful but economi-
cally weak communities. Economic power does not constitute a sufficient 
deterrent to prevent or fight it. A broken fence is a symbol of economic power 
coupled with political powerlessness. A third and final paradox the fence 
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represents is that of being a barrier to positive reciprocal exchange and a 
straightforward issue to usher in a negative reciprocal exchange. Yet at the same 
time the fence has the potential to become a reason for positive reciprocal 
exchange in terms of negotiating its location as we have seen with the 
Nyangambe fence location. This option of communication has not been tested 
elsewhere in the SVC where the communities have been confronted with the 
erection of the fence out of the blue, with their protests seen as an inevitable 
consequence. 
 As can be judged from the cases presented in this book, the reciprocal 
relationship between the SVC and the communities is a mixture of strategic 
considerations and affective relations, although the strategic relations dominated 
the scene in 1998, strengthened by the evolving national political context on 
land, which has revived many old sentiments about the unequal distribution of 
land in Zimbabwe. Strategic relations, as in balanced and negative reciprocity, 
can be easily recognised in the cases presented in this chapter. Far less obvious 
are the more affective aspects of the relationship, which paradoxically and even 
ironically have to do with the attachment to the land of both white and black. 
Both want to conserve the land for their own reasons of social identity. Whites 
identify with the landscape and blacks with the soil to which they belong and 
from which they have sprung. Both are caught up with the other in an endless 
struggle of negative reciprocal exchange over land. This could only have been 
ended and turned into a positive exchange if a major ‘land gesture’ had been 
made after Independence by the white landowners as an act of reconciliation. 
This would probably have fulfilled the whites’ reciprocal obligation towards 
Mugabe’s gift of reconciliation to them in 1980 in the first place. It could also 
have provided a fitting answer for all black Zimbabweans to their constant 
contestation of black and white power relations over land ever since the whites 
entered the territory at the end of the nineteenth century.   
 With the risk of touching upon an extremely politicised discussion at this 
particular moment in Zimbabwe’s political development (but I am probably in 
the middle of it anyway) I would like to end this book by drawing attention to 
this theme of reconciliation. Reconciliation has been an important theme in 
Zimbabwe. When Mugabe came to power at Independence in 1980, he said in 
his first public speech: ‘Surely this is now the time to beat our swords into 
ploughshares so we can attend to the problems of developing our economy and 
our society…I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new 
pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new 
amity, and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and 
regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we 
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reinvigorate our economic machinery…And that could be achieved only by a 
policy of national reconciliation.’2 Of course one can hardly read this without a 
sense of irony in the light of recent developments. Nevertheless, one could also 
interpret this plea for reconciliation within the framework of an ongoing 
reciprocal relation between black and white in Zimbabwe. One could argue that 
the national policy of reconciliation was a gesture from the victors of the 
struggle for independence to the losers that they were willing to work together 
with the whites for a common Zimbabwe. Black Zimbabweans offered 
reconciliation after a history of black and white relations in which the whites 
had taken the best land for themselves for more than 80 years and left the 
Zimbabweans with only the marginal land. Offering reconciliation after so 
many years of repression and economic exploitation cannot be interpreted as a 
strategic move only. It also requires definite moral fibre to dare to offer such a 
gift after so much humiliation. It was an attempt to cross the boundary from 
negative to balanced reciprocity. Instead of repaying in negative reciprocity, 
Mugabe at least tried to find a door to a more positive form of reciprocity 
between black and white, alongside, for instance, ruthlessly slamming doors in 
the faces of fellow Zimbabweans in Matabeleland at the same time. (Interaction 
processes are obviously never ‘either-or’, always the paradoxical ‘and-and’ at 
the same time.) Reconciliation seems to be a door through which one can go 
from a state of negative reciprocity to a state of balanced reciprocity. Mugabe’s 
speech was a way towards balanced reciprocity and a definite break with past 
reciprocal exchanges, but it was also a gift requiring a return gift. When the gift 
of reconciliation was given straight away after the struggle for independence, 
which was to a large extent motivated by the Land Question, its timing also 
indicated that the giver probably expected a certain type of return gift. The giver 
most probably expected a repayment in land. But that did not happen and 
unequal land distribution remained largely intact as described in earlier 
chapters, strange though this may seem, partly because of the restrained policy 
of Mugabe himself. It was certainly not only because the whites were not 
prepared to give up their land, let alone to use it for a return gift. But however 
intermingled and interdependent the configuration between black and white in 
Zimbabwe, the image remains that the gift of reconciliation from Mugabe was 
not repaid in the eyes of the giver. Consequently, all gifts in later years by 
whites to black Zimbabweans were always judged by the latter in the light of 
the earlier absence of an appropriate return gift. Reciprocal relations cannot 
disregard their exchange history. Therefore, the reconciliation preached and 
offered by Mugabe to the whites in 1980 could only really have started if the 
                                                           
2  De Waal 1990: 46 & 54. 
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return gift had been in land. I am not saying that a major gesture in land would 
have prevented all that is now happening in Zimbabwe or, at the level of the 
SVC and SVCT, that a gift of land would have solved the fence and related 
poaching problem. Most probably not. Poaching, for instance, is certainly not 
mechanically linked to land claims only. But I am convinced that in all 
scenarios and at all levels of interaction a major levelling effort to correct the 
land asymmetry between black and white would have constituted a necessary 
first step along the road to more positive reciprocal relations. When this did not 
happen, the black communities, triggered and legitimised by Mugabe’s 
government, started to come and collect their imagined return gift themselves. 
Of course many other factors played a role as well: Mugabe fighting for his own 
political survival and using every political and rhetorical trick imaginable to 
hang on to power, the repression of political opposition, the political necessity 
to keep war veterans satisfied, an economic recession (which only worsened 
due to Mugabe’s land policies), international opposition to Mugabe’s land 
redistribution plans etc. Within the context of my conceptual framework it can 
be argued that the deeper structure of the argument is based on a frustrated 
reciprocal relation over land between black and white. No matter how high the 
transactional costs involved, no matter how ineffective or inefficient the 
reaction is economically, the deep-felt injustice and humiliation of a frustrated 
gift will, in the end, always be revenged. In a speech at ZANU-PF headquear-
ters, on 25th October 2000, later broadcast by ZBC news, Mugabe said: ‘The 
national reconciliation policy we adopted in 1980 is threatened, gravely threat-
ened, by the acts of the white settlers in this country and we shall revoke that 
national reconciliation, we shall revoke it’.3 This applies to black Zimbabweans 
in terms of the Land Question in general. Therefore it is far too easy to suggest, 
as the Western press is eager to do when describing the political processes in 
Zimbabwe after February 2000, that it is only Mugabe’s political survival that is 
at stake. There remains a grain of truth in the rhetoric about land. But what also 
has to be noticed in this context is that, with all the scapegoating of whites in 
the Land Question, Mugabe is basically using the same strategies as the whites 
used in earlier years: violence, intimidation, ex post legislation for legalising 
land claims and a deaf ear to protests. Political opposition, the MDC under the 
leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai and consisting mainly of black Zimbabweans 
justly tired of the bad government practices of Mugabe and his ZANU (PF), is 
being crushed4 in the process as are the many black farm labourers on the 
designated (white) commercial farms because ‘Party officials, and war veteran 
                                                           
3  Blair 2002: 186. 
4  Blair 2002: Chapter 5 entitled ‘MDC will be crushed forever’. Italics added. 
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leaders [assume] that farm workers have been tools of the farmers and are 
‘foreigners’, [therefore] it is unlikely that farm workers will be officially 
welcomed onto whatever resettlement schemes result from the invasions’.5 
Mugabe is settling more than one score at the same time.6 This is what is at 
stake at a national level, while at the local level of the SVC a similar frustration 
exists regarding their gift to the communities, which has not, in the eyes of the 
SVC, been appropriately repaid by the recipient. These different levels of 
reciprocal exchange cannot be seen in isolation as shown in the previous 
chapters. Together they result in a complex system of reciprocities as described 
in the case study of the SVC and its joint venture with the neighbouring com-
munities in the Lowveld of Zimbabwe.  
 
 
5  Pp. 250, Rutherford, B. (2001), Working on the Margins. Black Workers,White 
Farmers in Postcolonial Zimbabwe. London: Zed Books and Harare: Weaver Press 
6  Of course one has to be careful in taking these parallels too far, if only because it 
requires further research into how local communities respond to the two forms of 
expropriations and those orchestrating them. 
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